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Abstract 
The 1999 war over Kosovo shaped, and was in turn shaped by, US public spheres. Chapter I 
offers a theoretical and historical account of the importance of publics to US political 
development, especially the founding of an official liberal-republican state-based public 
sphere. Four organisational themes are identified - law, technology, dissent, and foreigners - 
as key normative and practical benchmarks by which we can observe this development and 
extend to the war over Kosovo. Chapter 2 develops ideas about the violence associated with 
the diffusion of public and private through a discussion of the ambivalent role of law in 
legitimating the war. The chapter traces the complex meanings attributed to law during 
processes crucial to defining the official public sphere and the emerging global order as 
evidenced by the war. Chapter 3 suggests that the information technology used to conduct and 
debate the air campaign embodied the socially constituted values of the official public sphere 
and provided a means by which counterpublic spheres could be created. Chapter 4 argues that 
despite the role of technology and NATO's humanitarian claims in limiting public dissent 
anti-Kosovo war activists participated in and constituted counterpublic spheres. These 
alternative, but increasingly marginalised, publics reveal modes and types of publicity not 
captured in liberal and deliberative theoretical accounts. Chapter 5 extends the argument 
about different ways of 'being public' through an analysis of how Serb- and Albanian- 
American immigrants and Kosovo-Albanian refugees were represented in the official public 
domain. Several norms associated with gender, race, and economy appeared to be upheld and 
invigorated via representations of these 'foreigners'. Chapter 6, which is the most explicit in 
drawing Hannah Arendt, addresses endeavours to transpose the public sphere category to an 
emerging global public realm, especially Habermasian efforts to legitimate violent 
intervention. 
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Introduction: 
Publics and Humanitarian War 
Publics are queer creatures. You cannot point to them, count them, or look them in the eye. 
You also cannot avoid them. 
- Michael Warner' 
Although the US Postal Service saw fit to delay the release of a new peace stamp in honour of 
NATO's 50th anniversary, 2 US society seemed on the surface relatively unscathed by the 1999 
bombing campaign over Kosovo. Few citizens are presumed to have heard of Kosovo before 
the war began. However, taking President Bill Clinton's lead by dusting off old maps of 
Eastern Europe and working out where the place actually was, parents and teachers used the 
war as an excuse to catch up on both civics and geopolitics. 3 They would have found, for 
example, that Kosovo is about the same size as the Los Angeles metropolitan area and Kosovo 
and Serbia combined is smaller than Kentucky. 4 
The war over Kosovo shaped and was, in turn, shaped by politics in the United States. 
As a consequence of the military operation there was an imposition of dominant liberal 
political and economic social forms on Kosovo and the surrounding region. But also versions 
of public and private in the United States - immanent to a complex host of norms and 
institutions - were partly remade during this war. There is dialectic between the 'liberal peace' 
in the United States and humanitarian war mediated by discourses of public sphere 
legitimation. 
Public spheres are perhaps the sites of political legitimation in the modem West, and 
the legitimisation of violence in particular. The dissertation seeks to make the link between 
public spheres in the United States and practices of violent intervention apparent by facilitating 
a much-needed conversation between democratic political theorists and International Relations 
(IR) scholars. Likewise, a more comprehensive engagement with the historical-sociology of 
forms of violent humanitarianism in the US context reveals the 'humanitarian' interventions of 
the 1990s, and Kosovo in particular, as being intimately part of, rather than just a sideline to, 
extended historical processes of political and technological change. 
1 Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002), p. 7. 
2 Foreign Desk, 'Peace Stamp Delayed', The New York Times, April 10,1999. 
3 Randal C. Archibold, 'Schools Turn Kosovo Into Civics Lesson', The New York Times, March 27,1999. 
4 Benjamin S. Lambeth, NA TO's Air Warfor Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, 
CA: Rand, 200 1), p. 17. 
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5 NATO's 'humanitarian war' , though occurring in a seemingly different geopolitical 
context to that which the world faces post-September 11, is important. The campaign, which 
began at 1400 EST (1900 GMT) on 24 March and ended 10 June 1999, was at the time after 
Vietnam and the 1990-91 Gulf War the third largest strategic application of air power by the 
United States since World War II, costing more than 3 billion dollars. 6 However, the thesis 
does not as such deal with the background leading up to the wars, both on the ground between 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or the 
diplomatic manoeuvrings prior to the US-led NATO entry. 7 It also does not address how 
disputes over the Kosovo war were resolved in the US public realm (they were not). Rather the 
project addresses how the historical development of public spheres in the United States shaped 
and conditioned how those debates actually occurred; how the subjects of humanitarian 
'assistance' in Kosovo were constituted; how the relevant sites of political community were 
partially determined; and how the meanings of violence over Kosovo were partly produced. If 
public spheres are constituted by our sense of a shared world - where we talk about what we do 
and do not have in common - then the discourses surrounding law, technology, anti-war 
dissent, 'foreigners', and liberal-humanitarian motives during the war over Kosovo are part of 
the complicated fabric and social construction of the republic of the United States. 
Building on the theoretical and historical fi-amework to be established in Chapter One 
there are five themes which illustrate in different ways the central claim of the thesis: how 
important dimensions of NATO's war shaped and were shaped by practices central to the 
historical development of US public spheres. The first theme is the rule of law, a major 
technique for the establishment of public and private; the second is information technology, 
central to the actual conduct and justification for the war itself; the third is practices of anti-war 
dissent, a form of political action extolled in public sphere theory; the fourth theme concerns 
questions about 'foreigners', specifically, immigrants and reftigees, who were represented as 
upholding some of the valued norms of the 'official' Public sphere; and stepping back from the 
5 Though NATO refused to call the military operation a war, I use the term because war is the clash of armed 
forces and this was clearly the case in this instance. Also see Adam Roberts, 'NATO's "Humanitarian War" 
Over Kosovo', Survival, Vol. 41, no. 3 (1999), pp. 102-123. 
6 Lambeth, NATO's Air Warfor Kosovo, pp. x, xx. 
7 For good accounts see Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How MOM and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999); Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of1dentity in Kosovo (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2000); William Joseph Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Michigan: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2000); Tim Judah, Kosovo: War andRevenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
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United States, the final chapter addresses claims concerning an emerging global public sphere 
which has become an important legitimating discourse of 'humanitarian' war. 
Public Sphere Literatures 
The term 'public sphere' is often invoked analytically and normatively to mean many 
things, ranging from public opinion to civil society to all political institutions within and 
sometimes beyond the nation-state. In addition, much of the literature on humanitarian war 
presupposes an understanding of a functioning democratic public sphere in the liberal West, 
especially those pointing to the importance of public opinion for inciting (or constraining) such 
interventions! The form and content of this assumed public, however, has not been rigorously 
explained and analysed. 
It is readily acknowledged that citizens in the West will not support lengthy and costly 
humanitarian wars, even though this 'new military humanism'9 is partly influenced, if not 
driven, by domestic pressures to provide humanitarian relieL But this is where the analysis 
usually ends. We have a steady stream of work on the nature of the conflict out there, on the 
fringes of the so-called 'liberal peace' and on the problems of implementing democracy 'post'- 
conflict. 10 But what kind of politics do we have in the West? Can important dimensions of 
recent 'humanitarian' wars be traced to the modem politics and society of the dominant 
intervening states? What is the role of such warfare in shaping public spheres in the 
intervening states at the core of the international system? 
The political theory literature is more cognisant of the public sphere category, to mean 
6a socially shared organization of experience constitutive of modem societies'. ' 1 However, this 
field of study usually begins with the relatively secure, territorial sovereign state as the relevant 
political community or location of state-society relations. This leaves the primary object of 
explanation in most public sphere theorising at interactions between individuals and groups 
8 Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas G. Weiss, The News Medig Civil War, and Humanitarian Action 
(Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1996). 
9 Noam Chomsky, The New Mililwy Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 
1999). 
See David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (London: Polity, 1999). 
Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age ofthe French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), p. 5. 
3 
within the state. Though there are exceptions, 12 political theory tends to be unmindful of how 
the national body politic is mutually implicated in the international and how modem liberal 
politics is intimately related to justifications for state violence beyond the so-called liberal 
sphere of 'peace'. 
On the other hand, IR theory has often, though usually implicitly, transposed domestic 
models of public space onto an international public realm, from the neo-realist Hobbesian 
account of the anarchic state of nature to liberalism's Kantian democratic peace. 13 In the 
absence of an imposed hierarchy in relations between states, the neo-realist international 
sphere is one of incessant competition and fight for survival. 14 John Rawls's liberal theory of 
justice has been extended to an international 'Society of Peoples' 15 and critical and 
constructivist literatures have theorised a global cosmopolitan public realm of potential 
universal validity. 16 
To date, however, little scholarship exists at the intersection of IR, public sphere 
theory, and the political-sociology of the United States. Given the dependency of recent 
interventions on US military, technological, and ideological power scholars seem to have 
overlooked the significance of US-based publics and how they may shape and define any 
'cosmopolitan' public realm. This omission is perhaps surprising. From the Revolutionary War 
of 1812, warfare has served a pivotal function in consolidating the social, political, and cultural 
dynamics of the 'official' liberal state-public sphere in the United States and, through the 
extension of Western social and political forms, as increasingly practised globally. 17 
Several IR scholars have, indeed, looked to the public sphere of liberal states as a 
causal mechanism to explain an important feature of international politics - the seeming 
absence of war between powerful liberal regimes. 18 In other words, the most popular 
12 See Adun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996) and JOrgen Habermas, 7he Post-National Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001). 
13 Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, no. 4 (1986), 
pp. 1151-1169. 
14 Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 
15 John Rawls, The Laws ofPeople (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
16 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation ofPolitical Community: Ethical Foundations of the post- Westphalian 
Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics 
ofJordan's Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
17 Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America; 1790-1820 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987). John Dewey is the most explicit public sphere theorist to view the state as a 
form of public. See John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1927). 
18 John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997). 
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understanding of the relationship between liberal publics, democracy, and war is the notion of 
a liberal democratic peace. Powerful norms of peaceful conflict resolution within liberal- 
democratic states are thought to be crucial features contributing to peaceful relations with other 
liberals. 19 The 'logic' of economic interdependence and the pacifying effects of trade are also 
marshalled to explain a seemingly important transformation of international relations - the end 
of war - between powerful liberal regimes? 
o 
If the assumed peacefulness of liberal states, certainly towards one another, is a key 
feature of most of the mainstream in IF, this is also mirrored in much contemporary political 
theory. 'Glorification of militarism strikes directly at certain liberal values', Nancy 
Rosemblum argues. Tiberalism stands for, among other things, security of expectations, 
civilianism, and peace'. 21 With basic juridical respect for the civil and political rights of 
individuals, free and fair elections, few restrictions on the freedom of speech and certain 
(though not complete) rights of protest and dissent, the spread of liberal and democratic 
institutions and norms are assumed to enable mutual recognition and the easing of hostilities. 22 
In general, however, the liberal peace literature has tended to offer an impoverished 
account of what is 'liberal' and certainly what is 'democratic' about contemporary Western 
societies, often simply assuming a liberal 'state is a state is a state' across time. 23 Liberalism 
and democracy are often treated as synonymous; the only appropriate political unit being the 
territorial state. There is little dispute over the meaning and desirability of liberal democracy, 
and therefore the nature and form of the public spheres where such democratic practices are 
assumed to take place. Indeed, the quintessentially narrow social scientific methods through 
which the causal mechanisms of the liberal peace have been investigated replicate the legalist 
paradigm, discussed in Chapter Two, of the liberal tradition itself. 
Whether this narrow focus on the governing institutions of 'democracy' within liberal 
states is the only appropriate nexus for developing the relationship between publics, 
19 Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Parts I and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Part I, Vol. 12, no. 3 (1983), pp. 205-35, Part 2, Vol. 12, no. 4 (1983), pp. 323-53. 
20 Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism', Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, andSocialism (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1997), pp. 205-311. 
21 Nancy L. Rosenblum, Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction ofLiberal 7hought 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 9. 
22 Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies Do Not Go To War With 
Each Other', Review ofInternational Studies, Vol. 20, no. 3 (1994), pp. 207-223. 
2' For a critique of the liberal peace literature along these lines see Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, (eds. ) 
Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2001). 
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democracy, and war is questionable. First, the literature has tended to reinforce the very 
assumption that liberal states are inherently 'peaceful' and meaningfully 'democratic' which is 
productive of a dynamic in which liberal violence has paradoxically seemed easier to publicly 
defend. The reputation for humanitarianism and democratic peacefulness NATO enacted 
during Kosovo, for example, sheds much light on, and helps to justify in some quarters, the 
continuing endeavour to legitimate US wars in the post-September II world? 4 
Second, and more importantly for the thesis, by combining some of the most interesting 
democratic theory with a critical view of liberal war, rather than liberal peace, we can make 
more explicit the link between public spheres and violence as well as offer a thicker 
description of how social relations in liberal states shape and are shaped by contemporary 
wars. CK Doreski's study of the black independent press in the United States, for example, is 
organised around black America's claims to the public sphere via their multiple responses to 
major twentieth-century wars. 25 
Moreover, the assumption of peacefulness is partly achieved through domestic cultural 
narratives of 'America's' role in the world. As Alan Nadel writes, 
Tbroughout the post-World War 11 era, democracy has been the name we have given to 
a narrative of American global politics. Recounted as it was on the pages of Time and 
Newsweek and on national television networks, the narrative called democracy placed 
Americans in the roles of reader and viewer of a series of adventures, in which the 
heroes and villains were clear, the desirable outcome known, and the undesirable 
outcomes contextualized as episodes in a larger narrative that promised a happy 
ending. 26 
By shifting the focus from liberal peace to war we can otherwise consider in a critical- 
historical fashion how the 'global' has contributed to the constitution of US society, including 
economic, gender and race relations. 
The critical theoretical literature has rightly been accused, however, of mythologising 
aspects of political history, including the existence of public spheres, to produce an idealised 
picture of the past. 27 Examples include Hannah Arendt's Ancient Greek polis, Jargen 
24 'Afghanistan is the latest example of not only a just war but a humanitarian war'. Nicholas D. Kristof, 'The 
End of an Uncivil War', The New York Times, June 11,2002. 
25 C. K. Doreski, Writing America Black: Race Rhetoric in the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
26 Alan Nadel, 'Failed Cultural Narratives: America in the Postwar Era and the story of Democracy', in Donald 
Pease (ed. ) National Identities and Post-Americanist Narratives (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 
pp. 96-7. 
27 Moishe Postone, 'Political Theory and Historical Analysis', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public 
Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 165-77. 
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Habermas's 18th Century bourgeois public realm, and John Dewey's small town meetings of 
American folklore. 28 Habermas, in particular, has been criticised for his attempt in Yhe 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere to generalise principles established in the 
context of 180' century Britain and France to an idealised public realm of potential universal 
validity. 29 
In his analysis, the originary public sphere was first and foremost a 'category of 
bourgeois society', as the subtitle of Habermas's work implies. This was the case not simply 
because its participants happened to be bourgeois but because one of the central political 
functions of the public sphere was its role in forming the bourgeoisie's consciousness of itself 
as a 'society'. Criticisms and developments of Habermas's seminal work are addressed 
throughout the thesis. Despite the inaccuracies of Habermas's reading of history (and mine for 
that matter) it is important to trace the emergence of US publics and various modes of publicity 
in as much historical detail as possible. 
The conditions of possibility for public spheres to shape and be shaped by war must be 
understood not only in terms of social and political theory, but also empirically and 
historically. Thus an important objective of the investigation is to account for and navigate 
between two views of the public sphere: as a normative construct associated with democratic 
theory and as a sociological description of social relations in the United States historically and 
during the bombing campaign. Indeed, much of the sociological account of the importance of 
publics to modernity in the United States is used to critique the claims to general validity of 
normative models of the public sphere. 
Empirical and historical analysis, however, ought also to contribute to critical political 
and social theory. Looking into the history of public spheres as a cultural form, Lloyd Kramer 
suggests, for example, helps us revise 'our categories of historical interpretation. 30 Not only 
can this shed new light on the history and theory of contemporary wars, in doing so we can 
respond to the conservative challenge articulated by Walter Lippmann that there is no, or ever 
28 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Jargen Habermas, 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [1962] 1991). 
29 Lloyd Kramer, 'Habermas, History, and Critical Theory', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public 
Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 236-258. 
30 Kramer, 'Habermas, History, and Critical Theory', p. 238. Nancy Fraser has pointed to the need for a 
'revisionist historiography of the public sphere'. Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to 
the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in Bruce Robbins (ed. ) The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 14. 
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has been, an engaged 'public sphere' as a check on power; this notion, Lippmann argued, is a 
mere 'phantom'. 31 Bruce Robbins has rightly suggested, however, that, 
Without this discursive weapon [of the public sphere] we seem to enter such struggles 
inadequately armed. If the phrase 'phantom public' still has some power to startle and 
discontent, if there is some reluctance to see the public melt conclusively into air, the 
cause may not be vestigial piety so much as the fear that we cannot do without it. 32 
The aim of the historical analysis is to trace the public sphere modalities manifest during the 
Kosovo war 'in order', borrowing Arendt's words, 'to arrive at an understanding of the nature 
33 
of society as it has developed and presented itself. There is no other place from which to 
criticise. 
The thesis, then, is directed toward a 'war and society' approach. The general aim is to 
historically and critically account for the way in which the societies engaged in war shape and 
condition the use of force as well as the way these societies are also partly remade through this 
process. 34 The military dimensions of past colonisation directly effected the social and political 
organisation of the colonial powers. 35 Similarly, the conduct of militarised 'humanitarianism' 
more recently has shaped, and in turn been shaped by, democracy in the liberal West. Using 
the politics of the Kosovo war as an example, the thesis looks at US public spheres at war and 
how they can, in part, be produced through war. 
Depicting the war over Kosovo as something fundamentally shaped by US-based 
publics risks the charge of ignoring the force of internationally grounded humanitarian 
'norms'. 36 For one thing, the military operation occurred under the auspices of a multi-national 
military alliance. However, the United States provided over seventy per cent of the air sorties 
deployed as well as almost the entire infrastructure of surveillance and location systems upon 
which the European allies depended but had no direct access. Every operation that involved US 
assets was controlled via EUCOM, the United States European Command. While European 
31 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Macmillan, 1927). 
32 Bruce Robbins, 'Introduction: The Public as Phantom', in Bruce Robbins (ed. ) The Phantom Public Sphere 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. x. 
33 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 6. 
34 For a statement of this general approach see Geoffrey Best, 'Editors Preface', in Brian Bond, War and Society 
in Europe: 1870-1970 (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998), pp. v-x. 
35 Tarak Barkawi, 'War Inside the Free World: The Democratic Peace and the Cold War in the Third World', in 
Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds. ) Democracy, Liberalism, and War. Rethinking the Democratic Peace 
Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 107-128. 
36 Martha Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed. ) 7he 
Culture ofNational Security Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), pp. 153-85. 
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unmanned aerial vehicles conducted battle damage assessments and detected emerging targets, 
it was US Army Hunter, Navy Pioneer, and Air Force Predator's that conducted the most 
crucial reconnaissance operations. 37 More importantly, Congressional (and almost all other 
forms of) debate in the United States occurred, in the words of Sabrina Ramet, 'as if it had not 
been a Nato operation, or even there were no Nato'. 38 
What of the overly detennined character of the war? After all, 'Kosovo 1999' has 
variously been dubbed an intervention to shore-up NATO credibility; 39 a desire to complete 
tasks crucial to the success of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia; 40 a product of 
Clinton's desire to fabricate a distraction from 'Monica-gate'; 41 and perhaps a genuine wish on 
the part of Western governments to 'save' (some) Kosovo-Albanians from extreme Serb- 
nationalist terror. Some (or none) of these stories may be right. None are incompatible with the 
approach of the thesis. 
Embedded within the political and technological structures of US culture, NATO 
violence and US public responses to it were shaped by the distinguishing mode of US politics 
and its associated practices of dissent, dominant modes of media representation, prevailing 
attitudes towards technology, immigration, and law, and more widely its role in the post-Cold 
War world. The thesis as a whole hopes to show how the public sphere concept can provide an 
explanatory framework for understanding how we got to where we were when NATO started 
bombing. However, before addressing some of the methodological issues and offering a more 
detailed overview of the thesis argument it is important to clarify the way in which 'publics' 
are conceptualised in the project. 
Conceptualising Publics 
'Public spheres' are most straightforwardly understood as the places in which people 
talk or read about their common affairs. They are self-organised entities, existing to the extent 
37 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons andNon-Lessons ofthe Air andMissile Campaign in Kosovo (London: 
Praeger, 2001). 
38 Sabrina P. Ramet, The USA: To War in Europe Again, in Anthony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds. ) The 
Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe? (London: Pearson Education, 200 1), p. 178. 
39 Peter Gowan, 'The Euro-Atlantic Origins of NATO's Attack on Yugoslavia', in Tariq Ali (ed. ) Masters ofthe 
Universe: NATO's Balkan Crusade (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 345. 
40 Marianne Hanson, 'Warnings from Bosnia: The Dayton Agreement and the Implementation of Human 
Rights', in Ken Booth (ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy., 77ie Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 200 1), 
pp. 87-104. 
41 Mona Charen, 'Why We are in Kosovo', Jewish World Review, April 19,1999. See 
htlp: //www. iewishworldreview. com/cols/charen04l999. aM [downloaded on October 9,2002]. 
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that those comprising the public are being addressed. A 'sphere' implies a position, place, or 
realm. We might also view it as a particular field of activity, assumptions concerning what 
constitutes either a public or private matter being the most common and contentioUSý 2 Thus 
public spheres can be conceived as either 'topographical locations' or political 'sites 43 
(including digital ones44) for organising relations among strangers. 
That being in public is to be related to strangers is important. Individuals in public are 
ostensibly connected by nothing more than by virtue of being there and being addressed, 
unlike communities of nations, tribes, or families. 'A res publica', according to Richard 
Sennett, 'stands in general for those bonds of association and mutual commitment which exist 
between people who are not joined together by ties of family or intimate association; it is the 
bond of a crowd, of a "people", of a polity'. 45This feature is often seen as the most libratory 
dimension of acting and speaking in public, rather than, say, in a 'community' with its 
suggestion of boundedness and homogeneityý6 
Hannah Arendt has argued, for example, that it is within public spheres where we most 
fully disclose and actualise who we are as citizens, rather than, say, through the activity of 
simply voting or engaging in private pursuits. 47 Though there is more diversity and struggle in 
the 'domestic' sphere than often assumed, including by Arendt, the private domain is not and 
should not in principle be always open to all. Because humans reveal their distinctiveness 
through speech and action, it is partly through encountering the diversity of speakers and 
actors in public, a space in theory at least open to all, that we discover perhaps the fullest 
extent of both human plurality and individuality. In Arendt's words, 
Action, the only condition that goes on directly between men without the intermediary 
of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that 
men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human 
condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the 
condition ... of all political life. 
48 
42 Jeff Weintraub and Kristin Kumar (eds. ) Puhlic and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a 
Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997). 
43 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self- Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), p. 93. 
44 Anthony G. Wilhelm, Democracy in the Digital, 4ge: Challenges to Political Life in Cyberspace (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
45 Richard Sennett, The Fall ofPublic Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 34. 
46 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 97. 
47 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 22-78. 
48Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 7. 
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Within a 'common space of appearances', of words and deeds, political action is constituted as 
a realm of human inter-action in a public space, where citizens act through speech and suasion. 
As Nancy Fraser suggests, 'public spheres are not only the arenas for the formation of 
discursive opinion; in addition they are the arenas for the formation and enactment of social 
identities'. 49 
All public sphere analyses contain within them the tension inherent in attempting to 
reconcile (at least) two notions and it is important to clarify how this functions in the thesis. 
First, there is the notion of a compact and imposing idea of a single public - indicated by the 
public realm as the valorised amphitheatre of always already occurring political struggle. In 
this sense, as Warner describes, the 'public is a kind of social totality. Its most common sense 
is that of the people in general . 
50 Throughout the thesis, the term 'public', as opposed to 
'publics', is often analysed with reference to US government wartime efforts to constitute a 
single 'official' or 'mainstream' public sphere within the confines of the national territorial 
state. 
This notion of the 'public' as homogenous and unified is not privileged in the analysis, 
however, as it exists only as an image, or indeed a 'phantom'. Bob Jessop makes a similar 
point with reference to modem territorial states. In his words, 'There is never a fixed point 
when the state is finally built within a given territory and thereafter operates, so to speak, on 
51 automatic pilot according to its own definite, fixed and inevitable laws'. In other words, the 
public does not exist; however, those who invoke it are also those most likely to try to speak in 
its name. 
When President Clinton, for example, made reference to the will of the 'American 
people' during the bombing campaign he evoked the image of otherwise unrelated persons 
who are constituted as a public through their participation, to the extent that they are being 
addressed, in the national discourse about Kosovo. 52 The notion of a unitary, empirically 
49 Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', p. 16. 
50 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 65. 
51 Bob Jessop, State Theory. Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1990), p. 9. 
52 Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation, Washington D. C., 24 March 1999 in Heike Krieger (ed. ) The Kosovo 
Conflict in International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999 Vol. 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 415-6. 
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extant, public at large is symbolic of a modem desire on the part of nation-states (and political 
leaders) to produce, as Lauren Berlant suggests, a 'mass political experience'. 53 
Even though the notion of 'the' public is a mere image the effort to constitute a unitary 
public nonetheless has material effects. In the words of Rosalyn Deutsche, 'Categories like 
"the public" can, of course, be construed as naturally or fundamentally coherent only by 
disavowing the conflicts, particularity, heterogeneity, and uncertainty that constitute social 
life'. 54 This can be seen in attempts to solve the immigration 'problem, which is also 
unavoidably a question of public space. Efforts to represent an image of the public coinciding 
with (fantasy) norms about the 'American Way of Life 55 shaped the treatment of Serb- and 
Albanian-American immigrants and Kosovo-Albanian refugees during the war. 
In contrast to the unitary image in public sphere theory and practice, there is another 
sense, then, in which the public sphere is composed of diverse, decentred publics that appear 
and disappear with different issues and agendas featuring from time to time more intensely 
than others. With Craig Calhoun, 'we should understand the public sphere to be a sphere of 
publics'. 56 Theorists have variously termed these 'subaltern counterpubliCS, 57 or simply 
'counterpublics' to refer to the alternative discursive arenas where individuals subordinated in 
and by the discourses of 'the' official public sphere may originate and express divergent 
identities and interests. 'There is no necessary conflict between the public sphere and the idea 
of multiple publics... ' suggests Warner, 'some publics are defined with their tension to a larger 
public'. 58 
The extent to which members of these publics are 'subaltern' prior to their participation 
in counterpublic activity varies. 59 Anti-war activists, for example, are not necessarily 
subordinated prior to their self-organisation into a public in defiance of any given war in the 
way that some women, African-Americans, and gay and lesbian communities might be. The 
thesis deals with some of these conceptual and empirical tensions in public sphere analysis by 
53 Lauren Berlant, The Queen ofAmerica Goes to Washington City. Essays on Sex and Citizenship (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 177. 
54 Rosalyn Deutsche, Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 259. 
55 Berlant, The Queen ofAmerica, p. 179. 
56 Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and the Public Sphere', in Jeff Weintraub and Kristin Kumar (eds. ) Public and 
Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1997), p. 100. 
57 Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', p. 14. 
58 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 56. 
5" Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 57. 
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addressing an archetypal occasion in which 'the' public in general and political activity par 
excellence often appear to have parted company - at times of war and anti-war dissent. 
The existence of multiple public spheres in the United States must not be taken for 
granted; public spheres are in large part produced through essentially precarious social 
processes and practices incorporating class, gender, and race. Public spheres can be sites of 
dialogic (or even better multi-'logic') dispute among multiple and diverse, but also usually 
unequal, communities. Robbins suggests, for example, that it is possible to move 'away from 
the universalizing ideal of a single public and... [attend] instead to the actual multiplicity of 
distinct and overlapping public discourses, public spheres, and scenes of evaluation that 
already exist, but that the usual idealizations have screened from view'. 60 
That said, even though modem political societies, especially since the emergence of 
print media, are always in some way connected to publics, they are also always much more 
than their organisation into publics. Although originally expounded by Habermas as a 
bourgeois concept, public sphere critique cannot exclude analysis of the class, gender, and race 
dynamics at play in the very founding and practices of publics. Oscar Negt and Alexander 
Kluge suggest that there is a grave risk that 'the form in which the public sphere manifests 
itself conceals the actual social structure of production and, above all, the history of the 
development of its institutions'. 61 The consequences of these often hidden biases in public 
sphere discourses are introduced in Chapter One and discussed further in Chapter Five. 
Modem US society is not entirely constituted in and through the creation and 
maintenance of public spheres. Where it is common to define societies through their 
organisation into a state it is quite standard for scholars to avoid explicit reference to public 
spheres entirely. Despite the multiple reasons for adopting public spheres as a unit of analysis, 
the thesis does not suggest that the war over Kosovo can wholly be explained in these terms. 
Public spheres nonetheless are an important field of vision alongside which to explore the 
nexus between modem society and war. 
Different locations and fields of activity are public in different times and places; they 
are constituted through a variety of media (print, electronic, and face-to-face encounters); and 
there are various modes in which one can participate in public discourse and action. For the 
60 Robbins, 'Introduction', p. xii. 
61 Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis ofthe Bourgeois and 
Proletarian Public Sphere (forward by Miriam Hansen, translated by Peter Labanyi, Jamie Owen Daniel and 
Assenka Oksiloff) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1972], 1993), p. I. 
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purposes of clarity we may separate these into liberal (legalist), deliberative (communicative), 
and performative (agonistic). 
In general, the liberal mode of public address conceives a unitary rational subject 
expressing interests, which are then legally adjudicated by the state. 62 Laws are generally 
conceived as an expression of the public will derived from reason and the most effective mode 
of public address is via these constitutional (regulated) mechanisms. Only episodically and in 
extremis is the liberal public subject compelled to use extra-legal means of public speech and 
action. 
The 'deliberative' mode of publicity, most closely associated with Habermas, signifies 
engaging in rational-critical dialogue aimed at achieving consensus. 63 The liberal notion of 
rational-critical subjects expressing interests is accepted. But in contrast to the liberal model, 
where competition for public power occurs in an almost market competition between rational 
interests, the deliberative approach posits that political legitimacy derives only from the 
communicative presuppositions of the debate. The 'better' (most legitimate) argument will 
produce consensus in public only if the procedures are fair; practical discourse will then, it is 
assumed, respect the norms of universal moral respect and reciprocity. 
Where liberal politics is about adjudicating between justly and efficiently competing 
interests, and deliberative democrats want this process to be thoroughly and freely debated by 
all concerned, the 'performative' model inaugurates a conception of public space and mode of 
being public that, in Sheldon Wolin's words, is 'something other than a form of government'. 64 
The performative or agonistic mode rejects both the liberal and deliberative 
assumptions that public subjectivity exists prior to its performance in public, as well as 
pointing to other non-rational and non-deliberative kinds of public address. The human self 
does not exist in the singular sense of a transcendental ego, but is produced through the 
manifestation of multiple historically contingent human drives and only actualises itself in 
action. 65 There are also diverse rhetorical and stylistic norms of publicity that the liberal and 
62 See Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings (edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [1970] 1991); John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1971). 
63 JUrgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (translated by lbomas McCarthy) (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1984). 
64 Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Fugitive Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed. ) Democracy andDifference: Contesting the 
Boundaries of1he Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 43. 
65 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy ofMorals (translated by Francis Golffing) 
(London: Anchor Books, [1887], 1956), p. 179 (section 13). 
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deliberative accounts overlook. Awareness of these alternative modes of public address 
suggests some of the public spheres constituted by anti-Kosovo war activists, for example, 
were unstable and performative rather than rational or deliberative. 
As the empirical and historical investigations of the thesis will suggest, each mode of 
being public - which individually privilege certain topics and certain speakers in different ways 
- has made its appearance and constituted publics in the United States since the founding of the 
republic. Moreover, the thesis hopes to point to the importance of thinking about the public 
sphere category as partly a transnational form - not solely a classic form of bourgeois 
representation but also productive of an imaginary in which war is partly framed. Many of the 
important norms and modes of being public constituting the multiple public spheres in the 
United States were sustained, revitalised, and sometimes challenged during NATO's 1999 
bombing campaign. 
If little else, one thing that unites public sphere theorists is a certitude concerning the 
existence of a specifically public sphere as a source of democratic legitimacy, even though 
they may disagree on the appropriate mode of public address and the positioning and fluidity 
of its relation to the private. But other social critics have commented on the demise of the 
public-private dichotomy, as well as the notion of any meaningful public sphere activity in 
modem bureaucratised states. 66 For Homi Bhabha, 
cultural homogeneity, or the nation's horizontal space [cannot] be authoritatively 
represented within the familiar territory of the public sphere: social causality cannot be 
adequately understood as a deterministic or overdetermined effect of a 'statist' centre; 
nor can the rationality of political choice be divided between the polar realms of the 
private and the public. 67 
To the extent that public and private are conceived as entirely immutable and separate, or 'the' 
public sphere is understood in entirely statist terms, 68 Bhabha's claim is certainly right. But 
these are not assumptions in the thesis. 
There is no objective criterion by which we may judge something as either normatively 
public or private. However, by virtue of their power to create social meaning the sociological 
categories still warrant our attention. 'As long as these concepts retain such resiliency in 
66 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 188-9. 
67 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location ofCulture (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 154. 
6' For an account which treats the public sphere and the state as functionally equivalent see Margaret R. Somers, 
'The Privatization of Citizenship: How to Unthink a Knowledge Culture', in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt 
(eds. ) Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study ofSociely and Culture (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), pp. 121-61. 
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modem Western culture', in the words of Mary P. Ryan, 'their theoretical obituaries are 
premature. Quite independent of their role in policing genders, the terms private and public 
remain charged with value, albeit weighted with varying, contested, and shifting references'. 69 
One feminist strategy, for example, has been to call for the radical reorganisation of the 
exclusionary politics which has led to the ordering of political life along the lines captured in 
the title of Jean Elshtain's book Public Man, Private Woman. 70 This does not necessarily imply 
the destruction of the boundaries between public and private, but a commitment to uncover the 
places where the distinction is falsely naturalised. 
Even if the language and ideologies of publics still resonate, this does not necessarily 
imply that public spheres still effectively exist in modem society in the honorary republican 
sense of fostering a critical stance towards power. Political theory talk of a 'decline' or 'decay' 
of the public realm denotes this very specific lack: the loss of a place for dissent, perhaps the 
most distinct activity of politics. 'Public space has been privatized to such an extent', suggest 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 'that it no longer makes sense to understand social 
organization in terms of the dialectic between public and private spaces, between inside and 
outside. 71 Arendt, Habermas, Dewey, Sennett, Edward Herman and Noam ChOMSky72 all 
view the story of the contemporary public sphere as one of 'decline'. 
In Arendt's quintessential model of mass society, the United States, the founding 
republican spirit of revolution could not be sustained. 73 In contrast to Habermas's bourgeois 
idealisation, Arendt's trepidation derived from the challenge posed by modernity to the 
classical ideal of political freedom in the PoliS. 74 Modernity, for Arendt, had resulted in the 
invasion of the political by matters of technical administration and bureaucracy, the collapse of 
the distinction between public and private and the loss of public freedom, in short, the 
destruction of the public realm. 75 The increasing identification of freedom with the ability to 
69 Mazy P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), pp. 6-7. Also see Nikifer G81e, 'Tlie Gendered Nature of the Public Sphere', Public 
Culture, Vol. 10, no. I (1997), pp. 61 -8 1. 70 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (2ed) (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
71 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. IS S. 
72 See Edward S. Herman and Noarn Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media (with a new introduction by the authors) (New York: Pantheon Books, [199812002), p. xviii. 
73 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, [1963] 1970) and the essays collected in Crisis 
ofthe Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, [ 1969] 1972). 
74 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 22-78. 
75 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 256. 
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accumulate personal wealth and the triumph of the archetypal liberal freedomfrom politics all 
signalled the deformation of the political sphere. 
One effect of the seeming inability of citizens to institutional ise popular small-scale 
structures of direct participation has been the extensive institutionalisation of organised 
political conflict along prescribed, usually representative lines. Civic equality has come to rely 
on the emergence of an independent state that could be a symbol of society as a whole and 'in 
splendid isolation' function through the intermittent balloting of opinion. Seen in this light, 
Arendt's opposition to the Vietnam War and her defence of civil disobedience, discussed in 
Chapter Four, may be linked to more penetrating critiques of the modem state-public sphere 
nexus that stress the inter-relationship between dehumanising bureaucratisation and twentieth 
century violence. Arendt's account, accordingly, is central to evaluating the social conditions 
of anti-war activism in 1999 and beyond. 
Habermas also presented an account of the bourgeois public sphere's rise, 
transformation and, like Arendt, decline, as a historical-sociological prelude to his theory of 
communicative action. Chomsky has pointed to a 'vigorous and outspoken... working class 
and community press that flourished in the U. S. from the early nineteenth century up until the 
76 1930s, when it was finally destroyed by private power'. The influence of historical narratives 
of public sphere decline is discussed in Chapter Four. The consequence of the 'privatisation' of 
liberal politics, including the effect this has had on responses to humanitarian catastrophe, is 
examined in Chapter Five. 
Through a rejection of monolithic conceptions of power the analytical category of the 
public sphere enunciates perhaps more familiar (and hackneyed) concepts often appearing in a 
different guise. In the words of Robbins, 'Unlike "hegemony", the public sphere is less on the 
side of rule, more open to opposing views. Unlike "culture", it is more obviously a site of 
intersections with other classes and cultures... Public sphere invokes "identity", but does so 
with more emphasis on actions and their consequences than on the nature and characteristics of 
the actors'. 77 Variously perceived as a location of political debate (no matter the content); a 
substantive field of politics relating to government and law (and thus not private); or the place 
76 Chomsky, 'Democracy and Education'. Mellon Lecture, Loyola University, Chicago October 19,1994. See 
http: //www. zmag. or%t/chomskv/. The transcript of the lecture states the 1930s, however, in personal 
correspondence Chomsky has argued that the 1950s is a more accurate date to describe when the labour press 
'finally was killed off. 'As late as the 1950s, there were about 800 labor-based newspapers reaching 20-30 
million people weekly'. Personal correspondence with Noam Chomsky. 
77 Robbins, 'Introduction, p. xvii. 
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where opinions are formed and identities partly constituted, public spheres are forms of 
embodied social relationships providing the texture of much of modem social life. 
The Humanitarian Condition 
The use of 'The Humanitarian Condition' as the title for the thesis needs explanation. 
First and foremost, it is a signal of the importance of Hannah Arendt's work, especially her 
1958 book The Human Condition, for the way in which public spheres are conceived in the 
project. In many ways, the theoretical and political inspiration of the thesis derives from 
Arendt. But it is also much less than a transposition of the categories of 'labour', 'work' and 
(action' that Arendt explicated in that book. Although Arendt's distinction between work and 
action will be important to how we conceive potentially global public spheres the thesis only 
traces the capacity for political action in light of the stated aims of the thesis. It therefore falls 
short of what would be necessary for an Arendtian 'theory' of the relationship between publics 
and war (with the United States and Kosovo as the presumed case study). But this is in line 
with Arendt's thinking. She was not concerned with offering a programmatic theory that might 
be 'applied. 78 
Of the theoretical resources to raise questions about public spheres and humanitarian 
war the most obvious and most keenly 'applied', is Habermas's work. Indeed, much of the 
thesis is in critical dialogue with him, as well as Arendt. Not only has Habermas addressed 
military interventions directly, including questions about an emerging global public realm, his 
work is clearly seminal to public sphere theory. Supporting the extension of violent 
cosmopolitan commitments across borders, Habermas defended NATO's bombing campaign 
and has been influential on justifications for 'humanitarian' war based on deliberative legal 
frameworks in international society. 79 Where liberalism has traditionally been presented as 
most closely associated with the ideology of humanitarian violence, 80 the final chapter 
suggests that Habermas's deliberative model also provides it with much theoretical sustenance. 
78 Hannah Arendt, 'On Hannah Arendt', in Melvyn Hill (ed. ) Hannah Arendt: The Recovery ofthe Public World 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 309. 
79 Jargen Habermas, 'Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality', in William 
Joseph Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2000), pp. 306-316; Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
80 Doyle, 'International Intervention', Ways of War and Peace, pp. 389420. 
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Arendt's public sphere theory and reflections on violence are central to making this 
argument. Just as Habermas's earlier 18d' Century bourgeois idealisation of public sphere 
debate, with its dependence on industrial and imperial society, served to enhance class, gender 
and North-South domination, new global public sphere discourses, Arendt helps us to see, 
similarly serve to rationalise violence. Her work is also crucial to understanding US-based 
public spheres, offering a uniquely important resource for tracing their historical development 
to the Kosovo war. The project is not, however, an effort to always remain true to Arendt's 
understanding of the activities (labour, work, and action) she saw as conditioning, but not 
wholly determining, the human world. The human condition is not human nature; it 'never 
conditions us absolutely'. 81 When we act in the public world we 'constantly create' our own 
'self-made conditions'. 82 
In fact, Yhe Human Condition is a somewhat misleading name for Arendt's book given 
its contents and her intentions for the title. Arendt's US English-language publishers suggested 
Yhe Human Condition because the more accurate European title, 'Yhe Vita 4cliva', was 
presumed to be less catchy. Arendt's actual preference was Amor Mundi, love of the world. 
The purpose was to contrast her approach with the distain she thought philosophers had 
traditionally treated the public world of human affairs. 83 Eventually, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl 
would choose For Love ofthe World for the subtitle to Arendt's biography. 
The European title was also more accurate because Ae Human Condition did not deal 
with the other side of the vita activa, the vita contemplativa. The tripartite mental faculties of 
thinking, willing, and judging were discussed in Arendt's final but never-finished work, 7he 
Life of the Mind. 84 Only together might these two books constitute what Arendt broadly 
understood by the historical and conceptual development of the human condition. The final 
chapter of the thesis suggests some of the ways Arendt's dispersed writing on the worldliest of 
the mental faculties, 'judging', making a decision upon which to act, may accord (albeit 
problematically) with existing efforts to theoretically ground a global public sphere. 
81 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 1 1. For a contrasting assumption that both terms 'human condition' and 
'human nature' hold us back see Philip Allott, 'The Future of the Human Past', in Ken Booth (ed. ) Statecraft and 
Security. The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 323. 
82 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 9. 
83 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love ofthe World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 
p. 324. Arendt refused to accept the label philosopher for this reason. Bidding philosophy her 'final farewell' in a 
television interview in 1964 she said her profession was 'political theory'. Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, p. 
327. 
84 Hannah Arendt, The Life ofthe Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1971] 1978). 
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Arendt held a deeply ambivalent view of the concept of humanity and by extension 
justifications for political action that invoked humanitarianism. Often, however, criticisms of 
NATO's own particular invocation of 'humanity' follow the earlier warnings of Carl Schmitt. 
In his words, 
When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the 
sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal 
concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify 
itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress and 
civilization in order to claim these as one's own and to deny the same to the enemy... 
85 humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion. 
Though sympathetic to this critique, the thesis moves to the foreground Arendt's insights, 
which have not to date been sufficiently addressed in the context of humanitarian war. 86 
In an essay originally published in 1945 on the question of collective responsibility for 
Nazism, and at a time when many Germans felt shame at the very thought of being German, 
Arendt acknowledged, rather, a sense of shame at being human. 87 She wrote, 
Our fathers' enchantment with humanity... did not even conceive of the terror of the 
idea of humanity... For the idea of humanity, when purged of all sentimentality, has the 
very serious consequence that in one form or another men must assume responsibility 
for all crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil committed 
by all others... To follow a non-imperialistic policy and maintain a non-racist faith 
becomes daily more difficult because it becomes daily clearer how great a burden 
mankind is for man. 88 
The findings of the thesis, when allied with the critique of liberal and violent public spheres, 
demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Arendt's thinking. There was no humanitarian 
condition of global political action evident during the Kosovo war. The title of the thesis is 
ironic. We are no more ready in contemporary times to acknowledge the awesome 
responsibility implied in taking seriously the idea of humanity. 
When the term 'humanitarian' is used throughout the thesis, then, it is categorically not 
to ventrilloquise, liberal state justifications for violence. It is to make reference to an already 
85 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 54. For a critique 
of NATO drawing on Schmitt see Tarak Barkawi, 'Air Power and the Liberal Politics of War', in Ken Booth 
(ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimension (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 3 10. For a response to 
Schmitt see Jflrgen Habermas, 'Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights', The Post-National 
Constellation. Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 200 1), p. 120. 
86 There has been one earlier effort to do so which is critiqued in Chapter Five. See Anthony Lang, Agency and 
Ethics: The Politics ofMilitary Intervention (New York: State University of New York Press, 200 1). 
87 Hannah Arendt, 'Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility', Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954 (edited 
by Jerome Kohn) (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994), p. 13 1. 
88 Arendt, 'Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility', p. 13 1. 
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established discourse in the academy, liberal state policy-making circles, and most importantly 
in public citizen debate. The intervention in Kosovo, as with Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia 
(1992), and Bosnia (1995), warrants this discrete categorisation because the 'humanitarian' 
justificatory framework took almost absolute centre-stage and played a crucial role in reducing 
the level of public dissent. It is also important because the 2001-2 war over Afghanistan was 
also partly justified using these terms. The invocation of humanitarianism by Western states 
during the Kosovo war was a legitimation for violence. But we do not humanise the world 
through violence; we can only humanise 'the world', as Arendt suggested, 'by incessant and 
continued discourse about its affairs and the things in it'. 89 
Methodological Issues 
To investigate how public spheres may shape and be shaped by war a single 
interpretative case study method was selected. A structured focussed comparison, for example 
between Britain and the United States, would have been too diluted. 90 The thesis aims to be 
descriptively rich in substance as well as theoretically thorough in an effort not only to gather 
empirical data but also use it to engage with existing public sphere theory. 
The drawback of this approach is that one cannot easily generalise from the US and 
Kosovo case. However, the search for regularities and generalisations are not the only proper 
subject of inquiry. Public spheres are historically and culturally specific and methods for 
interpreting their existence and significance are also epistemologically bound. 91 In other words, 
the thesis goes beyond the forms of social scientific methodology which position 'the public' 
as an empirically extant object to be analysed via the accumulated data. 92 
The phrase 'public opinion', for example, which is partly constitutive of the idea of 
'the' public it seeks to describe, is falsely constructed in much social science research in terms 
of an exercise in liberty. In public opinion surveys, as Anne Norton describes, 'the respondents 
participate not as a party to a debate but as a source of information and an object of study... 
The respondents are then reconstituted into fictive communities of opinion: the 15 or 40 or 70 
89 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 30. 
90 Arend Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method', American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 65 (1971), pp. 682-93. 
91 C. f. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social lnquiry. ý Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6. 
" For a recent example see Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: Ae Collapse and Revival ofAmerican 
Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
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percent whose responses are coded alike'. 93 This polling is a highly crafted and expensive 
technique that aims to manufacture the 'public' as an empirical fact separate from any analysis 
of the mode and effect of particular kinds of circulation or address. 94 Publics, publicity, and 
public opinion - these terms are themselves productive of a social imaginary and must be 
analysed accordingly. 
If societal norms and modes of politics shape the conduct and justification for war 
research is required into the context of US public sphere debates over Kosovo. The empirical 
research on the 'official' (state-based) public sphere derives from a qualitative analysis of US 
government departments and mainstream media outlets just prior to, and during, the bombing 
campaign. 
As one commentator noted, there seemed to be a special effort by Clinton to 'pitch' the 
war to 'newspaper elites', 95 the same realm of discourse Habermas valorised as a medium of 
public deliberation. A search was conducted of all news articles within the period of the 
intervention in the major organs of official public debate, The New York Times, Yhe 
96 Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times. Where relevant to the specific theme, several 
other forms of information supplement this data, including the vast secondary literature on the 
Kosovo war, Internet sources, and opinion polls. 
For instance, Chapter Four is concerned with the social and political context of dissent 
against the Kosovo war and provides an example of the methodology used in other chapters. 
Information on protest activity was derived from news articles from the main daily newspapers 
within the period of the intervention. Supplementary data includes theoretical studies of 
dissent, secondary sources on anti-war protest and opinion covered by the network news 
channels, the websites of activist groups, and correspondence with activists. An exhaustive 
survey of every anti-Kosovo war demonstration is not provided. Indeed, of the immense 
variety of protests occurring at any one time the media choose barely a few, of which probably 
only the most conscientious of newsreaders will become aware. Although usually under- 
reported at the time, however, assessing protests through media channels provides an important 
93 Anne Norton, Republic ofSigns: Liberal Theory andAmerican Popular Culture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), p. 38. 
94 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 72. 
95 James Gerstenzang, 'Clinton Pitches War to Newspaper "Elites"', The Los Angeles Times, April 16,1999. 
96 It was decided that rather than cite every article relevant to the empirical point (which would run into a word 
count of thousands) a solution would be to create a separate section in the bibliography for relevant and 
interesting newspaper articles. 
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gauge of opposition opinion as an alternative to the ideal of recording the fullest detail of all 
protest events. 
Thesis Outline 
The organisational themes which structure the empirical chapters - law, technology, 
anti-war dissent, 'foreigners', and discourses of an emerging global public sphere - were not 
randomly chosen, but they were also not the only possible public sphere themes for a 
humanitarian 'war and society' approach. The political economy of the war, and how capitalist 
norms of public and private were maintained (and exported), could have been pursued in a 
whole chapter. The relationship between public spheres and the 'body' could have filled a 
chapter, with an analysis of the public iconicity of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic (the 
enemy) and Clinton (the embodiment of the 'American public'). Specific chapters may have 
been dedicated to race and gender instead of being framed together in Chapter Five. 
For reasons of space (and time), however, some things had to be left out. But the 
themes chosen were not random; each in a different way reveals something important about the 
politics of public spheres and something particular about the Kosovo war itself For example, 
as Chapter Three illustrates, crucial to reproducing the official US public realm as liberal has 
been the promise (and realities) of technological advance, while one could seldom open a 
newspaper without reading from supporters and opponents alike how Kosovo represented the 
dawn of a new era, both internationally and technologically. Similar claims are made about the 
relevance of each theme in the specific chapters, as well as in the following thesis outline. 
Chapter One introduces the framework underpinning the empirical analysis of the 
Kosovo war by tracing in more detail how publics have historically and theoretically acquired 
importance. Building on Kant's original insight that the public use of critical reason could 
provide a bridge between power and morality, theorists have sought to stake out the social and 
political terrain where this might be possible. Habermas located the seeds of a critical public 
sphere in the coffeehouses, salons, and world of letters in the newly enlightened liberal 
European cities. However, Arendt's interpretation of the open political conflict and expansive 
conception of power central to the ideologies and practice of the US founding period 
emphasises the centrality of republicanism. The importance of print techniques to 'America's' 
eighteenth century public spheres as well as the fluid counterpublics based on gender and race 
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that emerged also suggest that the rational-critical mode assumed by the liberal and 
Habermasian public sphere category does not wholly apply in the United States. 
After establishing the groundwork related to different modes and types of publicity 
operating in the United States the chapter positions the sociological development of an 
6official' public sphere in the modem, state-centred context. This is important because the 
'counterpublics' described throughout the thesis usually assume this 'official' state-public as 
the political background. Politics in the United States generally evolved to approximate the 
broadly 'liberal-republican' conception of public space -juridical, technological, individualist, 
and efficient. The remainder of the chapter introduces the organisational themes - law, 
technology, dissent, foreigners - which structure the empirical chapters and offer the normative 
and practical benchmarks by which we can trace the relationship between public spheres and 
the Kosovo war. 
Chapter Two develops ideas about the violence associated with the diffusion of public 
and private through a discussion of the ambivalent role of law in legitimating the Kosovo war. 
From the ever-growing litigation industry to televised intimate suffering, the cultural power of 
law and its ability to define and redefine what is public and private is pervasive in the United 
States. That the private life of the commander-in-chief became a public commodity via judicial 
investigations (partly clouding the moral authority of the President to engage troops in combat) 
is only the most trivial example. There was a massive growth in the influence of lawyers at all 
levels of military targeting and deployment during the war, as well as the resurgence of 'Just 
War' claims, the philosophical basis of much of the laws of war. The chapter also discusses the 
role of advanced surveillance technologies in compiling evidence to fit Milosevic's crimes (but 
not NATO's), the way in which legal arguments can shape public opinion, and how public 
realms, both national and international, can be constructed as legalised entities. In other words, 
the chapter traces the complex meanings attributed to law during processes crucial to defining 
the official-state public sphere in the United States and, by extension, the emerging global 
order. 
The desire for domestic legitimacy, the US position as the unchallenged global 
hegemon, and the role of law in the founding of the US republic, are all central to 
understanding the ambiguous but sustained effort by the government to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the bombing campaign while also avoiding the explicit appearance of relying on 
law to justify violence. In making this argument, the chapter traces the complex meanings 
24 
attributed to law during processes crucial to defining the official-state public sphere in the 
United States. The 'humanitarian' violence seemingly crucial to the establishment of a global 
constitutional order gains greater coherence when addressed in light of how law functioned in 
the founding period and the emergence of the US penal system as an important technique for 
producing liberal citizens. The history of criminal punishment in the United States was closely 
related to the legitimisation of violence and sheds a great deal of light on more recent global 
police actions. 
The pragmatism of law but also the promises of technological advance have served as 
effective extra-political legitimations for both politics and war in the United States. Indeed, 
James Boyle has described a mode of modem legal discourse, 'Jetson's Jurisprudence', that 
tries to make legal rules appealingly futuristic by associating them a long list of technological 
wonders. 97 Chapter Three centres more specifically on the information technology (IT) used to 
conduct and debate the Kosovo air campaign. Transformations in technology and the rise of 
the liberal-state public realm provided an important part of the social and political context of 
the war. Modem political theory engages little with the high technology that many see as 
transformative not only of the global economy, but also political interaction and war. The 
intersection, broadly speaking, however, is not new. Forms of government, prevailing 
technology and the practice of war have been linked since Antiquity-98 Transposed to the 
modem era, Clausewitz's understanding of how the passions of the people could be yoked to 
the military potential of the centralised and industrialised state" foreshadows the way in which 
societal norms would shape and be shaped by the preparation, conduct and aims of modem 
military adventures. 100 Further consolidated by state bureaucratisation and the expansion of 
capital, the so-called 'post-modem' age has continued this politics/technology/war tradition 
with liberal governments embracing 'post-industrial' technologies to attain goals fought during 
the 1990s in the name of humanitarianism (and more recently against 'Teffor'). 
The chapter investigates whether electronic space has radically transformed public 
spheres, the means of violence, and the relationship between them as witnessed over Kosovo. 
97 James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction ofthe Information Society 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Thanks to George Welton for suggesting this link. 
98 Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (Introduction by John 
Keegan) (2ed. ) (London: University of California Press, 1989). 
99 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret) (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). 
100 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (London: Macmillan, 1973). 
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Certainly features of high-tech warfare were presented as embodying the socially constituted 
values of the official public sphere (as liberal and 'humanitarian') and provided a means by 
which counterpublic spheres could be created (via the Internet). But US 'publics' have 
historically viewed technologies (including low lethality and precision-guided weapons) as 
harbingers of international justice and representative of their presumed values. By elaborating 
what has been presented as the natural alliance in the United States between liberal-republican 
values and technological advance, the chapter places in historical perspective the 'in vogue' 
nature of much of the IT discourse about Kosovo. Claims about video game and virtual 
warfare are compared with similar practices from the Vietnam War and are squarely situated in 
the pre-September 11, Clinton-era and Internet boom-age. 
Chapter Four addresses whether the 1990s produced other less than democratic 
transformations of the relationship between public spheres and war, in particular whether 
citizens can or should have been conceived as mere 'spectators' to humanitarian violence. It is 
argued that despite the role of technology and NATO's humanitarian claims in limiting public 
dissent, anti-Kosovo war activists, against the background of the official state-public, 
participated in and constituted counterpublic spheres. Perhaps more than any other social 
battleground, anti-war activity and anti-war protestors as a social category indicate both a kind 
of extraordinary political activism indicative of public sphere activity at its greatest, and the 
extreme end of state coercion and legitimation tactics. As Sarah Chinn suggests, 'subordination 
and resistance have been continual although necessarily unequal partners in the forging of 
national identities in the United States'. 101 As seen historically, the act of defying the state's 
monopoly on violence - its very raison detre - points to the ability of citizens to come 
together, organise and challenge dominant power, as well as revealing the limitations and 
strengths of specific state actions and various state forms. 
With this in mind, the chapter examines the modes of being public in the 'liberal 
tradition' of dissent most formative in the United States; the 'American tradition' expounded 
by the transcendental idealists (Emerson, Thoreau) and evident in multiple practices of anti- 
war activism; and the 'democratic/republican tradition' found in the work of Arendt and which 
corresponds with much protest activity. Rather than the liberal or Habermasian image of the 
protester as either a conscientious objector or one engaged in rational-critical dialogue, it is 
101 Sarah E. Chinn, Technology and the Logic ofAmerican Racism: A Cultural History of the Body as Evidence 
(London: Continuum, 2000), p. xiii. 
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suggested that the counterpublic spheres of anti-war demonstrators during the Kosovo war 
reveal the multi-logic and contested spirit of debate among diverse and unequal publics 
mediated by different types of publicity. These alternative, but marginalised, publics are not 
always effectively captured in liberal and deliberative theoretical accounts. 
Chapter Five extends the argument about different ways of 'being public' through an 
analysis of how Albanian-American immigrants and Kosovo-Albanian refugees were 
represented in the official public domain prior to and during the bombing campaign. Several of 
the public and private norms associated with gender, race, and economy appeared upheld and 
invigorated via representations of these 'foreigners'. Accordingly, the politics of foreignness 
4must.... be seen', in Samira Kawash's words, 'as a mechanism for constituting and securing a 
public, [and] establishing the boundaries of inclusion' and exclusion. 102 We witnessed in full 
display during the war, for example, a variation of 'the iconic good immigrant' narrative, 
which holds that 'good' immigrants work hard and up-hold (or refresh) the values of the 
nation. 103 As well as serving to ratify the choice worthiness of the liberal regime - look at all 
the immigrants desperate to come here - an important outcome of narratives of 'good' 
immigration is to regulate and punish the domestic poor. Buttressing the stereotype that US 
citizenship is above all characterised by the mobility of class, African-Americans, for example, 
can be further excluded from public sphere visibility and respect. This argument is situated in 
the context of the general lack of investigation into issues of race in the historiography of 
'humanitarian' violence. 
Individuals and groups in Kosovo were widely treated as pitied victims, as objects of 
fleeting emotion rather than equal participants in human dignity and plurality. For modernity 
has not only ushered in the extension of functional rationality to politics as the sphere of 
'decision-making', as Chapter One will argue. It has partly eliminated the spaces and criteria to 
be established in public political forums where citizens may act for and politically sustain a 
concern for human rights. The plight of thousands in Kosovo 'post'-conflict, of all ethnic 
groupings, is further evidence of this. 104 Drawing on Arendt, it is suggested that narratives of 
'goodness' and 'compassion' reveal the gendered antimony of ethical humanitarianism 
102 Samira Kawash, 'The Homeless Body', Public Culture, Vol. 10, no. 2 (1998), p. 325. 
103 Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 80. 
104 Jasmina Husanovid, "'Post-Conflict" Kosovo: An Anatomy Lesson in the Ethics/Politics of Human Rights', 
in Ken Booth (ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 263- 
80. 
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conducted within the de-politicised and 'personalised' US public context. As Berlant has 
suggested, the 'political as a place of acts oriented to publicness... [has been] replaced by a 
105 world of private thoughts, leanings, and gestures'. One effect of the personalization of the 
mainstream public sphere in the United States is revealed in the sentimentalism of journalism 
and much of the public debate concerning the Kosovo-Albanian refugees. 
Chapter Six extends the analysis of public spheres in the United States to addresses 
recent and related endeavours to transpose the public sphere category to the global realm 
through the discourse and practice of humanitarian war. The emergence of a presumed global 
public conscience in response to humanitarian catastrophe was important to public 
justifications for the Kosovo war. The chapter argues that the effort by Habermas and others to 
redeem a deliberative global public as the non-violent site of rational-critical debate ignores 
how the very founding of publics can itself be productive of, even dependent upon, violence. 
This argument is made using Arendt's indictment of the modem 'politics-as-making' tradition, 
where political action is equated with moulding the human condition to a preconceived end. 
Arendt, in contrast, helps us by not simply attending to the creative dimensions of the 
political beyond a narrow focus on rights and government. She also usefully conceives the 
public sphere explicitly in contradistinction to all of the things that Habermas simply assumes 
away. Habermas and others locate outside of the political (as barbaric, and irrational) the 
violence of liberalism and the founding of public spheres. Arendt, in contrast, positions 
violence as constitutively outside of the public; the historical and political context of each 
(violence and the public) is mutually related and co-dependent. One does not have to agree 
with Arendt's own sharp distinctions between public and private, between politics and 
violence, to recognise that those distinctions are important and offer a more critical perspective 
on the legitimisation of humanitarian war than we have witnessed thus far. In other words, 
Arendt helps IR scholars conceive how the very founding of public realms, including at the 
global level, can itself be productive of the violence the creation of a public sphere ostensibly 
sought to banish. 
The Conclusion summarises the main findings of the thesis and suggests some of their 
broader implications for how we might understand the ongoing relationship between US 
society and war. Publics are important sites in the seemingly constant effort to justify the use 
of force, including legitimations for violence under the label 'War on Terror'. To date, the 
105 Berlant quoted in Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 298 fh. 69. 
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nexus between public spheres and war has been a neglected field of inquiry in both political 
and international theory. Moreover, the specific insights of Hannah Arendt have yet to be fully 
appreciated in terms of thinking through the potentialities for any 'humanitarian condition' of 
global political action. The thesis hopes to make a contribution to our understanding of global 
politics by examining how publics in the US context were important in shaping the war over 
Kosovo and how publics themselves were partly created and recreated through this war. 
'Understanding... ' as Arendt suggested, 'is an unending activity by which, in constant change 
and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at 
home in the world'. 106 
'06 Hannah Arendt, 'Understanding and Politics, in Essays in Understanding. 1930-1954 (edited by Jerome 
Kohn) (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994), pp. 307-8. 
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Chapter 1 
A History and Theory of US Public Spheres 
The meaning of a committed act is revealed only when the action itself has come to an end and 
become a story susceptible to narration. Insofar as any 'mastering' of the past is possible, it 
consists in relating what has happened; but such narration, too, which shapes history, solves no 
problems and assuages no suffering; it does not master anything once and for all. 
- Hannah Arendt' 
Public spheres are one of the contexts in which meaning is created, where we find the 
important narratives that partly constitute history, including the story of humanitarian wars. 
The problem of public spheres, which is really a problem of how we conceive democracy and 
politics in modernity, is latently present in all questions of human security. The function of 
histories and myth as productive of 'ethnic' violence in the Balkans has assumed almost 
mythic proportions. 2 What have not been investigated is how public sphere narratives are also 
productive of US actions into (or not into) the Balkans and how this process has itself 'become 
a story susceptible to narration. 
The language of the 'public sphere' is foundational to democratic theory and practice 
and most of our activity is oriented toward some form of public. As subject and object of 
democracy, the notion of a public is a discursive weapon second only to the 'people' as the 
political honorific par excellence. 3 All publics are different however, in size, mode, and effect 
and the conditions of the multiple public spheres in the United States have been long in the 
making. This chapter describes the historical and contingent course by which an 'official' 
liberal state-public sphere has attained importance in the United States, and it introduces the 
theoretical framework that structures the empirical investigation into the US politics of the 
Kosovo war. 
The chapter provides some historical and conceptual background by addressing the 
origins of modem politics in the United States in terms of how publics have changed and 
developed over time. In the words of Margaret Somers, we need an 'historical sociology of 
1 Hannah Arendt, 'On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts on Lessing', Men in Dark Times (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 3-j 1. 
2 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (2ed. ) (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997); Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myhs and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999). 
3 Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and the Public Sphere', in Jeff Weintraub and Kristin Kumar (eds. ) Public and 
Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1997), p. 81. 
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concept formation [as] a cultural and historical approach to making sense of how we think and 
why we seem obliged to think in certain ways'. 4 
In particular, the chapter places in historical context different elements constitutive *of 
US public spheres - the liberal-republican state, the rule of law, technology, dissent, and 
'foreigners' - as a prelude to showing how publics have shaped, and been shaped by, the 
Kosovo war. Public discourses during this war surrounding law, technology, anti-war activists, 
and 'foreigners' cannot fully be understood separately from their function in helping to ground 
US national identity and the official liberal-republican (as well as unofficial or 'counter') 
public realms. 
Because much contemporary public sphere theorising responds directly to liberal 
theory and practice, the first part of the chapter, 'Publics in History and Theory', accounts for 
the history of the form as well as the usually ideal-type portrayal of liberal public space that 
has emerged. In contrast to Thomas Hobbes's account of the absorption of public power into 
5 the hands of the amoral Leviathan, it was Immanuel Kant who first considered the principle of 
publicity, free debate in the public sphere, as the bridge between politics and morality. 6 
Similarly, JOrgen Habermas observed the emergence of a critically reasoning bourgeois public 
in 18'h Century Europe as the hoped for conduit of democratic deliberative rationality. 7 
There has been much debate concerning the extent to which the concept of the public 
sphere enunciated by Habermas might be extended to other historical and geographical 
contexts, the United States included. 8 Publics exist in widely differing contexts and 
generalisation is difficult. Habermas has subsequently acknowledged that he 'can rightly be 
accused of having idealized what were presented as features of an existing liberal public 
sphere... I was at least not careful enough in distinguishing', he wrote, 'between an ideal type 
and the very context from which it was constructed'. 9 
4 Margaret R. Somers, 'The Privatization of Citizenship: How to Unthink a Knowledge Culture', in Victoria E. 
Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds. ) Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study ofSociety and Culture 
(Berkeley: University of Cal ifomia Press, 1999), p. 12 1. 
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (edited with an introduction by C. B. Macpherson) (London: Penguin, [165111968). 
6 Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings (edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [ 1970] 199 1), p. 55. 
7 Jargen Habermas, The Structural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [ 1962] 
1991). 
8 See Michael Schudson, 'Was There Ever a Public Sphere? If So, When? Reflections on the American Case', in 
Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 143-163. 
9 Jorgen Habermas, 'Concluding Remarks', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) flabermas and the Public Sphere 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 463. 
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Accordingly, the second section of the chapter, 'Publics in the United States, addresses 
the extent to which the category of the liheral public sphere, and its presumed rational-critical 
mode, can usefully be applied to the United States. It is suggested that in contrast to the 
deliberative account, public spheres in the United States, to varying degrees, can more usefully 
be conceived as places of agonistic instability, incessant debate, and re-founding. Hannah 
Arendt's reading of the founding of a repuhlican public sphere during the American 
Revolution, for example, laid greater emphasis on the performative, rather than the purely 
deliberative, dimensions of action in the public realm. 
Political action, so closely related to the change and potentiality inherent in birth and 
new beginnings was, for Arendt, almost by definition relative. 10 Moreover, action being a kind 
of speech, the Declaration of Independence was 'the perfect way for an action to appear in 
words'. ' 1 With this conception, we move away from Habermas's understanding of language as 
merely a function of making cognitive statements about truth or identity towards investigating 
theforce contained in articulation. 'Performative utterances', as Bonnie Honig interprets, 'are 
not cognitive statements; they are events'. 12 
But if the mode and effect of public sphere debate in the early republic is accorded an 
alternative trajectory to Habermas's, the description of the United States as 'liberal' remains 
axiomatic for scholars working on democratic peace theory, foreign policy analysis, and even 
US public spheres. 13 In the words of Michael Warner, 'most of the major figures of our time 
on the subject of public and private have reacted against the liberal tradition'. 14 Accordingly, 
the third section, 'The Liberal-Republican State', addresses the extent to which a liberal 
tradition, and attendant conception of public space, has shaped modem US political practice. 
10 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 247 and 
'Understanding and Politics', Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954 (edited by Jerome Kohn) (New York: 
Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994), p. 321. The importance of 'natality' to Arendt's thought is discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
11 Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, [1963] 1970), p. 127. 
12 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement ofPolitics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
p 89 
Robert Latham, The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making ofPostwar International Order 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) and John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace, Liberal War. American 
Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
14 Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002), p. 43. 
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The widespread notion that US political development has been shaped by some 
'natural' liberal creed owes much to Alexis de Tocqueville and, later, Louis Hartz. 15 By 
liberalism as a 'constant' in US history Hartz pointed to the primacy of individual rights and 
private property, an intuitive liberalism due to the absence of feudalism and a lack of 
revolutionary impulse. Radicals in the United States never had to defend the idea of a strong 
state, which had been necessary in Europe to facilitate the victory of the bourgeoisie over 
feudalism. Broadly speaking, and in a slight revision of this 'liberal' school, the section argues 
that a liberal-republican tradition corresponds more closely to the ideological development of 
the official state-public sphere which had important implications for 'public-ness' in the 
United States. 
The democratic process in various forms of 'Atlantic' republicanism enjoys a 
normatively higher position as popular sovereignty than the liberal emphasis on representation 
and individual rights. 16 'While republican society and liberal society represented different 
stages in the postfeudal West', suggests Steven Watts, 'they did not stand diametrically 
opposed in America... with defenders of civic virtue angrily arrayed against the minions of 
self-regarding individualism'. 17 The language of republicanism is important to understanding 
modes of public-ness and publicity, especially when in alliance with the valorisation of 
personal abstraction (making identities such as class, gender, or race an inappropriate basis for 
debate) as the most fitting way to appear in public in the newly emerging state. 
Since the concept of the Yankee Leviathan, 18 however, is itself often represented in a 
summary of abstractions - 'bureaucratic', 'capitalist', 'sovereign', 'corporate'19 - any 
discussion of the US state, the official liberal 'public', and the relations between them must 
deal with the problem of reification. What social conditions are we exactly referring to when 
deploying these contentious terms? The 'official' US public is accordingly theorised around 
the emergence and consequence of the modem bureaucratic state and market economy with 
15 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (translated by George Lawrence, edited by J. P. Mayer) (New 
York: HarperCollins, [1835] 1966) and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1955). 
16 J. G. A. Pocock, 7he Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
17 Steven Watts, 7he Republic Reborn: War and the Making ofLiberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. xviii. 
18 Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
'9 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion ofNational Administrative Capacities, 
1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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their attendant mass media, reliance on law and technology and primarily liberal modes of 
dissent . 
20 The relationship between liberal state power, publics, and war also becomes crucial. 
Following Charles Tilly, we must understand 'the place of organized violence in the growth 
and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states. 21 
But alongside the organisation and re-organisation of modes of warfare, technological 
advance and the rule of law also strengthened the Federalist's assurance that 'America' could 
answer the age-old question of how to reconcile a republican political ethos with a 
geographically expansive society. 22 Both thematics, the United States as a 'Legal Republic' 
and as a 'Technological Republic' are discussed in separate sections below. Chapters Two and 
Three extend these analyses to suggest that public sphere discourses concerning law and 
technology were similarly effective, and highly ambivalent, strategies for attempting to 
publicly legitimate the Kosovo war. 'Dissent in the Liberal-Republic' and 'Foreigners and the 
Republic' are likewise identified in the chapter as vital to understanding the historical 
development of US publics. These efforts, if successful, forms the basis for showing how 
public spheres in the United States shaped and, in turn, have been shaped by the 1999 Kosovo 
war. Though a complete account of the importance of publics to modernity in the United 
States, even if it were possible, cannot be provided in the space of this one chapter, the 
contours of an outline history are supplied. 
Publics in History and Theory 
Narratives of 'decline' thoroughly pervade theories of the public realm. As suggested in 
the Introduction, almost all who have written on the subject conceive the story of 
contemporary publics in this romantic genre of decay. 'Critiques of American politics and 
culture', writes Michael Schudson, 'are sometimes posed as if contemporary life represents a 
decline from some great golden age'. 23 In these narratives, however, is there not a ftindamental 
20 Bob Jessop, State Theory. Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1990). 
21 Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer 
and Theda Scokpal (eds. ) Brining the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 170. 
22 See John F. Kassen, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1777-1900 (New 
York: Grossman Publishers, 1976) and Robert Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
23 Schudson, 'Was There Ever a Public Sphere? ', p. 143. 
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danger of 'collapsing... norm and description, 124 to borrow Habermas's phrase, when using an 
essentially 'normative category for political critique 2S _ the public sphere - to describe an 
already existing society? The extent to which a normative Kantian or deliberative public sphere 
of rational-critical discourse has ever thrived in the United States is in serious dispute. 
In 'What is Enlightenment? ' Kant made explicit the link between human freedom and 
the notion of a public sphere, introducing what would become the dominant liberal conception 
of publicity. 'The public use of man's reason must always be free, ' he wrote, 'and it alone can 
26 bring about enlightenment'. This principle of publicity, for Kant, ruled all political action. In 
his words, 
All action affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not 
compatible with being made public... For a maxim which I may not declare openly 
without thereby frustrating my own intention... or which I cannot publicly 
acknowledge without thereby inevitably arousing... resistance... can only have stirred 
up this necessary and genuine... opposition... because it is itself unjust and thus 
constitutes a threat to everyone. 27 
When people joined together to debate their common affairs, in Kant's view, they bequeathed 
the critical use of reason onto the political realm. There was clearly a tension, however, in the 
gap between the empirical circumstances of modernity (where people were unfree) and Kant's 
need to posit the existence of the ideal public sphere as a precondition for reason to function. 
Similarly, Kant was aware that humans were disposed to except themselves from the 
requirements of morality given their 'inclinations and desires'. Recalling the pacifying effects 
of commerce in contributing to 'perpetual peace' amongst states, exclusively those who were 
property owners could enter the public realm. In an assumption that still resonates, as Chapter 
Five will suggest, only those emancipated from the corrupting influences of power, in other 
words those already in possession of private property, could be their own masters. Law became 
the expression of the public will that was itself derived from reason. 
Habermas, in contrast, attempted to reconstruct the public sphere concept as an 
essentially historical, rather than ideal, category. In The Structural Transformation, he 
delineated the public as a fourth realm of social interaction distinct from the state, economy 
and family. In the emerging 18'h Century bourgeois European world of letters and salons, 
24 Jargen Habermas, 'Concluding Remarks', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public Sphere 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 463. 
25 Peter Hohendahl quoted in Michael Schudson, 'Was There Ever a Public Sphere? ', p. 147. 
26 Kant, Political Writings, p. 55. Italics in original. 
27 Kant, Political Writings, p. 126. Italics in original. 
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political legislation that had formerly been at the aristocracy's privilege increasingly became 
subject to the critical appraisal of newly fashioned 'citizens'. 
From the salons largely shaped by women to the male preserve of the coffeehouses and 
the world of letters emerged a public sphere, Habermas observed, amongst an elite avant-garde 
where conversation on literature and art turned to matters economic and political . 
28 Habermas, 
in short, attempted a historically and sociologically grounded elucidation of the possibility for 
human emancipation grounded in communication. Unrestricted, undistorted conversation, he 
argued, could be the means to political legitimation, with a public sphere grounded by a 
common commitment to rationality and faith in publicity as the mode of coming to terms with, 
if not settling, political disputes. 
Three 'institutional criteria' of this new-fashioned delight in the public consumption of 
tea, coffee, and chocolate were singled out. First, social intercourse, at least for the duration of 
the soiree, ignored the social status of the participants. A 'tact befitting equals' traded with the 
4 29 celebration of rank'. With this metamorphosis, 'the authority of the better argument could 
assert itself against that of social hierarchy and in the end carry the day'. 30 Second, not only 
could the finest discussant allegedly hold sway, but also conversational territory traversed old 
boundaries, especially in matters of philosophy and culture. 
Third, and most importantly, talk in the coffee house and salon was, in principle, 
inclusive. All propertied and educated 'readers, listeners, and spectators' could partake in the 
conversation. But even where the numbers were small, gatherings were conscious of 
themselves as but a mere component of a wider public who could potentially be addressed. 
'Wherever the public established itself institutionally as a stable group of discussants, ' 
Habermas argued, 'it did not equate itself with the public but at most claimed to act as its 
mouthpiece, in its name, perhaps even as its educator - the new form of bourgeois 
representation'. 31 
Of course, this was never an ideal state, even for Habermas, where completely 
'undistorted' communication thrived. Marx, for example, had dismissed bourgeois public 
opinion, mere class ideology, for its dependence on economic domination; the public sphere 
was structurally parasitic on the bourgeois constitutional and imperial state and manifested the 
2' Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 33. 
29 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 36. 
30 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 36. 
31 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 37. 
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interests of those benefiting from it. 32 While liberal economics under free-market capitalism 
invariably concealed the fundamental structural inequality between the classes, rational, 
critical dialogue in the public sphere, according to Habermas, might subject this to proper 
scrutiny. 33 
The 'political emancipation of the bourgeoisie' and this attendant model of a debating 
and coffee drinking public depended upon a distinctive configuration of liberal social and 
economic (not least imperial34) interests and could not, even according to Habermas, feasibly 
(or desirably) be transposed to late-modem society. However, it is important to elaborate the 
ideal given form at that time - that in informal institutional settings authority could be 
legitimised by the public use of inter-subjective reason - because it shapes the still widely 
influential deliberative model of public space. 35 
In contrast to the liberal model, where competition for public power occurred in an 
almost market competition between rational interests, a 'discourse-theoretic interpretation', in 
Habermas's words, 'insists on the fact that democratic will-formation draws its legitimating 
force not from a previous convergence of settled ethical convictions but both from the 
communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play'. 36 
It should also be noted that in Yhe Structural Transformation, neither imperialism nor 
nationalism are explicitly linked to public sphere structure. As Benjamin Lee suggests, 
Habermas's 'account was resolutely intranational at both the cultural and economic levels'. 37 
This is important because Chapter Six will suggest the consequences of these omissions are 
potentially great. 'Imperialism was born', Arendt suggests, 'when the ruling class in capitalist 
production came up against national limitations to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie 
turned to politics out of economic necessity'. 38 The public sphere of bourgeois debate that 
Habermas describes was largely brought into being in an effort to influence foreign policy. 
32 According to Lenin, 'the bourgeois democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capital'. Quoted 
in Jessop, State Theory, p. 109. 
33 Jim McGuigan likewise suggests, 'The very concept of a "public sphere" is to do with rational-critical 
discussion'. See Jim McGuigan, Culture and the Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 4. 
34 Hannah Arendt, 'The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie', The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: 
Meridian Books, (1951] 1958), pp. 123-57. 
35 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
36 Jilrgen Habermas, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib, (ed. ) Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 24. 
37 Benjamin Lee, 'Peoples and Publics', Public Culture, Vol. 10, no. 2 (1998), p. 372. 
38 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 126. 'Imperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule 
of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism... ' Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 1 38. 
37 
Likewise, Habermasian accounts of global publics similarly overlook how more contemporary 
relations of global power and subordination - as witnessed during the Kosovo war - can be 
constituted in and through public spheres. 
Suffice-it-to-say here, that as the initial bourgeois public sphere expanded first in terms 
of the printing press then with the extension of the franchise, quality control (the 'better 
argument') predicated on high levels of education among a reasoning (white male property- 
owning) public seemed no longer to prevail. More and more groups, more and more issues, 
burst onto the public stage. 39 With the masses of labourers arriving in the industrialising cities - 
with the arrival of the working classes on the liberal political scene - came the bourgeois public 
sphere's so-called 'structural transformation. ' From Habermas's perspective, the emergence of 
mass society overwhelmed what could have emerged as genuine deliberative democracy. 40 The 
impetus for representative democracy, a system later exported to the United States, was borne. 
Though not admitting, of course, the structural conflict identified by thinkers on the 
Left, leading liberal commentators on both Europe and the United States became increasingly 
sceptical of the opinions of the 'masses'. John Stuart Mill lamented that "'the tyranny of the 
majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its 
guard. 241 In response, Mill called for toleration of 'minority' (middle class) views given 
society's inability to adjudicate between competing interests and accounts of the good. These 
matters were to be taken off the political agenda and left to the free and private conscience of 
the individual. 42 
With the emergence of mass society a once valorised public opinion was viewed as 
merely one, usually coercive, interest among many. 'The majority in the United States', argued 
Tocqueville, 'takes over the business of supplying the individual with a quantity of ready-made 
opinions and so relieves him of the necessity of forming his own. So there are many theories of 
philosophy, morality, and politics which everyone adopts unexamined on the faith of public 
39 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 140. 
40 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. xvii-xviii, 177. 
41 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism; On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government (edited by H. B. 
Acton) (London: Everyman's Library, 1992), p. 73. 
42 For an influential US-based contemporary formulation see John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 197 1). For a critique of the liberal notion that people are unregulated by power in their private 
domain see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison (translated by Alan Sheridan) (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977). 
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opinion'. 43 By the mid-19'h Century, the ambivalence with which liberals held the power of 
Kantian publicity was clearly palpable. 
The constitutional manifestation of this liberal scepticism towards unfettered (working 
class) opinion was representative government. Derived from social contract theory, democracy, 
at least in the influential Lockean formulation articulated in the US Constitution, was 
conceived as the process of manoeuvring the government in the interests of society. 44 The 
masses, in both Europe and the United States, were now to depend on a political elite, who, 
through their own critical debate, would inform and direct public opinion. The 'official' US 
public sphere would become a realm less like Kant's debating society and more a playing field, 
though not equal, of competing private interests. 
Publics in the United States 
Now that we have sketched how publics have been conceived in political theory, 
including the Habermasian notion of public sphere 'decline', we have a benchmark against 
which to measure the sociological trajectory of publics in the United States. Multiple public 
spheres have long existed in 'America'. The question becomes the appropriate way to 
characterise their mode and effect. Mary P. Ryan has suggested, for example, that, 
'Nineteenth-century American public life was not enacted in some ideal hall of rational 
deliberation, in no modem day acropolis or small town meeting, but on a fluid field of cultural, 
social, and political mobilization'. 45 
When the American Revolution, which began as a tax revolt, yanked power from the 
private will of George III, a public sphere for the colonial elite seemingly appeared in the New 
World. The standards, though not the reality, of publicity were later raised in Philadelphia in 
1787 with the ideologies of popular sovereignty, public accountability, and 'universal' white 
male suffrage. City halls were quickly erected to complement the elaborate civic ceremonies. 
Small public meetings and political associations are widely imagined to have thrived. 46 
43 Alexis de Tocqueville quoted in Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 134. 
" John Locke, No Treaties ofGovernment (with introduction and notes by Peter Laslett) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963); Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1980), pp. 734. 
45 Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), p. 176. 
4" The classic reading is Tocqueville's Democracy in America. 
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A spirit of public-ness, however, had already been clearly manifest in colonial America 
via a culturally energetic world of letters among propertied straight white men. In the early 18'h 
Century, as Warner suggests, 'an emerging political language - republicanism - and a new set 
of ground rules for discourse - the public sphere - jointly made each other intelligible 9.47 
Printing, more particularly, made it possible for colonists to imagine themselves already as part 
of a 'fourth' social category, the public, distinct from family, economy and colonial 
administration. 
A bourgeois public sphere of sorts, then, existed in the early republic, which generated, 
and in turn was generated by, novel uses of print. An incipient public opinion emerged, indeed 
an historical transformation occurred, as the small newspaper presses boomed. How printed 
works were considered comprehensible, how they acquired cultural meaning in colonial 
America, had already begun to influence the shape of politics to come. Not simply a question 
of technological innovation in printing techniques, the 'structuring metalanguage 48 of 
republicanism, a cultural transformation, ensured print would develop as the mode of 
comprehending what the 'public' was or could be. 
In particular, the idea of being 'public' became associated with personal abstraction. In 
the words of Warner, 'publics are different from persons... [T]he address of public rhetoric is 
never going to be the same as address to actual persons, and that other partial nonidentity with 
the ob . ect of address in public speech seems to be part of what it means to regard something as 
public speech! 9 Printed discourse fostered an increasingly formal separation between public 
and private, as well as contributing to imaginings of a concrete but unknowable audience 
constituted as a public via the circulation of the printed text itself 
This sense of impersonality and anonymity has been perceived as an essential cultural 
norm for opening up communicative spaces for individual men - they were usually men - to 
appear and express opinions in public. Consider Richard Sennett's account of an image of 
public-ness associated with theatre in the expanding cities of Europe . 
50 The focus, like the 
actor on the stage, was on the content of the act, gesture or word rather than the agent behind. 
These social codes of personal abstraction, of being social but impersonal, Sennett suggests, 
47 Warner, Letters of the Republic, p. xiii. 
49 Michael Warner, 'The Mass Public and the Mass Subject', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public 
Spýýre (Cambridge, MA: MT Press, 1992), p. 380. 
4 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 78. 
50 Richard Sennett, The Fall qfPublic Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
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opened the way for people to express controversial opinions without having to define onesetf 
in the process. 51 'Including people different from each other', in the words of Craig Calhoun, 
'while making arguments rather than identities of the arguer the basis of persuasion is crucial 
to the meaningful constitution of a public sphere'. 52 
Though alienationfirom self was viewed as essential for the integrity of white, male 
bourgeois publics, in the early US republic we can already observe a contrasting instance 
where personal abstraction was not the norm. The publics created by slaves and ex-slaves so 
crucial to their emancipation partly came into organisational being in relation to 
autobiographical circulating texts. This public was initially formed, however, not through 
strangers in the chaste sense most closely associated with liberal-republicanism, but via an 
explicit identification with the participants of the discourse as African-American slaves. 
Between 1703 and 1944, as Henry Louis Gates records, over six thousand slaves and ex-slaves 
narrated their stories forming the basis not only of the African-American literary genre but an 
incipient black public sphere desirous of freedom. 53 The potentially hidden class, gender, and 
race biases of the republican notion of impersonality will be important to the analysis in 
Chapter Five of contemporary race and immigration politics manifest during the Kosovo war. 
Whatever the mode of public address, the sense of a public world, a human artifice of 
objects and things in between speakers and actors is important. S4 The American colonists, for 
example, proud of their public realm, were fond of comparing the United States to the classic 
republic of Rome, not coincidentally both politically and architecturally. 55 In Promised Land, 
Crusader State, Walter McDougal writes, 'their Senate was an echo of the Roman institution, 
and their symbols of state, architecture, and even place names recalled the glory of Athens and 
Rome. And like those great republics of old, the United States seemed destined to prosper and 
51 Sennett, The Fall ofPublic Man, p. 64. 
52 Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and the Public Sphere', in Jeff Weintraub and Kristin Kumar (eds. ) Public and 
Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1997), p. 85. 
53 Henry Louis Gates Jr., 'Introduction, in Gates Jr. (ed. ) Classic Slave Narratives (New York: Mentor, 1987), 
ri IX. 
For a fascinating discussion of the architectural analogies in Arendt's concepts of labour, work, and action see 
Kenneth Frampton, 'The Status of Man and the Status of his Objects: A Reading of The Human Condition', in 
M. A. Hill (ed. ) Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 
101-130. 
55 Carroll William Westfall, 'Architecture and Democracy, Democracy and Architecture', in Arthur M. Melzer, 
Jerry Weinberger and M. Richard Zinman (eds. ) Democracy and the Arts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999), pp. 73-91. 
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grow into what Jefferson called an "empire for liberty"'. For briefly renewing the Roman CP 
marvel of founding a stable republic in 'mutual promise', the American Revolution was, 
according to Arendt, a paradigm of political action in the modem world. 57 
Crucially, 'modem' here denotes more than simply industrialisation, including the 
political problem of legitimation - how to found a more lasting public realm in the absence of 
traditional morality. 58 In a philosophical and political break with traditional values '59 the 
American Revolution seemed a quintessentially modem attempt to derive a new concept of 
power. Although not explicitly conceptualised by the Founding Fathers in the heady practice of 
conducting revolution, Arendt observed in their actions the transcendence of the Christian 
political tradition of founding authoritative principles in the otherworldly. 60 
When reading Thomas Jefferson's famous words 'We hold these truths to be self- 
evident', for example, Arendt laid emphasis on the authority of the agreement of 'we hold', 
rather than the 'self-evident' nature of the truth . 
61 The significant revolutionary act was the 
6necessarily relative' agreement of the Founders. That the authority of the Declaration was 
contained within itself, that it derived its own legitimacy, meant it met the dual yardstick of 
neither being autocratically enforced nor needing to appeal to grounds outside. 62 
Though undoubtedly a partial account which largely ignores the violent exclusion of 
women, Native Americans and slaves, 63 in re-reading this founding period in US history, 
Arendt perceived at least a partial answer to the problem of politics in modernity - how, in the 
absence of authoritative principles to impose on the public sphere, public freedom could both 
(for some) thrive and be rendered more stable. 64 
56 Walter A. McDougal, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 
(New York: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1997), p. 18. 
57 Arendt, Yhe Human Condition p. 228. 
'8 See Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (translated, edited, and 
with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-128. 
59 Arendt overstates the radical break with traditional values. 'America', as Williams writes, 'was born and bred 
of the British Empire... [which] produced another culture [in the United States] based on the proposition that 
expansion was the key to freedom, prosperity, and social peace'. William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way 
ofLife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 17,23. 
60 Arendt, On Revolution; p. 186. 
61 Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 92-4. 
62 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 194. 
6' This is a common critique of Arendt. See the essays in Bonnie Honig (ed. ) Feminist Interpretations ofHannah 
Arendt (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 
6' This was in contrast to the Reign of Terror that arose after the French Revolution. See Arendt, On Revolution, 
pp. 217-85. 
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It is in this context that two key discourses of US identity and foreign policy practice - 
law and technology - emerge as important. The rhetoric of the entire founding period was 
overwhelmingly legalistic because the method offered much sustenance for those attempting to 
scale down a New World as yet unknown. At the moment of instituting a new system ofjustice 
and law through the political founding of 'America' law itself, and associated rhetoric, took on 
a powerful legitimating force. Moreover, liberal-republicanism provided not only the ideology 
for the political experiment of the Revolution, its alliance with the promise of technology 
rendered possible the United States' peculiar brand of national and international utopianism - 
technology as the aesthetic and political future. 65 
Before accounting in more detail the importance of technology and law as modes of 
political legitimation, we must clarify the sense in which the United States is described as a 
'liberal-republic'. Because the term is subject to more than a little controversy 'one must 
distinguish sharply', in the words Stephen Holmes, 'between two objects of criticism: liberal 
theories and liberal societies... Liberal ideals are only imperfectly embodied in existing liberal 
societies'. 66 If humanitarian violence can be deemed a powerful form of liberal cosmopolitan 
law-enforcement, as the next chapter will suggest, then the seeds of its performance and 
contradictions must lie where liberal politics and ideology have firmly taken root. 
The Liberal-Republican State 
Republican and liberal ideologies are to some extent contradictory. 67 'Republicanism', 
in M. N. S. Sellers' words, 'requires popular sovereignty, which liberalism does not'. 68 The 
democratic process in various forms of republicanism, from Machiavelli to Rousseau to 
Arendt, enjoys a normatively higher position as popular sovereignty than the liberal emphasis 
on representation and individual rights. From the very beginning, however, liberal and 
republican principles and practices have been consciously (and unconsciously) balanced in the 
United States. Liberal legalism, regulations and conventions, as well as a written constitution, 
regularised administrative conduct in the post-colonial state, as well as supporting republican 
65 Kassen, 'Technology and Utopia', Civilizing the Machine, pp. IS 1-234. 
66 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy ofAntiliberalism (London: Harvard University Press, 1993), pxiv. 
67 See Eirgen Habermas, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', pp. 21-30; Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and Democracy (translated by William Rehg) (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, [1992] 1996), pp. 296-301. 
68 M. N. S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire ofLiberty., Republicanism, Liberalism and the Law (London: Macmillan, 
1998), p. x. 
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ideologies of popular sovereignty and a balance of power. The Constitution instituted a 
balanced government and Senate justified in republican terms. A republican form of 
government was also guaranteed for individual states. The following year, however, the first 
ten constitutional amendments, as Sellers describes, 'established a list of proto-liberal rights. 69 
The institutions of the United States government have been variously imagined as the living 
embodiment of liberal principles combined with republican government, 70 and the epitome of 
republican principles combined with liberal institutional rule. 
One need not accept the normative claim that liberalism contains within it the potential 
for civic renewal, 71 to acknowledge the practical union of both (broadly conceived) liberal and 
republican norms in the institutions and practices of US public spheres. 72 That said it is quite 
easy to offer a crude vision of liberal principles and oversimplify contemporary liberal politics 
in the United States. 'Liberalism' is highly contested and how it manifests itself politically in 
any specific context is open to dispute. In the words of Richard Flathman, 'liberalism has never 
been a closely integrated or firmly fixed doctrine; its proponents have held to a considerable 
and frequently changing variety of views and its historians and critics have regularly disagreed 
concerning its main ideas and tendencies'. 73 
Establishing the pre-eminence of individual rights, positive law, and constitutional 
fi-ameworks, the legal structures and procedural mechanisms of the liberal-republican polity 
has been enduring in the United States, at once preserving individual freedoms for some and 
allowing infrequent though regular political participation for most in the form of voting. Even 
if one accepts the (critical) sociological diagnoses of Habermas, Max Weber and Arendt, the 
broad liberal response to the challenges of modernity has been to furnish the United States, and 
perhaps the entire West, with a conception of public space that is unique and uniquely 
powerful. The emphasis on the liberal tradition in the United States, however, has a forerunner 
and can be grounded in (and critiqued through) Tocqueville and Louis Hartz. 
69 Sellers, The Sacred Fire ofLiberty, p. ix. 
70 Arthur Ekirch Jr., The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955); 
Richard Dagger, Civic Virtue: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997). 
71 For this argument, however, see Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmerican 
Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
72 The potentially more democratic republican edge to various moments of political action and dissent will 
become central to the analysis in Chapter Four of anti-war activism over Kosovo. 
73 Richard Flathman, Toward a Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 2. 
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For Tocqueville, a widespread egalitarian ideology, bountiful material conditions, and 
the absence of a feudal tradition combined to make 'America' (and 'Americans) ripe for 
democratic association and civic engagement. More specifically, however, the sense in which 
the United States is characterised as liberal derives, with some modification, from the classic 
Lockean sense most closely associated with Louis Hartz. 74 'There has never been a "liberal 
movement" or a real "liberal party" in America', Hartz remarked, 'we have only the American 
Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which usually does not know that Locke 
himself is involved'. 75 
What Hartz famously conceived as the Lockean 'consensus' others, such as J. David 
Greenstone, describe as 'republican liberalism', 76 the general acceptance and 
institutionalisation of individual rights, private property, and government by popular consent 
expressed in periodic elections. These conditions are presumed to be those without which any 
serious political alternative in the United States has been able to radically diverge. This is the 
image of the 'centrist nation', for Benjamin Barber at least, 'through which Clinton would 
-n eventually make his journey'. 
European liberalism, represented by Locke and Mill, historically stood for an anti- 
establishment radicalism, a doctrine that was anti-Church, pro-secular state, and sought to 
reconcile the protection of capitalism with freedom of thought and expression for the rising 
middle class. Locke's notion of the free individual emerging from the state of nature gave 
meaning to the defence of civil government; Locke defended the emerging modem state but 
also, in a liberal vein, sought its limitation. Consequently the liberal-European reaction against 
feudalism endowed the state (and state intervention) with philosophical power and legitimacy 
it never had to be accorded in the New World. 79 
Thus the absence of a feudal tradition in the United States, against which to defend the 
state, seemingly obscured the significance of liberal philosophy in the US founding period 
compared to the more celebrated republican tradition. When the Founders applied Locke's 
social contract theory by instituting representative government and the separation of powers, 
74 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in AmericA p. 4. 
75 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, p. 11. 
76 J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), pp. 51-53. 
77 Benjamin Barber, The Truth ofPower: Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House (New York: WW 
Norton, 200 1), p. 220. 
78 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, p. 60. 
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they were not, according to Hartz, 'conscious of already having done anything to fortify the 
state but were conscious only that they were about to limit it. 979 'One side of Locke became 
virtually the whole of him. ' 80 
Liberal 'consensus' readings of US political history nevertheless underrate the extent of 
class conflict at the very heart (rather than simply the fringe) of society in the United States. 81 
Notions of 'American exceptionalism', especially the bountiful material conditions and sense 
of egalitarianism, are assumed to have militated against any socialist tradition of real 
substance. Hartz for example, suggested that the rhetoric of 1920s New Deal social reforms 
possessed a peculiarly liberal bent. Franklin Roosevelt 'did not use [the] language of class 
but... spoke pragmatically of solving problems'. 82 
Certainly a cultural mindset on the part of powerful elites has militated against 
progressivism, as a seemingly 'irreversible ethic' of liberalism has made all problems seem 
'technical'. 83 However, Charles Beard's account of the economic interests important to the 
Founding Fathers is not easily dismissed. 84 Consolidating (as opposed to re-founding) state 
power was probably second place in the Founders' minds, eager as they were above all to 
restrict the power of the British exchequer. 85 'The Americans', Hartz rightly suggests, or 
certainly those most likely to self-represent in the official public sphere, are 'a kind of national 
embodiment of the concept of the bourgeoisie'. 96 
Republican and liberal impulses have variously been combined, if only ambivalently, 
then, throughout the history of the state-based US public realm. Civic virtue, for example, 
traditionally appeared in tension with the liberal-individualist impulse for economic ambition 
and the creation of wealth - the first Jeffersonian Republicans were vocal critics of early-19 th 
Century commercial liberalisation. 97 
79 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, p. 60. 
80 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, p. 60. 
81 For an account of the relationship between unifying ideologies of white superiority and the varied class 
coalitions that ruled the United States during the nineteenth century see Alexander Saxton, 77ie Rise and Fall of 
the JAite Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth Century America (London: Verso, 1990). 
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85 Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution 
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One of the ways corporate liberal practices came to the fore at the expense of civic- 
republicanism, however, was via the ability of propagandists during wartime to valorise the 
entrepreneurial and commercial spirit while at the same time expressing civic 'public' virtue, 
albeit in nationalist form. As Steven Watts suggests in The Republic Reborn, 
many influential Americans urged the prosecution of war in 1812 to relieve the social 
tensions accruing to liberalizing change. War with Great Britain offered a means to 
objectify and overcome the specters of avarice, faction, and dissipation that were 
haunting commercial development. Yet it is important to note that the social impulse to 
war did not fundamentally challenge consolidating liberal capitalism in the young 
republic. Instead, by offering only temporary catharsis for dissent, war actually 
reinforced emerging liberal hegemony. 88 
By seeming to counter the increasingly pervasive spirit of self-interest, war emerged, in a 
89 Machiavellian sense, as a practical application of republican virtue. 
Arguments for war in 1812 united a nostalgic desire for social renewal and the ethos of 
an innovative, new era. 'From this amalgam', suggests Watts, 'emerged war as a social crusade 
for ennobling unity and entrepreneurial striving, patriotism and profit. '90 Dissent against 
liberalism was effectively channelled away from its original 18'h Century object (increasing 
commercialisation and decreased public duty) towards defence of the nascent nation. 
From the Revolutionary War of 1812 warfare has served a pivotal function in 
consolidating the social and cultural dynamics of liberalism, especially liberal capitalism, as 
practiced in the United States. (The even earlier mythology of the frontier had already 
established the socially 'regenerative' features of violence, as Richard Slotkin has shown. 91 ) 
Indeed, fundamental to Weber's sociology of modem administrative structures - secular, 
rationalised and bureaucratic - was the state's legal domination of the institution of war. 
92 
Depersonalisation in the administration of the state was mirrored in integrated and 
specialised functional organisations elsewhere, military structures included. 93 The growth of 
unitary territorial sovereignty, both conceptually and historically in the United States, 
depended above all on control over the legitimate means of violence. In this sense, 'the military 
88 Watts, The Republic Reborn, p. 105. 
89 Niccol6 Machiavelli, The Discourses (edited and with an introduction by Bernard Crick) (Middlesex: Penguin, 
1970). 
90 Watts, The Republic Reborn, p. 105. 
9' Richard Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence: the Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (New 
York: HarperPerennial, [1973] 1996), p. 5. 
92 Weber, 'Bureaucracy', From Max Weber, p. 222. 
93 See Skowronek, 'Reconstituting the Army: Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Illusion of Corporatism', in 
Building a New American State, pp. 21247. 
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origins of the modem American state', according to Nigel James Young, 'may lie less in the 
[Revolutionary] "founding" army of the Potomac, than in the [Civil War] Union army of the 
1860s with its expanding industrial and population base in the North and East, and its more 
advanced mobilisation of national resources'. 94 
Processes of obtaining the components of military power thought key to state survival 
have been crucial engines of political innovation, especially by increasing state penetration into 
society and the economy. 95 Buttressed by the institutions of the military and bureaucracy, 
established rational procedures encouraged societal acquiescence to the new order, especially 
in the decades after the Civil War; this proved crucial to the formation and legitimisation of the 
US nation-state itself. 
Industrialisation, of course, was another major impetus. As Stephen Skowronek writes, 
'The construction of a central bureaucratic apparatus was championed as the last way to 
maintain order during this period of upheaval in economic, social, and international affairs'. 96 
The relative weakness of the early federal state in extracting the necessary resources to pursue 
great power ambitions may also account for the apparent delay in the arrival of the United 
States as a hegemonic regional and global power. 97 
Moreover, the liberal notion that democracy and nationalism could exist in a more or 
less harmonious state helped ensure that popular allegiance to the nation - aided by multiple 
wars - would offset non-state fidelity to class, gender, and race. The notion of public life 
independent from the 'tremendous business concern' in which the expansion of the territorial 
98 
state was rooted became much more tentative. Rather than the labouring class identifying 
themselves as such, modem society largely became 'identified', in Arendt's words, 'with a 
privately owned piece of the world... with a tangible, albeit collectively owned piece of 
property, the territory of the nation-state'. 99 Ultimately, political identification with the nation, 
a kind of family writ-large in Arendt's view, would serve to transform the potentially 
94 Nigel James Young, 'The Nation State and War Resistance', University of California, Berkeley, PhD. 
dissertation, 1976, p. 93. 
95 Tilly, 'War Making and State Making', pp. 169-19 1. 
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heterogeneous assortment of political opinions, 00 into a seemingly, though illusory, 
homogenous national interest. 
Concentrated and decentralised, hegemonic yet dispersed, the neo-Weberian 
administrative state in the United States has endowed itself an almost unprecedented scope of 
power to shape collective lives. New-fangled state structures and social dislocation, moreover, 
could more easily be accepted in the rapidly industrialising nation with the appearance of new, 
seemingly impersonal and neutral, modes of regulation. Legal domination, manifest in a single 
centre of institutional political power, was dependent on the modem separation of public 
administration from private authority and wealth. In particular, liberal legalism, regulations 
and conventions, as well as written constitutions regularised administrative conduct in the 
emerging liberal-state public realm. 
The Legal Republic 
Law is central to making a lasting public realm. Sociologically, lawyers have been 
crucial to both the development of modem statesi0i and the organisation of capital. 102 The rule 
of law is foundational to any democratic order and, of course, goes back much further than 'the 
103 modem'. In the Greek conception, the 'work' involved in building a system of laws was in 
essence 4prepolitical', necessary to securing the structure of the public realm within which 
political action could then occur. In Arendt's words, 
The law of the city was neither the content of political action... nor was it a catalogue 
of prohibitions... It was quite literally a wall... This wall-like law was sacred, but only 
the inclosure was political. Without it a public realm could no more exist than a piece 
of property without a fence to hedge it in2 04 
Although the term 'law' would assume different meanings throughout the centuries, 105 this 
resembles one of the traditional liberal understandings of laws as constituting the boundary 
between public and private (discussed further in Chapter Two). 
100 For Arendt's account of the denigration of the term 'opinion' see On Revolution, pp. 228-232. 
101 Weber, 'Bureaucracy and Law', From Max Weber, pp. 216-221. 
102 Charles Perrow, Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 31-39. 
103 Michel Foucault, Power (edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley) (New York: The New 
Press, 1994), p. 33. 
104 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 63-4. 
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Law, however, does more than secure the boundaries between public and private. 
Drawing on the Roman understanding, law is also relational, a way of institutionalising a 
relationship of pluralistic conflict, and hence was wholly political. The Roman word for law, 
lex, as Arendt describes, 'has an entirely different meaning; it indicates a formal relationship 
between people rather than a wall that separates them from others'. 106 
The Roman conception, which was far more influential in the US system, according to 
Arendt, understood the spatial significance of the role of law in relating things that would 
otherwise be separate. 107 In other words, 'without human law the space between men would be 
a desert, or rather there would be no in-between space at all. 108 Law, however, like the 
territorial boundaries Arendt regularly analogised with law, is always fragile, but is necessary 
to provide an element of stability to the always-unpredictable character of political action and 
the frailty of human institutions. In her words, 
the territorial boundaries which protect and make possible the physical identity of a 
people, and the laws which protect and make possible its political existence, are of such 
great importance to the stability of human affairs precisely because no such limiting 
and protecting principles rise out of the activities going on in the realm of human 
affairs itself The limitations of law are never entirely reliable safeguards against action 
from within the body politic, just as the boundaries of the territory are never entirely 
reliable safeguards against action from without. 109 
Law alone could never be a match to political power; however, to focus on the question 'how 
should we strengthen the law to provide a check to political powerT is to misunderstand the 
character of power foundational to the US republic. 
For Arendt, the emerging system of law in the United States, following Rome, 
established a republican network of relations among citizenry. After Montesquieu's original 
formulation, once laws were understood in spatial terms, the philosophical dilemma of finding 
absolute authority, some 'higher' law, was dissolved, replaced by the practical political 
problem of building consent. 110 Machiavelli's concept of republican politics as dynamic, 
conflictual, and expansive is critical in this regard. 
106 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 63. fh. 62. 
107 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 189. 
108 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 304. fh. I S. 
109 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 191. 
110 Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 182-3, pp. 189-90. In contrast to the liberal emphasis, Arendt suggested laws 
should not be conceived solely as imposing 'standards and commands' by some higher authority. 
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To 'safeguard liberty' in a republican government, Machiavelli argued, would require a 
network of continual social conflict. ' 11 As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri recount, the US 
Constitution accordingly articulated a model of politics as 'constituent power... a product of an 
internal and immanent social dynamic' 112 to match the system of relational law. Public space 
would thus arise through the unending plurality of conflicts manifest in the separation of 
powers, expressed and augmented by legal constitutional procedures! 13 The principle 
underlying the revolution was that power, not law, 'arrests power'. 114 
Arendt was fully aware of the originality of this networked arrangement, in which 
public freedom depended on open political conflict. She did not, however, explicitly articulate 
5 this in terms of a logic of territorial expansion, though it was not excluded from her account. " 
"'Wherever you go, you will be a polis": these famous words became not merely the 
watchword of Greek colonization', she argued, 'they expressed the conviction that action and 
speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost 
anytime and anywhere'. 116 
Since Plato, thinkers have argued that a truly republican form of government, allowing 
direct and full participation for all, could only endure within a limited territory - the Greek 
city-state being the ideal polis. 117 Power, in the US system of government, however, seemed to 
depend on an open space in which to thrive. In the words of James Madison, 'This form of 
government, in order to effect its purpose, must operate not within a small but an extensive 
sphere... Extend that sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you 
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens'. 118 
While notions of new beginnings, human progress and expansion, natural law, and a 
continent unsoiled were crucial to the rhetoric of revolution, for Native Americans these 
assumptions required a 'profusion of law legitimating [and] energising... genocidal 
111 Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 113-17. (Book 1.3 and 1.4. ). 
112 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 162. 
113 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 164. 
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115 For an account of the imperial logic behind the America Constitution see Williams, Empire as a Way ofLife, 
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imposition'. 119 The notion of the US public realm as requiring boundless empty space could 
only be envisioned by reducing Native Americans to 'part of the natural environment'. 120 
This was possible in the complementary liberal vision, following Kant, by defining 
public identity in terms of property rights. Indians were defined as incapable of possessing the 
rights of citizenship thus legitimating the legal expropriation of their land. With the doctrine of 
terra nullis, law became a critically redeeming tool of expansion and liberal militarism in the 
violent conquest of the continent. 121 US strategists during these wars with Indian peoples often 
disregarded norms of noncombatant immunity, which were already emerging in Europe, in 
favour of the almost total destruction of entire communities. 122 
In the emerging liberal republic, law at once provided a positive rationale for political 
rebellion against the Old World and the perfect instrument of empire, patriarchy, and slavery in 
the 'New', the legal institutionalisations of which still resonate today. Law was the perfect 
instrument for as Philip Allott suggests, 'Law is the most efficient instrument for the 
actualizing of the ideal'. 123 Although the language of 'natural law' figured substantially in the 
Founders' discourse it did not, indeed could not, sufficiently stretch to include recognition of 
the Indians' rights to land. It could not if expansive republican democracy as conceived in the 
early republic were to flourish. Indeed, the law itself was proof-positive that Europeans were 
bringing forth into the 'open' terrain a superior civilization, politically, economically, and 
technologically. Intertwining well with the legal discourses of the day was, of course, racial 
discrimination, necessary if colonisation was to be squared with the language of liberty. 
The search for extra-political groundings for the public sphere, including ones based on 
, rational' law, which did not account for plurality, difference, and the contested nature of 
politics could only have been this destructive. 124 Similarly, the result of efforts to Provide 
extra-political legitimations for politics in the United States, especially through the language of 
"9 Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford: 
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technology and law, will be shown as central to justifications for the Kosovo war. But as 
Chapter Two will also suggest, the force of international legal discourses during war over 
Kosovo is more than simply consistent with the codification of law and politics in this 
founding period of the United States. 125 The expansive conception of networked power that 
justified the 'legal' expansion into Native American territories suggests the legal quandary 
represented by Kosovo can also be read, in part, as an extension of the US Constitutional 
project. What links these two apparently disparate eras and 'legal' practices, continental 
expansion and global engagement, is the open network conception of power inaugurated by the 
US Constitution. 'The idea of sovereignty as expansive power in networks is poised', Hardt 
and Negri rightly claim, 'on the hinge that links the principle of a democratic republic to the 
idea of Empire'. 126 
The Technological Republic 
If law plays only an ambivalent role in justifications for war then technology, it seems, 
is much more decisive. Integral to the endeavour of the thesis - especially the argument 
concerning the role of technology in efforts to legitimate war over Kosovo - is establishing the 
often assumed natural alliance between the values of the US state-public sphere and 
technological advance. The ascent of instrumental, 'technical' rationality has been one of the 
most distinguishing (and politically relevant features) of founding the first modem polity, in 
essence, without traditional foundations. 127 
From the original frontier in the American West to the new frontier of outer space, the 
expansion of the United States outwards has been tied up with the technological, and the 
capacity of the technological to absorb public imagination. 128 'Neither the general fear of the 
mechanical and the specific fright of accident and injury', suggests Alan Trachtenberg 'nor the 
social fear of boundless economic power entirely effaced the Utopian promise implicit in the 
"' Though it is an age-old feature of US foreign relations, this logic of expansion has most recently been re- 
articulated in the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy Document. See 
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establishment of speed as the new principle of public life'. 129 This cultural dimension of the 
power of technology is central to the account in Chapter Three of the technological discourses 
related to 'virtual war' over Kosovo. 
Though the term did not enter popular usage prior to Harvard Professor Jacob 
Bigelow's influential 1829 book Elements of Technology, the utopic impulse of liberal- 
republican ideology in the United States combined, from its very roots, with a faith in 
technology's ameliorative, progressive and future-oriented powers. 130 As Arthur Melzer, Jerry 
Weinberger and M. Richard Zinman describe, 
liberal politics and technological science began to emerge at about the same time, and 
to some extent, in the same minds. They sprouted from similar premises concerning the 
autonomy of practical and theoretical reason from scriptural or teleological absolutes, 
and they were nourished by shared hopes for humanity's progressive self-improvement 
through its conquest of the political and natural worlds. They have also supported each 
other symbiotically: liberalism protecting free and public scientific inquiry, while the 
latter generated the technological and economic growth on which the former has 
depended. 131 
What developed in the United States was a combination of romanticism and utopianism 
brought together above all by the promise of technological advance. 
This joining was not entirely unique to the US, of course - such a combination of 
sentimentalism and faith in a progressive destiny also formed the basis of Nazi ideology. 132 In 
the words of Thomas Mann, 'the really characteristic and dangerous aspect of National 
Socialism was its mixture of robust modernity and an affirmative stance towards progress 
combined with dreams of the past: a highly technological romanticism'. 133 Nevertheless, not 
simply the broker of economic progress but also the guardian of liberty, from the power loom 
adapted from the English textiles industry to assembly-line production later put to use by 
" Alan Trachtenberg, 'Forward', in Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of 
Time and Space (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986), p. xiii. 
"' Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History ofAmerican Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
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Henry Ford, 134 technological achievement has become the tool and symbol of US republican 
virtue. 
Since the War of Independence, the links between technology and republicanism have 
been fundamental to the United States' conception of itself as democratic. In the words of 
Hugo Meir, 
democracy became consciously and elaborately associated with American progress in 
the applied sciences. Evident in the early years of the Republic, this association came to 
emphasize the special role of technology in providing the physical means of achieving 
democratic objectives of political, social, and economic equality, and it placed science 
and invention at the very center of the age's faith in progress. 135 
Central to the development of this vision of republican technology - and abundantly clear from 
the literature - was the extent to which the pioneer's identity was imagined in terms of 
agriCUiture. 136 
In his Second Treaties of Government, John Locke went as far as suggesting the United 
States was the exemplification of the state of nature. 'Thus in the beginning', he wrote, 'all the 
World was America'. 137 Moreover, where European liberalism had always been associated 
with the urbane cities, Thomas Jefferson made the land, not the towns, 'the indispensable base 
of liberal democracy'. 138 Agrarianism seemed to naturally coincide with limited 
government. 139 Thus, puritan, agrarian America of the late 18th and 19th Centuries came to 
epitomise the revolutionary virtue of the newfangled republic. 140 Colonists agitating against 
British regulation could turn to the advancing technology of decentralised domestic 
manufacturers to beget an industry of indigenous, rather than foreign, wealth. This nostalgic 
and patriotic 'myth of the self-sufficiency, ' 141 has acquired national status of almost mythic 
proportions. 
` Henry Ford himself flirted with Nazism and Hitler was an admirer of Ford and his assembly line innovations, 
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Alexander Hamilton and Trench Coxe, authors of the influential 1791 Report on 
Manufactures, were keen on the extension of factory systems at accelerated pace, systems 
6manned' largely by women and children. 142 Though Jefferson remained less sanguine that the 
machine could be introduced without the polluting industrialisation of England, the widespread 
easing of Puritan cultural misgivings concerning indulgence pushed further the already 
opening door to industrial capitalism. 143 In addition to suggesting to working class whites what 
the republic could offer, the once European-centred philosophies of representative democracy 
and economic freedom were appropriated by elites in full force. Led by Adams and Jefferson, 
opinion leaders affirmed Adam Smith's laissez jaire logic, notably the liberal adage that 
collective public good could come from private vice. 144 
More than this, however, the emergence of a distinct national identity, seeming unity, 
and new form of modern subjectivity was itself fostered by the conquering of geography by 
machines. 'Mechanized by seat arrangements and by new perceptual coercions (including new 
kinds of shock), routinized by schedules, by undeviating pathways', suggests Trachtenberg, 
'the railroad traveller underwent experiences analogous to the military regimentation... He was 
converted from a private individual into one of a mass public -a mere consumer'. 
145 
A transformation of the self from a private individual into one conscious of itself as 
part of a mass public was facilitated by new mechanised schedules. According to 
Trachtenberg, 
Thus the physical experience of technology mediated consciousness of the emerging 
social order; it gave a form to a revolutionary rupture with past forms of experience, of 
social order, of human relation. The products of the new technology, as [Karl] Marx 
remarked, produced new forms of subject; they produced capacities appropriate to their 
use. In their railway journeys nineteenth century people encountered the new 
conditions of their lives; they encountered themselves as modems, as dwellers within 
new structures of regulation and need. 146 
These new railroads reduced the sense of overwhelming distance between the diverse peoples, 
entwining them into a continental web. 
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While appearing to resolve one dilemma - how to reconcile republican morality across 
a geographical expanse - technological advance posed another problem as the rural idyll gave 
way to post-Civil War industrialisation. Not all responded with uniform rapture to the spread 
of technology and the seemingly attendant glut of wealth. Even by the War of Independence, 
Jefferson had asserted, 'Our enemy has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our 
parents from first Paradise: from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us a military 
and manufacturing one'. 147 
An ever increasing 'job mentality' born of growing relative affluence seemed to 
produce individuals too assimilated to the pursuit of wealth and consumption to be responsive 
to republican citizenship. Experiments of the 'factory as republican community' certainly took 
shape, most famously as the 1820s 'celestial factory town' in Lowell, Massachusetts. 148 But to 
Arendt, like Jefferson, 'the danger was that all power had been given to the people in their 
private capacity and that there was no space established for them in their capacity of being 
citizens'. 149 
Long before the rapid industrialisation. of the 19'h Century, emerging abundance and 
republican equality for all, pace the rhetoric of the Founders and the national myth, profusely 
failed to reflect life for the majority. 150 Moreover, increasingly into the 2e Century, 
government, industry and the educational establishment began to further collude in founding a 
science of government geared towards 'problem-solving' in the extreme. 151 Such endeavors 
extended the metaphor of society as a giant machine to the technological semi-utopias of the 
workplace. Frederick Taylor's 1911 treaties, Principles of Scientific Management - though 
primarily proposed for the factory - was extended by his followers to almost every sphere of 
modem US life. 152 
In the context of Cold War uncertainty, dystopic science fiction and 'doomsday myths 
inspired by the atom bomb', 153 political writers and popular culture continued to depict the 
147 Quoted in Marx, The Machine in the Garden, p. 144. 
148 See Kassen, 'The Factory as Republican Community', in Civilizing the Machine, pp. 55-106. 
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onset of a bureaucratic 'iron-cage 9.154 In contrast to post-war liberal theorists who have been 
relatively close-lipped on the subject, ' 
55 
critical theorists reacted to the instrumental rationality 
156 increasingly associated with liberal society. The 'Political' in these visions has come to 
embody the values of 'technique' - efficiency, speed, and know-how - the methods and devices 
of the practical sciences applied to government, economy and the military at virtually all 
levels. 
Not only would modernity lead to the ever-increasing pursuit of rational knowledge in 
the scientific sphere and the rational ordering of the means of production in the economic, the 
impact on public spheres in terms of the rise of the legal-bureaucratic state would be immense. 
The situation would worsen by the systematic differentiation of spheres of knowledge and 
finther institutional reorganisation to advance instrumental rationality, where practical, 
political problems become technical issues to be scientifically resolved. 
Proving foundational to public sphere narratives of 'decline', when the United States 
embraced the broad ethics of a liberal-enlightenment response to modernity, including the 
valorisation of technology, a kind of 'politics-as-technique' emerged. As Hartz reminds us, 'it 
is only when you take ethics for granted that all problems emerge as problems of technique'. 157 
However, with most politics in the United States seemingly operating in a sphere of technical 
admmistration what becomes of public spheres? Are these critiques exaggerated? What place 
is there for effective argument and anti-war dissent if most politics is deemed merely 
technical? 
Dissent in the Liberal-Republic 
Emergency legislation, appeals to nationalism and the triumph of jingoism demonstrate 
the highly politicised nature of modem society and the major empirical function of war, even 
so-called humanitarian war, as a substantial mode of social control. 'Despite Nietsche's remark 
that "a good war justifies any cause"', as Nigel James Young suggests, 'most modem states 
154 See Weber, 'Bureaucracy', From Max Weber, pp. 196-244. 
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have sought to rationalise warmaking in fairly elaborate terms'. 158 Chapter Four will suggest in 
more detail that the expansion and measure of the legitimacy of state power is perhaps 
nowhere more acutely revealed in the urgency, speed, and concentration of state activity in the 
official public sphere during the immediate period of war mobilisation. 
All forms of political dissent, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted, in some sense 
contravene the majority's right to make binding law under the social contract. 159 Moreover, in 
times of war, rebels set themselves against the perceived needs of the administrative national 
security state; the growth of pacifism and other organised forms of anti-war dissent largely 
corresponds with the development of modem bureaucratic armies. 160 
The modem diffusion of a relatively homogenous political culture in the United States, 
sustained by mass communication as witnessed during Kosovo, has made it difficult (but also 
created new opportunities) for groups opposing war to reach and appeal to a mass audience. 
That said, traditions of anti-war activism enjoy a central place in both liberal and 'American, 
intellectual traditions, also important to the United States' perception of itself as democratic. 
In 1846, the American radical Henry David Thoreau was arrested in Concord, 
Massachusetts for refusing to pay his poll tax. Claiming he would not support black slavery or 
external wars of aggression, Thoreau radicalised Locke's notion of consent; unless he had 
assented directly he would remain unbound by any government act. 'The only obligation 
which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think is right'. 161 On the grounds of 
individual conscience no other option was possible; 'it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of 
, 162 it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support . 
Presaging an analogy powerfully drawn later by Michel Foucault, modem man, forced 
to follow the orders of industrial and increasingly mass society, seemed little more than a 
regimented soldier. 163 'The mass of men', Thoreau claimed, 'serve the state thus, not as men 
mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, 
15' Young, 'The Nation State and War Resistance, p. 14 1. 
159 Jean Jacque Rousseau, Rousseau's Political Writing (edited by Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella, 
translated by Julia Conaway Bondanella) (New York: WW Norton, 1988), p. 93. 
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constables... In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgrnent or of the moral 
sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones'. 164 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thoreau's peer, similarly argued in the US context that, 
'Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members... 
165 th Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist'. These 19 Century masculine paeans to 
radical individualism in Emerson, Thoreau, and the poetry of Walt Whitman, valorise the 
absolute priority of the heroic 'rugged' self; a distinctly 'American' conception of human 
agency and dissent seemingly found in courageous acts of rebellious self-display. 
The Lockean understanding of consent - that power could never legitimately be held 
over someone without permission'66 - is mirrored in Seymour Martin Lipset's standard liberal 
definition of legitimacy. 'Legitimacy', he argued, 'involves the capacity of the system to 
engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate 
ones for the society'. 167 In the words of Nancy Rosenblum, 'because consent is the sole source 
of legitimacy for liberal authority, liberal theorists define tyranny subjectively as a loss of trust 
rather than objectively as misgovernment'. 169 
Nonetheless, in all but the most dogmatic appraisals of the liberal tradition, the right to 
dissent against repressive authority, to refuse political allegiance to monarchical rule, was 
close to the heart of the initial revolutionary impulse - the democratic cutting-edge of 
liberalism as it emerged in the modem West. Where certain forms of dissent found a home in 
early liberal theory, the sociology and institutional origin of constitutional democracy 
incorporated features that would provide, at least in principle, crucial protection to individuals 
and groups resisting participation in war. The delineation of the checks and balances in Locke 
found expression in the US Constitution and, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence, 
concrete liberties were grounded in principles of human rights deemed universal in theory, if 
not practice. 
Moreover, for those barred these established liberties, the natural rights basis of social 
contract theory supported certain appeals to higher laws, including the religious basis of much 
164 Thoreau, 'Civil Disobedience', pp. 637-8. 
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pacifism, as well as more general considerations of justice. 169 The institutionalised freedoms 
most pertinent to anti-war activism included habeas corpus, basic religious toleration, free 
association and speech. 
Bourgeois-liberal opposition to conscription thus offered novel, secular rationalisations 
- as distinct from earlier peasant rebellions based on sheer survival - against the security states 
entitlement to dispatch of its subjects lives in war. 170 Private, spiritual, or conscientious beliefs 
about life and death - though still much in evidence in arguments against Kosovo - increasingly 
came under state regulation as it penetrated more and more areas of collective life. However, 
struggles against conscription and other more indirect forms of citizen participation in war 
could now, as a result, be expressed in terms of liberal, as well as libertarian and anarchist, 
aversions to state power in general. 
Of course, with the virtual abandonment of the draft since the Vietnam War, the 
executive branch of the US government has been able to avoid some of the more difficult 
legitimacy questions by deploying an all-volunteer, highly technological military force. 171 
Nonetheless, even today, in the age of corporate-politics and institutional compromise modem 
citizens are well within traditional liberal bounds, as Chapter Four suggests, when discarding 
conventional modes of electoral participation and take directly to the streets. 
Opposition to societal integration, including mobilisation for war, has been eroded, 
however, to the extent that modem national cultures have emerged and taken the place of 
alternative nodes of authority. Becoming especially apparent 'as a plurality of "publics"', in 
Young's words, 'has been replaced by a set of divided elites and pressure groups' 172 there has 
been a persistent tendency for peace movements to engage in pragmatic compromise indicative 
of liberal institutionalism. 
The history of peace movements in the United States, accordingly, follows a 
comparable pattern of 'civic development' underlined by T. H. Marshall: 'an initial stage is that 
closely allied with the search for toleration - and is associated with individual liberties of the 
person'. 173 A vital tactic of dissent, defending the legal right to conscientiously object relies on 
a level of administrative neutrality, an independent judiciary and separation of powers, 
1" April Carter, DirectActionandLiberai Democracy (London: Routledge, 1973), pp. 94-5. 
170 Young, 'The Nation State and War Resistance', p. 163. 
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privileged within the liberal school. These processes of legal adjudication, suggest John Whyte 
and Allan MacDonald, are 'rooted in the view that society with its agencies and instruments, is 
directed to reflecting human choice'. 174 The frequent search for legal redress by those seeking 
alternatives to war corresponds closely to the liberal-state stress on the individual and private 
dimension of the decision to publicly object. 
Examples of popular activism against NATO's war will be shown in Chapter Four to 
represent instances in which the role of liberal political culture in shaping anti-war publics is 
both reinforced and exceeded. Liberal, constitutional modes of dissent were common against 
NATO, but much more unpredictable and contingent styles of being public were also evident 
in the numerous 'counterpublics' of anti-war demonstrators. The treatment of Kosovo- 
Albanian refugees and Serb- and Albanian-American immigrants, the latter groups quite 
actively taking to the streets during the bombing campaign, will provide further evidence of the 
limitations of a straightforwardly 'liberal' reading of the development of US publics. 
Foreigners and the Republic 
The category of the 'public sphere' is a transnational cultural form, not only a Western 
articulation of bourgeois forms of representation but also constitutive of a social imaginary in 
which questions of immigration and refugees are framed. The truths and myths of the 
immigrant origins of the United States have been long functional, Bonnie Honig describes, 'as 
a variety of American institutions and values, from capitalism to community to family to the 
consenting liberal individual, are seen to be periodically reinvigorated by that country's newest 
comers, its idealized citizens: naturalizing immigrants'. 175 
US patriotic pride was evident throughout the Kosovo war and was partly produced via 
the symbolic politics of Serb- and Albanian-American immigrants and Kosovo-Albanian 
refugees. The very existence of public spheres in the United States, however, must not be taken 
for granted; the very founding of publics is in large part produced through essentially 
precarious social processes and practices. As historical and conceptual context for the 
discussion of 'foreigners' in Chapter Five, this section positions refugees and immigrants in 
historical and contemporary US public discourse as both constitutive of, and a fundamental 
threat to, the use of public space. 
174 John D. Whyte and Allan MacDonald, 'Dissent and National Sectuity and Dissent Some More', C. E. S. 
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Unlike societies based on religious or ethnic ties those who live in the United States, 
according to national legend, uniquely choose (or their ancestors once chose) to live there. 
(African slaves are not usually included in the histories of migration to America. 176) 
Nevertheless, although such narratives obscure the history of Native Americans (already there) 
and Aftican-Americans (whose ancestors never had a choice) that the US imagines itself as the 
place where the wretched can find freedom holds a power rarely lost on nostalgic writers and 
politicians. 177 
This can be witnessed in the politics of one of the most crucial intersections between 
foreign policy practice and national identity, the ability to use military force legitimately. In 
the words of Ryan, 'the public arena is... the only legitimate agency for the use of force'. 179 
This legitimacy, and alleged subsequent confidence and coherence of foreign policy, according 
to some on the political right, can only arise from US values of liberal democracy (defined as 
sequality of opportunity') rather than efforts to create a 'multicultural democracy' (defined in 
171 terms of an equal representation of diverse, especially immigrant, cultures). 
By these accounts, if liberalism holds out over multiculturalism US foreign policy will 
promote democracy and human rights and secure markets abroad. According to Henry Nau, 
individuals in America escaped race, gender, and ethnicity in the past and forged 
voluntarist groups to free slaves, emancipate women, and open the American dream to 
non-European immigrants... The traditional liberal notion of America underwrites an 
internationalist foreign policy, which promotes the spread of human rights, democratic 
institutions, and nondiscriminatory markets to all societies. 180 
But if racial, class, and ethnic divisions come to the fore, it is argued, foreign policy would 
become little more than a 'patchwork of ethnic and commercial particularisms', 181 necessarily 
eroding national interests. Indeed, whoever wins the battle over the place of gender and culture 
in US democracy, whoever triumphs for the soul of 'America, by this view, will determine the 
extent to which 'democracy is relevant to the non-Western world' 1182 
176 See Leonard Dinnerstein and David M. Reimers, Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration (4ed. ) (New 
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This narrative is based on a history that imagines any progressive results of black, 
feminist, and immigrant struggles occurring because African-Americans, women, and 
immigrants overcame their race, gender, and ethnicity - they self-abstracted - in favour of the 
liberal-bourgeois 'neutral' ideal. It relies on an image of a liberal public sphere in which 
(voluntarist groups' are assumed to operate but is a familiar story linking US democracy at 
home and hopes and expectations abroad. 
That the first white settlers founded 'democracy' in the United States and the official 
public sphere on violent conquest and slavery, expansion and annexation, is usually lost in the 
re-telling. 183 'From the beginning', suggest Hardt and Negri, 'American space was not only 
extensive, unbounded space but also an intensive space: a space of crossings, a 'melting pot' of 
continuous hybridization'. 184 The people of the republic were a new people in exodus, so the 
story goes, inhabiting the vast continental expanse. 
Others have suggested, however, that these violent practices demonstrate the existence 
of 'multiple traditions' throughout US history, rather than just an over-arching liberalism. 
Rogers M. Smith, for example, emphasises republicanism and 'ascriptive forms of 
Americanism', including racism, sexism and nativism. 185 Each of these traditions, Smith 
contends, are 'in a profound logical tension with' the tenets of liberalism. 186 This notion that 
liberal values are incompatible with less 'civilized' US traditions is common. 
'Although the conquest of the frontier', according to Arthur Ekirch, 'involved such 
features as Indian warfare, with its accompanying lapse into barbarism the sense of opportunity 
and liberation offered by the West was compensation for the temporary decline in 
civilization'. 187 IS it enough, however, to simply posit the existence of 'multiple traditions' in 
US history, as if liberal practices where in no way complicit in currently prevailing (not only 
historical) inegalitarian cultural and political norms? 
Liberal-Tocquevillian notions that 'America' was shaped, above all, by the egalitarian 
ideology of the settlers and the favourable material conditions which they found, ignores the 
"' For exceptions see Williams, Empire as a Way oftife and Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny. American 
Expansionism and the Empire ofRight (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
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fundamentally inegalitarian ideologies and conditions that have equally (if not more 
profoundly) shaped US politics and society. One testing ground on the question of whether 
practices associated with the liberal tradition are actually productive of, rather than simply 
compatible with, exclusion and violence can be found in the historical role of 'foreigners' in 
contributing to the constitution of (and contestation over) US public space. 
Though it has become more widely known since the September II attacks (but is a fact 
since the early republic) the US has historically targeted immigrants, both legal and illegal, as 
potential national security threats, enemies of the state and the American way of life. The 
Plenary Power Doctrine, for example, established in 1889, gave Congress and the Executive 
the power to make immigration policy free from judicial review. 188 As a result, the Supreme 
Court is especially deferential over 'alien' matters, recognising the ultimate sovereignty of the 
legislative branch. 
It should thus be of little surprise that immigrants often lack basic legal rights. From the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s (meant to limit alien support for the Republicans) to the 
Chinese Exclusion Laws of the 1880s and Haymarket Riots in 1886, rather than singling out 
racial and ethnic groups for the colour of their skin it has been 'the perverse effects of foreign 
political ideas, "89 as Ernesto Verdeja suggests, that constructs these groups as a public danger. 
The extent to which race has always been at the forefront of legal and political 
representations of threats from foreigners should not be underplayed. Nonetheless, aliens 
deemed a particular political persuasion, as well as an undesirable skin colour, have been 
judged treasonous and unpatriotic. The Immigration Act of 1903, for example, was designed 
principally to exclude anarchists. At the height of the McCarthyite Cold War, ideological 
purging was behind the deportation regulations in a series of immigration laws. 190 'In the post- 
war years', Arendt observed, 'the US was even considering depriving of citizenship US-born 
Americans who were communists'. 191 
The production of territorial state-publics has necessarily rested on the exclusion of 
non-citizens, immigrants and refugees in particular. Hierarchies of citizen rights, including the 
right to disobey, are constitutive of all bounded communities, but especially the mass, 
'as Ernesto VerdeA 'Law, Terrorism, and the Plenary Power Doctrine: Limiting Alien Rights', Constellations, 
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territorially defined, national state. One of the alleged rewards for belonging to a 'public' or a 
4people' is the (often fictional) guarantee of security. 
Refugees are thus illustrative of a contradiction at the heart of the modem liberal- 
democratic and nation-state project. As Chapter Five will further suggest, they are not only 
traditionally confronted with the hostility literally constricting territorial space during times of 
global or regional war. The enlightenment commitment to universal individual rights has 
proved largely incompatible with the parallel assertion of national sovereignty that rests on the 
ability to refuse citizenship or refuge to individuals or whole groups. Even with the historical 
turning point of the French Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens the entire issue of 
human rights became, as Arendt observed, 'quickly and inextricably blended with the question 
of national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one's own 
people, seemed to be able to ensure them'. 192 
No sooner were human rights deemed inalienable, solely dependent on the dignity of 
the individual that same individual, in Arendt's words, 'disappeared again into a member of a 
people'. 193 Stateless peoples without a public sphere in which to act, according to Arendt, 
showed that 'the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger'. 194 
The consequences of the historical counterpart to human rights, the assertion of national 
sovereignty, meant that when citizen rights are shattered the fundamental human rights 
(proclaimed as 'natural' or 'universal') are virtually destroyed. 195 
Human rights were revealed once again during the Kosovo war to be fragile artefacts 
wholly dependent on human conventions, in Arendt's formulation, the recognition of the 'right 
to have rights, ... to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions' 
196 
rather than one's 'ethnicityl. In an effort to move beyond the usual stifling assumptions about 
ethnicity and identity when the 'Balkans' is invoked, 197 ethnicity (like 'the people' or 'the 
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public') is not a stable identity but rather a socially and culturally constructed norm made 
non-nal by particular historical circumstances. 198 
The treatment of refugees and immigrants during wartime must be identified as part of 
the constitution of public security in the West; not simply the effort to manage the employment 
and crime issues frequently associated with their presence but the securing of an identity in 
opposition against which the liberal, normal public citizen can (usually) thankfully stand. 199 
Representations of refugees and immigrants, as Chapter Five will suggest, buttress temporal 
notions of the United States as the Promised Land and spatial images of a 'melting pot' of 
cross-cultural fusion. Several important norms constitutive of the official public sphere in the 
United States, including race, gender and economy, were sustained and revitalised through the 
politics of representing these 'foreigners'. 
Conclusion 
The 'public sphere' has been contextualised in this chapter, as an ideal category and 
normative model of democratic critique but also as a historical-sociological description of 
processes central to the development of modernity in the United States. The liberal-republican 
state with its 'official' public sphere, the rule of law, technology, dissent, and 'foreigners' were 
identified as modalities central to the way in which US public spheres have been constructed. 
By way of conclusion, the themes emerging from this analysis most relevant to how public 
spheres shaped and were shaped by the Kosovo war will be re-emphasised. 
When the Founding Fathers transcended the Christian tradition of originating 
(legitimating) the polity by appeals to God a new modern order, an essentially anti- 
foundational arrangement of power, was born. Of course, leaders did not dispel all efforts to 
construct legitimating discourses and it is in this context that the value of law and technology 
emerge as important to the analysis of the Kosovo war. The rhetoric of the ensuing political 
struggles over the future of the United States overwhelmingly centred on both the pragmatism 
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Duijzings' analysis of Kosovo as a kind of 'frontier. Ger Duij zings, Religion and the Politics of1dentity in 
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of law and the promise of technological advance as a form of security in an unfamiliar New 
World. 
These extra-political legitimations for politics have profoundly shaped the official 
liberal-state public sphere and, as Chapters Two and Three will suggest, have proved equally 
effective and ambivalent in endeavours to legitimate war. 'Because the medium of state power 
is constituted in forms of law', suggests Habermas, 'political orders draw their recognition 
from the legitimacy claim of law'. 200 Investigating the conditions of emergence of both law 
and the 'legitimacy claims' of technology in the US public domain reveals the multiple 
uncertainties surrounding these themes during NATO's Kosovo intervention. 
With Arendt, we gained greater insight into the originality of republican networked 
arrangements of power not captured by Kant or Habermas. Following Machiavelli, the 
constitutional model of a functioning and dynamic republican public sphere would require 
open political conflict to avoid the system sinking into corruption. The political and economic 
'freedom' of the settlers, Madison argued, would depend on violent expansion into the frontier, 
with the use of force and the threat of force the underwriter. 
The expansion of public spheres so central to US political, economic, and cultural 
history can be traced to more recent wars justified on humanitarian grounds. This notion of 
public sphere expansion, including by means of violence, becomes crucial to the analysis in 
Chapter Six. Deliberative, Habermasian, accounts of an emerging 'global' public realm not 
only ignores the violence in deliberative rationality, which privileges some ways of being 
public over others. It also overlooks how the effort to 'make' and expand a global public realm 
is implicated in the production of 'humanitarian' war, which is intimately connected to the 
global expansion of US-led political and economic forms. 
Arendt also allows us to move beyond the assumption of the general validity of the 
deliberative bourgeois model in the US context. Her account of the Declaration of 
independence emphasised the performative, identity creating, dimensions of public speech. 
The language of republicanism also provided an important structural framework for 
understanding modes of public-ness in the emerging body politic. In particular, when allied 
with new print techniques and attendant sense of impersonality a new public space was 
constituted for bourgeois white men, distinct from family, economy, and state. On the other 
Jorgenflabermas, The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 112. 
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hand, more socially radical efforts by women and African-Americans to self-represent in 
public spheres problematise this notion of personal abstraction central to classic accounts. 
Chapter Four will suggest the political agonism supported by numerous anti-war 
demonstrators over Kosovo supports a similar irreverence for liberal representative 
mechanisms that seek stability and closure. Chapter Five extends the argument to the treatment 
of Serb- and Albanian-American immigrants and Kosovo-Albanian refugees by suggesting that 
multiple values and institutions associated with the most cherished self-images of the 'official' 
public sphere have traditionally appeared refreshed by war and the arrival of new 'hyphenated' 
citizens. But as the analysis will also propose, the endeavour of minorities to 'be public' in the 
United States is itself becoming increasingly problematic as the private mode and growing 
centrality of body-centred politics not only undermines the public context of 'humanitarian' 
political action but also constructs immigrants and refugees as sentimentalised sites of national 
regeneration. 
The circulation of media discourses on a national scale has (falsely) sustained the sense 
in which a unitary 'official' public sphere exists in the United States, also complicating citizen 
endeavours to limit efforts to monopolise 'legitimate' violence. Sociologically, the emergence 
of the 'Yankee Leviathan' through earlier wars, the establishment of a modem bureaucratic 
state, and market economy, would provide the operating framework around which 
conventional politics would occur. Although social battlegrounds involving race, class and 
gender, have never been totally eradicated, 'normal' political affairs in the United States 
generally centre on the 'legitimate' distribution of power adjudicated by the state. 
With this in mind, Chapter Four asks whether the further institutional isation of the 
liberal-state public realm and wars fought in its name has helped signal the death-knell of 
large-scale US peace movements. Customs of anti-war dissent in the United States are still 
widespread, signifying occasions in which we can test some of the most enduring features of 
public sphere critique. These include questions about the mode of public-ness appropriate to 
anti-war activism, the effect of narratives of the 'decline' of 'the' public realm, and the 
consequences for humanitarianism of the further professionalisation and commercialisation of 
the big party machines and politics in general. 
By examining some of the key practical and normative features of public spheres in the 
US context this chapter has considered some of the historical modalities of public spheres that 
will be extended in the analysis of the Kosovo war. Public spheres are one of the places where 
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the meanings of wars are struggled over and where the weapons, laws, and refugees used to 
conduct or justify such wars are endowed with powerful symbolic meanings ('democratic', 
'liberal', 'humanitarian'). The meanings of these political symbols cannot be understood 
separately from how they are constituted in the US public domain. If it is in public spheres 
where the narratives that constitute history are partly made an 'Arendtian' reading of how 
publics shaped and were shaped by the Kosovo war might contribute to a move away from 
definitive or 'official' histories, towards a new reorientation to the past. 
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Chapter 2 
US Public Spheres, 
Kosovo, and the Force of Law 
The ambition of Rome was not to subject the whole world to Roman power and imperium, but 
to throw the Roman system of alliances over all countries of the earth. 
- Hannah Arendt' 
The historical intertwining of law and modem politics in the United States - itself a 
relationship constitutive of US public spheres - sheds light on many of the legal dimensions 
surrounding NATO's violence over Kosovo. Notions of public and private, culture and 
identity are constituted in public spheres and law plays a major role in the consolidation of 
these practices. The focus of this chapter is on direct and indirect efforts to use law to 
legitimise the Kosovo war. The central claim is that questions concerning the legitimacy of 
NATO's war in the US context must be understood in the light of how law was constitutive in 
the emergence (and maintenance) of the United States as a liberal republic both within its 
borders and without. 
From the legality of NATO's air strikes and targeting decisions to the evidence 
required for war crimes indictments the role of law during the Kosovo war appeared both vital 
and inconsequential. For some 1999 marked the 'point of transition from the classical system 
to an international constitutional order'. 2 According to JUrgen Habermas, 'the war in Kosovo 
could signal a big step on the path from the classical international law of states to the 
cosmopolitan law of a society of world-citizens'. 3 For others, Kosovo 'marked the moment 
when it became evident that force was not governed by law'. 4 
The multiple ambiguities of the law surrounding Kosovo can be revealed through an 
investigation of the conditions of their emergence in the liberal-republican US public sphere. 
Although the chapter is aware of the complex transnational origin of much of the relevant 
international law, the first section of the chapter, 'Law and the US Founding', traces the 
meanings attributed to law (whatever its complex origins) during processes crucial to defining 
'Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, [1963] 1970), p. 188. 
2 Marc Weller, 'The Kosovo Indictment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia', in Ken Booth 
(ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 215. 
3 Jargen Habermas, 'Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality', in William 
Joseph Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2000), p. 308. 
" Michael J. Glennon, Limits ofLaw, Prerogatives ofPower: Interventionism after Kosovo (New York: Palgrave, 
2001), p. 4. 
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the official US state-public sphere and thereby the emerging global order under US 
leadership. In the early republic political freedom in an open space republican democracy - 
the original US public sphere - appeared mutually dependent on expansion in the frontier. 
Through appreciating the juridical and political mechanisms by which power was extended 
across the continental expanse, as elaborated in Chapter One, we can better appreciate the 
way in which a global system of networked power, with the United States at its centre, has 
begun to form. In the words of Thomas Jefferson: 'I am persuaded no constitution was ever 
5 before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government'. 
The second section, 'International Law and NATO Violence', suggests that the war 
over Kosovo was indicative of emerging trends towards the globalization of discipline and 
punishment, the very essence of law. Michael Byers suggests we are witnessing post. 
September 11 'the US serving as global lawmaker and sheriff, setting the rules and acting 
alone or at the head of a posse of compliant allies to impose discipline'. 6 The 'imperial 
tinge, 7 however, was already evident with Kosovo. Building on the interventions of the 
1990s the United States has sought to create an exceptional regime where international law 
constrains all other actors except itself and closest allies. Where on occasion the 'local 
strongman' may still enjoy the support of US power, Yugoslav President Milosevic's open 
defiance of the demand to tone down reprisals against KLA guerrilla violence invoked 
imperial wrath. The United States took great pains, however, to avoid the appearance of 
needing to rely on international law to justify its use of force. On the other hand, it was 
extremely difficult for US officials to admit that the bombing was illegal. 
Legal discourses during Kosovo shaped the military intervention in a far more 
ambivalent manner than information technology (as discussed in Chapter Three). The 
ambivalence of liberal citizens facing the law, upholding law in the pursuit of justice but 
always aware of the distinction between the two, both disparaging and reverent, pervades US 
culture. 'American political history', as Paul Goodman suggests, 'consists spectacularly of 
' Quoted in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 200 1), 
p. 160. 
6 Michael Byers, 'Teffor and the Future of International Law, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (ed. ) Worlds in 
Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 125. Examples include the 
pulling out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the rejection of International Criminal Court jurisdiction over US 
military personnel; withdrawal from a biological weapons treaty; the rejection of the Geneva Convention as a 
bench to judge the treatment of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay; the destruction of the Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change; and the unilateral imposition of steel tariffs. 
7 Byers, 'Teffor and the Future of International Law', p. 125. 
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illegal actions that became legal, belatedly confirmed by the lawmakers. 8 The third section of 
the chapter, 'Law, Liberal Democracy and Punishment', interrogates the material and 
discursive logic by which legal questions in the US context help sustain, and in turn are 
sustained by, the socio-legal legitimation of violence in the United States. In doing so, we can 
record the extent to which legal discourses in one important example are reliant on a 
considerable number of unspoken assumptions concerning the distribution of social and 
public resources. Liberal legalism, as critical legal scholars have consistently shown, encodes 
the history of state power, capitalism and gendered and racialised distributions of power and 
resources 9 and can be traced to more recent practices of 'humanitarian' war. In the words of 
Friedrich Kratochwil, 'legal norms provide particularly powerful justifications for certain 
political choices. Legal norms, therefore, figure prominently in defining issues and in 
legitimization and delegitimization attempts'. 10 
In the current geopolitical context the only law of major significance to the United 
States is domestic law and as we will see in Chapter Four, Clinton defeated the principle 
domestic legal challenge - that the executive had broken the 1973 War Powers Act and the 
Constitutional provision that war necessitates the approval of Congress. Law was (and is) a 
crucial tool for individuals and groups dissenting against liberal state violence and this will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. But Byers's claim (hope? ) that 'the international rules and 
institutions rejected... [by the United States government] are more consistent with the 
founding principles of the US than the imperialist principles to which they subscribe"' is 
mistaken. 
As understood by Machiavelli and Hannah Arendt, the open network conception of 
power and Roman understanding of law that inspired the US Constitution, as elaborated in 
Chapter One, is the axis point relating the liberal-republican public sphere to the idea of 
expansion. 12 By their own estimation, the 'genius' of imperial Rome, as the Americans also 
8 Paul Goodman quoted in April Carter, Direct Action and Liberal Democracy (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 
139. 
" Jerry D. Leonard, 'Transgressive Postmodernism: Prolegomenon to a Radical Legal Studies', in Victor E. 
Taylor and Charles E. Winquist (eds. ) Postmodernism: Critical Concepts, Vol. IV (London: Routledge, 1998), 
F6 S. 
Friedrich V. Kratochwi 1, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions ofPractical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1), p. 206. 
11 Byers, 'Terror and the Future of International Law', p. 127. 
12 Hardt and Negri have also elaborated this idea, first appreciated by Arendt, in Empire, pp. 160-72. 
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believed, was in the founding principles of the city. 13 The position of the United States in the 
emerging global order gains greater coherence when placed squarely in light of the 
codification of law and politics during the defining, founding period of the US Constitution. 
The final section of the chapter, 'From Just War to Global Police', does not suggest 
that the internal (continental) expansion of the liberal system (and the attendant massacre of 
indigenous peoples) in some way caused the expansive tendency of the United States in the 
international arena. Rather, it is suggested that the disciplinary coercion central to producing 
liberal citizens in the early republic demonstrates many of the tendencies currently evident in 
international forms of law. Just War rhetoric and assumptions about the 'humane' nature of 
liberal warfare during Kosovo served to reproduce and justify US imperial violence and its 
identity as a liberal democratic regime. 
If 'American_ power' and the 'empire of capitalist democracy' seem almost naturally to 
fit, as G. John Ikenberry suggests, 14 then wars fought in the name of humanity to expand this 
empire are part of the historically evolving international system favouring US global power. If 
'humanitarian' violence is seemingly so crucial to the establishment of a global constitutional 
order (according to Habermas and others) is it here that we must look for its roots. 
Understanding these processes is crucial to reconciling ourselves to the consequences of the 
socio-legal construction of 'legitimate' violence over Kosovo. 
Law and the US Founding 
If we have to use force it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We 
stand tall. We see farther into the future. 15 
- US Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
Philip Allott has suggested that law 'makes the public realm' which is itself crucial to the 
, 16 
actualisation 'of the legal potentiality in international society . As suggested in Chapter One, 
however, law may be the exterior appearance of a political community but it is entirely 
dependent on it; law provides the boundary of the public realm. It is not constitutive of the 
13 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 21 1. 
14 G. John Ikenbcrry, 'American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy', Review ofInternational 
Studies, Vol. 27, special issue, (2001), pp. 191-212. 
15 Albright on the use of cruise missiles against Iraq in 1998 quoted in Chalmers Johnson, Blowback (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2000), p. 217. 
16 Philip Allott, 'Globalization from Above: Actualizing the Ideal Through Law', Review ofInternational 
Studies, Vol. 26, Special Issue, (2000), p. 72. 
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public sphere itself or of public sphere activity. 17 There is no origin of law beyond human 
power. As E. H. Carr writes, 'Law cannot be self-contained; for the obligation to obey it must 
always rest on something outside itself. It is neither self-creating nor self-applying'. 18 Within 
the framework of public spheres, law instantiates a relationship between people, as Arendt 
suggests, which also 'harbours' and 'encloses' political life. ' 9 
Natural law, however, as Arendt would remind us, was no better at providing a legal 
foundation to political relations in a republic than absolutism or appeals to God. 'For the 
trouble with natural law', she wrote, 'was precisely that it had no author, that it could only be 
understood as a law of nature in the sense of a non-personal, superhuman force which would 
compel men anyhow, no matter what they did or intended to do'. 20 Onlypositive law, rather 
than ius naturale, could offer some sense of a tangible social reality. 21 Accordingly, it was 
important that the Constitution be a tangible written thing. In Arendt's words, 
The seat of power to them was the people, but the source of law was to be the 
Constitution, a written document, an endurable objective thing, which, to be sure, one 
could approach from many different angles and upon which one could impose many 
different interpretations, which one could change and amend in accordance with 
circumstances, but which nevertheless was never a subjective state of mind, like the 
will. It remained a tangible worldly entity of greater durability than elections or public- 
opinion polls. 22 
What the Founders aimed do to, then, as suggested in Chapter One, was transcend not only the 
rule of George III but also the Christian tradition of otherworldly authority. 23 
The modus operandi of law, 'the paradigmatic discourse of modernity, 24 is to be at 
once prudent (and judicious) in means while abstract (and ideal) in scope. The wide-open 
American continent 'discovered' by the settlers was deemed unspoiled by human history and 
" This point is actually imminent in Allott's own argument when he describes law, along with cultural artefacts, 
as providing the 'substantialform' of society. Allott, 'Globalization from Above', p. 65. Emphasis added. 
13 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years'Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study ofInternational Relations 
(London: Macmillan, [1939] 1954), p. 178. 
'9 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 64. 
20 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 190. Ideologies of natural law only stepped into the breach during 17'h and 18 th 
Centuries as a reaction to the collapse of divinity as a source of political authority. Arendt, On Revolution, p. 190. 
21 Hannah Arendt, Yhe Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, [1951] 1958), p. 464. See Jeremy 
Waldron, 'Arendt's Constitutional Politics', in Dana Villa (ed. ) The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 216, &. 20. 
22 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 156. 
23 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 186. 
24 Margaret Thornton, 'The Cartography of Public and Private', in Margaret lbornton (ed. ) Public and Private: 
Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. S. On the legal formalism of liberalism see 
Nancy Rosenblum, 'The Law of the Heart versus Liberal Legalism', in Another Liberalism: Romanticism and 
the Reconstruction ofLiberal Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 34-56. 
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thus could be ordered, as Robert Ferguson describes, 'through a correct, theoretical application 
of man-made or positive law in harmony with the natural law around them'. 25 'In a developing 
nation obsessed with its own future glory', he continues, 'no audience could be held by the 
traditional forms and rhetoric of the past'. 26 Both ideologically and structurally the texts in the 
United States central to liberal-republicanism's reliance on reason and the force of law gain 
consistency from the legal rhetoric and aesthetic by which they were underpinned. 'In 
America', Thomas Paine could proclaim in 1776, 'the law is king'. 27 
Law, to extend Arendt's words on political action more generally, has the ability to 
'create new relations and realities'. One of the central new 'realities' to emerge during the 
revolutionary period, of course, was the belief that providence had judged the New World of 
'America' to be the 'Promised Land'. 28 Such a division between Old and New still resonated 
during Kosovo. For Michael Wines, the conflict 'only underscored the deep ideological divide 
between an idealistic New World bent on ending inhumanity and an Old World equally 
fatalistic about unending conflict'. 29 
Chapter Three will discuss the extent to which beliefs in liberal progress as being 
technological progress have become part of US political culture and crucial in accounting for 
practices of humanitarian --var. Similarly, the assumption that 'America' was the last hope for 
human progress served to endow man-made law with both cosmic overtones and the 
appearance of common sense. Lawyers, not the clergy or military, became the natural talking 
heads of republican revolution, the first but not last worshippers of the US Constitution. 30 
The seeming achievement of the lawyers was their ability to articulate a new 
governmental apparatus of control in the absence of an established past. Jacques Derrida has 
labelled this kind of founding political moment an instance of 'interpretative violence. '31 In his 
words, such an appeal to law can claim to be 'neither just nor unjust [as] no previous law 
23 Robert Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 
Fý16. 
Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture, p. 23. 
17 Quoted in'Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture, pp. 1 1-33. 
28 Walter A. McDougal, Promised Land, Crusader State: TheAmerican Encounter with the World Since 1776 
(New York: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1997). 
29 Michael Wines, 'Two Views of Inhumanity Split the World, Even in Victory', The New York Times, June 13, 
1999. 
30 Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 198-200,205. 
31 Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michael 
Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds. ) Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 13. 
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could guarantee or contradict or invalidate' its legitimacy. 32 The Nietzschean trick, of course, 
rests in the performative act of instituting law without reference to any pre-existing authority 
or sub . ect. 33 In Arendt's formulation, 'those who get together to constitute a new government 
are themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do what they have set out to 
achieve'. 34 Once this is accomplished, however, it seems harder, as Derrida continues, to 
4criticize this same violence since one cannot summon it to appear before the institution of any 
preexisting law: it does not recognize existing law in the moment that it founds another'. 35 
Thus in contrast to the violence intrinsic to law that is literally enforced on a daily 
basis, the violence inherent in the founding moment of a democratic republic ironically takes 
on the appearance of being the 'Immortal Legislator, 9,36 exterior to the prevailing distribution 
of power. Law and justice, therefore, did not appear as merely the product of pre-existing 
social and economic power, a force that could manipulate law to its own end. 37 The 
interpretative and literal violence is that, in the moment of founding, law and the institution of 
new socio-economic power relations appear simultaneous. 'Legal formulation', as Ferguson 
confirms, 'both created and capped the conservative American Revolution: it provided the 
rationale for rebellion even as it blocked the continuum of revolution with the archetypical 
patterns of a new order. 38 
Law, therefore, could be positioned following John Locke and the liberal tradition more 
generally as a 'constant and lasting force', derived from the command of society and not the 
state. 39 Where Hobbes had previously asserted that Truth (state power) makes Law, with Locke 
and the emergence of liberal republican society in the United States the origin of legal codes 
could be de-institutionalised and set apart as the emblem of society, not the state. 
In a reversal of Hobbes' image of the Leviathan as the supreme lawgiver securing the 
necessary conditions for civil society to emerge, Locke's narrative, followed closely by the 
Founders, was launched with the people assembling first and then agreeing to representative 
32 Derrida, 'Force of Law', p. 13. 
33 For Nietzsche, the self, in this case the legal self, is only constituted in the practical activity. '[Tlhere is no 
'being' behind the doing... ', he famously wrote, '... the doing is everything'. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of 
Tragedy and Yhe Genealogy ofMorals (translated by Francis Golffing) (London: Anchor Books, [1887], 1956), 
178. 
Arendt, On Revolution, p. 184. 
35 Derrida, 'Force of Law', p. 40. 
36 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 185. 
37 Derrida, 'Force of Law', p. 13. 
3'Ferguson, Law andLetters inAmerican Culture, p. 15. My italics. 
39 John Locke, Two Treaties of Government (with introduction and notes by Peter Laslett) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 343. 
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government through the social contract . 
40 This non-institutionalised conception of political 
development, though historically suspect, allows the liberal rule of law to (falsely) appear 
independent of political rule. 
The normative discourse of public opinion and political culture, the public sphere, 
could thus be imagined as cohering around and deriving force from social norms more 
generally, an account central to much contemporary socio-legal theory. 41 'In the "law", the 
quintessence of general, abstract, and permanent norms', Habermas suggests, 'inheres a 
rationality in which what is right converges with what is just; the exercise of power is to be 
demoted to a mere executor of such norms'. 42 Legal codes, according to this liberal view, 
were conceived as the legitimate organisation of public opinion. 
Margaret Somers suggests, however, that 'this was less the law in any institutional 
form as it had in fact developed historically from medieval Rule of Law (e. g. administrative 
courts and the principles of justice such as 'just wage') and more the law now defined as 
general and abstract norms'. 43 Liberal theorists could accomplish this feat of sociological 
revision because as an historical point constitutionalism was indeed asserted in the course of 
rebellion against an executive foreign power. In April Carter's words, 'a political theory 
which stressed the role of law had as its foundation myth a violent and glorious revolution'. 44 
However, all law depends on violence and violence regularly occurs with the explicit 
45 (and sometimes implicit) authorisation of law. Law is enforced and enforcing. As Derrida 
describes, 'there is no law without enforceability, and no applic4bility or enforceability of the 
law without force, whether this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or 
interior, brutal or subtly discursive... coercive or regulative, and so forth'. 46 If law 'functions 
"0 Margaret R. Somers, 'The Privatization of Citizenship: How to Unthink a Knowledge Culture', in Victoria E. 
Bormell and Lynn Hunt (eds. ) Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study ofSociety and Culture 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 153. For a critique of social contract theory applied to the 
early republic see Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 168-73. 
41 See Michael Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds. ) Habermas on Law and Democracy. Critical Exchanges 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
`2 Jargen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [1962] 
1991), p. 53. 
43 Somers, 'The Privatization of Citizenship', p. 153. 
44 Carter, Direct Action and Liberal Democracy, p. 94. 
45 Austin Sarat, 'Situating Law Between the Realities of Violence and the Claims of Justice: An Introduction', in 
Austin Sarat (ed. ) Law, Violence, and the Possibility ofJustice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200 1), 
pi 3. 
4 4 Derrida, 'Force of Law', p. 6. 
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as a metalanguage beneath which all other languages are subsumed 947 in the United States, 
what do the varying modes of legal discourse surrounding the Kosovo war reveal about 
practices of law and violence in the official US public sphere? The violence in law is 
sustained by its social organisation into public and private norms, its effective articulation of 
principles, norms and procedures exterior to both violence and law. How were legal 
discourses used - in both brutal and subtly discursive ways - to publicly legitimate violence 
over Kosovo? 
International Law and NATO Violence 
Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary: 'We have problems with our lawyers. ' 
Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State: 'Get new lawyers'. 48 
Since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 1990-1999 wars in the former Yugoslavia there 
has been much talk about international punishment for crimes committed during war. The 
&world', according to the editors of one text, 'is witnessing a move to law' . 
49 Despite the fact 
that powerful states have frequently superseded the 'right' to sovereignty of weaker states and 
that western jurisprudence was effective in subordinating the rights of colonial subjects, 50 
discourses and institutions linked typically with domestic jurisdictions and structures are 
becoming increasingly commonplace (and celebrated) across the globe. 
The US and European response to the lengthy and multiple Yugoslav wars have, of 
course, provided a major impetus. During the Bosnian war, the relatively stunning speed in 
1993 by which the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
established created a supranational institution with independent decision-making powers to 
override Balkan state sovereignty. 51 For one legal scholar this move to prosecute those 
accused of serious humanitarian law violations helped make possible 'the primacy of law over 
considerations of policy' thus constituting 'radical changes in the international constitutional 
47 Victor Taylor, 'Postmodernism and the Double Question of the Frame: The Adjudication of Art as Policing 
and Silencing of Dissent', in Victor E. Taylor and Charles E. Winquist (eds. ) Postmodernism: Critical Concepts, 
Vol. IV (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 69. 
Quoted in Michael J. Glennon, 'How War Left the Law Behind', The New York Times, November 21,2002. 
Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Introduction: Legalization 
and World Politics', in Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter (eds. ) Legalization and World Politics 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 200 1), p. 1. 
50 Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns and Quasi Sovereigns, andAfticans: Race and Se? f-Determination in 
International Law (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
51 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Strugglefor Global Justice (London: Allen Lane, 1999). 
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order'. 52 The refusal of the US to participate in the permanent International Criminal Court 
(ICC) established on I June 2002 at The Hague would seem to belie this expectant claim. 
Nonetheless, the public event of a trial and the establishment or reestablishment of the 
rule of law can facilitate conflict resolution and for many bring about a sense of justice and 
finally peace. 53 Although the sheer scope of atrocities can sometimes make trials seem 
irrelevant this was perhaps not so with Kosovo. Arendt suggested of the Holocaust that some 
gare unable to forgive what [they] cannot punish and... are unable to punish what has turned 
out to be unforgivable'. 54 Where several have (absurdly) tried to analogise Kosovo and the 
Holocaust, 55 one difference is that the alternative to forgiveness, punishment, factored greatly 
in the global response. 
Since the 1990s the Security Council in a series of resolutions relating to crises as 
diverse as Northern Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1992-5), Somalia (1992-3), Rwanda (1994), Haiti 
(1994), Albania (1997), Kosovo (1998-9), East Timor (1999), Sierra Leone (1999-2000), and 
the United States (2001) frequently condemned violent acts as violations of international 
humanitarian law. 56 It would seem, as Adam Roberts has claimed, 'the law of war is acquiring 
a role as a trigger for military action'. 57 The Security Council has frequently censured 
participants in a conflict for breaching international humanitarian law and this has acted as a 
justification for military intervention. 
Debates raged during the Kosovo campaign (and still do) as to whether the initial 
decision to bomb the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was justified in accordance with 
international law especially given NATO's failure to seek Chapter VII Security Council 
approval. According to Michael Ignatieff, in typically exaggerated language, this was the 
52 Weller, 'The Kosovo Indictment', p. 207,208. 
53 Martha Minow, 'Institutions and Emotions: Redressing Mass Violence', in Susan A. Bandes (ed-) The 
Passions ofLaw (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 265-8 1. 
54 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 24 1. 
55 Richard Cohen, 'A Look Into The Void: Kosovo as Holocaust Analogy', 1he Washington Post, April 16, 
1999; Charles Babington, 'President Pleads for Support: Clinton Cites Hitler, "Ethnic Cleansing"', The 
Washington Post, March 24,1999; Lee Hockstader, 'Holocaust Memories Contribute to Israeli Ambivalence on 
Kosovo', The Washington Post, April 1,1999. 
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$only issue of political legitimacy to arouse discussion'. 58 In what can only be a generalisation 
given the findings of Chapter Four, Ignatieff continues, 'All of the opposition to the war 
throughout the world focused on NATO's failure to abide by the letter of the Charter'. 59 
Although overstated, this claim is also telling of the level and content of political contestation 
surrounding international law, as well as the role of the UN in a US dominated world. Much 
of the legal debate in the United States on the significance of Kosovo did centre on this 
question of authorisation. 
Contrary to popular perception, the United States was decidedly reluctant to resort to 
legal justifications for its use of force over Kosovo with the main defence presented by 
Britain. 60 'We are in no doubt', claimed British Defence Secretary George Robertson a day 
after the bombing commenced, 'that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal 
justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstance 
to avert a humanitarian disaster'. 61 
There are several reasons why the United States has not felt obliged to frame violence 
in such explicitly legal terms. One contributing factor may have been an ICJ ruling in 1985. 
In the case of Nicaragua v. United States the Court stated that, 'while the United States might 
from its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, [the Court 
believes] the use of force could not be an appropriate method to monitor or ensure such 
respect'. 62 The US had been aiding the Contras and claimed human rights violations on the 
part of the Nicaraguan government as justification for its acts. However, if US officials were 
loath during Kosovo to dignify international jurisdiction over their armed forces, law 
nonetheless played a major role, as we shall see, in other more indirect efforts to legitimate 
the campaign. 
Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter explicitly prohibit intervention in the 
domestic affairs of another state, as well as outlaw the threat or use of force except in self- 
defence or in exceptional circumstances when the Security Council so permits. Article 2(7), 
however, does permit intervention if authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VH. 
Article 53 of the Charter also avers that, 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
58 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual Wars: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000), p. 1 8 1. 
59 Ignatieff, Firtual War, p. 182. 
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arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'. In 
the words of Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, 
I have many times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo that under the Charter 
the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace 
and security - and this is explicitly acknowledged in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Therefore the Council should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of 
force. 63 
Although Chapter VII recognises the right of the Security Council to act in the event of a 
threat to 'international peace and security' no international treaty unequivocally 
acknowledges the right of military action to halt or prevent violations of human rights (when 
taken through the competent organs of the UN). 64 
The preamble to the UN Charter, as well as Articles 1 (3), 55, and 56, does entail a 
legal obligation on member-states to promote human rights. However, as Simon Chesterman 
has rightly pointed out, the wording 'clearly privileges peace over dignity: the threat or use of 
force is prohibited in Article 2(4); protection of human rights is limited to more or less 
hortatory provisions of Articles 55 and 56 9.65 
Between 1998 and 1999 it was unanimously agreed by the Security Council that Serb 
forces had committed gross and systematic violations of human rights in Kosovo and that 
these actions represented a threat to 'international peace and security'. Although technically 
Kosovo is in the domestic jurisdiction of the FRY, it was asserted in 1995 by the ICTY 'that it 
was "settled practice" that Chapter VII powers could be invoked to address purely internal 
armed conflicts as a species of "threats to the peace"'. 66 
President Bill Clinton, in his Address to the Nation on the day of the initial bombing 
raids, stated this 'threat' in the starkest possible tenns. According to Clinton, 
Sarajevo, the capital of neighbouring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War 
I and the Holocaust engulfed the region. In both wars Europe was slow to recognize 
the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just 
" Statement of the Secretary-General, Press Release SG/SlvV 6938,24 March 1999 in Heike Krieger (ed. ) The 
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imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could 
have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. 67 
That the United States might be acting to preserve its (and NATO's) global reputation once 
coercive diplomacy had been instigated against the FRY and that strategic regional interests 
were of a second-order level was not central to public debate in the US. (This contrasts with 
Europe where the concern for the ftiture of NATO was and is seen as a more urgent 
priority. 68) 
According to one critic, since Vietnam '[a]mbiguity and nuanced political objectives 
have acquired an equally ill repute'. 69 Nonetheless, the view that Serbia's escalating counter- 
insurgency campaign against the KLA risked spreading conflict to Albania, Macedonia and 
the more fragile situation in Bosnia was widespread enough to make the 'regional stability' 
argument plausible as well as adding something of a strategic rationale to the concern for the 
human rights situation on the ground. 70 
But the overwhelming focus of US officials' polemical justification for bombing was 
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. 71 Accordingly, during the first two weeks of the war, 
when US military Psyops were working with CNN, the news network produced thirty articles 
for the Internet. 'An average CNN article', according to one media study, 'had seven 
mentions of Tony Blair, NATO spokesmen like Jamie Shea and David Wilby or other NATO 
officials. Words like refugees, ethnic cleansing, mass killings and expulsions were used nine 
times on the average. But the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (0.2 mentions) and the 
Yugoslav civilian victims (0.3 mentions) barely existed for CM%72 
67 President Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation, Washington D. C., 24 March, 1999 in Heike Krieger (ed. ) 7he 
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The principal defence NATO offered was that its actions were taken on behalf of the 
international community to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. 73 That this was consistent with 
Resolutions 1160,1199 and 1203 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter provided 
extra 'legal' support, though it is an open question whether in their absence NATO would still 
have acted. Nonetheless, NATO maintains its position that these resolutions imposed 
mandatory obligations on the FRY that they consistently failed to carry out. 
This was witnessed most dramatically, NATO argued, in Milosevic's public refusal to 
allow the ICTY Chief Prosecutor access to the Racak massacre scene in January 1999, as well 
as his negative response to external monitoring at the Rambouillet peace talks (discussed 
further in Chapter Four). The most widespread view among politicians and commentators 
alike was that 'Yugoslavia had violated a mandatory peremptory norm of international law', 
according to Ingrid Detter, 'thus a rule ofjus cogens, regarding the duty of States to refrain 
from genocide and gross violations of human rights'. 74 
To publicly demonstrate this end, the US State Department, media, and several 
commentators freely attributed to the situation in Kosovo one of the most 'emotion-laden 
words in diplomacy and international law. 75 Based on a Nexus database search of the Los 
Angles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, and Time between 1998 and 
1999 the term 'genocide' was applied to Serbia/Kosovo 220 times, including 41 times on the 
front page. 76 This compares with the case of Indonesia/East Timor over a period of nine years 
where the word was used 33 times, with 4 on the front page. During the one unambiguous 
case since the Genocide Convention, Rwanda 1994, following the Clinton administrations 
73 For a sympathetic reading of NATO's justifications see Nicholas 1. Wheeler, 'Reflections on the Legality and 
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lead, much of the press under-reported the scale of the atrocities and rarely used the 'G- 
word'. 77 
But it was, of course, politically imperative that NATO corroborated its claims about 
Milosevic's crimes. Contrasting with the situation in East Timor where the UN implored the 
US but failed to obtain their forensics expertise, 78 the moment KFOR arrived, Kosovo was 
inundated with skilled forensics to prove NATO's claims of atrocities. During the actual 
bombing raids, human rights observers, war crimes investigators and journalists all scattered 
throughout Kosovo to find evidence of mass graves and 'genocide'. 
Mostly this took the form of retrospective justification given that most atrocities 
occurred after and as the anticipated consequence of the bombing. 79 Another contrast to the 
speedy arrival of forensics experts was the US refusal to supply a weapons disposal team, for 
fear of setting a precedent, to remove the 15,000 unexploded cluster bombs (used to shut 
down Serbia's power source 8) . By April 2001, over five hundred civilians had been killed or 
injured by these bombs. 81 
Extremely controversial, but again bolstering NATO's legal case, was the 24 May 
1999 decision by the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, to charge the most senior 
members of the FRY leadership with crimes against humanity, including murder, persecution, 
and the forced deportation of 740,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. 82 Just a few weeks 
prior, the State Department had warned several Yugoslav commanders they would face 
prosecution. 83 The strategic consequences of the indictments were immense which for all 
77 Samantha Powers, 'A Problemfrom Hell'. America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 
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practical purposes prohibited any early-negotiated deal with Milosevic now an international 
pariah and leader of a criminal regime. 84 
An example of the discursive enforcement of law in this instance was the wearing 
down by prosecutors and journalists alike during the war of the general presumption of 
'innocent until proved guilty'. During domestic murder and rape trials journalists are rarely 
accused of prejudicing a case before conviction by describing the accused as 'criminal'. 
Throughout the Kosovo war, however, Milosevic was consistently described an 'indicted war 
criminal', a categorisation classical legal systems would never endorse. 85 
One effect of the indictment was to dispel doubts among many US citizens about their 
16 troops continuing Balkan involvements, though later it raised concerns that US military 
personnel and political leaders might also be the subject of such trials. 87 Also contrasting 
greatly with the often-principled refusal to do so in domestic terrorist trials such as Northern 
Ireland, several journalists who covered Kosovo willingly handed over evidence to NATO 
and the ICTY as well as act as trial witnesses in the later proceedings. 88 
But the allegations of atrocities could now be presented as not 'figments of NATO 
propaganda. Instead the allegations had been confirmed by a body', Marc Weller writes, 
'which was a creature of the UN Security Council, the international organ exercising primary 
responsibility in relation to international peace and security. The tribunal could claim 
objectivity'. 89 
The British also suggested there was evidence to show Milosevic enjoyed a 'close 
relationship' including military ties with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. US officials were 
unconvinced about the degree of these alleged links9o though this did not halt their 
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simultaneously bombing the FRY and Iraq on the basis of eight-year-old UN Resolutions. 91 
Other similarities between Saddam. and Slobodan were also not lost on the US government 
and media. Nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency visited the 
Vinca nuclear reactor (albeit on Yugoslavia's request) to forestall accusations that Milosevic 
was breaking international law by beginning weapons programmes or selling materials to 
Iraq. 92 
It was reported that the Yugoslav army stocked chemical weapons and that some of 
the non-lethal variety had probably been used. 93 Though it could not be independently 
verified, reports too emerged alleging that Serb forces attacked the KLA using gas and that 
this had affected Kosovo civilians. 94 Moreover, in what was alleged to be a systematic 
campaign to destroy evidence that could be used against them in trials NATO charged that 
Serb forces had exhumed mass graves and removed the bodies of hundreds of Kosovo- 
AlbanianS. 95 
Headlines like 'Judges at the Hague Refused to Halt the NATO Bombing'96 also 
served to bolster NATO's claims in the eyes of 'the law'. On 29 April 1999 the FRY appealed 
to the World Court to institute proceedings against individual member states to halt the 
bombing campaign. 97 (The action was against member states rather than NATO because it 
cannot act as a respondent before the ICJ. 98) By 2 June, however, ICJ judges had already 
declared that they were not able to 'exercise jurisdiction' in the case as well as declined to 
consider claims for payment for war damages sustained by the FRY. 99 According to one legal 
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scholar this must 'surely represent a "surprisingly narrow interpretation" by the Court of its 
own jurisdiction and powers. Indeed, the decisions are without precedent in this respect'. 100 
After the bombing had ended, ostensible consideration was given by the ICTY as to 
whether NATO had committed war crimes. However, according to the Final Report of the 
Committee established by the Prosecutor, 'either the law is not sufficiently clear or 
investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate 
charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous 
offences'. 101 It is doubtful that the ICTY would have had at their disposal the necessary 
forensic expertise to acquire 'sufficient evidence to substantiate charges'. 
The report did, however, assume 'that the NATO and NATO countries' press 
statements are generally reliable and that explanations have been honestly given'. 102 This 
judgement was perhaps hasty given Anthony Cordesman's opinion that, 'Much of the data 
NATO provided during the war were originally intended more to serve propaganda purposes 
rather than be used for serious analysis'. 103 (The role of the media in shaping public 
perceptions of the war is discussed ftirther in Chapter Four. ) 
Although there was no direct Security Council authorisation of the bombing campaign 
some have argued that the defeat of the draft resolution tabled by Russia, Belarus and India 
condemning NATO's acts as a breach of Article 2 (4), 24 and 53 of the Charter demonstrates 
a level of tacit acceptance by the international 'society of states'. 104 Despite the fact that 
previously the Security Council has left global opinion with little doubt concerning 
authorisation with a series of explicit resolutions concerning Iraq in 1991105 and Bosnia in 
100 Thomas Bruha, 'The Kosovo War Before the International Court of Justice -A Preliminary Appraisal', in 
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... international Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report in to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FRY, PR/P. I. SJS 10-E, 13 June 
2000 in Heike Krieger (ed. ) The Kosovo Conflict in International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999 
Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 352. 
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1995, retrospective validation now appears adequate. (The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997 may be an earlier 
example). 
The Security Council rejected Russia's resolution twelve to three. Voting in favour 
were Russia, China, and Namibia. Voting against were the NATO members, the United 
States, Britain, France, Canada and the Netherlands as well as Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia and Slovenia. 106 In the words of the Indian spokesperson, 'the 
international community can hardly be said to have endorsed their actions when already 
representatives of half of humanity have said that they do not agree with what they have 
done'. 107 
One possible outcome has been the 'unspoken agreement', according to one report, 
that in exchange for Russian acceptance of the bombing campaign the United States would 
tone down its criticism of its actions in Chechnya, as well as allow a Russian role in post-war 
regional reconstruction. 108 To NATO's embarrassment this was something Russia militarily 
ensured when two hundred troops drove from Bosnia to Kosovo and triumphantly secured 
Slatina airport without notifying NATO and cheered on by local Serbs. General Wesley Clark 
reportedly ordered General Mike Jackson to take the airport, but Jackson refused for fear of 
starting 'World War Three'. 109 
The desire for public legitimacy seems crucial to accounting for the ambiguous but 
sustained US effort to demonstrate in equal measure both the atrocities of the other side and 
legitimacy of the bombing campaign while also avoiding the explicit appearance of relying on 
law to justify violence. When the leader of the UN mission to Kosovo found 'indisputable 
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evidence' of ethnic cleansing and 'ample evidence' of the success of NATO strikes things at 
last seemed to be going NATO's way. ' 10 
Moreover, when human rights lawyers announced that Yugoslavia's decision to 
promptly try the three US soldiers (Staff Sergeants Ramirez and Stone and Specialist 
Gonzales) captured along the Yugoslav-Macedonian border violated the Geneva Convention 
covering prisoners of war, this evidence was widely contrasted to the legal treatment by the 
US of their Yugoslav counterparts. "' According to Pentagon officials, once the US captives 
had been duly paraded on Serb state TV they were kicked and beaten with rifles. 112 Why has 
law, even when apparently broken, seemed such an effective tool in securing public assent? 
Law, Liberal Democracy and Punishment 
The ambivalence US citizens have generally felt towards law, its capacity to justify 
both rebellion and repression, has manifest itself in multiple ways and partly accounts for the 
apparent success of US official discourse regarding Kosovo and the law. The mythology of 
the outlaw or vigilante, for example, the notion that justice can be done by breaking the law, 
provides a staple theme in US popular drama as well as recent accounts of humanitarian 
war. 113 
While Europeans scoff at the conformity of much of US society there is undoubtedly a 
greater popular sense of rebellion, the possibility of radical change and the pursuit of justice, 
the mythologisation of gangsters. As Anne Norton describes, 
The traditional revolutionary admiration and affection for the outlaw shows itself even 
in those series where the protagonists represent the law. Police officers on television... 
and the Founding Fathers in rebellion, often do justice by breaking the law. Their 
transgressions mark them as the agents not merely of the law but of justice... The 
pursuit of justice is marked as an enterprise distinct from the enforcement of the law, 
accomplished sometimes through, sometimes despite, the law's agents. 114 
The figure of Justice, blindfolded with a sword in the right hand and scales in the lefý is 
widespread in the United States. In popular culture the image holds such iconographic power 
because, as Taylor suggests, 'it can be easily identified as "justice", it appears as a 44natural" 
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part of our political environment... the truth it speaks is that the legal system is blind to 
"extraneous" factors... and in effect, all are (formally) equal before the blindfolded figure'. ' 15 
Law, then, whether in the national or global domain, is built on a vast construction of 
representations, 116 and is also implicated in favouring some ways of being 'public' over 
others. As Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge have suggested, 'All bourgeois forms of the 
public sphere presuppose special training, both linguistic and mimetic. In public court 
proceedings, in dealing with officials, it is expected that all parties involved that they be 
concise and present their interests within forms of expression fitting to the official context'. 117 
The cultural power of law can be fimther witnessed in the ever-growing US litigation 
industry where trial lawyers win massive compensation payments in personal injury lawsuits. 
These trials have in effect taken the place of redistributive legislation in a country suspicious 
of more organised labour, itself a product (discussed in Chapter Five) of the 'personalisation' 
of the liberal public domain. 118 The contemporary United States is more comfortable with 
televised intimate suffering and individual testimony, taking the lead in what has become a 
more general trend in the West of a 'politics of anecdote', 119 than the more politicised 
struggles of whole races, classes, and genders. The first US war of this kind, perhaps, was 
Vietnam -a victims' war thus defined above all by TV. 
120 The sentimentalised coverage of 
Kosovo-Albanian refugees and the 'freed' women of Afghanistan more recently is also part of 
this trend. 
The 'national' public sphere in the United States more generally is obsessed with 
intimacy, not without repercussions for our analysis of Kosovo. That the official public sphere 
was gripped by the most intimate life of the Commander-in-Chief for months prior to the war 
is only the most trivial example. 121 Mirroring an argument to be made in Chapter Five, the 
i's Taylor, 'Postmodernism and the Double Question of the Frame, p. 66. 
116 Norton, Republic ofSigns, p. 143. 
117 Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and 
Proletarian Public Sphere (forward by Miriam Hansen, translated by Peter Labanyi, Jarnie Owen Daniel and 
Assenka Oksiloff) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1972], 1993), pp. 45-6. 
118 For efforts to move beyond this see Stanley Aronowitz, 'Unions as Counter-Public Spheres', in Mike Hill and 
Warren Montag (eds. ) Masses, Classes, and the Public Sphere (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 83-10 1. 
9 Nicholas Lemann, 'The Newcomer', The New Yorker, May 6,2002, p. 83. 
"" Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 200 1), p. 3 7. In contrast, Bruce Curnings suggests 
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121 Some even argued that Clinton bombed Serbia as a distraction from 'Monica-Gate'. See Mona Charen, 'Why 
We are in Kosovo', Jewish World Review, April 19,1999. See 
htlp: //www. iewishworldreview. com/cols/charen04l999. asp [downloaded on October 9,2002]. 
91 
collapsing of public and private 'into a world of public intimacy, ' 122 as Lauren Berlant would 
claim has been constituted in the United States most thoroughly through the medium of law 
and the diffusion of punishment. The historical development of criminal punishment in the 
United States, more particularly, is intimately linked to political authority and the 
legitimisation of power and violence more generally. These practices, the next section argues, 
resonate in ways that illuminate US global police actions such as Kosovo. 
Crucial to the emergence of legal codes in liberal societies was the distinction between 
the inner (private) and outer (public) self. Once institutionalised, this move, according to 
Margaret Somers, 'forever imprinted on our political imaglinations a binary spatial divide 
between public and private'. 123 In a move that made the non-political sphere the single realm 
of true liberty the private autonomy of individual rights bearers had to be created if the status 
of legal (public) persons were to exist. 
Without these classical freedoms, as Habermas recounts, there 'would not be any 
medium in which to legally institutionalize the conditions under which citizens could 
participate in the practice of self-determination'. 124 If individuals had native or natural rights, 
as Locke had argued, then a tolerant society must distinguish between appropriate political 
persuasion and legitimate coercion. The use of force against citizens could only be legitimate 
in defence of the public good. 
The traditional liberal concern that the state should not interfere with individual 
freedom coincided with debates among 'humanitarian' social reformers in the early republic 
regarding how people were to be fashioned into subjects appropriate for democratic rule. 125 In 
the words of Louis Hartz, 'the separation between inner belief and outer work, established by 
Lockean liberals as a means of protecting the freedom of religious belief, also enabled 
authorities to influence the actions of subjects and, more fundamentally, actually to construct 
those subjects as liberal individuals'. 126 If a powerful state were feared then civil society itself 
122 Lauren Berlant, The Queen ofAmerica Goes to Washington City. Essays on Sex and Citizenship (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 1. 
"' Somers, 'The Privatization of Citizenship', p. 139. 
124 Jilrgen Habermas, 'Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights, The Post-National Constellation: 
Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 117-18. 
125 Thomas L. Dumm, Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United States (Wisconsin: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 26. 
126 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), p. 8. 
92 
would have to be responsible for social control, for creating the required 'society of 
reasonable Christians. ' 127 
Just as advanced technology was hailed in this period for its seemingly natural ability 
to create liberal subjects with republican values, capable of fostering both democratic 
individualism and personal wealth, 128 legal codes also seemed in natural harmony with this 
particular vision of the citizen. It was through 'their very specificity, their regularity', 
according to Thomas Dumm, that enabled legal codes to 'establish the modem, liberal 
democratic person'. 129 The contradictory result, despite the rhetoric of liberal discourse, was 
the politicisation of both public and private. 
Liberal norms of citizenship and economy in the United States, themselves built on 
assumptions concerning public and private, were to a large extent consolidated via the penal 
system at the beginning of the 19th Century. More than any other industrialised nation, the 
United States has historically relied on the penitentiary to maintain public (and private) 
order. 130 As Elliot Currie describes, 'short of major wars, mass incarceration has been the 
most thoroughly implemented government social program of our time'. 131 Moreover, as 
Nfichel Foucault has convincingly demonstrated, judicial systems - where wrongful behaviour 
is determined and punished - are a major technique by which modem society defines types of 
subjectivity and forms of truth. 132 During the 19'h Century, for example, a whole system of 
factories was organised across the United States on the model of the penitentiary. 133 
Prisons do a great deal of ideological work for modem forms of governance being the 
exemplar, only the most symbolic institutional form for converting individuals into a 
productive force. Of course, the establishment of the legal apparatus (including the whole 
series of attendant policing institutions, surveillance and rules) was a major contributor to the 
127 Dumm, Democracy and Punishment, p. 84. 
128 John F. Kassen, Civilizing the Machine: Technology andRepublican Values in America, 1777-1900 (New 
York: Grossman Publishers, 1976). 
129 Dumm, Democracy and Punishment, p. 84. 
130 'By the late 1980s the United States had surpassed the then authoritarian governments in the Soviet Union 
and South Africa in having the highest incarceration rate in the developed world... This expansion, for the most 
part, was not fueled by a great increase in serious crimes'. Jonathan Simon, 'Refugees in a Carceral Age: The 
Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the United States', Public Culture, Vol. 10, no. 3 (1998), p. 577. 
131 Eliott Currie, Crime andPunishment in America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), p. 21. 
132 Michel Foucault, 'Truth and Juridical Forms', Power (edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert 
Hurley and others) (New York: The New Press, 1994), p. 4. 
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Penitentiary', Democracy and Punishment, pp. 87-112. 
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democratisation of sovereignty and the rule of law. However, as Foucault describes, it was 
also 'fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion'. 134 
The mainstream US public sphere has been forcibly constructed as white, normal, 
employed etc. to a large extent by law and definitions of what is legal and illegal. (Chapter 
Five will suggest that racist legal structures underpin the official US public sphere in ways 
that shaped the treatment of Kosovar-Albanian refiigees and immigrants. ) But the 
globalization of discipline and punishment, as witnessed during Kosovo, also cannot be 
understood unless placed squarely at the intersection of law and the violent constitution of 
'legitimate' public space. 
Where several have noted that any scheme for transnational democracy - the 
expansion of Western social and political forms - requires the establishment of systems of 
justice and law, 135 we must be equally attendant to the politics of global disciplinary coercion. 
Just as punishment and the expansion of penitentiaries were central to the extension of liberal 
democratic freedoms in the United States during the 19 th Century we must also account for 
the types of subjectivity and forms of truth in the emerging global order inaugurated by 
'humanitarian' war, including globally-oriented definitions of legality, democracy and rights. 
Revealed through the following examination of the resurgence of Just War discourse 
during the Kosovo intervention, which mirrors at the international level justifications for 
domestic policing, we can similarly conceive assumptions concerning liberal 'humane' 
warfare as part of the ongoing production of the legitimacy of global disciplinary coercion, 
US imperial violence. Liberal state violence is justified both through the construction of legal 
norms at the international level, including the right of the United States to break and create 
'norms', and then by 'the appeal to essential values ofjustice". This exercise is then presented 
as a police action because it was 'solicited by' 136 one of the parties involved (Kosovo- 
Albanians). 
In the United States it was widely accepted as normal that Kosovo represented a case 
of 'their' sovereignty versus 'our' humanity. 137 Backed up by evidence provided by the 
4moral police', Just War discourse fashioned a sacrilisation of war appropriate to the 
t34 Michel Foucault, 'The Juridical Apparatus', in William Connolly (ed. ) Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 219. 
133 David Held, 'Violence, Law, and Justice in a Global Age', in Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer 
(eds. ) Understanding September II (New York: The New Press, 2002), pp. 92-105. 
136 Negri and Hardt, Empire, p. 17. 
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contemporary balance of power: violence justified solely by whom it was proclaimed. 138 
However, if the means-end calculus inherent in Just War discourse is partly to blame for this 
instrumentalism, it is not new to Just War thinking. 139 What is added in this context is the 
hegemonic liberal-republican twist - the expansive US conception of power and law in the 
project of building world order. 
From Just War to Global Police 
One of the most revealing features of NATO's war was the recovery of 'Just War' 
rhetoric. 140 This tradition, originally a Christian one expounded by S4'. Augustine, has more t 
recently been exhibited in international law and most fully explicated and secularised by 
Michael Walzer. 141 Thus far the chapter has principally discussed matters concerning the right 
to fightjus ad hellum, the initial decision to intervene. This section moves the analysis tojus 
in bello, what is right to do in war. 
Jus ad bellum has typically been conceived as a war waged by a legitimate authority, 
for a just cause in the last resort with at least a moderate chance of success. Forjus in bello, 
the means ought to be proportional to the ends, the evil incurred in conducting war cannot be 
greater than the evil it was designed to relieve, and those deemed 'innocent', usually non- 
combatants, should be spared (or at least not deliberately targeted). The tension betweenjus 
ad bellum and jus in bello can be summed up with Walzer's expression, as the 'dilemma of 
winning and fighting well: the military form of the means/end problem, the central issue in 
142 
political ethics' . 
Even if morality gives leave to fight it might also refuse the right to do what is needed 
to win. 'In any struggle... ' Walzer writes, 'the rules of war may at some point become a 
hindrance to... victory'. 143 Judged only by their numbers, however, the presence of NATO 
military lawyers during the Kosovo bombing demonstrated a desire to create the appearance 
138 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 13. 
139 For Arendt's brief discussion ofjust and unjust wars see On Revolution, pp. 12-13. 
140 William Jefferson Clinton, 'A Just and Necessary War', The New York Times, May 23,1999; Wheeler, 
Saving Strangers, pp. 34-6; Melanie McDonagh, 'Can There be Such a Thing as a Just War? ' in Ken Booth (ed. ) 
7lie Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 289-94. 
"' Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (2ed. ) (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992). 
142 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. xxx-x)od. Also see Ken Booth, 'Ten Flaws of Just Wars', in Booth (ed. ) The 
Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 314-24; Chesterman, 'Ile Just 
War: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention', in Just War or Just Peace? pp. 744. 
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of resolving this tension. 144 While such lawyers played little or no role in assessing targeting 
decisions during Vietnam, 145 throughout the Kosovo campaign legal opinion concerning the 
Geneva Convention standards for each deployment (scrutinised on an ad hoc basis by as 
many as nine people in different locations) brought their public function of adding 
'legitimacy' to violence to an unprecedented height. 146 
Strategists, of course, were quick to complain of the repeated indecision by civilians 
inflicted on the otherwise efficient military machine. 147 The foremost issue, of course, was 
whether air assaults were sufficiently discriminatory between 'military' and 'civilian' targets. 
Article 48 of the 1948 Geneva Convention states, 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objects and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 
With legal assessments of each target seemingly built into the computerised process, and 
civilians 'micro-managing' to an extent not seen since Vietnam, it appeared as though war 
was at once clinical and liberal if the lawyers so agreed. 148 
However, the assumption that precision equalled cleanliness was more plausible (if it 
ever wasj during the early stages of the conflict. In early May, NATO hit the Yugoslav power 
grid with graphite bombs disabling the generators which caused the transformer to short out 
for less than twenty-four hours. A few weeks later less fancier kit took out the entire grid. "9 
Nonetheless, so apparently humane (and cultured) were NATO strategists that while 
bombing Belgrade, as alleged by Christopher Coker, 'they refused to target one of 
Milosevic's residences because it contained a Rembrandt painting. Instead, they designated it 
150 
a historic cultural site'. Simon Jenkins, in contrast, has pointed precisely to NATO's 
6crimes against civilization', the deliberate destruction of important Serb cultural sites such as 
'"Dianne Molvig, 'Military Lawyers: A Sense of Duty', glisconsin Lawyer, Dec. 2001, Vol. 74, nol2. See 
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145 Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. 197. 
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the atrium of the Banovina Palace in Novi Sad, as well as approximately forty listed churches 
and monasteries (including one under consideration as a UNESCO World Heritage Site). 151 
Others were also less sanguine. According to Nelson Mandela, 'NATO's actions are 
equally criminal with those of Milosevic'. 152 Human Rights Watch (HRW) was similarly 
concerned about NATO's apparent violation of international humanitarian law. ' 53 Article 57 
(2) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention states 'an attack should be 
cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that... the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated'. 154 
According to HRW, however, the use of cluster bombs near highly populated areas 
indicated inadequate concern for avoiding civilian losses and lack of discrimination between 
civilian and military targets. The latter was witnessed most controversially with the 
destruction of Serbian Radio and Television buildings that killed sixteen people, 155 as well as 
the targeting of heating plants, and bridges while also not giving due warning of impending 
attacks. 
Lawyers and law professors, including the American Association of Jurists, made a 
formal complaint to the Hague Tribunal. As well as alleging violation of the UN Charter, the 
Geneva Conventions and the NATO treaty itself, the list of possible crimes included, 
wilful killing, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly, employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons to 
cause unnecessary suffering, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity, attack, or bombardment, by whatever 
means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings, destruction or wilful 
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and 
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science. 156 
151 Simon Jenkins, 'Not War But Vandalism', The Times, May 7,1999. 
152 Quoted in Lord Rees-Mogg, 'Flying Above the Law', The Times, May 31,1999. 
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The level of environmental destruction was also deemed excessive. Refineries, fertiliser 
plants, and petrochemical plants were repeatedly targeted leading to sulfur dioxide emissions 
contributing dramatically to the levels of acid rain. 157 The UN discovered sizeable amounts of 
mercury that would have had a likely affect on the water and fish supplies. NATO's bombing 
of a car factory also freed high levels of polychlorinated bipheryls. 158 
This kind of long-term environmental damage was given no official reckoning in the 
'After Action Review'. 159 Indeed, according to one relatively sympathetic critic, Cordesman, 
the official US account 'is a travesty... Lying by omission is not unusual, but US government 
reporting is rarely so lacking in basic integrity and content'. 160 Also omitted was any 
calculation of the level of 'collateral damage' or the impact of weapons such as cluster 
bombs. 
That such grave contradictions between ends and means seem to have arisen during 
Kosovo is perhaps surprising given Ignatieff s determination mentioned earlier that the 
majority of legal debate centred on NATO's slighting of the UN. Indeed, this is doubly so 
given widespread assumptions that the conduct of war for the West is becoming more not less 
, humane'. The next chapter will discuss in more the detail the function of information 
weapons technology on the ability to present warfare to US publics as clinical, liberal, and 
humane. It is worth considering at this juncture some of the ethical and legal consequences of 
accounts of 'humane warfare' as it pertains to Just War and public legitimations of violence. 
During Kosovo, suggests James Der Derian, 'the killing was kept, as much as it was 
technologically and ethically possible, virtual and virtuous'. 161 According to Coker, 
Public opinion would not allow the targeting of Serbia's cities or civilian population 
on the scale it had in 1941 when Belgrade was last bombed... Post-material societies 
fight post-material wars - they try to avoid the material (human and environmental) 
damage which was essential to warfare for two millennia. They are intent on 
sanitizing war, on purging it of those elements which though once familiar and 
accepted without question, now cast it in a light that is offensive to the liberal 
conscience. 162 
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Indeed, the so-called 'norm of noncombatant immunity' much-hailed in recent 
constructivist 163 and 'humane warfare' literatures would also seem to belie claims of a liberal 
tension between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Colin McInnes has suggested, for example, 
that 
This sudden return to the just war niceties of non-combatant immunity is not to be 
solely explained by humanitarian or moral concerns. Rather it is because since we - 
the normal citizens of the West, going about our every day business - are not directly 
affected by the war, then citizens of the enemy state should not be unduly affected 
either by making them targets. A tacit bargain has been struck. 164 
Tacit indeed. How, for example, could the decision to deploy only air strikes be consistent 
with the declared humanitarian end? 
Debates occurred during the bombing campaign concerning the justness of developing 
combatant immunity by flying above 15,000 feet. Zero battle deaths for NATO personnel 
potentially left hundreds more civilians dead. 
165 Admittedly 'It is far from clear', as suggests 
Cordesman, 'that lowering the altitude ceilings earlier and more broadly would have achieved 
any decisive tactical effects'. 
166 However, tactical decisions concerning how best and quickly 
to secure Milosevic's capitulation is a different question to how best to protect the lives of 
Kosovo-Albanian and Serb civilians. A rapid reaction force of NATO soldiers on the ground 
even - as early as 
March 1999 might have reduced the numbers of civilian deaths. 
Approximately 2,500 had been killed during the previous two years of the Serb/Kosovo- 
Albanian civil war. After the bombing commenced approximately 10,000 died. 167 
The assumPtion that liberal citizens would not tolerate any loss to their armed forces 
thereby undermining the safety of those presumed to be 'saved' touches on a contradiction 
inherent to the 'Just War' defence of Kosovo. (It should be noted that this conjecture about 
public attitudes is as yet unproven in wars justified principally as 'humanitarian'. As 
Cordesman suggests, 'American politicians and the media seem to be more sensitive to 
casualties per se than the public. ' 
168) Nonetheless, the assumed terms of the seeming 
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democratic legitimation of the intervention (no NATO casualties) constrained the justness, 
the justification, of its methods. 169 
Democratic power, in the words of Arendt, 'derives its legitimacy from the initial 
getting together rather than from any action that then may follow. Legitimacy, when 
challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justiffication relates to an end that lies 
in the future'. 170 Richard Miller similarly draws the distinction between legitimation, which is 
based on democratic support, and justification, which is based not so much on the political 
procedures determining consent for an action but rather whether the action itself 'is morally 
17 
sound' The only politically legitimate methods (or so PrCosident Clinton calculated) 'were 
not the morally preferable ones'. 
172 
From a humanitarian point of view this basic tension betweenjus ad bellum andjus in 
bello is, as Hilaire McCoubrey described, 'the fatal defect of "just war" theory. ' 173 In other 
words, although the two dimensions of the theory form part of a whole, in terms of military 
strategy they ought to be property treated as entirely distinct. For example, even if we 
accepted (for the sake of argument) that NATO's motives were sufficiently embedded in 
humanitarian concerns (! us ad hellum) to justify military intervention, the use of aerial 
bombardments Yus in bello) utterly undermined this. For the reality was, as Jean Bethke 
Elshtain argued, NATO's strategy flew 'in the face of a centerpiece of the just-war tradition - 
"noncombatant immunity"'. 174 
Indeed, NATO's strategic choice damaged one of the legal advances of international 
law in terms of a public-private distinction. The laws of war have always safeguard the 
distinction between (public) combatants and (private) non-combatants. Given the 17'h Century 
Western origin of international law as an adjunct to the modem sovereign state it is perhaps 
not surprising that, as Hilary Charlesworth describes, international law itself 'rests on a 
variety of distinctions between public and private worlds'. 
175 
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Most obviously, as witnessed in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, this consists of areas 
internal to the domestic jurisdiction of states (private) and issues of international concern 
(public). For Charlesworth, however, 
combatants, an almost exclusively male class, receive much greater protection than 
non-combatants. Within the weaker regime developed to protect non-combatants, 
there is a further gendered distinction: particular harms that women face are regulated 
in a more attenuated way than those faced by non-combatants in general. 176 
Mirroring the norm within national jurisdictions where 'domestic' (private) violence against 
women is deemed less important ('not surprisingly', as Ruth Gilmore would note, 'the case 
law establishing aggressively violent standards consists exclusively of incidents in which 
white men killed white men' 177) international law has similarly neglected the violence that 
unevenly affects women. 178 
Nonetheless, the appearance of liberal war as lawful and humane war (bolstered by the 
recent addition of rape to the list of potential war crimes) has been a pivotal assumption in 
literatures alleging a major transformation in the Western way of war. One of the 'most 
striking' features of war at the turn of the millennium, according to one analyst, 'has been the 
extent to which governments have justified their actions by reference to international law'. 179 
An inference drawn from this widespread view is that the use of force has declined in 
acceptability within the West; 'force may only be used in extreme circumstances, McInnes 
claims, 'and if sanctioned by international law'. 180 
A more accurate image, however, would draw attention to the extent to which the use 
of force for the United States has effectively become routine. By March 1999 the FRY was 
the fourth target of US air strikes (after Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq) in a period of eight 
months suggesting that recent US military history more accurately, in the words of Andrew 
Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, 'is, first of all, a story of unprecedented... activism'. 181 if 
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international law figured in US calculations any subsequent 'validation' was perhaps equally 
routine. 
In the words of Richard Falk, 'with respect to war, contemporary IL [International 
Law] appears to offer either foolish legalisms that are ignored or manipulated by the 
leadership of dominant states... or the silent lawyers leaving the arenas of policy choice and 
decision to the unimpeded discretion of geopoliticians'. 182 The December 1998 air strikes 
against Iraq were justified in terms of Security Council resolutions passed seven years 
hence. 183 Such claims are also no doubt bolstered by the incongruous linguistic diversion of 
government's refusing to call the Kosovo war a war. Indeed, these two phenomena are not 
unrelated. As Brien Hallet observes, 
So far as international law is concerned, both war and peace are now formal 
categories, lacking substance and reality. When journalists report that war is ravaging 
Vietnam or Bosnia or Somalia or Nicaragua, the jurist must correct them by pointing 
out, first, that technically it is not a war but an armed conflict that is ravishing the 
countryside and, second, that because there is no war, only an armed conflict, peace 
reigns in this country - so far as international law is concerned, which is no doubt a 
great comfort to all concerned. ' 84 
All such efforts to search for a definition of war, as well as basic humanitarian imperatives, 
are obscured by the Kosovo interventionist's rhetorical 'Just War' claims. 
Moreover, the democratic consequences on the ability of anti-war counterpublic 
spheres to emerge, as discussed in Chapter Four, are great. With insufficient prior grasp of the 
principles of just war citizens cannot, in the words of John Rawls, deter their governments 
'handy appeal to [its] practical means-ends rationality'. ' 85 Justifying 'too much, too quickly', 
just war doctrine allows governments to hush moral dissent, simply becoming one more 
consideration to be balanced in the scales. This is even more likely if the current reliance on 
air power continues. 
By uncovering some of the places where the tensions in liberal/legal discourses are 
manifest in the United States and widely accepted as normal, the chapter has principally 
described the legal discursive practices in operation. While the chapter has not refrained from 
judging the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the discourse per se, it has not engaged in the debate 
"'Richard Falk, 'International Law and International Relations: Collaboration and Tension', Cambridge Review 
ofInternationalAffairs, Vol. 12, no. 2 (1999), p. 19. 
183 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? p. 22 1. 
1" Brien Hallet, Yhe LostArt ofDeclaring War (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 94. 
"I John Rawls, The Laws ofPeople (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 102. 
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over whether a 'right' of humanitarian intervention actually exists in international law. This is 
perhaps wise given that humanitarian intervention, as Chesterman describes, $amounts... to a 
lacuna in the enforceable content of international law'. ' 86 Indeed, the question of whether a 
'right' exists in either the UN Charter or customary international law is, to borrow 
Chesterman's words, 'of secondary importance to the implications that these arguments have 
for world order and international morality'. 187 
It would certainly seem that the UN delegation function, where its decisions are acted 
upon by willing states rather than the other way around, has been reduced to a mere 
formality. 188 As Hedley Bull was well aware, 'there exists an intimate connection between the 
effectiveness of international law in international society and the functioning of the balance of 
power'. 189 In the context of US global hegemony the significance of the declined efficacy in 
constraining the United States but enhanced calling forth of law by the United States (to 
condemn the actions of others) would not have been lost on Bull. 
Notwithstanding the extent to which increasing numbers of social theorists have aimed 
to be self-reflexive concerning power, it is manifestly in the domain of law that these analyses 
reveal themselves as often legitimating liberal state violence in a wider and more problematic 
sense. 190 The abstract universalistic law appealed to by Habermas and his followers disowns 
the violence of its origins and even the less opaque turmoil produced by its effects. in 
operation, these accounts look to juridical institutions as alternative political justifications so 
that the role of violence looks juridical. After all, law always announces its violence to be 
legitimate. Chapter Six will build on this argument to suggest that where an understanding of 
the changing role of war must accompany accounts of the emergence of so-called 'global' 
public spheres this must not preclude analysis of the way in which the very invocation of an 
incipient global public can itself be productive of violence. 
'" Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? p. 2. Also see Edward C. Luck, 'The Enforcement of Humanitarian 
Norms and the Politics of Ambivalence', in Simon Chesterman (ed. ) Civilians in War (London: Lynne Rienner, 
200 1), pp. 197-2 IS. 
I" Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? p. 6. Ct William Glaberson, 'Legal Scholars Support Case for Using 
Force', The New York Times, March 27,1999. 
188 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? p. 165. 
119 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society A Study of Order in World Politics (New york: Columbia University 
Press, 1977) p. 13 1. 
19' See Jdrgen Habemas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and 
Democracy (translated by William Rehg) (Cambridge: Polity Press, [ 1992] 1996). 
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Conclusion 
Law plays a central role in the diffusion of public and private norms as well as 
providing the structure around which public spheres are constituted. The relationship between 
law and war in the Kosovo case can partly be understood, the chapter has suggested, by how 
law shaped the historical development of the official US public sphere. Law, especially penal 
law, was constitutive in the emergence of the United States as a liberal republic by producing 
citizens suitable for liberal democratic rule. In turn, 'humanitarian' intervention 
internationalises the very essence of law, discipline and punishment, suitable to US global 
rule. The enforceability and applicability of law is dependent on force, to include direct 
physical violence and more symbolic and discursive modes of exerting power. It is through 
expanding on this insight that the chapter has shown how law in the US public sphere shaped 
and was shaped by efforts to legitimate the Kosovo war. 
The ambiguous relationship between law and legitimacy accounts for the continued 
effort by the United States to employ legalist rhetoric to undermine Milosevic and opponents 
of the bombing while also circumventing the need to rely on any specific international law 
itself. That the United States went against international law by not seeking a Security Council 
Resolution is not inconsistent with some of the most honoured traditions of the country; the 
rebellious outlaw in a corrupt and repressive world challenging the law in the pursuit of 
justice is a staple theme in US culture. 
It has been assumed by some scholars that the persistent and regular breaches by the 
United States of international law are not in keeping with some of the oldest democratic 
traditions of the country. This chapter has suggested that the opposite is more accurately the 
case. This is not to spend time arguing that the Founding Fathers were explicit that when the 
United States reached its full potential it would walk the world stage undaunted (though in 
fact this was the case'91) but that the Roman idea of the open expansion of power in 
republican networks, which inspired the US Constitution, is consistent and partly dependent 
upon its throwing over the world a system of laws and alliances which produced this 'great, 
republic. 
If power in the United States, understood as circulating between countervailing 
networks, was not to collapse into corruption then expansion first into the frontier and then 
'91 See Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making ofthe Constitution 
(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1987). 
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across the globe was essential. The continent 'discovered' but above all ordered by the settlers 
allowed lawyers to articulate the republican governmental apparatus of control in the absence 
of authoritative principles. The 'interpretative violence', 192 however, was the way in which 
law was then reinterpreted by the liberal tradition as a 'constant and lasting force' (Locke, 
Habermas), originating from society. 
In other words, societal norms, contrary to the actual sociological development of 
legal systems, were imagined as coming together within the public sphere as abstract law, 
instantiating a vast array of assumptions concerning public and private when codified, and 
making violence appear legitimate. But these liberal norms of what it meant to be a good 
citizen had to be produced; they did not simply arise out of a natural democratic disposition. 
The development of criminal punishment in the United States, to a not inconsiderable degree, 
fashioned people into liberal subjects. No other industrialised nation has depended on prisons 
to maintain order more, to designate and constitute 'legitimate' public space. In the modem 
period, the seeming dependence of politics on the force of law, always in some sense violent, 
meant that the rhetoric of the founding period was highly legalistic, profoundly shaping 
political struggles to come. 
The globalization of disciplinary coercion, US global police actions, and concomitant 
intemationalisation of political authority (including decisions about who is and is not subject 
to its rule) is similarly constitutive of contemporary global power and subjectivity. In other 
words, 'Specific disciplinary practices', borrowing the words of Thomas Dumm, 'constitute 
the modem humanitarian project, which is expressed theoretically in the ideal values of liberal 
individualism and democratic equality'. 193 These values were expressive of the legitimating 
norms of military globalization, the extension of European and US social forms. 
As Chapter Three will now suggest, the extent to which accompanying beliefs in 
liberal progress have been conflatcd with technological progress and become part of the 
culture of US public spheres is crucial to accounting for practices of humanitarian war. in the 
(somewhat exaggerated) words of Patricia Limerický 'the American public has... completely 
accepted... the notion that the American frontiering spirit, sometime in the... [19'h Century], 
picked itself up and made a definitive relocation - from territorial expansion to technological 
192 Derrida, 'Force of Law', p. 13. 
193 Dumm, Democracy and Punishment, p. 26. 
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and commercial expansionip. 194 Notwithstanding the inherent ambivalence with which many 
US citizens have viewed technology, like law, the persistent faith in some of the presumed 
ameliorative effects of technology ('efficiency', 'progress', 'speed') has never been seriously 
challenged. So tied up as technology has been with the consolidation of the liberal state-based 
public realm, the ideology of technological advance has created a 'boundary condition' to 
match liberal-republicanism-195 That is, a system of values and conditions without which no 
serious alternative has been able to radically diverge. 
194 Quoted in David E. Nye, Narratives and Spaces: Technology and the Construction ofAmerican Culture 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), p. 160. 
195 Liberal-republicanism has been portrayed as the historical boundary condition of US politics. See J. David 
Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
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Chapter 3 
Remote Control: 
Information Technology, Public Spheres, and Kosovo - 
Mankind owes its existence not to the dreams of the humanists nor to the reasoning of the 
philosophers and not even, at least primarily, to political events, but almost exclusively to the 
technical development of the Western world. 
- Hannah Arendt' 
The technologies used to conduct and mediate the debate about the Kosovo air campaign 
embodied the socially constituted values of US public spheres. This chapter suggests some of 
the ways in which public spheres in the US context shaped both the military application and 
public understandings of the newest generation of weapons systems. To do this, we will look at 
practices of humanitarian war from the vantage point of a wider cultural and political history of 
technology and war to examine practices central to US public spheres, both 'official' and 
$counter', partly productive of 'humanitarian' war. The technology described has a double 
meaning. A cultural and social as well as a material phenomenon, machines and systems of 
machines have shaped patterns of political thought and military action, but also public spheres 
have partly been constituted by technology. 
Contra both the Frankfurt School Left and Heideggerian Right, however, modem US 
politics and society cannot be reduced to 'merely the political manifestation of technological 
ratjonalism'ý But neither is technology politically neutral .3 Modernity 
is an amalgamation of 
contingent economic, political, social, cultural and technical dimensionsý Though technology 
5 is not uniquely modem the modem might be uniquely technological. The cultural politics of 
information technology not only coincided with many of the military dimensions of the 
Kosovo war. It was partly productive of the liberal state violence represented and the official 
US public sphere from which they mutually derived. 
Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), p. 84. 
Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, 'Preface', in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry 
Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman (eds. ) Technology in the Western Political Tradition (Ithaca, NY: Comell 
University Press, 1993), p. viii. AIrgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society. Student Protest, Science and 
politics (London: Heinemann, [1969] 1971); Martin Heidegger, 17he Question Concerning Technology and 
other Essays (translated by W. Lovitt) (New York: Harper, 1977). 
' Andrew Feenberg, Critical 7heory of Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
" William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 
5 Arthur Melzer, 'The Problem with the "Problem of Technology"', in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and 
M. Richard Zinman (eds. ) Technology in the Western Political Tradition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1993), pp. 287-321. 
107 
To make firmer these constitutive links the chapter suggests how technologies can 
acquire widespread cultural meaning. Following Paul Edwards, we 'cast technological change 
as technological choice, tying it to political choices and socially constituted values at every 
level, rendering technology as a product of complex interactions among scientists and 
6 engineers, funding agencies, government policies, ideologies, and cultural frames'. 
The first section, 'US Liberalism, Modem-Technology, and War', addresses the 
modem political context in which claims about a Politics-technology-war nexus are made in 
the United States. The interplay between US liberal-republicanism and technology, as Chapter 
one suggested, cannot fully be understood if divorced from its modem location. In other 
words, meaning can be bestowed to (and by) technologies through their complex organisation 
and adaptation to fit the much broader social whole. 
Sociologically, the increasing organisation of the scientific community into an 
extensive system of collaboration between academic, industry and military, contributed greatly 
to the emergence of the US national security state, what President Eisenhower would famously 
term the 'military-industrial complex'. 7 The cumulative result for strategy, in James Gibson's 
formulation was, 'Technowar or the production model of war [which] designates the military 
mode of strategy and organization in which war is conceptualized and organized as a high- 
technology, capital-intensive production process'. 8 
This political and sociological background, and the consequences it had on the official 
public sphere, provides the framework around which the chapter contextualises some of the 
over-hyped claims about the 'revolutionary' character of technology during the Kosovo war. 9 
One of the most enduring tropes from NATO's war was the alleged revolutionary role of 
information technology (M in both the way the war was fought and how it was represented. 
The events of 'Kosovo 1999' have been dubbed a new form of 'virtual war', 'Web War F, 10 or 
6 Paul Edwards, The Closed World., Computers and the Politics ofDiscourse in Cold War. 4merica (Cambridge, 
MA: NUT Press, 1996), p. xiii. 
7 Paul A. C. Koistinen, The Military Industrial Complex. 4 Historical Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1980). 
" James Gibson, The Perfect War. Technowar in Vietnam (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1986), p. 26. Italics in 
original. 
9 C. f. Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000); Colin 
McInnes, 'Spectator Sport Warfare', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, no. 3 (1999), pp. 142-65; James Der 
Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 2001). 
10 April Lynch, 'Kosovo Being Called the First Internet War'. See http: //www. sfgate. com/cizi. 
larchive/1999/04/15/MN38479. DTL [downloaded 26 June, 2001]. 
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more commonly the first 'Internet war. "' From computers linked to satellite positioning 
systems to unmanned surveillance drones each miraculous gadget was hailed and visually 
presented as the essence of some new age. 12 
Though much of the rhetoric concerning IT and Kosovo will be shown to be e-science 
hyperbole, the second section, 'IT and Fighting Kosovo: Historicising the Hype', suggests that 
inseparable from this talk was an important conviction; in dissecting the most advanced 
technology employed both to fight and debate over Kosovo we could pronounce on some new 
and essential quality of our time, both internationally - as allegedly the first truly 
, humanitarian' war - and technologically. 
Stealth technology and cruise missiles, global satellite positioning systems and 
advanced CM networks, electronic jamming and the destruction of computer networks all 
featured prominently in public debate of (and justification for) the Kosovo campaign. 13 This is 
not to suggest that the use of - and discourses surrounding - 'virtual' technologies were not 
exaggerated during the Kosovo war on the scale of the misrepresentation of 'smart' bombs in 
the 1990-91 Gulf War. 14 Rather it is to propose an investigation in to how the changing 
character of machines and systems of machines came to redefine and profoundly shaped the 
military intervention, US public spheres, and the relations between them. 
As a point of comparison the section addresses the attempted incorporation of Vietnam 
into the 'Western' Cold War system as a similar rationalisation (legitimation) technique for 
war; the way computers help overcome the logistical problem of micro-management; and how 
the precise accounting of strike sorties contributes to the appearance of 'rational' war. The 
position of technology in the modem context comes to construct machines, in Andrew 
Feenberg's words, as 'technically innocent, rational, stripped down to a bare causal nexus s. 15 
lbomas Keenan, 'Looking like flames and falling like stars: Kosovo: The First Internet War,. See 
an/kosovo. htm [downloaded 26 June, 2001]. 
12 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology. Technics-out-of-Control as a 71eme in Political 7hought 
(Cambridge, MA: NflT press, 1977), p. 45. 
13 Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review presented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and 
Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
October 14,1999. See http: //www. defenselink. mil/news/Octl999/bIO141999 bt478-99. html [downloaded 17 
June, 200 1] 
14 Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, 7he Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 
183. 
15 Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity., The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory (London: 
University of California Press, 1995), p. 228. 
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This is precisely the characteristically 'modem' revolt against tradition. 16 In other words, 
technologies are manifestly political and can be consciously (and unconsciously) constructed 
as such. 
During Kosovo, the seeming necessity of creating the appearance of a highly rational, 
lawful and thus liberal war, with precise reports of the number and accuracy of Allied strike 
sorties, contributed to the proliferation of computer-generated statistics of war as well as the 
impression of almost death-free fighting on NATO's part. US state-of-the-art weapon-systems 
were constructed as humane and (Iraq notwithstanding) only ever reluctantly used. The 
increasing US reliance on air power, however, reflects dominant Western norms constructed 
both internationally and in US public domains. Just as the centralised digital command and 
control systems of the 1950s partly came to symbolise the Cold War, computers and related 
weapons technologies have also come to embody the discourses of liberal-state global 
expansion via 'humanitarian' war, 'its paradoxes and failures', to borrow from Edwards' 
analysis, 'as well as its ideals'. 
17 
Most obviously, and widely commented upon, the liberal politics of high technology 
warfare produced the contradiction between bombing from thousands of feet to avoid NATO 
combatant deaths but killing hundreds of the civilians supposed to be 'saved'. 
18 NATO 
(principally US) military planners also ruled out relief flights necessary to get food to 
thousands of hungry refugees inside Kosovo because they required low-altitude airdrops. 19 
Yet, as NATO maintained the appearance of discriminating between the regime and the Serb 
population, the target list expanded dramatically especially during the second phase of 
bombing to include dubious 'dual-use' sites. 20 Indeed, the most important results of the NATO 
campaign probably had the least impact on the Yugoslav armed forces and the most effect on 
16 The 'rational', clean, ordered and symmetrical form of modem art and technology scarcely imitates the 
decorative ornamentation of pre-modem axtefacts. John F. Kassen, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and 
Republican Values inAmerica, 1777-1900 (NewYork: Grossman Publishers, 1976), p. 154. 
17 Edwards, Closed World, p. 113. 
18 Benjamin S. Larnbeth, NATO's. 4ir Warfor Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (SantaMonica, 
CA: Rand, 2001), p. 137. This is not necessarilyto acceptNATO's position that 'saving' Kosovo-Albanians was 
NATO's over-riding concern. 
19 Dana Priest, 'NATO Rules Out Relief Flights as Too Risky', The Washington Post, April 15,1999. 
20 Steven Erlanger, 'NATO Missiles Strike a Center Of State-Linked TV and Radio', The New York Times, April 
21,1999. 
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civilians, including the destruction of infrastructure, industry, bridges, fuel supplies and supply 
routes. 21 
It is crucial, however, to look not only at the practical use of hi-tech weaponry - its 
operational success or failure on the Kosovo battlefield - but also the symbolic property of the 
machines. The fourth section, 'Excursus: Technological Accidents', attempts to do both of 
these through addressing the extensive coverage paid to the multiple 'mistakes' of the war. 
What might they reveal apropos the ambivalent relationship of modem technological 
achievement to liberal individualism and the 'politics-of-technique' to the official liberal 
public sphere? Some of the most important military dimensions of NATO's actions, in other 
words, need simultaneously to be understood as technological acts and spaces of political 
subjectivity. For example, when compared with earlier coverage of the risks of aviation and the 
shock induced by railways, NATO's accidents reveal an ambivalent historical and cultural 
relationship between the so-called mechanistic age and liberal individualism. Where critics 
suggested that NATO's errors undermined the liberal-humanitarian character of the 
intervention - partly because it was fought with almost no risk to Allied soldiers - it is 
suggested that discourses of technological malfunction paradoxically served to return the realty 
of human-ness - individual daring and potential death - to the war. 
If high-technology has made 'humanitarian' wars seemingly more easy to fight, the 
appearance of the Internet as a new digital domain - the electronic agora - has aroused a 
proselytising, quasi-religious zeal of pax electronica to match (and often coincide with) that of 
humanitarian warriors. 22 The fourth section of the chapter, Tyber-Publics and War', positions 
Kosovo in the context of these wider developments, many of which were seen as transforming 
the culture of public spheres itselE How did the late 1990s culture of Usenet groups, multi-user 
domains and videogames reflect an increasingly widespread perception (if not reality) of 
spatial disembodiment, which mirrored (and helped sustain) state-public discourses of 
humanitarian war and liberal internationalist order? How did the techno-war discourse 
(popularised earlier by Desert Storm and the growing IT literature) shape reactions in US 
public spheres to this supposedly most 'liberal democratic' form of war? What role did the 
very language of newness come to play, which has seemingly come to serve in and of itself as 
21 Lawrence Freedman, 'The Split-Screen War: Kosovo and Changing Concepts of the Use of Force', in 
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (New 
york: The UN University Press, 2000), p. 428. 
22 T'homas Friedman, 'Manifesto for the Fast World', The New York T"Imes Magazine, March 28,1999. 
III 
a legitimating factor in public support of NATO's campaign? 23 To answer these questions, and 
place in context some of the hype surrounding IT and Kosovo, we need to both historicise and 
theorise how computer technology applied to war has acquired widespread cultural meaning. 
If culture and public spheres, as Hannah Arendt would remind us, are not practically 
distinct fields of activity but rather are mutually produced, then how the meanings of weapons 
and war shape and are shaped by US public spheres deserves more detailed consideration. 24 
'American weapons and American culture', as H. Bruce Franklin has shown, 'cannot be 
understood in isolation from each other. Just as the weapons have emerged from the culture, so 
too have the weapons caused profound metamorphoses in the culture'. 25 This is crucial to our 
understanding of how US public spheres shaped the war over Kosovo and how liberalism and 
technology have interacted to shape modem US public spheres. 
US Liberalism, Modern Technology and War 
Relative to the devastation imposed on the Soviet Union, Europe and Japan, the United 
States emerged as the only Great Power relatively unscathed from both World Wars. 
Moreover, both comparative isolation from European affairs prior to its 1917 entry to World 
War I and the perception that the US enjoyed a liberal 'anti-militariSt, 26 strategic culture fed 
directly into the long-standing goal of thoroughly integrating high-technology with strategic 
planning. 
27 
To make this possible, Arthur Ekirch suggests, domestic 'liberalism had to yield to the 
exigencies of revolution and to the practical necessity of consolidating and concentrating a 
measure of authority in the hands of a semi-centralized war govermnent'. 
'8 'In the United 
States, war', he remarks, 'has never been a friend of liberalism. 29 Rather than view such 
&exigencies' as a radical departure from liberal thinking and practice, however, we can 
23 See, for example, R. W. Apple Jr., 'It's the 21" Century Arriving Early', The New York 1"Imes, April 1,1999. 
24 Hannah Arendt, 'The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance', in Between Past and Future: 
Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking Press, 1968), pp. 1 97-226. 
25 H. Bruce Franklin, War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 7. 
26 For a critique of the idea that US culture is anti-militarist see Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to Retreat: 
nolence and Values inAmerican History and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
27 David Noble, 'Command Performance: A Perspective on the Social and Economic Consequences of Military 
Enterprise', in Merritt Roe Smith (ed. ) Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the 
American Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 330-346. 
28 Arthur Ekirch Jr., The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955), 
F; 38. 
Ekirch, The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism, p. 287. 
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otherwise conceive it as a reflection of a 'war and society' dynamic in its distinctive liberal- 
state mode. We see this in the post-1945 consolidation of US state power, and the attendant 
rationalisation of the official public sphere. 
Though the addition of the computer-screen, as we shall see, was novel to Vietnam, 
attempts at precision-guidance and bombing from the air - with their attendant strategic and 
moral paradoxes - also enjoy earlier incarnations at least since World War II. In the immediate 
wake of the Italian-Ethiopian war of 1935, Germany's destruction of Guernica in the 1936-39 
Spanish Civil War, and the direct Japanese bombing of Chinese civilians, Western 
commentators and strategists agreed that bombing cities was an especially fascist trait. 30 The 
fascist technique of the air mid served as an extremely effective side track, however, obscuring 
that the US and Britain were the only interwar states, though with different emphases, heavily 
31 invested in the theory and practice of strategic air war. 
Though the impact of technological advance on 'depersonalising' war had produced 
earlier and perhaps equally significant breaks with the past, such as artillery and cannon, 32 the 
bombing of cities from high-altitude was portrayed as peculiarly suited to politics of 
legitimating war to a liberal society. 33 From inception, high-altitude precision bombing, argues 
michael Sherry, promoted war 'as a matter of production and technique rather than destruction 
and killing'. 
34 In aviation especially, wartime advertising solicited the popular view that US 
efforts in Europe were as much a 'production and engineering effort' than anything else. 35 
Creative technicians could conceive bombing not only in terms of its consequences for battle 
or morality, not merely a destructive act of war, but as pure science. Liberal society in the 
30 Michael Sherry, 1he Rise ofAmerican Air Power: 77ie Creation ofArmageddon (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997), p. 71. 
31 David Maclsaac, 'Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists', in Peter Paret (ed. ) Makers of 
Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 
624-47. 
32 See William H. McNeill, The Pursuit ofPower. - Armed Force, Technology andSociety (Oxford: Blackwell, 
I qg2), pp. 8 1-9,170-5; Susan L. Carruthers, 'Review Essay: New Media, New WarT, International Affairs, 
Vol. 77, no. 3 (200 1), pp. 673-68 1. 
3' The US decision to deploy the atom bomb against Japan at the end of WWIl has been portrayed in precisely 
these terms. For a critique of this position in favour of the notion that it was a political signal to the United 
States' emerging Cold War rival, the USSR see Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the 
Architecture ofan American Myth (London: Fontana Press, 1995). 
34 Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 204. 
35 Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 126. 
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United States and the 'politics-as-technique' mentality seemed to coincide in the modernist 
strategy of air war. 36 
The uniquely close and liberal institutional ties between civilians and the emerging US 
air force were partly responsible for these visions. The National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA), established in 1915, served, as Sherry suggests, as 'the prototype for the 
mobilization of industrial and academic science during World War 11,. 37 The intimate 
association between science, air force, and industry can, of course, be viewed as a consequence 
of operational necessity. This purely functional retelling, however, misses an important 
cultural point. As Sherry describes, 'airmen - by class and education, by their relationship to 
youth, by their sheer numbers, and by the era's infatuation with aviation - were attuned to the 
demands of modem technology, organization, and civilian expertise. 38 
The whirlwind speed between the end of the second global war and the emergence of 
hostilities in a new apocalyptic Cold War meant the federal institutions in the United States 
that emerged during the early 1940s would correspond more than usual with their wartime 
heirs. Public dissent against the expansion of state power, as Chapter Four will further discuss, 
was dissipated by a perceived threat to national security. Where in earlier periods the 
emergency powers and funding granted to government in wartime were usually (though never 
entirely) confiscated with the end of formal hostilities, the emerging conflict with the USSR 
generated the apparent need both for greater internal and external political control. 
The preserving of a massive standing army in peacetime radically transformed society- 
military relations. However, national security would not demand conscription akin to the 
USSR. Alongside President Truman's 1947 National Security Act creating the Central 
Intelligence Agency and George Kennan's Foreign Affairs enunciation of 'containment 09 the 
same year, a course of extensive automation of almost the entire military would ensue. The 
course of progress in computers - from basic funding through to design and code - is thus 
thoroughly wrapped up in Cold War politics. More specifically, global politics during the 
36 Philip K. Lawrence, Modernity and War: The Creed ofAbsolute Violence (New York: Macmillan, 1997); Azar 
Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douet, and Other Modernists (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998). 
37 Sherry, 77; e Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 188. 
38 Sherry, 7he Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 190. 
39 George Kennan, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', in James F. Hoge Jr. and Fareed Zakaria (eds. ) The 
American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World (New York, Basic Books, 1997), 
pp. 155-69. 
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second half of the 20'h Century had already spurred attempts at precision and the 
miniaturisation of weapons so often associated with the post-Cold War world. 
Real breakthroughs in the computerisation of war began earlier, however, in 1939 
Britain, with Alan Turing and the Government Code and Cypher School, Bletchley Park. 
Turing's task was to develop a digital computer to automate thereby increase the speed by 
which British intelligence could decrypt the advanced German cipher machines, 'Enigma' and 
'Fish'. 'Colossus', another of Turing's machines, became the first electronic digital computer 
in 1943. Computers coordinate rather than physically do things, for example automating the 
capacity to organise information thereby generating greater command and control. Already, at 
I this early stage, computers were conceived, in Edwards' words, as 'a technology with 
linguistic, interactive, and heuristic problem-solving capacities'ýO 
In terms of operating and calculating complicated engineering and mathematical 
problems, encoding and decoding messages and basic military manoeuvres, even in their 
earliest incarnations, computers increasingly removed the need to rely on human skill (and 
fallibility). Wartime attempts to improve the accuracy of fighter-guns became a major task 
with increasing aviation leading to advances in the calculation of ballistics via computation 
tables. These as well as other wartime developments set the scene for what would become an 
unprecedented race between the USSR and the USA to build ever higher-performance 
computers for war. 
NATO's reliance in the Kosovo war on the most advanced aviation and computer 
technology speaks to a deeply rooted strain in liberal war-fighting and political traditions. 
'Rather than ushering a new paradigm of warfare', as Anatol Lieven has argued, 'NATO's 
victory in Kosovo represents the ftirther evolution of that technological superiority that has 
helped Western powers repeatedly to defeat their non-Westem opponents and dominate the 
world over the past five centuries' .41 Moreover, where precision was exacted somewhat more 
effectively in Kosovo, 'electronic space' has been functional 
in the effort since an earlier Cold 
War incarnation. By comparing features of the electronic battlefield dimensions of the Vietnam 
War with the allegedly 'new' phenomena attendant war in the Balkans the next section 
40 Edwards, Closed World, p. 21. Italics in original. 
41 Anatol Licven, 'Hubris and Nemesis: Kosovo and the Pattern of Western Military Ascendancy and Defeat', in 
Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds. ) War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New 
york: Columbia University Press, 200 1), p. 98. 
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highlights the presentism of much of the Kosovo literature, as well as preparing the way to 
more effectively situate the IT hype in the politics of US public spheres. 
IT and Fighting Kosovo: Historicising the Hype 
Improvements in computerised command and control, communication and intelligence 
(01), increased precision ordinance, stealth technology, and the use of satellites have - 
according to some - transformed the ability (and desire) of liberal states to wage war. 
42 The 
immediate post-Kosovo war explosion of literature on the seemingly 'virtual' character of the 
war has fostered an increasingly commonplace (though nonetheless dubious) view that wars 
are becoming 'cybernetic', society is turning 'techno-scientific', and individuals are subject to 
'tele-surveil lance' and 'universal voyeurism'! 3 
Even prior to the 1990-1 war in the Persian Gulf, Paul Virilio saw, 'Battle [as] now 
nothing more than the autonomy, or automation, of the war machine, with its virtually 
undetectable "smart" weapons. '44 James Der Derian, following Virilio, went further. 'New 
technologies of imitation and simulation', he wrote, 'as well as surveillance and speed had 
collapsed the geographical distance, chronological duration, the gap itself between the reality 
and virtuality of war. 
45 That the death-free (for NATO) objective of 'humanitarian' combat in 
Kosovo was publicly framed in terms of 'war in the age of intelligent machines 46 has been 
well documented (and hyped) in both academic and popular press. 
With some of the most outstanding images of the war linking the advanced computer 
technology to visual appeal - from the iconographic images of the stealth bomber pilote 7 to the 
Internet video clips of air strikes - 'Kosovo' thoroughly epitornised some of the most 
prominent representations of its age. In the words of columnist, Thomas Friedman, 
Have you ever played one of those video arcade games when you try to shoot as many 
targets as you can in a set period of time? When you start such a game a little sign 
flashes up and asks: 'One Player or TwoT Well, the Clinton team's approach to the 
Kosovo crisis reminds me of such a game. The US put a quarter in, pressed 'One 
42 Der Derian, Virtuous War, p. xiv. 
41 The terms have been taken from Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb (translated by Chris Turner) (London: 
Verso, 2000). 
44 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics ofPerception (London: Verso, 1984), p. 7. 
45 Der Derian, Virtuous War, p. 11. 
46 Manuel De Landa, War in the Age ofIntelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 199 1). 
47 Richard Stevenson, 'Allied Pilots Must Rely on Camera and Eyes', The New York 7-1mes, April 20,1999. 
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Player', and took aim against the Serbian armed forces. Unfortunately, it forgot that 
war is an interactive game and that somebody else was playing. 48 
With the extensive pre- and post-strike imagery of U-2s, Predators, Hunters, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, and tactical reconnaissance and, of course, the cockpit videos of actual bombings, the 
strategic language of official spokespersons and media commentators echoed the language of 
the wider computer and popular culture of the contemporary United States. 
Though technological innovations altering the battlefield are not a new phenomenon 
the changes wrought by the advent of information technology, and the attendant transformation 
this has beget, $rategic doctrine, has led many to level the term 'revolution' when describing 
military affairs . 
49 During the Kosovo war, the United States' new Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(jDAM) technology allowed bombing from altitudes over cloud cover, though given the 
frequency of complaints about bad weather with distinctly mixed results. GPS satellites and 
SIGINIT spacecraft helped with the delivery. 50 Other spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft 
technology, 'electronic scouts', 51 allowed NATO aerial photographs of mass graves to at least 
help the punishment fit Serbia's crime. 52 
US-led manoeuvres, on the other hand, according to Secretary of Defence William 
Cohen and General Henry Shelton, reflected the 'state of the art in ground control and mission 
planning capabilities, airworthiness, and mission payloads'. 53 Where wide-band dissemination 
systems transmitted high-priority imagery of emerging targets, air defences were provided for 
NATO missile runs by advanced US systems such as RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic 
intelligence aircraft and EA-6B tactical aircraft. 54 As the conflict began to escalate in its later 
stages the tactic of deploying low-circling AC-130 Spectre gunships, which fire at 2,500 
48 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bomb and Call in George Mitchell', The New York Times, April 2,1999. 
49 Talle literature on the so-called 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is huge. But see John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt, (eds. ) In Athena$ Camp: Preparingfor Conflict in the Information Age (with foreword by Alvin and 
Heidi Toffler) (Santa Monica: Rand, 1997). 
50 Lambeth, NATO's Air Warfor Kosovo, p. 98. 
51 Elizabeth Becker, 'The Drones: They're Unmanned, They Fly Low, and They Get the Picture', The New York 
y-Imes, June 3,1999. 
52 Vernon Loeb, 'From Above, Satcllites Track Refugees and Atrocities', The Washington Post, April 6,1999. 
" See http: //www. defenselink. mil/news/0ctl999/bIO141999 bt478-99. html [downloaded 17 June, 2001]. 
54 The transcript of the September 16,1999 press conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment Exercise 
conducted by NATO is available on-line. See http: //www. nato. int/kosovo/press/ý990916a. htm [downloaded 26 
June, 2001]. 
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rounds per minute, was intended to speed up the destruction of Yugoslav troop and artillery 
concentrations. " 'Dumb bombs', of course, were still used by B-52s. 
56 
It is worth noting, however, that perceptions that NATO extensively employed 
computer (as opposed to air-based) warfare in Kosovo are exaggerated. According to No 
Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, 
NATO considered employing cyber warfare, but in the end carried out attacks against 
air defense computers only from jamming aircraft. Partly out of fear of the legal 
ramifications - NATO lawyers were worried about war crimes charges if computers 
caused major damage to the civilian infrastructure - and partly due to the limited 
interconnectedness of many Serb computer systems, NATO reportedly did not carry 
5ý 
state of US cyber warfare out any hacking activities. The relatively rudimentarr 
capabilities was apparently also a factor in this decision. 5 
As a result of the relative success of enemy cyberattacks on the Non-Classified Internet 
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), used by the Pentagon to transmit unclassified 
information, efforts are underway to establish new networks less dependent on the Internet. 58 
The latest generation of US air-delivered munitions were employed in their most 
substantial numbers to date. In terms of both targets and projected results success at firing 
against fixed sites was considered high . 
59 In comparison to more hi-tech military protection, 
such as missiles, radar, and control systems, however, the alliance faired rather poorly. NATO 
was less well adept at coping with the relatively unsophisticated (low-altitude gun-based) 
dimensions of Serbia's air defences. Moreover, with the Yugoslav army effective in hiding and 
dispersing tanks and armoured personnel carriers they were still able to kill and drive people 
from their villages. 60 Only twenty-six Yugoslav tanks were destroyed. 
61 
Pace current emphases on the novelty of 'virtual' and 'Internet' wars, however, the first 
felectronic battlefield' was probably Vietnam. 62 In the words of Frank Rose, 
After Sputnik the American disadvantage in booster rockets and the consequent demand 
for miniaturization turned the DoD [Department of Defense] and NASA into eager 
consumers of the first integrated circuits. Microchips went into the nose cones of 
55 Dana Priest, 'Low-Flying Gunships Raking Ground Targets: Powerful Planes Reflect More Risk-Taking', The 
Washington Post, May 20,1999. 
5('Elizabeth Becker, 'B-52's to Carry Less Accurate Gravity Bombs', The New York Times, April 30,1999. 
57 Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 146-7. 
Is See Bob Brewin and Daniel Verton, 'Cyberattacks spur talk of third DOD network', June 22,1999, CNN. com. 
See 
_httgl//wwwL8. 
cnn. com/TECIUcomputinp, /9906/22/dodattack. idz/index. htmI (downloaded October 2,2001]. 
5913ut this was NATO's own assessment in the Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review. 
60 Lambeth, NATO's Air Warfor Kosovo, p. xvii. 
61 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 200 1), p. 5 8. 
62 See Michael T. Klare, War Without En& American Planningfor the Next Vietnams (New York: Knopf, 1972). 
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nuclear warheads and the guidance-systems of Vietnam-era 'smart-bombs'; they also 
made possible the high-speed 'supercomputers', capable of performing hundreds of 
millions of operations per second, that are used to break codes, design nuclear 
weapons, and forecast the weather. 63 
'We wired the Ho Chi Minh trail like a drugstore pinball machine', commented one US 
technician. 'And we plugged it in every night,. ' Other stories from Operation Igloo White 
(1967-1972), the Thailand-based US Air Force Infiltration Surveillance Center, sound 
uncannily like well-worn versions of Desert Storm (1990-1) and Allied Force (1999). 
Of the latter, Michael Ignatieff writes, 'It was fought in... conference rooms, using 
target folders flashed up on a screen, and all that... [General Wesley] Clark ever saw of the 
, 65 risk of battle was the gun camera footage emailed every night on secure internet systems... 
But compare Ignatieff s depiction with the following account of igloo White. 'Visiting 
reporters were dazzled by the high-tech white-gloves-only scene inside the windowless center 
where young soldiers sat at their displays in air-conditioned comfort, faces lit weirdly by the 
dim electric glow, directing the destruction of men and equipment as if playing a video 
66 
game' . 
Also auguring a pattern familiar to Kosovo early attempts to resolve some of the 
logistical problems of micro-managing the Vietnam War from Washington contributed to the 
production of computer-generated statistics of death. Gibson elaborates in more detail the 
political function of this totting up of the dead. He writes, 
The production with its precise reports of how many bodies were found on operations 
created the appearance of highly rational, scientific warfare. Body counts, weapons/kill 
ratios, charts of patrols conducted, helicopter and jet plane missions flown, and artillery 
rounds fired - all the indices of war production created at various command levels - 
presented Vietnam as a war managed by rational men basing their decisions on 
scientific knowledge. Statistics help make war managers legitimate to the American 
public. 67 
Again like Kosovo, the apparent necessity of creating the appearance of a 'lawful war' 
furthered the usefulness of these statistical facts. 
63 Frank Rose, Into the Heart of the Mind: An American QuestforArtificial Intelligence (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1984), p. 36. 
64 Quoted in Gibson, The Perfect War, p. 396. 
65 Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. I 11. Coincidentally, one connection between Kosovo and Vietnam is that the official 
gapologist' for the infamous My Lai massacre was Clark. Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War 
Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Makerfrom the Crimea to Kosovo (second edition with a new introduction by 
John Pilger) (London: Prion Books, 2000), p. 508. 
66 Fdwards, Closed WorI4 pp. 34. 
67 Gibson, The Perfect War, p. 124. First emphasis in original, second emphasis is mine. 
119 
Precise reports of the number and accuracy of Allied strike sorties in Kosovo 
contributed to the public appearance of a highly rational intervention. 68 We were informed, for 
example, that, 
NATO took advantage of improved weather to increase its sortie rate and pound away 
at Serb military and ground force targetý on Day 58 of Operation Allied Force. NATO 
aircraft flew 446 sorties, including 118 strike sorties and another 35 suppression of air 
defense (SEAD) missions. Strikes against Serb forces in Kosovo included tanks, 
armoured vehicles, artillery positions, an SA-6 transporter launcher and other military 
vehicles. 69 
These indices presented daily at global press-briefings by then NATO Secretary-General Javier 
Solana, Press spokesman Jamie Shea, and Clark created the impression of a war, to paraphrase 
Lene Hansen, run by rational married men . 
70 The bland personal profiles of military personnel 
on the NATO website also convey the heteronormative ordinariness, and thereby the 
authoritativeness, of the managers of this war. 71 
To any meaningful extent that the 'Gulf War Did Not Take Place 72 _ which of course it 
did - then neither did much of the Cold War in the Northern hemisphere as it was largely 
fought via RAND-style gaming, systems analysis, modelling and simulation. Indeed, the oft- 
cited level of unreality (and sterility) surrounding RAND's mathematical modelling and 'Men 
in Ties Discussing Missile Size 73 also belies current emphases on the newness of the moral 
paradoxes (discussed later) and technological feats attendant to so-called 'virtual war'. 
As it appears obligatory to state, of course, like the Gulf War and Kosovo, there was 
nothing virtual' about the death exacted in South East Asia or for the experience of Cold War 
troops. However, computers were already playing a considerable role in creating at least the 
initial public appearance of scientifically governed, rationally controlled assignments that were 
both legal and precise. The construction of the United States' peaceful, democratic, and liberal 
The daily 'factual up-dates' of Operation Allied Force are available on the NATO homepage. See 
bqp: //w_ww. nato. int/ko, sovo/all-frce. htm [downloaded 1 June, 20011. 
69 See http: //www. nato. int/kosovo/press/u990520a. htm (downloaded I June, 200 1]. 
70 The multiple pictures on the NATO homepage of 'married men having important meetings' also leave the 
impression of rational security and masculine control. See Lene Hansen, 'Visualizing Security Institutions: Security 
and Legitimacy in the Digital Age', Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Chicago, 
February2001. 
71 The very interesting biographies of KFOR commanders can be found on the NATO homepage. See 
bios/default. htm [downloaded November 12,2002]. 
12 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War DidNot Take Place (translated by Paul Patton) (Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1995). 
71 See Carol Cohn, "'Clean Bombs" and Clean Language', in Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias (eds. ) 
Women, Militarism and War: Essays in History, Politics, and Social Theory (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
199o), pp. 33-55. 
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identity is intimately related to justifications for war and computer-based weapons systems 
(both materially and metaphorically) have been vital. 
Our concern, then, has not been whether a radical (or 'revolutionary') transformation in 
military strategy was actually witnessed during the Kosovo war; that it was not revolutionary 
in this regard is persuasive. 74 It is also not denied that US military dependence on information- 
era weapons technologies, especially when allied with air power, can usefully be conceived in 
functional terms. By 'substituting machines for personnel as far as possible', as Coral Bell 
suggests, these technologies resolve the Pentagon's major post-Cold War planning dilemmas 
of finance, recruitment and strategy. 
75 Nonetheless, the cultural and symbolic function of 
information-era weapons technology on US public perceptions of liberal state violence itself 
contributes to the constitution of the liberal and humanitarian identity of the official US-state 
public sphere. 
But if liberal states, as some have suggested, are so concerned with the potentially 
surgical precision of bombing, 
76 have publics and politicians, as some critics lament, forgotten 
, that patients still die on the operating table' ? 77 Where several thinkers such as Ernst Ringer 
hailed war as the 'manifestation of mankind... that builds machines and trusts to machines, to 
whom machines are not soulless iron, but engines of blood, 
08 others feared the consequences 
of war in the industrial and later atomic age. But where passion and masculine valour 
supposedly used to keep the hell of war human, even when mechanisation took command of 
the battlefield, has 21't Century 'humanitarianism' and attendant technological advance made 
war even less human? 
Excursus: The Technological Accident 
Most recently witnessed in the Hollywood epic Pearl Harbor, the technology (and 
human skill) of air warfare has become 'something of a cultural icon'. 
79 However, from the 
bombing of Serb residential neighbourhoods and Chinese Embassy to the destruction of 
Kosovo-Albanian refugee convoys, bridges and hospitals, extensive media coverage was 
74 Freedman, 'The Split-Screen War', pp. 420432. 
71 Coral Bell, 'Force, Diplomacy, and Norms', Albrecht Schnabet and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ) Kosovo and the 
Challenge ofHumanitarian Intervention (New York: The UN University Press, 2000), pp. 448462. 
76 McInnes, 'Spectator Sport Warfare, p. 155; Ignatieff, rirtual War, p. 165. 
77 Lambeth, NATO'sAir WarforKosovo, p. 139. 
78 Ernst Jdnger quoted in Mitcham and Mackay (eds. ) Philosophy and Technology. Readings in the 
philosophical Problems of Technology (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 1 9. 
79 Lawrence, Modernity and War, p. 6 1. 
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afforded NATO's 'mistakes'. I use the terms 'mistakes' and 'accidents' not to ventrilloquise 
NATO but to make reference to an already established discourse that has recognised these 
incidents as at least warranting a discrete categorisation. 
On 12 April 1999, a NATO pilot fired a missile at a crossing train on a bridge. Then he 
fired another killing at least twenty Serbs. At least seventy-five refugees died when a bomb hit 
their convoy in southeast Kosovo two days later. On 27 April eleven civilians were killed 
when a Serb village was hit instead of an army barracks; 80 three days later, thirty-nine bus 
passengers died on the bridge at Luzane. Seven were killed and fifty wounded when bombs, 
short of their target, fell in a town. 
81 Three Chinese reporters were killed in Belgrade as their 
embassy was hit on 7 May. Eighty-seven 'human shields' became a 'legitimate military target' 
in the village of Korisa on 13 May. 
Human Rights Watch report some ninety separate incidents involving at least five 
hundred civilian deaths. 82 NATO losses, as to be expected, were greatly fewer. An F-I 17 went 
down during the night of 27 March and an F-16 was lost on 2 May. Two of the controversial 
US Apache helicopters crashed whilst training in Albania, killing two Americans. 83 A marine 
Harrierjet broke down and crashed in the Adriatic Sea. 
These human, but mostly technological, accidents and attendant 'collateral damage' 
were widely considered to undermine - if not downright contradict - the liberal and certainly 
humanitarian claims made by the NATO allies. 'An implication of technological infallibility', 
suggested Hilaire McCoubrey, 'has been allowed to develop which is, by its nature, ultimately 
unsustainable... Where failures either of equipment or the information upon which it is 
operated occur, the encouragement of such assumptions inevitably generates a presumption of 
calculated wrongdoing'. 
84 Moreover, the failure of NATO's precision-strikes to prevent ethnic 
cleansing, indeed, how the use of air power alone accelerated the refugee crisis, led to 
" Steven Erlanger, 'Inside an Accident of War: Sirens. Blast. Grief, The New York Times, April 29,1999. 
31 Steven Erlanger, 'Small Serbian Town Is Stricken By a Deadly "Accident of War"', The New York Times, 
April 7,1999. 
82 Human Rights Watch, 'Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, February 2000. See 
00/nato/ [downloaded 14 August 200 11. 
Molly Moore, 'Earthbound Apaches: Helicopter Crews Fight Frustration and Boredom - Not Serbs', The 
Washington Post, May 21,1999. 
84 Hilaire McCoubrey, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis', in Ken Booth (ed. ) Yhe Kosovo 
Tragedy: Yhe Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 199. 
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widespread criticism. For Der Derian, 'The overselling of precision weaponry made the usual 
mistakes of warfare appear to be aberrations, if not war crimes'. 85 
NATO's defenders were quick to respond. 'Thanks to unrealistic efforts to treat the 
normal friction of war as avoidable human error', argued Benjamin Lambeth, 'every 
occurrence of unintended collateral damage became overinflated as front-page news and 
treated as a blemish on air power's presumed ability to be consistently precise'. 86 'In a world 
that no longer accepts, with a fatalistic shrug', remarked Eliot Cohen, 'the notion of accidents 
and bad luck, in which, for example, corporations find themselves held accountable for the 
lung cancer that afflicts smokers who have chosen their habit, tolerance for combat losses has 
declined precipitously'. 87 
As the degree of coverage afforded the 'accidents' became itself a subject of 
widespread comment88 NATO responded by mobilising an older 'knights of the air' discourse. 
According to Richard Stevenson, 'NATO provided a glimpse of what an attacking pilot is 
going through when it released an audiotape last week. '89 He continued, 
Attacking pilots rely on three basic types of information in identifying targets. They are 
in radio contact with communications aircraft and spotter planes, which help guide 
them to potential targets. They have heat-sensing infi-ared cameras that allow them to 
magnify fuzzy pictures... And they have their own eyes. 90 
Moreover, on the surface at least seeming to contradict the Western idolatry of the machine, in 
official NATO post-conflict analyses extensive praise was lavished on individual pilots and 
support staff. 91 
How, then, should we conceive the role of these accidents in terms of public spheres at 
war? Leaving aside the question of whether the 'mistakes', the Embassy bombing in 
particular, 
92 constituted 'real' accidents (for how could such a calculation possibly be made? ) 
85 Der Derian, rzrtuous War, pp. 201-2. 
86 Lambeth, )VATO's Air Warfor Kosovo, p. xviii. 
87 Eliot A. Cohen, 'Kosovo and the New American Way of War, in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen 
(eds. ) War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a GlobalAge (New York: Columbia University Press, 200 1), 
p. 56. 
81 For a table of CNN coverage of the 'mistakes' see Steven Livingston, 'Media Coverage of the War: An 
Empirical Assessment', in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds. ) Kosovo and the Challenge of 
Humanitarian Intervention (New York: The UN University Press, 2000), pp. 373-74. 
81 Richard Stevenson, 'Allied Pilots Must Rely on Camera and Eyes, The New York Times, April 20,1999. My 
italics. 
90 Stevenson, 'Allied Pilots Must Rely on Camera and Eyes'. 
91 Thanks to Colin McInnes for pointing this out. 
92 John Sweeney, Jens Holsoe, and Ed Vulliamy, 'NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately', The Observer, October 
17,1999. 
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how do we fit the frequency and coverage of these events into our frarnework of war and 
libcral public sphcres? 
Recall from Chapter One how the consciousness of a mass modem sub ectivity j 
analogous to print media's production of an 'imagined community 93 was partly realised when 
private individuals encountered - and were newly regimented by - the mechanised schedules 
attendant the introduction of railways across the continental expanse. As Alan Trachtenberg 
described, 'the physical experience of technology mediated consciousness of the emerging 
social order'. 94 According to Wolfgang Schivelbusch, however, 
Early perception of the railroad was characterized by a curious ambivalence. The 
journey was felt to be uncannily smooth, easy, secure, like flying... At the same time, 
the journey entailed a sensation of violence and potential destruction... Thus all the 
ease, comfort and security that were superficial characteristics of the train journey were 
always accompanied by an ever-present subliminal fear. 95 
Even after such journeys became part of 'every day life' and the 'subliminal fear' seemingly 
declined, the ever-present possibility of technological malfunction has historically been 
96 functional in the modem liberal encounter with the mechanical. In other words, the ever- 
present possibility of risk, including technological malfunction and accidents, has seemed 
intrinsic to the human relationship with technology since industrialism and is both a threat to 
and redemptive of the liberal (individualistic) order from which it derives. 
For example, accounts of near misses and actual disasters pervade popular and 
academic histories of transport technologies. To early aviators, in particular, the press 
assiduously covered their hazards and triumphs. A non-conformist and free spirit but also a 
civic-minded team player, representative of the times of yore but also a portent of the future, 
throughout US culture, suggests Sherry, airmen have been depicted as both 'democrat and 
superman'. 
97 Charles Lindbergh, who since his first 1927 solo flight from New York to Paris, 
has become a national icon, simultaneously personified 'the promise of the machine age and 
93 Benedict Anderson, The Imagined Community (London: Verso, 1992). 
94 Alan Trachtenberg, 'Forward', in Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of 
y-Ime and Space (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), p. xv. 
95 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey. - The Industrialization of Time and Space (Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1986), pp. 129-30. 
96 1 am indebted to Brian Axel for our conversation about the genre of railway disasters. 
97 Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 135. 
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the virtues of frontier individualism'. 98 Aviators were (and still are) 'proof that the mechanical 
age possessed gallantry'. 99 
Accordingly, rather than position NATO's 'accidents' and the vast coverage of them as 
aberrations from the otherwise liberal and humanitarian character of the intervention or insist 
that we should expect nothing less from the would-be 'Masters of the Universe, '100 we can 
otherwise conceive the narrated event of these technological accidents as partly productive of 
(rather than merely destructive or somehow intrinsic to) liberal political subjectivity. For if we 
read NATO's well-documented blunders alongside the history of railway disasters and the 
hazards of early aviation a moral anomaly so animating liberal thinkers from Ignatieff to 
Walzer is partly, albeit ironically, resolved. With the discourse of the technological accident 
we have a suggestive solution to the liberal axiom, as articulated by Michael Walzer, 'You 
can't kill unlessyou arepreparedto die'. 
101 
Liberals are a self-reflective, pragmatic group, and following Isaiah Berlin, are often 
not even sure of their own liberal-ness, witnessed by the moral qualms revealed in the 'last 
resort' discourse of their Just War tradition. 102 Even for a just cause, argues Walzer, 'political 
leaders cannot launch a campaign aimed to kill Serbian soldiers, and sure to kill others too, 
unless they are prepared to risk the lives of their own soldiers'. 
103 
Autonomous machines and elusive truths also seemed to collide then - as some liberals 
would have it - with inauthentic morals when NATO bombarded Serbia. With Kosovo, 
Ignatieff envisioned a new era where 'Technological masters removed death from our 
experience of war. But war without death - to our side - is war that ceases to be fully real to us: 
virtual war'. 
104 Would liberal states now be able to wage war with moral impunity with 
6virtual' rather than genuine values, such as 'sacrifice, honour and country'? 105 
Thus, an enduring narrative in liberal as well as 'post-modem, versions of 'Virtual 
War' centres on the moral costs to liberal subjects of being able to inflict death with little cost 
98 Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 40. 
99 Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 20. 
11 Tariq Ali (ed. ) Masters ofthe Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade (London: Verso, 2000). 
101 Michael Walzer, 'Kosovo', in William Joseph Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan 
Interventions (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 2000), p. 344. 
102 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (2ed. ) (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992). Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in The Proper Study ofMankind An Anthology of 
isays (edited by Henry Hardy and Roger Hauheer, foreword by Noel Annan, introduction by Roger Hausheer) F 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), pp. 191-242. 
"' Walzer, 'Kosovo', p. 344 
104 Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. 5. 
"I Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. 201. 
125 
to them. 106 'In simulated preparations and virtual executions of war', fears Der Derian, 'there is 
a high risk that one learns how to kill but not take responsibility for it. ' 107 The moral 
consequences of the Western body seeming to disappear from the battlefield during the 1990s 
led to calls for liberal citizens to become more sentient about the reality of violence if war, 
even humanitarian war, was to be legitimate. 'The essential nature of combat', argued R. W. 
Apple, 'is the fear that you may die before you can kill your enemy. Isn't that what gives scale 
and meaning to an essentially savage act? And doesn't removing sacrifice through push-button 
warfare somehow corrupt the most nobly motivated war? "08 Leaving aside whether there is an 
dessential. nature' to war, the concern that we do ourselves moral ill even in the endeavor to do 
others good is a typical liberal anxiety. 
However, already initiated via the long-standing heroism and individualist imagery of 
the first fighter pilots, the narrated event of the NATO accident - it is not an 'accident' until 
narrated as such - allows contemporary liberals to salvage something from the mechanistic age, 
even before death was exacted more directly when the Twin Towers collapsed. 'In truth', 
argues Sherry, 'the disasters were as essential a part of aviation's image as the records set and 
inventions tested. They contributed to a sense of individual daring, of the machine's frailty, 
and of man's resourcefulness that made aviation a benign attraction, a fusion of frontier spirit 
and machine-age discipline'. 
109 
The greater the sophistication of the stealth bombers, the more precisely they bomb, the 
greater the productive effect of the accident in returning humanness (including death) to the 
equation of war. 'One might also say', with Schivelbusch, 'that the more civilized the schedule 
and the more efficient the technology, the more catastrophic its destruction when it collapses. 
There is an exact correlation between the level of the technology with which nature is 
controlled, and the degree of severity of its accidents'. 
110 If the element of uncertainty, 
accident, and danger remain then all is not lost to rationality and the machine age - the human 
is put back into the humanitarian, attacking pilots rely on 'their own eyes'. 
106 -Whatever humanitarian war does to the enemy, we should also think of how it degrades us'. Ken Booth, 'Ten 
Flaws of Just Wars', Ken Booth (ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000), p. 316. 
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Cyber-Publics and War 
Not only did the Kosovo war represent for many in the United States a revolution in 
military affairs, the war also occurred in a context of widespread academic and popular 
excitement over a potentially new era of e-accountability and public sphere participation, "' as 
well as radical transformations of 'the self', given new high-speed interconnectivities. 
Certainly, if Mary Midgley's notion of 'scientific imagination', 112 David Noble's 'spirit of 
invention', 113 and Margaret Wertheim's 'techno-spiritual dreaming' 114 have any critical 
purchase, then 'Kosovo 1999' occurred at what was presented as a important moment in 
Western cultural and technological history. 
Yet do these developments represent radically new phenomena? Or are they simply the 
latest manifestation of earlier practices linking cultures of self-transformation, public spheres, 
and war? According to Michael Warner, 'the contexts of commodities and politics share the 
same media and, at least in part, the same metalanguage for constructing our notion of what a 
public or a people iS,. 
115 These sites of identity-formation have become crucial for 
understanding the constitution of public spheres, the legitimation of 'humanitarian' violence, 
and the relationship between them. 
Established in 1946, RAND, the game- and mathematical-theory Mecca of the US 
defence industry, set to work on computer-based projects that had ostensibly been championed 
- in liberal fashion - as a way to re-assert rational civilian control over the military. 
116 
However, not only did promises of extensive funding and research opportunities from the 
military drastically speed up civilian computer research, thereby allowing the US to quickly 
outpace the early innovations of Britain, the secrecy encircling this work initially restricted its 
spread with both formal and informal censorship. Even as the private sector has increasingly 
overhauled computer-related research and development, incentives still remain from the 
anticipation that 'results' may be purchased by the military. As Rose describes, 'Neither the 
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private sector nor any other side of government has been so eager to support innovation in 
electronics. The computerization of society, then, has essentially been a side effect of the 
computerization of war'. 117 
By the 1960s - and partly in response to the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik - RAND 
commissioned a project to protect US Department of Defense weapons command and control 
functions from a Soviet first (or retaliatory) nuclear strike. Whether in fact the emerging 
system could have survived an all-out or even partial nuclear attack is moot. However, once 
embraced by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) at the Pentagon a network of 
networked computers became a reality in 1969 to form ARPANET (eventually Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)), the beginning (and foundation) of 
Icyberspace'. In the words of John Streck, 
Based on a packet switching technology developed by Paul Beran (whereby messages 
to be transmitted are fragrnented into small, separately addressed pieces, (packets', 
which move independently through the computer network and are reassembled at the 
destination point), the proposed network would have no central hubs and, in the event 
of a nuclear attack or another misfortune, could rotate the packets around any damaged 
nodes. 118 
By the early seventies universities became central nodes, allowing the exchange of messages 
with the creation of file transfer protocol (FTP) and remote terminal access (Telnet) systems. 
Though the initial instantiation of a multi-user online 'community' was perhaps 
unsurprisingly a large-scale war-fighting simulation, 
119 the new network of networks (or 
6protocols') allowing civilian computers to talk to each other heralded the creation of the first 
multi-user 'chat' environments. 
120 These distributed networks created a matrix or web-like 
structural architecture that was, in essence, non-hierarchical. By the 1980s, the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) founded five supercomputer centres, the NSFnet and basis of the 
internet, making accessible the potential of the fastest computers to university research. 121 'The 
civilian freedoms of the Net', Donna Harraway reminds us, 'are indebted to a tax supported 
117 Rose, Into the Heart of the Mind, p. 36. 
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commons tied initially to Cold War priorities and then to goals of national economic 
competitiveness'. 122 
Though 'cyberspace' - the place within and between computers - was coined earlier in 
William Gibson's 1984 novel, Neuromancer, the term had thoroughly entered the popular 
lexicon by the end of the 1990s. 123 The WELL, established in 1985 San Francisco, is one of the 
first (and largest) of such on-line discursive communities. 124 This self-described 'cluster of 
electronic villages' has been both valorised and criticised, in Paul Streck's words, as 'the 
computer-based instance of RIrgen Haberinas's bourgeois public sphere, in which the educated 
and affluent come together outside both home and state for critical discussion of aft, literature 
and politics'. 125 
Though certainly not all WELL 'inhabitants' are wealthy bourgeois 'netizens', such on- 
line communities are certainly out of reach to the information underclass. 126 Yet as computers 
have become mainstream, more and more have posited visions of an on-line democratic world 
able to transcend social and bodily limits, where inequality of access would diminish and 
public discourse across borders might thrive. 
In Cyberspace and the American Dream, Esther Dyson, Alvin Toffler and others 
argued that new forms of communication, inaugurated by the extension of computers into 
millions of homes, would herald an electronic frontier, a new era of digital democracy that 
transcends the old borders of the nation-state. In their words, Tyberspace is the latest 
American frontier... It... will play an important role knitting together the diverse communities 
of tomorrow, facilitating the creation of 'electronic neighborhoods' bound together not by 
geography but by shared interests'. 127 
Taking responsibility beyond borders, transgressing what is selectively seen as the 
artificial boundary of the nation-state, as Chapter Six will further discuss, has been a rallying 
cry of the 'new military humanism'. Often couched explicitly in the language of frontier 
(colonising) metaphors and borrowing Marshall McLuhan's futurist notion of a 'global village' 
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- where 'new vortices of power are shaped by the instant electric interdependence of all men 
on this planet' 128 _a vision of a new-fangled interventionary post-Cold War democratic order 
has been articulated, and practiced, using the cyber-metaphor. 129 
Computer technologies are endowed with symbolic meaning, not only through their 
location and the way they are used, but also by how they are talked about in public spheres. 
The marketing of these machines from their inception has established effective rhetorical 
procedures to shape public/consumer attitudes, as well as foster demand for these newly mass- 
produced goods. 
130 The modem advertising industry in particular has played a major role in 
shaping US technological and political cultures, as Michael Smith suggests, asking citizens 'to 
visualize the future as a succession of unimaginable new machines and products'. 131 
Since their inception, then, but increasingly in the 1990s, computers have provided a 
new medium of understanding within which liberal states can present their foreign policies, as 
globalization, democracy-promotion and humanitarian war became new buzzwords. Me 
meaning of a symbol is fluid rather than fixed', suggests Douglas Rosenberg, 'and is often 
made more complex by allusion to other, interrelated symbols. ' 
132 By the end of the 1990s 
terms such as 'smart bombs', 'surgical' and 'clinical' strikes, and 'artificial intelligence' were 
part of ordinary language of medicine, business, defence and media. 
Computers and related technologies of command and control had already by the Cold 
War fostered a 'metaphorical understanding of world politics', in Edwards words, 4as a sort of 
system subject to technological management., 
133 Likewise, post-Cold War notions of a 
globalising, diffusely chaotic world 
134 could be rendered more orderly and controllable by this 
image of technology. With the resurgence of National Missile Defence under the second Bush 
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Administration and the search for intelligence and technological solutions to the homeland 
threat posed by 'terrorism' the inclination has clearly not evaporated. 135 
Thomas Friedman's widely cited 'Manifesto for the Fast World', published in the New 
York Times Magazine and elsewhere during the Kosovo campaign, similarly conceived global 
politics as a system to be technologically managed. 
136 'Today, for the first time in history', 
Friedman wrote, 'we all have the same basic piece of hardware - free markets. The question is, 
which countries will get the economic operating systems (neoliberal macroeconomics) and 
software (regulatory institutions and laws) to get the most out of the free markets. ' 137 The 
attempt to rapidly extend information technology systems throughout Kosovo and Albanian 
society post-war is clearly part of that liberalising process. 
139 
'The hidden hand of the market', Friedman wrote in an oft-cited passage, 'will never 
work without the hidden fist - McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the 
designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley9s 
technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps'. 139 of 
course, US practices of 'democracy' promotion and neoliberal economic agendas have never 
been far removed. The world certainly seemed safer for business with the Kosovo bombing as 
the cost of shares in the United States' biggest defence contractors increased. 140 'War may be 
hell', as John Mintz describes, 'but in Washington, it's also a lobbying opportunity. ' 141 
Raytheon expected to obtain a billion dollars in new orders to replenish weapons stocks as a 
result of the air war. 
142 
In view of the popular hype regarding the cyber-dimensions of 'Kosovo', the 
intervention appeared then as nothing if not trapped in a broader cultural pattern. During the 
bombing campaign not only did Belgrade-based hackers break into NATO's official website 
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and cause line saturation, its email system was clogged by an individual sending 2,000 
messages a day. 143 Chinese hackers became part of the online war, attacking official US sites 
in response to the bombing of their embassy. 144 As the war continued, the World Wide Web 
became a major site of anti-war bustle, 'turning cyberspace', according to Ashley Dunn, 'into 
an ethereal war zone'. 145 
Though cyber-disobedience from hackers against NATO and other US government 
websites was common, the effect was largely symbolic, 'signaling the vulnerability of 
Goliath', in Goran Gocis' words, 'not really hurting him'. 146 Some Yugoslav citizens, 
however, went on the defensive against NATO by using radio receivers to eavesdrop on 
incoming Allied pilots and then inform Belgrade (with their mobile phones) of inward strike 
configurations. 
147 
Arguments both for and against the air campaign proliferated on listservs and e-groups. 
There are literally thousands of sites devoted to all aspects of Kosovo and hundreds on Kosovo 
and the Internet. There was, of course, much hate mail from all sides. Alb-net. com, a site for 
Albanians worldwide, posted hate mail from Russians and Serbs, no doubt to evoke disgust 
and reinforce stereotypes about Serb and Russian attitudes. 
148 During the bombing, as 
opposition was effectively muzzled in Belgrade and, of course, in the mainstream Western 
press, dissenting groups went on-line if not already there. 
149 
When the phone-lines were not disrupted, daily messages sprang forth from both 
Kosovo and Serbia providing direct personal reports from the many frontlines of the struggle. 
'Not long after the first bombs fell on Kosovo', wrote Linton Weeks, 'e-pleadings with 
addresses ending in Yugoslavia's ". yu" designation started clogging American e-mail 
boxes. "" The International Rescue Committee set up the Kosovar Yellow Pages, an on-line 
directorY of the thousands displaced. 151 
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The easy availability of this technology in the former Yugoslavia, according to some, 
belied the claim that ordinary Serbs were unwitting victims of the regime's propaganda. 
According to media reports, for example, NATO's aerial photos of suspected mass graves and 
images of the fleeing refugees were easily available for Internet download, as were the 
pronouncements to the Serb underground radio stations of US Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright, President Clinton, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 152 Serbs too could 
(dubiously) be deemed as Milosevic's 'willing executioners', as Daniel Goldhagan had 
claimed of the German's under Hitler. 
153 
The Internet, according to one account, had the effect of 'personalising' the war for US 
citizens, becoming controversial, however, when MSNBC arranged for some of them to chat 
on-line with Arkan, the indicted and since assassinated Serb war criminal. 
154 Wired magazine 
and Newsweek in particular carried extensive coverage of the 'Web Witnesses' to conflict. 155 
When an Albanian girl emailed her pen pal in California extracts were read on National Public 
Radio. 156 
Iri the context of increasing disenchantment with politics, the corporate bypassing of 
public accountability, and the corporatisation of the media, cyberspace has nostalgically been 
presented then as the possible return to the esteemed days of the Athenian agora, Habermasian 
coffee shop debate, or the town hall meeting of republican lore. 
157 Often taking the form of 
techno-religious dreams, these fantasies of new disembodied on-line publics, as Margaret 
Wertheim has persuasively argued, are actually 'repackagings of age-old Christian visions in a 
technological format'. 158 
The longstanding tension in the Western philosophical tradition concerning the proper 
association between mind and body has taken the form of various (and evolving) conceptions 
about the location of our bodies in the universe, the actual realm in which they are (embedded'. 
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Though not explicitly conceptualised thus, notions of cyber/virtual war are based on similar 
understandings of this problem. According to Der Derian, 
The speed of interconnectivity that the computer enables has, more than any other 
innovation in warfare from the stirrup to gunpowder to radar to nukes, shifted the 
battlefield away from the geopolitical to the electromagnetic. Less obviously, the power 
of cyberwar comes from its ability to reproduce as well as to deconstruct reality with a 
real-time verisimilitude that will make future war more of a contest of signs than of 
soldiers. 159 
Of course, the global computer networks upon which cyberspace is physically reliant - the 
architectural structures of optic fibres, silicon microchips, satellites, display screens, phone 
cables, and modems - exist in a material sense. Yet there is perhaps another no-less-real sense 
in which the physical determinates of this newest form of space, which to ever-changing 
degrees is both public and private, cannot be mapped and thereby contain important 
similarities with medieval 'spatial dualism'. 
In contrast to the medieval conception of the universe, which included the immaterial 
domain of the transcendent, in our scientific-materialist age, physical space constitutes the 
, whole of reality. "60 However, 'this new digital space', according to Wertheim, 'is "beyond" 
the space that [modem] physics describes, for the cyber-realm is not made up of physical 
particles and forces, but of bits and bytes. These packets of data are the ontological foundation 
of cyberspace.. .' 
16 1 Thus, if our digital location is no longer bounded by the physical but is 
somehow transposed to an amphitheater of worldwide data space, between hardware and 
software, 'we' are literally in a new (public/private) realm. 162 
As Lauren Berlant persuasively suggests, however, presaging an argument developed 
in Chapter Four, 
embodied activism performed in civic spaces has become designated as a demonized, 
deranged, unclean (a)social mob activity. In contrast, every article about the Internet 
shows us that accessing and mastering national/global mass media forms has become 
widely construed as the other most evolved or developed sense for the practice of being 
American. 163 
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In other words, the extent to which resistance to NATO's discourse was given voice on-line 
may have distracted attention from and even replaced more traditional, less hyped, and perhaps 
more visible forms of dissent. For 'as subculture became market segment', Streck suggests, 
4control of the cyberpunk vision shifted from science fiction writers to advertising agencies 
and politicians; stories of jaded burnouts living in a technological dystopia gave way to thirty 
second vignettes celebrating life made perfect through telecommunications'. 164Simply giving 
vent on-line does not mean those who run the machine, as Mario Savio would have it, are 
paying attention. 
165 
The limitations of the Internet as a critical public sphere, Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky argue, include the persistent digital divide (which encompasses race, class, gender 
and North-South issues); the increasing privatisation of formerly publicly owned Internet 
hardwire; the commercialisation of Internet portals; and growing private control of the new 
broadband technology. 166 'The issue', in Diana Saco's words, 'is not only whether the state can 
project its sovereign authority into cyberspace given the technical features of networking, but 
also how the liberal discourse through which the insecurities reimagined by both state and 
nonstate actors will shape those efforts'. 
167 
Whatever the form in which the public sphere manifests, whether in the virtual domain 
or the 'real', it always conceals the social structure of production by which it is underpinned. 168 
As has often been the case with the emergence and valorisation of new publics, during the 
Internet boom era the American poor, both native and immigrant, were generally absent from 
mainstream media records. 169 When the 1990s economic boom itself was fuelled by the highest 
ever rate of immigrant (mostly cheap) labour, more than 13.5 million during the 1990s, 
roughly 9 million were undocumented. 
170 
164 Streck, 'Pulling the Plug', p. 21. 
165 Savio was one of the leaders of the Free Speech Movement at UC-Berkeley in the early 1960s. 
166 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(with a new introduction by the authors) (New York: Pantheon Books, [ 1998] 2002), p. xvi. 
167 Diana Saco, 'Colonizing Cyberspace: "National Security" and the Internet', in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, 
Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds. ) Cultures ofInsecurity. States, Communities, and the Production of 
Danger (forward by George Marcus) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 28 1. 
1611 Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and 
proletarian Public Sphere (forward by Miriam Hansen, translated by Peter Labanyi, Jamie Owen Daniel and 
Assenka Oksiloff) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1972] 1993), p. 1. 
169 See Robert W. McChesney, Ellen Meiksins Wood, and John Bellamy Foster (eds. ) Capitalism and the 
Information Age: The Political Economy ofthe Global Communications Revolution (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1998). 
171 Suzanne Goldenburg, 'Greatest Wave of Migrants Drives US Engine', The Guardian, December 3,2002. 
135 
Nonetheless, from the first prosthetics of modem medicine to double-clicking the 
mouse the hybridity of a cyborg world part machine (cybernetic) part human (organism) had 
certainly become mainstream by Kosovo. 
171 In particular, advances in cybernetic theories 
originally derived from endeavors to merge humans and fighting machines have radically 
altered popular, academic, and gendered conceptions of subjectivity. Some feminists, for 
example, use cyborg theorising to 'reject a science of origins or telos', including the notion of 
an &essential' female 'identity and body'. 
172 'We come to see ourselves differently', suggests 
Sherry Turkle, 'as we catch sight of our images in the mirror of the machine'. 173 Since nobody 
knows you're blond on-line, feminists, in particular, have drawn attention to the potentially 
174 liberating features of the changes implied when computers become metaphors. 
These metaphors, suggests Edwards, build 'on the computer's formal and mechanical 
features: the brain as a set of digital switches, the mind as a set of programs'. 175 While 
conceptions of subjectivity attendant to this newest transformation of public and private 
spheres appeared liberating for some there was a more sinister way in which a culture of 
computers derived from war seemed to impinge on the politics of 'Kosovo'. 
Consider the controversy surrounding the Columbine High School shootings and the 
Wachowski Brothers' movie The Matrix. Maureen Dowd describes the movie as 'a video game 
writ large, a balletic and epic ode to violence about rebel hackers... As the bullets fly... the 
shell cases glimmer alluringly in slow motion, giving a gorgeous techno-sheen... The violence 
has a terrible beauty and the death seems merely virtual'. 
176 But with the Columbine shootings 
in Littlerock, Colorado and concomitant outcry - taking place on the single heaviest day of 
Serbia's bombardment - The Matrix and violent web sites came under widespread public 
scrutiny. 
177 
'11 Gabriel Brahm Jr. and Mark Driscoll (eds. ) Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies (Boulder, 
co: Westview Press, 1995). 
172 Chris Hables Gray and Steven Mentor, 'The Cyborg Body Politic and the New World Order', in Gabriel 
Brahm Jr. and Mark Driscoll (eds. ) Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1995), p. 229; Paul Edwards, 'The Army and the Microworld: Computers and the Militarized 
politics of Gender', Signs, Vol. 16, no. 1. (1990), pp. 102-127. 
173 Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in theAge ofthe Internet (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 
9. 
Donna Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 
Century', in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention offature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp. 149- 
181. 
175 Edwards, Closed WorU pp. 21-22. 
176 Maureen Dowd, 'In the DC Matrix', 7he New York 7-imes, April 28,1999. 
177 John F. Harris, 'Clinton Challenges Hollywood on Violence', The Washington Post, May 16,1999. 
136 
Where Clinton connected the same 'fear of the other' that produced conflict in Kosovo 
to the alienation of the two Columbine teenager shooters, 179 others were concerned that the US 
public had more to think about in fighting evil at home than abroad. 179 Those seeking 
weightier, though in this instance quite tenuous, links between US domestic and global 
militarism noted that Columbine High School neighboured Fort Carson Army base 'where they 
practice invading countries like Serbia'. 
180 
Of course, as has been widely noted, with information and entertainment technology 
advancing apace the easier it becomes to act out computer-simulated versions of hackneyed 
violent fantasies abroad, as well as at home. 
181 We have the ability to re-enact on-line over and 
over again, for example, NATO's bombardment of the Serbian Ministry of Interior Affairs. 
There are no less than 108 video-clips of actual bombs hitting Yugoslav targets available on 
the NATO homepage, from tanks, ammo storage sites, and bridges to radio relays, TV 
transmitters and the Ministry of Interior Affairs. 182 
But this gaming culture of 'self-transformation in combat' 183 and its relation to war is 
not new with the 'virtual'. Self-consciously in response to the shock of defeat in Vietnam an 
animated masculine gaming culture of war and violence emerged in President Ronald 
Reagan's 1980s 'America'. Compare the more recent 'techno' manifestations of the 
tregeneration through violence' 184 theme with the following description of the fighting 
experience of a 1980s mock-combat game. According to Gibson, 
In this shifting back and forth, the world blurs. Reality can be undone and reconfigured 
again and again. Even if the United States has problems winning military victories 
abroad, the Wolverines, Maraudrers, and Vigilantes can fight on indefinitely, with 
every man a hero and every hero a comrade for life. In this way good wars replace the 
bad one of the recent past. 185 
173 Edwin Chen, 'Clinton Sees Kosovo Tied to Littleton, The LosAngeles Times, May 20,1999. 
179 Laurence Tribe, 'The Internet vs. the First Amendment', 77? e New York 271mes, April 28,1999; Sharon 
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Washington Post, May 27,1999. 
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Is' Ile University of Southern California's new Institute for Creative Technology openly fuses together research 
into war-fighting simulation, the development of videogames, and the movie industry. For discussion of these 
themes in relation to Kosovo see Der Derian, Firtuous War, pp. 180-203. 
182 These are available at http: //www. nato. int/kosovo/video. htm [downloaded 2 June, 2001]. 
183 See James William Gibson, 'Self-Transformation in Combat and the Pleasures of Killing', in Warrior 
Dreams: r1olence and Manhood in Post-Vietnam America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), pp. 10 1-117. 
194 See Richard Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence: the Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 
(New York: HarperPerennial, [1973] 1996). 
115 Gibson, Warrior Dreams, p. 14 1. 
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Taking form in the proliferation of handgun sales, large male crowds at paintball and other 
mock combat-games, the unprecedented rise in incidents of mass murder, tough-guy Tom 
Clancy novels and 'New War' movies like Rambo, the angry outburst of warrior fantasies 
signified a distinct cultural pattern: the 1980s Reagan era endeavor to authenticate a more 
hard-hitting US national and international identity. 186 
With the American right in political ascendancy in that decade a distinctive reshaping 
of political and popular culture ensued. In particular, the defeat in South East Asia was 
squarely blamed on cowardly liberals in the media and university campuses busy as they were 
in the sixties with loosening the nations morals in the bedroom while being overly moral on the 
battlefield. The as-to-be-expected weak and fernininised government betrayed the 'American 
People' and its soldiers by 'fighting with one arm tied behind our back'. This discourse 
provided an effective moral tone, as Susan Jeffords argues, with which to undermine other 
government interventions, this time in the form of existing welfare programmes and public 
assistance, which not coincidentally proportionately benefited African-Americans and 
women. 187 
Aside from the somewhat ironic detail, noted by Gibson, that the 'image of manhood' 
achieved in mock-combat games broke the taboo of boys 'playing with clothes', ' 88 this cultural 
manifestation of the attempted remasculanisation of US society offers a telling comparison to 
1990s discourses of a new liberal-humanitarian culture, multiply illustrating the cultural 
situated-ness of Kosovo in the politics of the official public realm. Where the post-Vietnam 
generation sought refuge and reinvention in reworking older frontier mythologies of 
, Ainerica's' warrior greatness, 'humanitarian' warriors rewrote similar (albeit liberal) myths, 
this time via a 'dual construction of intimacy and force'. 189 
The 'third-way' social-democratic liberals dominating the 1990s had something to 
prove in Kosovo - Clinton and Blair were both children of the sixties who opposed -the war in 
Asia. "O Most obviously, this facilitated a reworking by conservatives of the 'one arm tied 
Is' Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994). 
"'Susan Jeffords, The RemasculinizationofAmerica: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana 
University Press, 1989). 
188 Gibson, Warrior Dreams, p. 129. 
119 This term is borrowed from Lene Hansen. 
1`0 Craig R. Whitney, 'Born Again; The Doves of Yesteryear Fly off to a Different War', The New York Times, 
April 18,1999- 
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behind our back' mantra that emerged during the early phase of the bombing. Former 
Secretaries of State and Vietnam veterans, most vocally then Senator John McCain, reminded 
citizens that if liberal politicians would cease their legal wrangling the military could 
accomplish the task at hand and defeat was unimaginable. 
191 
Interestingly, as Jean Elshtain observed, 'The upsurge of interest in the candidacy of 
Senator John McCain for the Republican president nomination showed an increased nostalgia 
for notions of military honour and rectitude'. 
192 Others were also not happy to let Kosovo be 
appropriated for the domestic liberal agenda. National Rifle Association lobbyist, James Jay 
Baker, argued that 'if you can be sent to Kosovo and serve in our armed forces, we certainly 
think you ought to have the right to have a firearm'. 
193 Others also questioned the justice of US 
servicemen and women bringing bread to refugees when many had families on food stamps 
back home. 194 
Permitted by 'technological battlefield' discourses and the liberal internationalist order 
itself, however, heightened debate about the so-called 'humanisation', even 'feminisation', of 
Western armed services'" became productive of 1990s liberal self-identity. 'Our information 
societies', according to Christopher Coker, 'put a premium on technical versatility and 
knowledge rather than muscle as a source of power. Western soldiers, like citizens, interface 
with computers... [And] women will significantly change attitudes to war itself, which is why 
their presence in uniform is so important'. 196 
Of course, the democratising impact of advanced technology was presaged in the US 
during the 1920s, supporting gender stereotypes to boot. According to Sherry, 'opportunities 
envisioned for women - and to a lesser extent for blacks - sustained the image of aviation as a 
kind of vertical frontier in American history, a new arena for social mobility. At the same time, 
19' See the various broadsheet op-ed pieces by Henry Kissinger, 'Kosovo and the Vicissitudes of American 
Foreign Policy', collected and reprinted in Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending Voices, pp. 293-305. Also see the 
essays by Zbigniew Brzezinski in, 'Get Serious About Kosovo', reprinted 
in Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending 
Voices, pp. 317-332. 
'92 Jean Bethke Elshtain, "'Shooting at the Wrong Target": A Response to Van Creveld', Millennium, Vol. 29, 
no. 2 (2000), p. 445. 
'93 Editorial Desk, 'N. R. A. and the Marines', The New York Times, May 8,1999. 
194 Michelle Singletary, 'Our Defenders Have Earned A Better Life', The Washington Post, April 18,1999. 
191 See Martin van Creveld, 'The Great Illusion: Women in the Military, Millennium, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2000), pp. 
429-42. 
196 Christopher Coker, 'Humanizing Warfare, or Why Van Creveld May Be Missing the Big Picture', 
Millennium, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2000), p. 455 
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ferninizing aviation further reinforced its pacific image, for women would presumably bend 
aviation toward benign and uplifting purposes'. 197 
Though not without vocal opposition from the military and the political right (the 
dominant ethos of each moving ever closer'98) there was a widespread perception in the 1990s 
that to join the army was to make a lifestyle choice more reminiscent of the Peace Corps than 
anything to do with death. To be sure, if even women were permitted to fight during Kosovo 
(albeit in the cockpit or via computer screen) then liberal armed forces must surely be 
compassionate! This peculiarly domestic 'liberal' discourse, however, has been notably absent 
in the apparently more manly 2001-2 war over Afghanistan. 
Due to the presentism of so much of the Kosovo literature on high technology and war 
there are serious doubts that electronic space has introduced radically new transformations in 
the relationship between publics and violence. Nonetheless, the politics of humanitarian war, 
as Saskia Sassen suggests of financial markets, 'creates a conceptual and practical opening for 
questions about the embeddedness of electronic space. It allows us to elaborate that point 
where the materiality of place/infrastructure intersects with those technologies and 
organizational forms that neutralize place and materiality'! 99 The public battlefield over 
humanitarian war provides an exemplary model to theorise information technology as both a 
means of combat and mediated field of public debate. 
Conclusion 
Developments in computer technology created at least the feasibility (if not the reality) 
of violence over Kosovo conducted in the name of humanity. This is not to suggest that wars 
justified in humanitarian terms never occurred prior to the computer age? OO Nor is to deny that 
this kind of air war is generally the historical exception rather than the rule or that information- 
era weapons can be conceived in functional terms. Yet with the increasing application of 
computer technology to warfare it has seemed easier for liberal states to justify violence to 
191 Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, p. 4 1. 
198 Ignatieff, rirtual War, p. 188. 
199 Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays in the New Mobility ofPeople and Money (forward 
by K. Anthony Appiah) (New York: Ile Free Press, 1998), p. 1 82. 
"0 There are few (if any) examples of wars that have not been accompanied by human rights rhetoric of some 
kind (however perverted). See Noarn Chomsky, The New Military Humanism (Monroe, ME: Common Courage 
Press, 1999), pp. 74-5. 
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publics in humanitarian terms. Central to understanding these processes is the way in which 
technology as a social instrument has shaped and been shaped by US public spheres. 
Where technological up-grades shaped the political environment to make violence over 
Kosovo possible, the politics of this violence became embedded in the technology, both 
metaphorically and sometimes literally. 'Twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in 
Kosovo', declared Blair to a rapturous American audience. 'The fact that we are engaged is the 
result of a wide range of changes - the end of the Cold War, changing technology; the spread 
of democracy. 201 Of course, the term democracy, the image of 'democracy-promotion', and 
the widespread perception that these are phenomena with which the US (and Britain) enjoys a 
unique heritage are particularly powerful myths in the production of liberal violence. 
Information technologies were placed in the modern sociological context to illustrate 
how the specific design features of machines can be constructed as rational and clinical while 
reflecting dominant societal norms. Computer systems, for example, have provided a new 
medium for self-understanding, especially during the Internet boom em of the late 1990s, as 
globalization and attendant wars became the post-Cold War motto for liberal states. A 
conception of world politics that could be technologically ordered has been sustained by the 
computer metaphor as neoliberal economic agendas have been aided by 'democracy by force'. 
Precision-guided missiles were not only used in Kosovo, for example, to protect the 
lives of Allied soldiers. They were absolutely crucial in fostering the conditions in which the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (and of course Kosovo and Albania) could eventually be 
transformed into liberal democracies and partake in the 'liberal peace', the bedrock of any 
global public sphere as described in Chapter Six. 
Precision-guidance, for example, helped sustain the 'humanitarian' distinction between 
the political elite of the regime (who are corrupt) and the Serbian 'people' (potential liberals) 
with whom publics in the West were continually told NATO had no quarrel. 
202 Though by no 
means always successful, targeting the military and political infrastructure of the Yugoslav 
state thereby avoiding levels of 'collateral damage' too great to gloss over facilitated the slow 
and on-going transition toward regional liberal-hood. 
201 British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 'The Doctrine of International Community', Speech to the Economic Club 
of Chicago, April 22,1999. See hqR: //www. globalpolicy. org/globaliz/Rolitics/blair. htm [downloaded 20 July, 
20011. 
202 CNN reported on 26 March 1999 that in a videotaped satellite message intended for the citizens of 
yugoslavia (also posted on a U. S. government Web site) President Clinton said the Allies had no quarrel with 
the Serb people. See http: //www. cnn. com/WORLD/eurot)e/9903/26/nato. attack. 03/ [downloaded June 14,200 1]. 
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As a point of contrast consider the military tactics deployed by the Russians in 
Chechnya where little or no discrimination has been exacted between 'separatist rebels' and 
the surrounding population. The likelihood that Chechnya in the near future will be a 
consenting part of an extended Russian empire is slight to non-existent. With over 36,000 air 
munitions recently released over the territories, however, Serbia and Kosovo can still be 
included in the world of 'Western' democracies. 203 As we saw, this incorporation into the US- 
dominated political and economic global system - an effective rationalisation technique - had 
an attempted (though ultimately failed) forerunner in Vietnam. 
The advanced technologies used to make Kosovo 'safe for democracy' were not 
developed solely (or even principally) for such purposes. Moreover, deploying high-tech 
weaponry served not simply to sell the campaign to reluctant publics or merely to act as a 
coercive diplomacy strategy against the Milosevic regime. The numerous financial and 
material supports linking the computer industry to the military notwithstanding, one of the 
most crucial and perhaps neglected ways in which computer technology has served in the 
discourses of war is as a cultural icon of liberal violence, as part of a self-referential matrix of 
ideologies and practices which contributes to founding the very identity of the post-Cold War 
US republic. 
The cultural politics surrounding IT not only overlapped and was a reflection of 
military strategy it was partly productive of the liberal ideologies necessary to legitimate war 
and bring into being several of the (on-line) counterpublics that emerged in response. The 
emergence of the Internet as an on-line public sphere, a potentially new site of democratic will- 
formation, has provoked a proselytising fervour coinciding with and often explicitly connected 
to proponents of 'Web War I'. 
But if more and more practice dissent on-line in 'virtual communities' what of more 
visible forms of protest? For Herman and Chomsky, 
the steady advance, and cultural power, of marketing and advertising has caused 'the 
displacement of a political public sphere by a depoliticized consumer culture'. And it 
has had the effect of creating a world of virtual communities built by advertisers and 
based on demographics and taste differences of consumers. 204 
203 See Madeleine K. Albright, 'After Kosovo: Building A Lasting Peace, Remarks to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York, 28 June 1999. See http: //www. un. int/usa/99alb628. htm [downloaded June 7,2001]. 
204 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, p. xviii. The authors are quoting Kevin Robins and Frank 
Webster, 7-imes ofthe Technoculture (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 127. 
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'These consumption- and style-based clusters', they continue, 'are at odds with physical 
communities that share a social life and common concerns and which participate in a 
democratic order. These virtual communities are organized to buy and sell goods, not to create 
or service a public sphere'. 205 
Did widespread beliefs in the late 1990s that the US was invulnerable from attack, at 
least from a tin pot (elected) dictator like Milosevic, allied with precision-technology and the 
perception of relatively bloodless combat work against the peacenik activity of old? The 
narrative is sometimes referred to under the heading 'spectator sport warfare', that Western 
citizens are too cosy and technologised to worry greatly about the wars fought by their 
increasingly automated armies. 206 More than merely comfortable liberal-citizen detachment 
and air power's technological advance inaugurated the spectatorial politics witnessed during 
Kosovo, as the next chapter will suggest. US practices of humanitarian war cannot be fully 
understood separately from the way in which technology has transformed war, liberal public 
space, and the relationship between them. Theorists concerned with public spheres have much 
to say on spectatorship and democracy, offering a much-needed politicisation of the 
relationship between citizen politics, public spheres, and war. 
215 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, p. xviii. Chomsky does maintain, however, that this narrative 
of 'decline' applies to the public sphere of the mass commercialised media only and is not to be confused with 
the publics created by feminists, race activists, lesbian and gay rights campaigners, and environmentalists where 
there has been much progress in spite of the commercialisation of mainstream media forms. Personal 
correspondence with Noam, Chomsky. 
206 McInnes, 'Spectator Sport Warfare', p. 144; Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. 3. 
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Chapter 4 
On Dissent: 
US Publics and Anti-War Protest over Kosovo 
The lifespan of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin 
and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a 
faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they may 
die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin. 
- Hannah Arendt' 
This chapter describes how the political development of the 'official'US public sphere shaped 
the possibilities for anti-war dissent against the Kosovo war, and how the war itself became an 
issue around which 'counterpub tics' were constituted! In doing so, by addressing the social 
and political context and significance of US-based dissent, the chapter also contends with some 
of the conceptual and empirical issues in public sphere theory. 
There is always a problem when defirting public spheres. Either the definition is at too 
high a level of abstraction - 'where people come together to talk about their common affairs' - 
or too particular when referring to a specific context - the 18'h Century 'bourgeois public 
realm'. In both instances, however, the meaning and permissibility of dissent and opposition 
are fundamental. If the state in its most deeply penetrative, administrative, and bureaucratic 
modc serves to discipline citizcn-subjects in multiple ways then resistance to war is a 
quintessential instance of an episodic citizen moment with power. 
While rejecting singular, ahistorical definitions of 'the public' the chapter illustrates the 
modem state-liberal public realm nexus in the United States, Positioning our study of public 
spheres and war in ongoing processes of liberal state formation. 
3 Though dissent has begun to 
take on the global institutions of power (for example, protests in Seattle and Genoa), over the 
course of the last century the state itself became more and more a target of focused critique. 
4 
Not all counterpublics are anti-state or separatist, however. As Nancy Fraser suggests anti-war 
counterpublics are not rejecting participation in the mainstream Polity completely in that they 
I Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 246. 
2 For an extensive list of the anti-%var protests around the United States during the bombing campaign see 
os. htm4ARIZONA [doN, %mloaded 28 September 2001]. 
3 Nigel James Young, 'The Nation State and War Resistance', University of California, Berkeley, PhD. 
dissertation, 1976. 
4 Roland Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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I. assume an orientation that is publicist. Insofar as these arenas are publics they are by 
5 definition not enclaves - which is not to deny that they are often involuntarily enclaved'. 
In supporting internationalism, human rights, and democracy, the ideologies and 
institutional survival of numerous peace groups are typically consistent with democratic 
liberalism, the legitimating discourse of humanitarian war. Before accounting for some of the 
more traditional forms of protest that did occur against NATO's war, the first section of the 
chapter, 'Dissent and the Liberal Public Sphere', addresses the background operating 
assumptions of liberal dissent in the mainstream US public sphere. Different practices of 
dissent and theories of its place in the public realm are underpinned by alternative conceptions 
of agency and power. 
Is NATO's appropriation of humanitarianism a sufficient explanation, however, for the 
alleged dearth of opposition to the Kosovo war? The second section of the chapter, 'Being a 
Peacenik is Definitely Out of Style', presents what was an overriding theme in virtually all 
news reports and academic commentary. 
6 NATO's war was different, many suggested, not 
only because it purported to be the first truly 'humanitarian' or 'Internet' war but that it 
signalled the end in the United States of major, Vietnam-era type opposition to liberal state 
violence. With a post-Cold War 'generation of mass-produced bohemianS, 
7 (among others, of 
course) finding virtue in denouncing Starbucks and the WTO, what explains the relative 
silence over military globalization? 
During the 1990s - the jury is still out on the scale and effectiveness of activism against 
the ongoing 'War on Terror' - why did anti-war protests seemingly suffer the fate John Dolan 
ascribes the war protest poem, 'its ideological bent a trivialized given... performed before a 
public that knows what to expect, knows precisely what values will be invoked'? 
' 'Where... ' 
asked Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'are the tens, even hundreds, of thousands who used to come out 
to protest US imperialism, in Vietnam or Central America? '9 To answer these questions, and 
5 Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, 
in Bruce Robbins (ed. ) The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 15. 
6 John M. Broder, 'The Evolution of a President: From a Protesting Dove to a Hesitant Hawk', The New York 
Times, March 28,1999. 
7 John C. Dolan, 'A Show of Defiance: Poetry as "Protest" in Contemporary America7, in Frederick M. Dolan 
and Thomas L. Dumm (eds. ) Rhetorical Republic. Governing Representafions in American Politics (Amherst 
University ofMassachusetts Press, 1993), p. 177. 
s Dolan, 'A Show offleflance', p. 168. 
9 Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'Kosovo and the New Imperialism', in Tariq Ali (ed. ) Masters ofthe Universe? NATO's 
Balkan Crusade (London: Verso, 2000), p. 196. 
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challenge some of their assumptions, we must attend to what according to many was heralded 
for public spheres in the United States by the 'new military humanism' over Kosovo. 10 
There is much evidence to suggest that anti-war counterpublics are marginalised in the 
United States, not only by the predominance of liberal modes of dissent but also the power of 
corporate media. Public spheres are grounded in material structures, not just those of the 
prevailing social and economic system (the liberal-state public sphere) but also the media of 
publicity by which communication occurs. For the latter we can include fitce-to-face 
discussion, action, and protest, as well as mediated channels such as print, radio, TV and the 
Internet. The content and form of mainstream media coverage of NATO's bombing campaign 
(and dissent against it) is considered in the section 'Kosovo, The Media, and Possibilities for 
Dissent'. 
Analysis of the way in which the media covers (or ignores) protest activity is directly 
relevant for activists and researchers alike. Mass media coverage is virtually a prerequisite for 
protest activity to leave a political impression beyond the local and immediate, turning a public 
protest into a society-wide event. Critical coverage of war is also essential for debate and 
opinion formation but as Alistair Homes suggests, 'Kosovo turned out to be the most secret 
campaign in living memory'. 
it 
According to some, however, regardless of media content, the appearance of precision 
and almost death-free fighting for US soldiers has marked a 'watershed in US military 
history' . 
12 It is assumed that active and popular support for US wars is needed less and less. 
One of the seeming cultural effects of US dominance of information-era weapons technology, 
as we saw in the last chapter, has been their apparent role in constituting the 'liberal' and 
'humanitarian' nature of US violence, which partly explains assumptions about the 
concomitant decline in dissent. 
However, in contrast to recent suggestions that liberal states during the 1990s 
mobilised their citizens only in some 'virtual' or 'spectatorial' sense, the fourth section, 
'Spectatorship, Publics, and War', suggests that representations of (and efforts to control) 
10 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo (Monroe, IýE: Common Courage Press, 
1999). 
11 Alistair Homes quoted in Philip Knightley, The First Casua4: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth- 
Makerfrom the Crimea to Kosovo (new introduction by John Pilger) (2ed. ) (London: Prion Books, 2000), p. 
504. 
12 Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Neglected Trinity: Kosovo and the Crisis in US Civil-Military Relations', in Andrew J. 
Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, (eds. ) War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 200 1), p. 192. 
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dissent illustrate how even so-called humanitarian war can act as a mode of social control. 
Developing the critique of the presentism of the 'spectator sport' and 'virtual' war literature in 
the previous chapter, public sphere critique, it is argued, offers greater insight into the 
relationship between liberal publics and war. 
Anti-war activism has long been motivated by a desire to affect wider social change. 
Conforming to some of the basic tenets of liberal theory and 'American' practice, the next 
section, 'Dissent and the "American" Tradition', argues that direct action against wars 
conducted by US armed forces has become a seemingly normalised feature of politics, 
especially since its presumed heyday in the 'radical' 1960s. Popular opposition to the Kosovo 
war was not totally lacking in the United States, however, nor was it restricted to Serb- 
Americans, Russians indignant at the extension of US power, or Chinese protesting the 
bombing of their Embassy. The potential function of groups seeking to limit and otherwise 
constrain the war-making capacity of the United States did not entirely evaporate, it is argued, 
with the so-called rise of the liberal 'laptop bombardiers'. 
13 
Anti-war activists against the background fi-amework of the liberal-state public sphere - 
to which they remain subordinate but retain a critical perspective - can be conceived as 
participants in 'counterpublic' spheres. Many of the counterpublics that emerged in response to 
the Kosovo war, however, were comprised of a concoction of different modes and types of 
publicity. The final section, 'Dissent and the Democratic Tradition', borrows Hannah Arendt's 
theory of civil disobedience and political action to highlight the limitations of the liberal and 
'American' traditions. In doing so, we take another step away from the Habermasian notion of 
the public sphere as constituted by an imminent ideal of rational-critical debate. 
Different ways of articulating dissent always privilege some of the varied rhetorical and 
stylistic norms of being public over others. However, what makes civil disobedients great, in 
Arendt's view, in the sense of standing out, of breaking 'through the commonly accepted and 
reach[ing] into the extraordinary', 
14 is that they act for causes outside themselves. Without 
excessively idealising the protestor, anti-war intrusions on the political scene multiply 
highlight a radical separation of demonstration tactics from politics by a typical liberal subject. 
Where the fastidious activity of voting had, until the Bush-Gore contest of 2000 at least, 
always been an easily calculable means of expression, protest is apt to be many-sided, 
13 Alexander Cockbum, 'Peacenik Way Is Definitely out of Style', The LosAngeles Times, April 22,1999. 
14 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 205. 
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tentative, and uncertain in consequence. But if, as Arendt suggests, war brings 'ruin and 
destruction' to the human condition then anti-war activists are seeking with political action to 
interrupt this, to begin something new. 
Dissent and the Liberal Public Sphere 
Since John Locke, the theoretical foundations of power and authority in the liberal 
tradition has emphasised a dependence on individual human consent. 'Men being... by Nature, 
all free, equal, and independent', Locke wrote, 'no one can be put out of this Estate, and 
subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent'. 15 Liberty is derivative of 
personal autonomy and is given meaning through representative democracy. 
Contra Hobbes, the original state of nature was characterised in Locke's account by 
tolerance and reason; guided by natural law and social contract theory, individuals were 
guaranteed the inalienable rights of health, liberty, and property. If the hope of ever acquiring 
these liberties were absent, however, Locke overturned Hobbes' prohibition of revolution; it 
was the right, indeed the duty, of individuals to withhold consent, to revolt - as the American 
colonists eventually would - against despotic government. 
The notion that power in the United States is based on consent partly framed accounts 
of the expected limits of what a 'democratic' army 'can be expected to endure9 for the troubles 
16 
of 'other people' in Kosovo. Since John Stuart Mill, similar arguments have been used to 
defend the principle of non-intervention between states. 17 Subjects unable, now to mean 
unwilling, to rebel against repression are deemed not ready for the political freedom introduced 
by liberal intervening states. The notion that societal arrangements ultimately reflect human 
choice props up this notion of worthy and unworthy recipients of 'freedom". 18 
As Chapter One discussed, the institutionalisation of limited opposition within the 
liberal state, along with the expression of consent, took form in the mechanism of infrequent 
elections and representative assemblies. 
19 However, there is little doubt that civil disobedience 
" John Locke, Two Treaties ofGovernment (with Introduction and notes by Peter Laslett) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), p3 74. Emphasis in original. 
16 Geofrrey Wheatcro% 'A Land Of Reluctant Warriors', The New York Times, April 14,1999. 
11 J. S. Mill, 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention', in Essays on Politics and Culture (edited by J. M. Robson and 
introduction by Alexander Brady) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
18 For a more recent version of similar arguments see Michael Walzer, 'The Politics ofRescue' Dissent (Winter 
1995), pp. 3 5-4 1. 
19 C. E. S. Franks, 'Introduction', in Franks (ed. ) Dissent and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
P. 19. 
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as a method of political protest enjoys a respectable position in the liberal tradition, with some 
observers identifying tolerance of such opposition an archetypal feature of politics in the 
contemporary West. Christian Bay defines civil disobedience as, 
any act or process of public defiance of law or policy enforced by established 
governmental authorities, insofar as the action is premeditated, understood by the 
actor(s) to be illegal or of contested legality, carried out and persisted in for limited 
public ends and by way of carefully chosen and limited means... that exclude measures 
that could cause personal injuries or even the loss of lifO 
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin argue that non-violent civil disobedience - acts that break the 
law in the spirit of the law - provide, by definition, none other than an extra-institutional litmus 
test of the liberalness of constitutional regimes. 
For Dworkin, in particular, how liberal society manages such acts determines the extent 
to which rights are 'taken seriously' and appeals to the constitution are an essential first stepýl 
As suggested by April Carter, 
An appeal to constitutional rights is less a matter of strict legality than an appeal to the 
spirit of the constitution... The gap between the constitutional ideal and the realities of 
politics means that it may often be possible to charge with some plausibility that a 
particular government policy... is unconstitutional. 22 
For Rawls, in particular, the dissenting citizens in a liberal regime must continue to recognise 
and accept the existing constitution as legitimate if civil disobedience is to be justified. 
23 Some 
of the most prominent dissenting voices against NATO's war articulated opposition precisely 
along these lines. 'The next "collateral damage" caused by the bombing campaign', suggested 
Robert Borosage, 'may be to the laws and Constitution of the United States !4 
Alongside questions concerning the breach of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the 
failure to seek Security Council approval for NATO's use of force against Yugoslavia (as 
discussed in Chapter Two), an additional legal question illustrative of liberal forms of dissent 
obtains from the separation of power between the legislative and executive branches in the US 
Constitution. 
20 Christian Bay, 'Civil Disobedience: The Inner and Outer Limits', CX. S. Franks, Dissent and the State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19 89), p. 42. 
21 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
22 April Carter, DirectAction andLiberal Democracy (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 96. 
23 john Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197 1), p. 363. 
2' Robert L. Borosage, 'A "Splendid Little War" Collides With the War Powers Act', The Los Angeles Times, 
May 23,1999. 
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Article I, Section 8 states that Congressional oversight of executive war-making powers 
meant that Congress alone holds the power to declare war. 25 Moreover, post-Vietnam War 
legislation, the 1973 War Powers Act, requires the Commander-in-Chief, also the President of 
the United States, to report to Congress within forty-eight hours of the introduction of US 
forces into a 'hostile situation'. 'This report... ' writes Brien Hallett, 'was intended to force 
Congress either to authorize the operation formally and officially within sixty days, or in the 
absence of formal congressional authorization, to terminate the operation sý6 
These multiple provisions, argued California's Republican Representative Tom 
Campbell, required either a formal declaration of war on Yugoslavia or the withdrawal of US 
troops. 27 'If Congress does not stand up for its constitutional right to declare war in this 
instance', he argued, 'there is nothing left to the constitutional requirement that Congress and 
only Congress declare war. 
28 
Twenty-six bipartisan members of Congress alleging violation of the 1973 Act filed a 
lawsuit citing President Clinton's disregard for the split 213-213 House vote on 28 April 1999 
that in effect rejected a resolution supporting the bombing campaign. 29 Eventually District 
Judge Paul Friedman granted Clinton's motion to dismiss the suit stating there was no 'clear 
impasse between the executive and legislative branches, ' thus an appeal to the judicial branch 
was 'inappropriate'. 
30 Although the House voted against declaring war on Yugoslavia, argued 
the judge it also did not explicitly demand an entire troop withdrawal. 
Moreover, by a vote of 269 to 158 the House agreed with the Senate, 64 votes to 36, to 
almost double Clinton's budget request, approving a $15 billion emergency package to finance 
the War. 31 Perhaps as an expected qridpro quo a week later the Senate voted by a majority of 
25 Walter J. Rockler, 'War Crimes Law Applies to the US, Too'. See hqR: /hv,. v-, v. countemunch. oriz/ýýockler. htmI 
! do%Nmloaded 29 September 200 11. 
6 Brien Hallet, The LostArt ofDeclafing TT ar (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 4. 
21 For a transcript of the War Powers Act see http: //, ývi"v. cs. indiana. edu/statecraftAvgMow. html [downloaded 20 
December, 2001]. 
28 Guy GUgliotta, 'Campbell Issues War Ultimatum% The IT ashington Post, April 14,1999. 
29 Lawsuit filed by seventeen Congressmen and woman, "Tom Campbell et. al vs. William Jefferson Clinton", 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia'. See httT): //iv-%vw. counteEpunch. orgAvarlaw. htmI 
Idownloaded28 September 2001]. 
0 Bill Miller, 'IE11 Lawsuit On War Powers Is Dismissed', The Washington Post, June 9,1999. 
31 Eric Pianin, 111.5 Billion Approved For Balkan Airstrikes Clinton Request Doubled Passage Uncertain', The 
Washington Post, May 13,1999. 
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60 votes to 40 to reject Clinton's request to close some military bases - never a popular policy 
with elected politicians reluctant to be seen destroying jobs. 32 
Despite New Jersey's Republican Representative Jim Saxton's surprise (and 
unauthorised) trip to Belgrade where he called for the suspension of air strikeS, 33 lawmakers, 
suggested Allison Mitchell, 'rarely like to take an assertive stance on war, particularly before 
chance of success orpoll ratings become clear'. 34 Some polling suggested that resolution ofthe 
Kosovo conflict would most likely benefit sitting Vice President Al Gore in the 2000 
Presidential election. 35 Any boost to his standing, of course, was ultimately in vain. 
Contrary to Campbell's plea that this was the last chance for the Constitution, more 
active congressional oversight of executive war making had long since departed. Since the war 
in Korea and reflecting something of a modem consensus - that is, according to Hallett, when 
6people began reducing war to the violence of combat, formal declarations of war no longer 
made any sense 
36 
- US wars have remained undeclared. Moreover, the absence of legislative 
declarations is not unique to the US; other parliamentary democracies have fared little better. 37 
Even during the Congressionally popular 1990-91 Gulf War, constitutional procedures were 
bypassed. The State Department explained the standard position in 1971 stating that, 
formal declarations of war are often deliberately avoided because they tend to indicate 
both at home and abroad a commitment to total victory and may impede settlement 
possibilities. The issuance of a formal declaration can also have certain legal results: 
Some treaties may be cancelled or suspended, trading contracts and debts with the 
enemy are suspended; vast emergency powers become operative domestically; and the 
legal relations between neutral states and belligerents can be altered. 38 
Such arguments based on convenience, suggests Hallett, indicate 'inattention both to the need 
to justify the war in governing forums and to the possibility that fully reasoned declarations of 
war might serve indispensable military, moral, and even democratic functions'. 39 
" Elisabeth Becker, 'Senate Rejects Pentagon's Request to Close More Military Bases', The New York Times, 
May 27,1999. 
33 Juliet Eilperin, 'House Member Urges NATO to Halt Strikes: Saxton ofN. J. Back From Trip to Belgrade', 
The Washington Post, April 23,1999. 
34 Alison Mitchell, 'Only Congress Can Declare War. Really. It's True', The New York Times, May 2,1999. 
33 Katherine Q. Seeyle, 'Peace Deal Benefits Gore in Campaign and Shows Split Among the Republicans', The 
New York Times, June 6,1999. 
'6 Hallet, The Lost, 4rt ofDeclaring War, p. 36. 
37 Michael IgnatiefL Virtual Wars: Kosovo andBeyond (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000), p. 17 1. 
38 Quoted in Hallet, The Lost, 4rt ofDeclaring War, p. 37. 
" Hallet, The LostArt ofDeclaring War, p. 62. 
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The power to declare war, of course, is categorically not contained in the ability to 
initiate violence. 'Rather', as Hallett proposes, 'it is the power to compose a text, to draft a 
document, to write a denunciation'! o But if war is no more than violence then it does not need 
to be declared to be of use. Following Arendt's definition of violence, war would then be 
4mute 94 1 and so a declaration would seem unnecessary. However, if war (contra Arendt) is in 
the realm of politics, the place of speech and persuasion, there is a need, as Hallett describes, 
'to articulate that policy and to do so both formally and publicly'. 42 The vast drop in electoral 
participation and general interest in politics across the United States, however, has perhaps 
made it easier for politicians to avoid this. Despite the expected general upsurge in civic 
engagement whenever the nation's troops are deployed in war, the staple of associationism. for 
millions of US citizens is self-help and support groups rather than more civic-oriented political 
(or constitutional) activiSM! 
3 
After the free-phone number for the Kosovo refugee disaster fund flashed briefly on the 
April 15 1999 show of Oprah, more than 45,000 people called in. 44 The forged rhetoric of 
'internationalism', as Chapter Three suggested, was powerfully enabled in the late 1990s via 
the discourse of new communications technology. It was no surprise then that the 'charity' of 
the IT industry was also hailed as the US Information Agency altered Kosovo's 'serene' 
landscape 'into a lively hub of Internet activity'. 45 It was as if life itself had arrived with 'the 
din of multimedia computers' !6 This generosity grated somewhat when compared with the 
failure after six months of the US to deliver the $600 million in promised humanitarian aid to 
the Central American victims of Hurricane Mitch. 47 
North Americans are generally more philanthropic and twice as likely to work for 
voluntary associations than members of virtually any other nation. 
48 However, despite the 
Hallet, The Lost Art ofDeclaring War, p. xi. 
41 Arendtý The Human Condition, p. 179. 
42 Hallet, The LostArt ofDeclafing War, pp. xi-xii. 
43 RobertD. Putnam, BowfingAlone. The Collaps andR al OfAmerican Communi (New Yor * Simon and 
Schuster, 2000). 
e eviv ty k. 
" Cindy Loose, 'Images Tug at Purse Strings: Americans Moved by Refugees, Plight Bombard Relief 
Agencies', The Washington Post, April 28,1999. 
45 Daniel Verton, 'USIA opens Internet center to assist Kosovo refugees', CNN. com, June 15,1999. See 
r st Kos g 't s 
htt -//iv%v%v8. cnn. corn/TECH_/co-m utinn 99-06/-15/refu ee_. _idg/ 
[dawnloaded October 2,2001]. ( m12 gýL906L/15keýggLe. 
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47 Editorial, 'The Politics of Hurricane Relief , The New York Times, May 6,1999. 
48 Putnam, Bowling A lone, p .48,117. 
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occasional upsurge in involvement, including in the immediate period after September I1 49 
since the 1960s the US voluntary sector has undergone a radical shift away from large national 
membership-based federations with local offices towards professionally staffed advocacy 
associations usually based in the 'hothouse' of Washington DC. Not rooted in local 
communities, there is little interaction between members; the principal attachment via mass 
mailing or telephone drives (like Oprah) being financial contributions to the cause. 
50 
While associations of virtually all shapes and sizes have increased by almost two-thirds 
since the 1960s this represents, in Robert Putnam's words, more 'a proliferation of letterheads, 
not a boom of grassroots participation'; approximately only one half of these groups actually 
51 
have individuals as members. So although 'joining' per se is not in decline, local membership 
is progressively moving towards private sports clubs, art- and religious-based organisations, 
perhaps explaining the prominence of religious-inspired opposition (and philanthropy) during 
public debate over Kosovo. 
The religious community in the United States, partly represented by the World Council 
of Churches, with over three hundred Protestant and Orthodox Christian churches as members, 
52 
seemed openly divided by NATO's war. One high-ranking Roman Catholic prelate, Cardinal 
Roger M. Mahony, argued NATO's bombing qualified as a 'just war. 53 However, joining 
Patriarch Teoctist of the Romanian Orthodox Church in calling for an end to the bombing, 
pope John Paul ]I controversially sent one of the Vatican's top diplomats to talk with Yugoslav 
president Milosevic in Belgrade. 54 
Echoing the government line, US-based Catholic priest Andrew Greeley criticised the 
pope's neutrality in The New York Times for the assumed implication that NATO's 
'democratically elected leadership' was 'no better than [the] Serbs'. 55 With other Christian 
leaders, including the fundamentalist preacher Pat Robinson, calling for an Easter ceasefire, 
NATO's refusal led clerics across the US to use the occasion of their Easter sermons to 
49 'Volunteering Post 9/1 V. See httl2: //abclocal. %zo. com/k-%zo/ýewsn2ys/091102 7oys-91 I-volunteering. html 
VoNvnloaded 20 November 2002]. 
Putnam, Bowling Alone, p. 5 1. 
51 Putnam Bowling, 41one, p. 49. 
52 Gustav Niebuhr, 'Religion Journal, Acknowledging Discord Over NATO Air Strikes', The Xew York Times, 
Nfarch 27,1999. 
53 Lany B. Stammer, 'Kosovo Bombing Is "Just", Mahony Says', The Los Angeles Times, April 17,1999. 
54 Gustav Niebuhr, 'Amid Many Holy Days, Clerics Urge Cease-Fire', The New York Times, April 2,1999; 
Alessandra Stanley, 'Pope Joins Patriarch in Plea for Peace in Balkans, The New York Times, May 9,1999. 
55 Andrew Greeley, 'How Can the Vatican Stay NeutralT, The New York Times, May 4,1999. 
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condemn both the Yugoslav forces and the Western alliance. 56 By the end of May, thirty 
House Democrats, many previously supporters of NATO's campaign, also called for a halt to 
the strikes aimed at initiating dialogue with Belgrade ý7 
The American Friends and Services Committee (AFSC), a Quaker-based Pacifist 
organisation, was instrumental in organising, with other US-based peace groups, the National 
Coalition for Peace and Justice, which is still in existence and was active against the 2001-2 
war in Afghanistan . 
58 AFSC were extremely active in involving local communities to aid the 
relief effort; including a campaign aimed at children to send relief kits to Kosovo. 
Already by April 1 1999 they had shipped 7,300 kits (of candles, soap and towels, 
59 
antibiotic ointment, and bandages) and 20,000 pounds of clothing. (The Emergency Material 
Assistance Program (EMAP) had initiated the Kits for Kosovo campaign by late 1998. ) The 
AFSC's own report on their activities mentions that, 
People found numerous ways to raise money to support the refugees - through bake 
sales, T-shirt sales, pretzel sales, concerts and dances, and collections at Quaker and 
community meetings and other religious services. Sandy Spring Friends School in- 
Maryland held a 'math-a-thon' and 'basketball-a-thon', which raised more than $2,700 
for all the math problems solved and basketball shots made; and there is the 
unforgettable story of a four and a half-year-old boy from Wisconsin who raised $53.11 
at his Quaker meeting by, literally, selling sticks and stones! 
'AFSC phone lines and e-mail', they continue, 'were flooded by individuals, Friends meetings, 
churches, schools, civic groups, and businesses, asking about our needs and offering to 
volunteer, make donations, work in refugee camps, and learn more about the situation'. 
Although AFSC workers were unable to estimate the actual numbers of people involved, 
hundreds of children contributed, as well as thousands of individual contributions to the relief 
campaign. 
Other forms of collective political activity, however, such as attending local town 
meetings and volunteering for local organisations, along with individual means of public 
expression, such as petition signing, writing to Congress or the newspaper, have diminished as 
rapidly as voting across all socio-economic categories and US regions. But while citizen 
56 Nfichael Janofsky, 'In Easter Sunday Sermons, Both Sides Am Castigated', The Mew York Times, April 5, 
1999. 
57 Juliet Eilperin, '3 0 House Democrats Seek Bombing Halt as an Incentive for Talks', The Washington Post, 
May28,1999. 
58 1 am extremely grateful to Karen Crornley of the AFSC for providing me with this information. All 
information cited is from personal email correspondence with Karen. 
" For information see http: /Av%vNv. afsc. org/ýmaj2/l)roiects/kosovo/koshelp [downloaded December 14,200 1. ] 
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participation in partisan activities has fallen by half, the financial outlay on US presidential 
campaigns have amplified nearly fivefold. As the party machines have become mass-market 
business concerns in their own right, with direct mail fundraising and political action 
committees staffed by professionals, far fewer US citizens volunteer for a political party or 
keep up with the latest political news. 60 
The professionalisation of politics in the United States has had a profound effect on the 
politics of humanitarianism. The public profile of organisations such as Humans Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International are testament to the massive increase in the visibility of 
international human rights issues - and attendant grass-roots activism - during the 1990s. 61 
However, at the same time these and related organisations have increased their public 
prominence at both the national and international level, rates of local civic engagement in 
liberal democracies have radically declined. 
As Diana Johnstone has suggested, the 'creative center of the old liberal left has shifted 
to single-issue and humanitarian non-governmental organizations... Social problems are 
removed from the domain of the state, including its democratically elected parliaments, to 
become the concern of private volunteer organizations'. 62 Kosovo, like others, was billed a 
social-democratic war. 
63 One of the great attractions of 'human rights' wars for left-liberal 
politicians (with little in their domestic agenda to distinguish them from the right in an era of 
welfare 'reform' and social security cut backs) is the appearance of 'old-left' righteous 
benevolence, albeit in a violent form. Former leftists in the Clinton administration, indeed 
former pacifists, could distinguish themselves from the political right with media friendly 
social justice in the form of a 'Just War'. 
'Being a peacenik', then, according to a Counterpunch editorial, was 'definitely passe. 
Liberals are learning once again - did they every truly forget - that it's fun to be a warmonger 
and cheer the high explosive as it falls. After suffering indigestion towards the end of the 
Vietnam affair, they got the taste for war again in the mid-I 990s with Bosnia. They became the 
60 Putnam, BowlingAlone, pp36-8. 
"'See Margaret Keck and Katryn Sikkink, Activists BeyondBorders: Advocacy Networks in International 
politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 199 8). 
62 Diana Johnstone, 'Nato and the New World Order Ideals and Self-Interest', in Philip Hammond and Edward 
S. Herman (eds. ) Degraded Capability. The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 15. 
63 As Chomsky notes, Vietnam was also depicted thus by intellectuals supportive of the Kennedy administration. 
See Noam Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot. JFK, the Heinam War, and U. S. Political Culture (Boston, MA: 
South End Press, 1993). 
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, )64 "laptop bombardiers"... Many things are presumed to have conspired during the Kosovo war 
against the peacenik activity of old. These included a post-cold war geopolitical context 
permitting NATO violence with little fear of reprisal; precision-technology sanctioning air 
operations with only slight risk to Allied soldiers; the humanitarian discourse used to justify 
NATO's war; and perhaps most effective of all, the advent of 'real-time' news - and old- 
fashioned government propaganda - allowing 'spectating' Western publics to witness the 
atrocities of ethnic violence. 
'Being a peacenik is definitely out of style' 
This was a war, (falsely) argued Josef Joffe, 'that not even pacifists can resist: a war of 
conscience, not of interest... This makes all the difference to the postmodern liberal mind, 
which reflexively recoils from force when it is employed for strategic purposes - say oil, 
economic advantage or the balance of power'. 
65 Though liberal minds, let alone liberal states, 
have not especially recoiled from strategic war, the antiwar movement alleged to have caused 
so much havoc over Vietnam seemed relatively mute. 
66 What Kosovo demonstrated, according 
to Eliot Cohen, was that 'the United States can conduct combat operations over a period of 
months, even with some civilian casualties on the other side, without arousing a furore of 
opposition at home'. 
67 'Being a peacenik', Americans were told, 'is definitely out of style'. 68 
Though taken aback by TV images of hostage US soldiers and swift to compare Serb 
repression in Kosovo to the HolocaUSt'69 students of the post-cold-war generation, it was 
suggested, possessed 'only a murky idea' of the latest Balkan events. 
70 College campuses, a 
nostalgically time-honoured hub of political agitation and 'teach-ins', seemed reticent. 71 
64 couterPunch Editorial, 'From Vietnam to Serbia'. See hi! p: /Av%vw. counteiRunch. org/ýiet. htmI [downloaded 28 
September, 200 1]. For a list of anti- Kosovo war sites compiled by Counterpunch see 
htt& I/Ayww. &counteiMpcý. or&Lw4jljpks. htrý [downlo ad ed 28S eptember 2001 
6' josef Joffe, 'The Silent Peaceniks', The New lork Times, April 2,1999. 
66 Art Pine, 'Protests: Humanitarian goal ofNATO campaign holds back activists', The Los Angeles Times, June 
2,1999. 
67 Eliot A. Cohen, 'Kosovo and the New American Way of War', in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen 
(eds. ) War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a GlobalAge (New York: Columbia University Press, 200 1), 
p. 54 
63 Alexander Cockburn, 'Peacenik Way Is Definitely Out of Style', The Los Angeles Times, April 22,1999. 
69 Students were not alone in making these comparisons. See Geraldine Baum, 'Images of Refugees Resonate', 
The Los Angeles Times, April 9,1999; Lee Hockstader, 'In Refugees, Many Israelis See Themselves', The 
Washington Post, April 9,1999. 
10 Mike Allen, 'Student Insularity Mutes Their Outrage', The New York Times, April 11,1999. 
71 Frank Ahrens, 'Campus Sit-Out At College, Kosovo Elicits Concern and Not Much More', The Washington 
post, April 12,1999. 
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Though it was acknowledged if NATO's campaign became drawn out over several more 
months domestic opposition would increase, with not a little satisfaction, several 
commentators remarked on the difficulty domestic 'liberals 972 had in opposing the dropping 
bombs. 73 While many Republicans, most vocally presidential primary candidate John McCain, 
were critical of NATO tactics, numerous Democrats who opposed the 1990-91 Gulf War now 
supported war on Yugoslavia . 
74 'It's not where I usually find myself, reflected the late 
Minnesota Democratic Senator Paul Wellstone, in support for this new war !5 
Neither was this enthusiasm restricted to North America. Much was made in the US 
print media of the muted dissent in Europe. Political parties traditionally, though never 
radically, unenthusiastic about US military adventurism found themselves as vocal 
cheerleaders, none more so than Britain's Labour Party under Tony Blair !6 The French 
Socialists, traditionally more chilly towards NATO, participated in its first bombing mission. 
The then Prime Minister of Italy and former Communist, Massimo D'Alema, overcame dissent 
in his governing coalition to offer airbases !7 
Perhaps most of all, the active role of one time socialist revolutionary and pacifist 
Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, was exhibited as a signature ofthe righteousness of 
NATO's cause. With the German Social Democrats, in coalition with the Greens, engaging 
German troops in direct military combat for the first time since World War J1,78 one LA Times 
journalist could write, 'From the corridors of power in Bonn and Berlin to the farms and 
factories of the depressed eastern states, the descendants of the Nazis see their armed forces, 
action to protect Kosovo Albanians as repaying a debt to the guardians of human rights who 
once acted to halt German war crimes'. 
79 
72 in this context 'domestic liberal' broadly refers to the once left-Of-centre Political parties, such as the 
Democrats in the US and the Labour Party in the UY, 
73 This, however, did not necessarily break new ground. As Noam Chomsky has argued, a 'classic example... is 
the behavior of the intellectual classes on both sides during World War I... Among US intellectuals, principled 
opposition to the Vietnam war was very marginal, contrary to many illusions'. Personal correspondence with 
Noam. Chomsky. 
74 Alison Mitchell, 'Kosovo Is Causing Breaks And Shifts in the 2 Parties', The New York Times, April 8,1999. 
75 E. J. Dionne Jr., 'Not Munich, but the Holocaust: The hook that draws in the "progressiveell, The Washington 
post, April 3 0,1999. 
76 Warren Hoge, 'Kosovo Isn't Just an Air War; It's a Blair War', The New York Times, May 23,1999. 
77 Richard Boudreaux, 'Europeans Hardened by Reports of Serb Atrocities', The Los Angeles Times, April 1, 
1999; Steven Lee Myers, 'All in Favor of This Target, Say Yes, Si, OuL Ja, 71e New York Times, April 25, 
1999. 
78 Lally Weymouth, 'Pacifist Getman Turns Hawkish on Serbs', The Washington Post, April 11,1999. 
79 Carol J. Williams, 'Grandchildren, Children of Nazis Embrace Role Reversal', The Los Angeles Times, April 
14,1999. What is not mentioned here is that the Serbs also sustained a valiant though unsuccessful campaign 
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Similarly, wrote JUrgen Habermas, 'the critique of [NATO] ideology finds no basis for 
its suspicions. The present case demonstrates that universalistic justifications do not always 
mask the particularity of concealed interests. What a "hermeneutics of suspicion" claims to 
find behind the attack on Yugoslavia is rather meagre'. 80 With one of the most influential left 
intellectuals joining in the praise of NATO's actions, the significance of which is discussed 
further in Chapter Six, all but a few of those who did protest were discredited in the public 
realm with labels such as 'pro-Serb. 's' 
Not all leading intellectuals of the left justified violence as part of their 
humanitarianism. 'Milosevic has committed atrocities. Therefore it is okay for us to commit 
atrocities', mocked Howard Zinn. 'He is terrorizing the Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore we 
can terrorize the population of cities and villages in Yugoslavia'. 82 Both iconic figureheads of 
the left, Zinn and Chomsky offered probably the most well known US-based critiques of 
NATO actions in print media and the web. 83 Chomsky, in particular, however, is sceptical of 
the high-profile activist scene in the United States, tending to support more 'grassroots' anti- 
war struggles customarily valorised by public sphere theorists. 
84 
Chomsky dismisses the notion that NATO's war could only be humanitarian because 
no obvious strategic resources were at stake. 'Did the U. S. cherish the resources of Guatemala, 
Indochina, Cuba, Nicaragua, and a long list of other targets of violence in recent years? '85 His 
challenge to the military humanism of the 1990s is absent, however, misread or parodied in 
much of the extant academic and popular press. 
Michael J. Glennon, for example, criticises Chomsky's alleged search for an 'objective 
system of validation' for the 'moral precepts' on which his critique of NATO is based. 86 At 
times, Glennon's argument appears as little more than quibbling over the philosophical 
meaning of 'own' in the assertion that NATO's ... own actions"... brought about accelerated 
against the Nazis during WWH. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (2ed. ) 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 113 -17. 
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82 I-IoNvard Zim 'Their Atrocities and Ours', in On TT ar (Ne-tv York-: Seven Stories Press, 200 1), p. 22. 
13 For the Z-Net archive of essays by Chomsky see http: /Avý"v. zmag-org/ýhomsky/l*ndex. cfrn [downloaded 
December 21,2001]. 
84 Robert F. Barsky, Noam Chomsky. - A Life ofDissent (Cambridge, MA: Nffr Press, 1997), p. 137. 
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158 
ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo. 87 This outcome, however, is something that even General Wesley 
Clark, commander of NATO forces, openly accepted as an 'entirely predictable' consequence 
of bombing. 8a Interestingly, as no counter evidence is provided, Glennon. does not dispute 
Chornsky's general critique of US actions in this case. 
Chris Brown has also attributed 'theory-centred' moral reasoning to Chomsky given his 
invocation of the Hippocratic principle 'do no harin'. 89 Chomsky argued that doing no hann is 
6preferable', in his words, 'to causing harin - the consequence recognized in advance to be 
"predictable" in the case of Kosovo'. 90 This principle is an inappropriate form of ethical 
reasoning, Brown claims, given the implicit refusal to accept the problem of 'dirty hands'. 
91 
This problem, also articulated by Max Weber as central to an 'ethic of responsibility,, 92 is that 
to achieve a legitimate end ('save Kosovar-Albanians') it sometimes requires the use of 
otherwise illegitimate means (using violence). 
Chomsky, of course, accepts that there may be ... no alternative" to doing nothing or 
causing vast harm. 
93 However, the case does not apply to Kosovo. By no means were all 
diplomatic solutions exhausted prior to bombing, nor is it legitimate to simply assume NATO's 
benign intentions (saving Kosovar-AlbanianS). 94 One of the most publicised incidents in the 
lead up to NATO's campaign and widely cited as the single most significant event in the 
decision to finally bomb was the massacre of some forty-five Kosovo-Albanian villagers in 
Racak on 15 January 1999. 'There are simple ways, Chomsky writes, of appraising the effect 
of the Racak massacre 'on Western sensibilities'. 
95 How have the same leaders who responded 
to Racak, he asks, dealt with 'similar or worse massacres at the same time', where they are 
implicated themselves and where something could quite easily be done? 9' 
" Glennon, Limits ofLaw, p. 1 72. 
"Quoted in Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 21. This was also later acknowledged in Clark's 
memoirs. See General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New 
york: Public Affairs, 200 1), p. 17 1. 
8' Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 1 56. Chris Brown, 'Selective Humanitarianism and the Just War 
Tradition', Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Conference, New Orleans, 2002. 
90 Chomsky, Yhe New Military Humanism, p. 1 56. 
91 Brown, 'Selective Humanitarianism. 
92 Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in From Max Weber. EssaYs in Sociology (translated, edited, and with an 
introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-128. 
93 Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 1 56. 
" Noarn Chomsky, 'The Kosovo Peace Accord', in Tariq Ali (ed. ) Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan 
Crusade (D)ndon: Verso, 2000), pp. 387-96. 
95 Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 3 3. 
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Chomsky sites over one hundred East Timorese killed in April 19 99 alone, 'more than 
twice the number in Racak'. 97 Similarly with Columbia, during 1999, he writes, the 'figures 
are eerily similar: 2-3000 killed [over the medium term], 300,000 new refugees'. 98 The 
difference between the cases, he suggests, are on the one hand, 'in Columbia these atrocities 
are not new, and on the other, 'the blood is on Washington's hands'. 
99 Thus, the principles 
behind the rhetoric of the 'New Humanism', Chomsky writes, are that 'the world is ruled by 
force, under a veil of moral purpose woven by the educated classes, who, as throughout 
history, preach eloquently about "a landmark in international relations", a "new era7' ofjustice 
and righteousness under the courageous leadership of the enlightened states'. 100 
But do two wrongs in the international arena make right? '01 In other words, because 
prior to 1999 no intervention occurred to 'save' the East Timorese from Indonesian repression 
does this invalidate the (albeit selective) desire on the part of the West to do good elsewhere? 
First, to claim that no Western intervention occurred in East Timor prior to 1999 is misleading 
given the extent of arms sales to the Indonesian regime knowingly used to oppress East 
Timor. 102 Moreover, in A New Generation Draws the Line, Chomsky explicitly repudiates the 
principle that inaction in one instance negates the legitimacy of action elsewhere. In his words, 
A favorite target is the argument, attributed to unnamed 'leftists' or 'revisionists, that 
the US has no right to intervene because of its disgraceful record.... [Such an account] 
would be wholly irrational, hence easy to refute... I did not look at the record of 
inaction' of the West in [Palestine, East Timor, Kurdistan and so on]... but at the 
record of quite decisive action, a fact that evidently cannot be assimilated by many 
Western intellectuals. 103 
Chomsky's political project, he would claim, is not to look at the so-called 'double-standards' 
of the West but rather at what he would conceive as one standard, namely where 'the blood is 
on Washington's hands'. 
104 The public sphere in which it is made, of course, shapes the effect 
of such a political critique. 
9' Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 43. 
9' Chornsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 49. 
99 Chornsky, The New Military Humanism, p. 5 0. 
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101 This question is posed of Chornsky's critique by Nicholas J. Wheeler in Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 28 8,305. 
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There is a binding association in modem society between mass public communication 
and democratic politics. 105 This is why government efforts to 'manufacture consent', 106 to 
produce 'the people', during wartime are central to the workings of propaganda. 'Americans', 
in the words of Lauren Berlant, 'experience themselves as national through public sphere 
accounts of what is important about them: this is why the manufacture of public opinion is 
crucial both for producing citizens and seeing how citizens are produced'. 107 
Claims concerning the power of the corporate media to manage (or indeed produce) 
public opinion during the Kosovo war -a major issue in assessing the level and effect of 
antiwar dissent - have been grand indeed. Diana Johnstone suggests 'It was the conspicuous 
performance of the media as momlizing chorus that enabled NATO governments to claim that 
Kosovo was the scene of history's first purely unselfish war... waged solely in response to 
proddings of the conscience of the "international community"., 
108 The authors of The Kosovo 
Report begged to differ, however. They wrote, 
the basic charge - that journalists allowed themselves and consequently the public at 
large to be 'spun' by NATO media manipulation - seems unfounded. The reality was 
that there was rigourous public debate about the conduct of the war throughout the 
NATO countries, and NATO never enjoyed the kind of easy ride with public opinion 
that is assumed in the argument that the war was won by being spun. 109 
What should we make of these competing claims? 
Kosovo, The Media, and Possibilities for Dissent 
I. 1110 Due to the level of 'cynicism, sarcasm, [and] bitterness (General Wesley Clark) that 
characterised domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam and the concomitant myth of an anti- 
war media that 'lost' the war, 
"' both US government and military institutions have pro- 
'05 Nicholas Gamham, 'The Media and the Public Sphere', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public 
Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 359-376. 
11 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of MassMedja 
(2ed. ) (New York: Pantheon Books, [1988] 2002). 
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NC: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 10. 
10' Johnstone, 'Nato and the New World Order', p. 7. 
109 The Kosovo Report. Independent International Commission on Kosovo (OxfDrd: Oxford University Press, 
2000), P219. 
110 Clark, Waging Modern War, p. 204. 
"I Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot p. 2. Moreover, in addition to the'media' argument in Arendt's words, 'What 
caused the disastrous defeat of American policies and armed intervention [in Vietnam] was indeed no 
quagmire... but the wilful, disregard of all facts, historical, geographical, political, geographical, R)r more than 
twenty-five years'. See Arendt, 'Lying in Politics', Crisis ofthe Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace 
jovanovich, 1972), p. 32. 
161 
actively honed methods of wartime media control! 12 Especially during the early stages, few of 
even the most basic details of NATO's bombing operation were publicly disclosed, including 
which targets pilots were attempting to strike (routinely provided during the Persian Gulf 
War). Clark's incantation became the customary declaration of intent. 'We are going to 
systematically attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate, and ultimately destroy these forces and their 
facilities and support, unless President Milosevic complies with the demands of the 
international community'. 113 However, Clark's judgment that press briefings should be limited 
to only the broadest of generalities was widely criticised, especially as weather-hampered air 
attacks during the first two weeks were far from a resounding success. 114 
Repeatedly barred by the Yugoslav regime from covering the war on the ground, 
Western reporters relied heavily on handouts and briefings from NATO and the US State 
Department for news. 'US embassies... in Europe', according to one report, 'sent out... 
articles to newspapers, emphasising that although the US government owned the copyright of 
the articles, there was no need for the newspapers to tell their readers this'! 's However, with 
the leading editors and executives of seven major US news organisations sending a letter of 
protest to the Secretary of Defense more information about the bombing was reluctantly 
disclosed! 16 Questioning whether a Yugoslav media operation was a 'legitimate' military or 
'dual-use' target, the attack on Serbian TV headquarters killing sixteen and injuring more than 
twenty also drew protests from Western journalists. 
117 Yet even though reporters were killed, 
'The Committee to Protect Journalists refused to list the Serb victims in its annual report of 
murdered journalists, on grounds that they [were] propagandists, notjoumalists'. 
118 
Felicity Barringer suggested at the time that, 'what journalists see of air war is what 
NATO allies want them to see, and what they see of destruction in Kosovo and Serbia is what 
Serbs want them to see'. 119 Yet with NATO reconnaissance planes seeking evidence to fit 
Serbia's crimes, journalists could dutifully describe more than might otherwise have met the 
112 Susan, L Carruthers, The Media at War. Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Macmillan, 2000). 
111 Quoted in Clark, Waging Modern War, p. 2 03. 
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117 Howard Kurtz, 'NATO Hit on TV Station Draws Journalists' Fire', The Washington Post, April 24,1999. 
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eye. 120 When a NATO press officer suggested, for example, that what was actually a recently 
ploughed meadow, seen from 30,000 feet above ground, might be the site of a massacre, the 
&suggestion' was circulated as news. 121 Part of a much broader trend of official source 
dependency this 'symbiotic relationship', suggest Edward Herman and David Peterson, 'makes 
for an uncritical media institution consciously allied with, and readily managed by, the 
government'. 122 
In this respect CNN certainly stands out. Dispelling any suggestion by The Kosovo 
Report that important media outlets refused to be spun, military personnel from the Third 
Psychological Operations Battalion from Fort Bragg, North Carolina worked with CNN during 
the campaign to construct appropriate stories. 
123 Herman and Peterson contend that 'in word 
usage, assumptions, and choice and treatment of issues and sources CNN served as [NATO's] 
defacto public-information partner'. 124 
Other evidence of CNN's role in validating NATO can be found in the more general 
media trend, following US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, to date the beginning of the 
conflict between Serb nationalists and Kosovo-Albanians to the late 1980s, when Milosevic 
famously magnified ethnic tensions as part of his rise to power. 125 Rather than offering a more 
nuanced picture implicating Milosevic, KLA guerrilla violence, the proliferation of weapons 
after the collapse of civil order in Albania, as well as the West's 1995 decision to appease 
Serbia at Dayton by ignoring Ibrahim Rugova's peaceful calls for Kosovo autonomy, 
corporate-owned media outlets more readily corroborated NATO's effort to lay the blame 
squarely on Milosevic. 
126 Indeed, at the same time the military were being coy about their 
120, pentagon spokesman Kenneth H Bacon', reported David Stout, 'says photographs taken by US spy satellites 
seem to show that Serbian fi)rces 
dug up bodies of their victims to hide evidence of massacre in lzbica, Kosovo'. 
David Stout, 'U. S. Photos Show Ground Work at Suspected She of Mass Grave', The New York Times, June 10, 
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121 Miron Rezun, Europe's Nightmare: The Strugglefor Kosovo (Westport: Praeger, 200 1), p. 49. 
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activities, Clinton's foreign policy team filled TV and radio stations to justify the air campaign 
with testimonials of the 'genocidal' actions taken by Serbia against Kosovo -Albanians - 
127 
Continual images of tens of thousands of refugees pouring out of the province 
substantiated NATO's efforts to make deliberate ethnic cleansing the focus of the news, 128 
despite the fact that the majority of refugees were created after NATO started bombing. 129 
Similarly indicating a willingness of mainstream media to follow NATO's script are accounts 
of the 1999 Ramouillet negotiations which portrayed Milosevic as totally unwilling to 
compromise, omitting Albright's stipulation (bound to be rejected) that NATO forces should 
be allowed to roam Yugoslavia completely unchecked. 130 What did not enjoy widespread 
coverage was the view summarised by an aide to Albright at Rambouillet - the face-off in 
Frunce had 'only one purpose: to get the war started with the Europeans locked in'. 131 
Moreover, with so much media attention paid to NATO and the humanitarian 
catastrophe in Europe other important events were overshadowed, including the escalation of 
US and British bombing raids against Iraq and continuing violence in the Sudan and 
Indonesia. 132 Modest coverage was also given to criticisms of the US during the bombing 
campaign at the UN's annual meeting on global democratic rights, with Amnesty International 
also placing the US on its list of human rights violators for the first time. 133 Abuses obscured 
by NATO's war were not restricted to the United States, however. Akin Birdal, a leading 
human rights advocate, was jailed in Turkey, a 'democratic' NATO member, for 'subversive' 
speeches such as the demand for a peaceful settlement with the Kurds. 134 
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After more than a week of bombing, none of the Human Rights Watch reports included 
even estimated numbers of civilian casualties caused by NATO, 135 while media speculation 
about other events were often presented as fact. The quandary of fact verification was 
highlighted when the authenticity of a photo sent by a Serb free-lancer of an Albanian corpse 
136 lying in a crater near other bodies, published by Time -and Newsweek, was later disputed. 
ABC's John Cochran also reported, for example, that, 'NATO analysts are looking at the 
possibility that, after [NATO's] bombing [of Korisal, the Serbs shelled the town with artillery 
to make the devastation appear even worse. The analysts say the pictures from the scene do not 
seem to match the damage they believe was caused by the bombs'. 137 After eventually 
admitting that the Allies were indeed responsible for the devastation, NATO spokesmen 
proposed the idea that the dead refugees were actually 'human shields', deliberately placed by 
the Serbs near a military facility with the explicit intent of causing the embarrassing blunder. 138 
One way of assessing the level of media participation in the cultivation, rather than 
simply the reflection, of support for NATO - and low level of domestic opposition - is to 
review the relative airtime given to 'expert' supporters and opponents of the campaign. As 
suggested by Larry Beinhart, author of American Hero on how war can be thought of as a 
theatrical event, 'it is better if good guys seem purposeful and smart'. 139 
A May 1999 Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting study showed that out of two hundred 
and ninety-one sources appearing on ABC's Nightline and PBS's NewsHour, only twenty-four, 
or eight percent, were critical of NATO's actions. On NewsHour and Nightline, outright 
opponents of bombing constituted ten and five percent of sources respectively. 140 Herman and 
Peterson similarly report that of fifteen 'important dissident commentators', only three 
appeared briefly on CNN compared with the networks total count of seven hundred and 
"' CounterPunch Editorial, 'How the US State Dept Recruited Human Rights Groups to Cheer On the Bombing 
Raids'. See httl2: //wNvw. counterPunch. org/kohmtg. htinl [downloaded 28 September 20011. 
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battlefield'. Michael R. Gordon, 'NATO Admits Village Attack And Casualties', The New York Times, May 16, 
1999. 
139 Larry Beinhart, 'Book-, Movie, War, Reality', The Yew York Times, NIay 19,1999. 
1`0 See http: //wNvNv. fair. orgkei)orts-sources. htmi [doNvnIoadcd November 20,200 1]. Also see Ackerman and 
Naureckas, 'Following Washington's Script', p. 109. 
165 
twenty-eight sources. 141 With the lack of substantive political debate, televised contestation 
came to centre on tactics, principally whether Allied ground troops should be deployed in 
addition to the bombing raids. 
Although a majority of 'the American people' felt the US would eventually deploy 
ground troops and lead to the loss of US lives, only forty-six percent actually favoured the 
policy with forty-eight percent opposed. Amongst those self-described as following the 
conflict closely, backing for ground troops was strongest at fifty-five percent. 142 Indeed, by 
mid-May, a Washington Post-ABC News poll showed a majority of US citizens thought 
NATO should change tactics and negotiate a settlement with Milosevic. 143 Where 'opinion- 
leaders' mostly seemed to rally behind NATO, public support for the air war began to soften as 
the bombing continued. While an early April New York TimesICBS News poll showed only 
fifty-two percent support, even fewer thought bombing would stop ethnic cleansing believing 
the conflict between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians would continue for years. As 'public 
opinion' began to change, then, director of the Pew Research Center (for 'counting noses in 
144 
opinion-polls' ), offered comfort in The New York Times to those in support of war. Such 
polls, he suggested, must be read with caution because 'ordinary people' found it difficult to 
grasp this 'hard-to-understand conflict'. 
145 
With potential opposition centres to the Milosevic regime (in Nis, Kragujevic, Cacak, 
and VaIjevo) severely damaged by the bombing and with the campaign now more openly 
turning to attacks on civilian facilities as the months passed by, some in the media more 
readily highlighted character flaws in the Serb people, of whom we were previously told 
1 146 NATO had 'no quarrel . Wondering what it would take to 'cleanse Serbia', Blaine Harden 
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of The New York Times suggested that there was a (collective soft spot in the Serbian 
psyche' 147 which explained their susceptibility to Milosevic. 
NATO's remodelled twenty-strong multinational 'information strategy cell' would also 
sharpen the daily press briefings deemed crucial for disseminating the right 'strategic 
information'. 148 Methods were no doubt bolstered by the loan of Tony Blair's master spin- 
doctor, Alistair Campbell. 149 According to Anthony Weymouth, however, NATO need hardly 
spend time spinning the politics of the intervention; the images alone were enough. 'If there 
were other reasons for the intervention by Nato of a more complex nature... there was little 
need for them to be explained to the public. The newsreel footage that concentrated on the 
human disaster... said it all'. 150 
No doubt with the Reagan-era triumph of neo-liberalism and its related privatisation of 
Western aid, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been forced to play along and vie 
for public support in increasingly sophisticated (and emotive) media campaigns. (The AFSC 
have not taken this media route during their ongoing Kosovo relief effort. ) Certainly during the 
periods before and after NATO's involvement in Kosovo, NGOs including Human Rights 
Watch, Mercy Corps, and Amnesty International were providing important relief work and 
monitoring. 151 Indeed, some humanitarian workers can be added to the numbers of Kosovo- 
Serb and Albanian civilians killed. 152 Once the bombing began, however, several hundred 
NGOs descended on the scene, an almost 'feeding frenzy' of crisis junkies, as The Kosovo 
Report described. 153 The competence and coordination of many of these groups left a lot to be 
desired. 
While perhaps not openly requesting the use of force, aid workers and organisations are 
often construed as objective observers and thereby contribute to the construction of consent for 
war through their often-harrowing accounts of events on the ground. 154 Because they are non- 
governmental and do an enormous amount of relief work these organisations are allotted 
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ethical credentials in ways that contribute to the moral instruments of state-led military 
intervention. 155 During the Kosovo war, such organisations seemed to offer a level of 
6objectivity' to NATO's claims of atrocities. One example was UNHCR evidence of massacres 
offered to the UN Security Council meeting on 10 September 1998 which supplied some ofthe 
basis, as Adam Roberts describes, for the 'strongly worded Chapter VU resolution [1199] on 
Kosovo'. 156 One result of such 'moral interventions', as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
note, is that military deployments can then be 'presented as an internationally sanctioned 
police action'. 
157 
That during Kosovo, as Robert Redeker describes, 'intellectuals, humanitarians and the 
military all [used] the sarne vocabulary' 158 should be cause for democratic concern, not 
celebration. As Alex Calinicos describes, the use of emotive TV images has often led to the 
simplification of the causes of disaster, in effect de-politicising any practical response. 
159 That 
the sentimental (and gendered) images of Kosovo-Albanian refugees contributed to the de- 
politicisation of responses to the Kosovo crisis will be an argument developed ffirther in 
Chapter Five. 
Rather than heralding a new progressive era of global politics, it would seem, NATO's 
humanitarianism, as Redeker suggests, is dependent on government by [the marketing on 
emotion [and] ... the affective force of [television] images'. 
160 If public dissent against 
NATO's war was judged by many to be meagre then the level of active support for the effort 
was perhaps equally as shallow as a result. Why does this seem to be so? 'Despite the exposure 
of suffering offered by the globalized media', argues Colin McInnes, 'those of us who watch, 
hear about or read about such events are inevitably removed from it' . 
161 We seemingly witness 
such events as mere 'spectators'. What are the democratic implications, however, of 
characterising the relationship between liberal democracy and war as one of 'spectatorship'? 
Does public sphere critique offer a way beyond these largely de-politicised accounts? 
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Spectatorship, Publics and War 
From pictures of the thousands fleeing Kosovo and the flying FI 17's to the Eagle logo 
splashed across TV screens 162 _ presumably meant to symbolise US prowess - Kosovo seemed 
to represent 'spectator-sport warfare 163 at its worst. 'The war', according to Michael Ignatieff, 
fwas, a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do'. 164 This 
seemingly new phenomenon is summarised by McInnes. In his words, 
The majority spectate from a safe distance courtesy of the globalized media, 
empathizing but not experiencing, sympathizing but not suffering. Strategies for the use 
of force emphasize minimizing costs and risks, most clearly through the coercive use of 
air power but also through the adoption ofmanoeuvre-based strategies and an emphasis 
upon technology (including the promise of a Revolution in Military Affairs). The 
experience of war for the West has therefore changed over this century from one of 
total war to one of a spectator sporL 165 
For its effect on the mass public or 'majority' the main culprit in this dumbed down 
internationalism is an old one, TV. With its 'complacent flaunting of images of misery,, writes 
Redeker, and 'the spectaularization of victims' flesh' the proxy suffering inaugurated by 
television seems to negate 'political citizenship'. 166 Efforts to create an open public space for 
discussion about humanitarianism, politics and war are all but closed oflý it would seem, by the 
structural demands of the media form in which most public conversation now occurs. 167 
At first glance the notion of 'spectator sport warfare' accords with more critical 
expectations of liberal democratic theory and practice more generally: the TV-watching 
, rabble', in Chomsky's parody of existing liberal polities, should be 'spectators not active 
participants'. 
168 The oft-cited main offender in Chomsky's work is the liberal-conservative 
critic Walter Lippmann. In his 1927 book The Phantom Public, Lippmann claimed there never 
has or ever will be the public sphere found in the 'sophistry' of political theory. 169 In his 
words, 
To support the Ins when things are going well, to support the Outs when things seem to 
be going badly, this, in spite of all that has been said about tweedledurn and 
tweedledee, is the essence of popular government. Even the most intelligent large 
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public of which we have any experience must determine finally who shall wield the 
organized power of the state, its army and its police, by a choice between Ins and 
outs 
. 
170 
There could be no serious critical engagement by publics at even the national let alone 
international level, Lippmann argued. Experts and elites, accountable and replaced by 
elections, should run government via 'the manufacture of consent'. Edward Herman and 
Chomsky's book of the same title can be read as a radically democratic response to 
Lippmann's empirical and normative critique, specifically the very idea that citizens in mass 
democracies were or even could be interested in public policy. 171 
Habermas's Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere then is only the most 
commonly cited story of the winning of bourgeois enlightenment through print media, only to 
be lost with the dawn of mass media techniques. 172 Hardt and Negri offer a similar narrative. 
'In the society of the spectacle', they argue, 'what was once imagined as the public sphere, the 
open terrain of political exchange and participation, completely evaporates'. 173 Herman and 
Chomsky are explicit in conceiving the popular entertainment supplied by corporate 
advertisers as fundamental, in their words, to 'the gradual erosion of the public sphere under 
systems of commercial media'. 
174 
But as Sylviane Agacinski describes, like Redeker and others, Habennas not only 
wants to, 
transpose the opposition between reason and emotion to modes of communication 
(print and screen media) but also to the different publics affected by these techniques. 
The notion of 'masses' or of a 'public at large' is not only used to define the 
extraordinary extension of the public of the media but also to speci what could be 
called a class of public that is susceptible to the seduction of images. 17ý 
But 'political power', as Agacinski suggests, 'did not wait for the arrival of television in order 
to be seductive'. 176 We should reject straightforward Habermasian notions that mass media 
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techniques are principally to blame. 177 The 'spectatorial' politics witnessed during Kosovo was 
inaugurated earlier and by more than the liberal-citizen detachment of pre-September 11. 
The days of 'face-to-face' discursive communication are certainly long over, 
necessarily implying mediated forms of political spectacle. Tropes such as 'popular consent' 
and 'representative democracy' - constitutive of the idea of a singular liberal public sphere - 
are dependent upon forms of political subjectivity intimately connected to modes of mediated 
communication. Representative institutions are not in crisis because they are mediated by 
'spectacle'. Since Machiavelli, politics has often been conceived as an art of illusion, the 
staging of power, or in Arendt's formulation, the realm of appearances. 178 In other words, the 
&spectator-sport warfare' literature simply re-articulates what is already the dominant liberal 
stage set. The notion of citizen/audience ogling government/actor serves, in effect, to 
consolidate existing inscriptions of liberal political subjectivity as commodity citizenship. 
Through public sphere critique, in contrast, especially following Arendt's alternative 
understanding of power, we might begin to re-open spaces for a more political analysis of 
contemporary liberal state violence. In accord with Michel Foucault's understanding, for 
example, Arendt's model ofpower and dissent is not one based on the dichotomous interaction 
found in liberalism between rulers and the 'consenting' or 'spectating' ruled. In Foucault's 
words, 
there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root 
of power relations, and serving as a general matrix - no such duality extending from the 
top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social 
body. One must suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape 
and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and 
institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavages that run through the 
social body as a whole. 179 
Where power, for Foucault, is &a complex strategical situation in a particular society', ISO 
similarly for Arendtý power must not be equated with 'rule'. 
181 It is 'never', she argues, 'the 
177 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, pp. 18 1-95. 
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property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence so long as the group 
keeps together'. 182 
In going beyond the increasingly commonplace liberal narrative of 'spectator-sport 
warfare' - Western citizens are too comfortable to worry greatly about the wars of their 
increasingly automated armies - we might address some of the weightier paradoxes and 
pathologies of public spheres and their relationship to war. By taking more seriously the 
political importance that culture and the fourth estate have acquired in modem societies we can 
begin to question whether the popular screen is inevitably more damaging to politics than the 
public rhetoric of liberalism or the printed media form. Rejecting straightforward notions of 
the Ispectating' mass public implies a more sustained political critique of liberal public spheres 
than we have witnessed in accounts of spectatorship and war thus far. 
Before elaborating Arendt's critique of the possibilities for dissent in the liberal public 
sphere we must first address how individuals and groups in the United States formed anti-war 
publics not wholly dependent on the liberal notions of power, agency, and consent. 
Conforming to the perception that war strikes at the heart of the 'American tradition' it would 
seem that dissent against war can claim to be as 'American' as the actions of the more time- 
honoured (usually male) fighting patriots. 'Americans have been a violent people', suggests 
Joseph Conlin (in language devoid of its gender connotations), 'but, throughout most of their 
history, they have not loved war'. 183 Countless US citizens, both men and women, have been 
appalled by the horrors of Civil War, two World Wars, but most of all the war in Vietnam. 
Dissent and the 'American' Tradition 
Civil disobedience in the liberal tradition, as we have seen, is not permitted if civil and 
political rights have not been infringed and the institutions of state obey established 
constitutional rules of procedural justice. Civil disobedience in this vein is a calculating form 
of resistance, resting on the defense of liberal rights (the extension of private freedoms) not 
democracy itselL Once constitutional government has been secured, liberal 'politics', in Nancy 
Rosenblum's words, 'loses its dramatic appeal'. 184 Thus neither Rawls nor Dworkin interpret 
Arendt, 'On Violence', P. 143. 
Colin, American Anti- War Movements, pI The vast majority of violence in the domestic realm is male 
against female and until very recently violence conducted by US arm forces was by men. This is not, however, to 
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civil disobedience as a legitimate reaction to any institutional democratic deficit once the 
&revolution', meaning constitutional democracy, has been achieved. 'Apathy is dangerous', 
suggests Rosenblum, of this view. 'But vigilance and democratic participation are prudent 
rather than inspired'! 
85 
In contrast to the legalism inaugurated by liberal dissent, the transcendental idealism of 
'American' writers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau have sought to 
91 86 capture an 'essential radical heroism of American life . Emerson and Thoreau echo in the 
US context the romantic notion of an authoritative rational ego able to act independently in the 
world, yet in the refusal of allegiance to repressive authority the free individual is able to 
nurture an instinctive capacity to grasp beauty and truth. This romanticism, suggests 
Rosenblum, 'brings to mind the emotional, aesthetic, and personal... a prism through which 
187 
liberalism is refi-acted'. 
Through the use of the full play of emotions, as well as intellect, the emphasis in 
transcendental idealism is on an 'intuitive reaction to political life; ' 188 a contmst with the 
impersonal legalism of liberal politics. Indeed, in accordance with the mythic standing of the 
original 17th Century Pilgrim's escape from religious custom, 
189 references abound in US 
popular and political culture to the part played by more 'heroic' forms of direct action in 
winning democratic rights. 
Martin Luther King Jr., for example, in his 1963 essay 'Why We Can't Wait', wrote 
that, 'Nonviolent direct action did not originate in America, but it found its natural home in 
this land, where refusal to cooperate with injustice was an ancient and honorable tradition'. 190 
Although in the West direct action as a method of political engagement has been closely 
associated with liberal freedoms, this extra-parliamentary activity draws on various liberal and 
non-liberal, as well as violent and non-violent, traditions. Inspired by Vaishnav philosophy, a 
form of Hinduism, Gandhi's pacifism became influential in anti-Vietnam war movements 
Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, p. l. 16. 
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since the 1960s. 191 Pacifist organisations such as the Quakers, Catholic Worker's, American 
Legion and Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as dissident individuals such as Emerson, Thoreau, 
and Dorothy Day form part of this popular legacy. 192 
However, as witnessed in the 'support the troops' yellow-ribbon craze during the Gulf 
War - that sought to blame by implication antiwar protestors for dishonouring Vietnam 
veterans 193 _ the legacy of Vietnam, including the place of protestors and the 'vets' who joined 
them, remains as contested as ever. 194 Though the actual number who went out to demonstrate 
probably comprised a statistical minority, there was almost certainly no section of US society 
left untouched. 195 Vietnam became, in Arthur Marwick's words, 'the great universal issue, 
binding together protests within America over race, poverty, consumerism, and alleged 
repression of student freedoms'. 196 
Often collectively branded the 'New Left, these organisations and issues included 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the African-American civil rights movement, 
various women's groups, and the Berkeley student free speech movement. Though a nation- 
wide phenomenon, it was perhaps not coincidental that these groups coalesced - and still do - 
in Berkeley, California, the centre of research into the most advanced technologies used to 
conduct the war. 
Initial moves towards more planned opposition, presaging the co-ordination. of mass 
protests across the United States occurred in March 1965 when a group of scholars at the 
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor began to organise the first teach-ins. 197 As described by 
H. Bruce Franklin, 
Teaching the Vietnam War during the 1960s and early 1970s meant giving speeches at 
teach-ins and rallies, getting on talk shows, writing pamphlets, articles, and books, 
painting banners, picket signs, and graffiti, circulating petitions and leaflets, coining 
slogans, marching, sitting-in, demonstrating at army bases, lobbying Congress, 
testifying before war crimes hearings and congressional investigations, researching 
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corporate and university complicity, harboring deserters, organizing strikes, heckling 
genemls and politicians, blocking induction centers and napalm plants, and going to 
prison for defying the draft. 198 
As part of 'Stop the draft Week' over 100,000 people marched on the Pentagon on 21 October 
1967, towards the end of which armed police and soldiers attacked the crowd. 199 Often 
obliging civil libertarians (among others) who may have otherwise backed the war to call for 
its termination, police brutality was not the only 'official' response to direct action. The FBI's 
massive surveillance of dissident political activities became known to the (fullest? ) degree only 
in the mid-1970s. 200 
Currently, there are roughly 2,000 protest events every year in Washington DC, the 
vast majority of which are now officially permitted in advance. 
201 At their best, these 
demonstrations, albeit briefly, yank political representation away from, rather than merely 
supplement, liberal institutions. Individuals and groups that have resisted state militarism in the 
United States, both legally and illegally, have often viewed their acts as effective tools of 
political pressure that not only can alter specific state policies, but also come to adapt and 
transform the very structure of the state itself 
The extent to which such a critique of state power formed part ofthe self-understanding 
of US-based opposition to NATO's war obviously varies from group to group; domestic 
conservatives who rejected President Clinton's decision to involve US forces in what Pat 
Buchanan called 'the Big Muddy 202 are not in the same category as the members, for example, 
of the Socialist Party USA who viewed their opposition in terms of an aspiration to create a 
(, social and economic order in which workers and consumers control production, ý03 The 
Campaign for Labor Rights similarly opposed bombing Yugoslavia in the interests of 'working 
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people . 
204 'Yugoslavia, like Iraq', declared one flier distributed at an anti-Kosovo war 
demonstration, 'is a regional power in a strategic area that the Pentagon and Wall Street 
corporations seek to dominate. The Yugoslav government is presented as being akin to Adolf 
Hitler... The truth is that these governments have in one way or another resisted the designs of 
the US military and economic establishment to turn their countries into semi- colonies ruled by 
puppet govemments'ý05 
Generally, however, since the 1970s mass gatherings in the nation's capital have 
become effectively institutionalised (officially permitted in advance), predictable, and less 
politically 'dangerous', themselves. Demonstrations in the US against NATO's war were 
miniscule in comparison to both Vietnam and the Gulf Warý 
06 However, in an act of planned 
civil disobedience twenty-six members of the newly formed National Coalition for Peace in 
yugoslavia were arrested on 3 June 1999 for blocking an entrance to the White House in 
protest of the bomb ing! 
07 This coordinated campaign from eighteen peace groups (including 
former companions of Clinton in the anti-Vietnam war movement), and among them the AFSC 
and the Roman Catholic Pax Christi, promised to noisily tail and demonstrate around Clinton 
wherever he publicly appeared! 
08 As the AFSC's overview summary recalls, 
These activities culminated in a march in Washington, DC, on June 3. Wanting to 
demonstrate concern about ethnic violence perpetrated by Serbs as well as the massive 
destruction caused by the NATO bombing, AFSC supporters posted a letter to 
Milosevic on the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then walked to 
Lafayette Park in front of the White House. There, leaders of religious and peace 
groups gave speeches, and 26 protesters committed civil disobedience. 
After initially being rejected the permit for a march on 5 June from the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial in the Capital to the Pentagon was eventually approved. Thousands of Serb- 
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Americans and their supporters from across the US had already travelled to Washington DC on 
24 April and staged the largest anti-war demonstration since the bombing began. 209 
Meanwhile, in response to the bombing of their Embassy in Belgrade several Chinese 
students on college campuses across the United States demonstrated against NATO's 
actions. 210 Such political activity from Chinese students, once so praised by US Presidents' as 
an expression of their 'thirst for freedom'. 
211 seemed easily dismissed, especially on the 
occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. For some commentators, 
continued repression in China seemed to increase NATO's credibility despite 'anti-American' 
protests. 212 Written off as mere nationalism, a product of propaganda, or bussed in by the 
government, protests were allowed on the Chinese mainland, after-all, only if they expressed 
anti-American hate 
? 13 
There was much activity in the US at the local level. Los Angeles Orange County 
Veterans for Peace held banners with slogans and chants exclaiming 'All Killing Is Wrong', 
'Who Is Next? ' and 'Out of Kosovo'. 214 And although dismissed in the press for their 
&considerable confusion' debates about the intervention occurred on college campuses across 
the USP One of the more prominent public voices of acceptable dissent was sixties activist, 
'teach-in' speaker, and California State Senator Tom Hayden ! 16 The NATO promise that 
ethnic cleansing could be stopped with the aerial bombing was, argued Hayden, 'either a 
deception or a delusion. The war has turned into a horrific quagmire, and yet even liberal 
Democrats remain strangely tongue-tied about the suffering'ý 17 
Perhaps these acts in defiance of the state are the practical instantiation of George 
Kateb's espousal of an 'essential radical heroism of American life'P Perhaps, as Dolan 
suggests, 'Beneath the apparent level of courageous political stance runs the old constant of 
209 Philip P. Pan, 'Day Two: Demonstrators, Debates: Serbian Americans Stage NATO Protest', The Washington 
post, April 25,1999. 
210 1 witnessed several Chinese students picketing outside US Balkans envoy Richard Holbroke's first public 
address since the bombing began at Princeton 
University. 
211 Chaloupka, 'Suppose Kuwait's Main Product was BroccoliT, p. 143. 
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American political life, running straight from the Massachusetts Bay Colony to the present: the 
building of a career under cover of public rectitude'. 219 Even if Kateb is right, nowadays things 
'heroic', at least in political theory, are almost reflexively associated negatively with things 
smasculine'. The apparent correlation between heroism and manliness forms the crux of much 
of the feminist critique of the 'Greek' dimension to Arendt's thought. 220 
Jean Bethke Elshtain has argued, for example, that a basic assumption fi-om time 
immemorial has been the division between heroic fighting male 'just warriors' and female 
ViCtiMS? 21 As a corollary, conceptions of dissent in both liberalism and transcendental idealism 
are based on an image, as Roland Bleiker describes, 'of a male revolutionary riding toward 
freedom while ignoring and even entrenching the patriarchal social order that made this heroic 
fight possible t ! 22 
The assumption in both the liberal and 'American' traditions that forms of domination 
can be overcome if individuals simply withdraw their consent 'fails to understand the 
complexities', in Bleiker's words, 'of the discursive system of domination in which women are 
confined'. 
223 Accordingly, we might look to an alternative tradition of conceptualising the 
place of anti-war dissent in public spheres that overcomes the deficiencies of locating 
opposition in 'heroic' individualism and legalist inertia. For if having direct experience of 
power constitutes more than just infi-equent electoral participation by 'consenting' adults then 
the low standard of democracy in liberalism becomes apparent. 
Dissent and the Democratic Tradition 
Efforts to theorise modem politics beyond the constraints of liberalism have looked to 
direct action and civil disobedience, in Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato's words, for 'examples 
of self-limiting radicalism par excellence' 
ý24 However, it is neither a response to the violation 
of individual rights (liberalism) nor the act of a heroic (usually male) individual desperate to be 
a non-conformist ('Americanism') that distinguishes civil disobedience for Hannah Arendt. 
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As articulated by Rawls and Dworkin, the uniqueness of the US system and the ethical 
foundation of democracy (and by extension dissent) are found in the principle of individual 
moral rights. According to Arendt, however, 'the fundamental tenets of liberalism... its name 
not withstanding, has done its share to banish the notion of liberty from the political realm. For 
politics, according to the same philosophy, must be concerned almost exclusively with the 
maintenance of life and the safeguarding of its interests'. 
225 Arendt, in contrast, locates dissent 
not in terms of expressing an already settled upon 'interest' but as a democratic end in itself 
Liberal-legalism conceives civil disobedience, according to Arendt, 'in the image of 
, 226 either the conscientious objector or the man who tests the constitutionality of a statute. As 
we have seen, one effect is the transformation of the act of disobedience into an assertion of 
legal right, rather than an act of political dissent. In addition, protecting civil disobedients 
through arguments 'raised in defense of individual conscience or individual acts... be it secular 
or transcendent', Arendt argues, 'are inadequate'ý 
27 Conscience, in her view, is 'unpolitical' 
given that its primary interest is not with the external world between people, 'where the wrong 
is committed', or even largely with its consequences; above all, it is concerned 'for the 
individual self and its integrity. 228 
Recall from Chapter One the substance of Thoreau's unwillingness to support either 
war against Mexico or slavery in the South. 'The only obligation which I have a right to 
assume is to do at any time what I think is right'. 
229 Moreover, it is the dissenter's 'duty, at 
least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his 
SUpportq! 
30 The councils of conscience, Arendt illustrates, 'are always expressed in purely 
subjective statements 9; 
231 they are, she continues, 'entirely negative. They do not say what to 
do; they say what not to do. They do not spell out certain principles for taking action; they lay 
down boundaries no act should transgress 9! 32 
The 'heroism' depicted in Thoreau plays on the perceived radical individualism at the 
heart of what it means to be 'an American'. yet his libertarianism eventually became 
225 Hannah Arendt, 'What is Freedom', Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New 
York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 1 55. 
216 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', in Crisis ofthe Republic, p. 5 5. 
22" Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', pp. 56-7. 
223 Arendtý 'Civil Disobedience', pp. 60-1. 
229 Henry David Thoreau, 'Civil Disobedience', in Walden and Other Writings (edited and with an introduction 
by Brooks Atkinson, forward by Townsend Scudder) (New York: The Modem Library), p. 637. 
23' Thoreau, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 642. 
7,31 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 62. 
232 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 63. 
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indifference, derived, as it was, from the conscience of one heroic 'man'. The civic-republican 
culture memorialised by civil rights and antiwar demonstrators, according to Arendt's 
alternative reading, however, contrasts with the dominant liberal, as well as 'heroic', stance. 
The stakes, for Arendt, are seemingly greater than the moral conscience of one man. 
What makes the civil disobedient distinctivelypolifical, in contrast to the conscientious 
objector or the lone individual respectfully testing the constitutionality of a statute, is that he or 
she, according to Arendt, 'never exists as a single individual; he can function and survive only 
as a member of a group 9! 
33 Thus Arendt's alternative definition of civil disobedience 
conceives it as practiced by, 
organized minorities, bound together by common opinion, rather than common interest, 
and the decision to take a stand against the government's policies even if they have 
reason to assume that these policies are backed by a majority; their concerted action 
springs from an agreement with each other, and it this agreement that lends credence 
and conviction to their opinion, no matter how they may originally have arrived at it. 234 
Pointing specifically to the American-English origin of the term - yielding 'only with great 
difficulty to translation 235 - Arendt claims 'that civil disobedients are nothing but the latest 
form of voluntary association, and thus they are quite in tune with the oldest traditions of the 
country'. 
236 
From Arendt's alternative understanding of the animating principle behind modem 
constitutional politics in the United States, as well as the historical experience of the 
Mayflower Compact and establishment of the thirteen colonies, 237 she radicalises Thoreau's 
judgment of the necessarily delegated nature of power. The founding of the US republic, in 
Arendt's 'ideal-type 238 reading, went beyond institutional 'rights' and fictitious notions of a 
social contract found in liberalism as the basis of legitimacy. In principle, power derived not 
from consent to be ruled but the 'active support and continuing participation in all matters of 
public interestt. 
239 
23' Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p-55. 
234 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 56. 
233 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 98. 
236 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 96. 
237 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 85. 
233 Arendt likened her reading of the American Constitution to a Weberian ideal-type. Hannah Arendt, 'On 
Hannah Arendt', in Melvyn Hill (ed. ) Hannah 4rendt. The Recovery of the Public World (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 328-333. 
239 Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p. 85. 
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Literally serving to rearrange the topography of public space and offering a radically 
different emphasis on what it means to be public - the street, the park, and campus become 
political sites - political power need not be constituted legally to be meaningful. Drawing on 
similar assumptions to Arendt, Anne Norton contrasts liberal to more democratic forms of 
public space. She writes, 
Recollections of the 1960s counterpose spectacles to hearings, demonstrations to trials, 
speech (and several other kinds of sound) to silence. Hearings and trials took place in 
closed rooms, according to strict procedural forms. Demonstrations took place in the 
open, often against the law, always confronting established forms. 240 
Direct action understood in light of the democratic tradition enunciated by Arendt encourages 
social imagination instead of legalist inertia. 
The demonstration, for example, one of the more common public acts against NATO's 
war, is rhetorical in its effect. In William Chaloupka's words, 'it demonstrates - shows, 
exposes, replays, tests - in ways distinct from other forms of politics. The narrative form of the 
demonstration is the assertion, performance or claim, more than the explanation or totalization. 
It poses a partial, situated, contextual intervention'. 241 
From an increased awareness of the side effects of modernity, environmental 
degradation and nuclear waste, 242 to higher expectations for standards of living and anger at 
neo-liberal 'globalization', straightforward 'causes' for direct action vary across time and 
space. That said, liberal-fanctionalist accounts - protest as 'a rationally chosen, organized and 
strategically applied form of articulating and pursuing political interests 243 - depend on a 
dichotomy between rational and irrational outbursts. 
For the liberal scholar, the demonstration, in Chaloupka's words becomes 'only another 
representative variable in their (small) bag of independent variables -a political tactic enabled 
by (and operating under) free speech provisions of a constitution, as mediated by a judicial 
mechanism'! 
44 yet in contrast to the episodic political involvement encouraged by liberalism, 
the purpose of political action is to reach to the extra-ordinary ! 45 Thus, although direct action 
240 Anne Norton, Republic ofS! gns: Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), p. 1 52. 
241 Chaloupka, 'Suppose Kuwait's Main Product was BroccoliT, p. 150. 
242 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992). 
243 Dieter Ruct, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 'Protest as a Subject of Empirical Research, in 
Dieter Ruct, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds. )Acts ofDissent. New Developments in the Study of 
protest (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 9. 
21 Chaloupka, 'Suppose Kuwait's Main Product was BroccoliT, p. 146. 
245 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 205. 
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is always inspired by specific political grievances, on occasion, in Arendt's words, it contains 
within it 'a measure of complete arbitrarineSS, 
246 or, as Chaloupka would have it, 'more 
Charlie Chaplin than Locke or Mill, more cinema than physics, more play - dangerous, self- 
obliterating play, to be sure - than ideology., 
247 
Public sphere activity, especially in counterpublics, possesses a quality of 
unpredictability and sense of contingency, which following Arendt is a product ofplurality and 
the human fact of natality. Arendt borrows from Saint Augustine this notion of natality (which 
she likens to a 'miracle'), describing it as the ontological root of the faculty of action; 248 that 
inherent to human beings is the notion of new beginnings. 
Repeatedly, and in contrast to the traditional philosophical obsession with death, we 
find in Arendt's account the new beginning and promise of freedom inherent in birth - humans 
as 'a being whose essence is beginning'! 
49 But if freedom - to act and to express opinions in 
public - is the essence of politics, as most anti-war activists will perhaps bitterly recognise, 
'Nowhere... does man appear to be less free than in those capacities whose very essence is 
freedom and in that realm which owes its existence to nobody and nothing but man'. 250 
In contrast to political action, Arendt is saying, all other human activities depend on 
existing 'things' and thereby offer an element of enduring predictability, even repetition and 
reality, to the changeability of political events and the response of diverse publics. In principle, 
political action, on the other hand, can occur unmediated directly between people and, in this 
sense, is also boundless in that we can never be sure of the consequences of our political acts, 
dependent as they are on the actions and opinions of so many others. 251 Confronting the 
monopoly of violence, however, traditionally seen as the rationale of the state - especially 
through non-violent protest - brings into view the potential power of people acting in concert 
to challenge dominant power. 
246 Hannah Arendt On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, [1963] 1970), p. 207. 
147 Chaloupka, 'Suppose Kuwait's Main Product was BroccoliT, p. 144. 
248 Arendt, The Human Condition, p247. Jean Bethke Elshtain develops Arendt's notion of natality in'War and 
political Discourse: From Machiavelli to Arendt', Meditations on Modern Political Thought. - 
AfasculinelFeminine Themes. /rom Luther to Arendt (London: Praeger, 1986), pp. 103-113. 
249 Hannah Arendt, 'Understanding and Politics', Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954 (edited by Jerome Kohn) 
(New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 19941 p. 321. 
250 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 234. 
251 Arend4 The Human Condition, p. 7. 
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Conclusion 
Dissent and the possibilities of protest are essential to, indeed they define, any self- 
motivated public sphere. In contrast to Habermas's insight of the public sphere as ideally 
constituted by rational-critical dialogue anti-war activists, at their greatest, disclose the multi- 
, logic', 'extra-mural', "' contested character of debate among diverse and unequal publics 
mediated by different types of publicity. The chapter has contended with some of the abstract 
and concrete problems with conceptualising publics this way in the modem United States by 
addressing the social and political context of anti-Kosovo war activity. 
The civil disobedience described as foundational to anti-war dissent is a form ofpublic 
speech certainly, but it also more than this. It is a form ofpolitical action constitutive ofpublic 
spheres itsel& which suggests that freedom of speech is not enough. Writing about dissidents 
on both sides during the Cold War Arendt stated, 'The dissenters and resisters in the East 
demand free speech and thought as the preliminary conditions for political action; the rebels in 
the West live under the conditions where these preliminaries no longer open the channels for 
action, for the meaningful exercise of freedom. 
253 
The liberal citizen typically demonstrates interests within well-established, legal 
channels, in order to reaffirm their consent to rule. The sho , pe 0 ative, exp ssive, WY rf rin re 
sometimes humorous protestor publicly 'demonstrates', albeit momentarily, a dimension of 
him or herself in concert with others. The 'rhetoric of the demonstration', as Chaloupka 
describes, is 'one that emphasized visibility, the interplay of communication networks, the 
increasingly problematic representational forms, and the actual reasons for its habitual 
impudence toward power'. 254 
The Kosovo war was important, not only because its architects and supporters claimed 
it was the first strictly 'humanitarian' military operation and others that it was first and 
foremost representative of anew kind of 'virtual' or'Internet' war. Perhaps more importantly- 
in terms of its consequences for democracy in US public spheres - Kosovo was significant 
because it was warning sign (for others a cause of celebration) that the existence of small-scale 
public spheres constituted by anti-war activists were in danger, especially in response to wars 
justified and fought precisely in these humanitarian and advanced technological terms. 
252 Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory, in William Connolly (ed. ) 
Legitimacy and the State (oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 66. 
253Arendt"on Violence', p. 178. 
254 Chaloupka, 'Suppose Kuwait's Main Productwas BroccoliT, p. 148. 
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Dissent in the United States against the Kosovo war was much larger than depicted in 
the media and negative comparisons with Vietnam are problematic. Nonetheless, the 
background operating assumptions of 'official' liberal dissent in the US public sphere severely 
impinged on the possibilities for democratic opposition to the war. Liberal understandings of 
non-violent civil disobedience are parasitic on existing constitutional regimes with its minimal 
democratic parameters already established. Also dependent on state power, and its ability to 
wield the military arm, as we saw, were unsuccessful constitutional efforts by Congress to 
limit the war-making powers of the executive. However, more general civic, and often 
religiously inspired, engagement was not wholly absent. 
Where the public profile of human rights organisations may have increased, however, 
with the triumph of neo-liberalism and the related privatisation of Western aid, humanitarian 
agencies have undergone a radical 'modemisation'. Social problems in general, including the 
provision of welfare support, are moving away from the domain of the public realm to private 
profit-making organisations. As we saw, 'joining in' has become an increasingly privatised 
activity in the United States, evident in the large number of financial donations to refugee 
relief causes, which came to constitute people 'doing their bit'. The next chapter elaborates 
further some of the effects of the privatisation of public sphere activity in response to the 
Kosovo-Albanian refugee crisis. 
indeed, one community constituting much of the domestic opposition to the war 
represented in the mainstream US media were the thousands of Serb-Americans and their 
supporters who demonstrated against the bombing across the United States! 
55 ImMi grants 
choosing not to protest too vocally benefited from patriotic depictions of suburbanites living 
&normal' American lives - the 'Serb next door' 
ý56 A number were shown in proud Young US 
Marines uniforms, many in older generations having fought for the United States during World 
War 11! 57 Immigrants and refugees represent different ways of 'being public' in the United 
States. The next chapter illustrates this point by showing how they were represented in the 
official US public domain. 
255 Dirk Johnson, 'U. S. Kith and Kin Feet the Attack Themselves', The New York Times, March 25,1999. 
156 Phil McCombs, 'The Serbs Next Door', The Washington Post, April 25,1999. 
257 Sandy Banks, 'U. S. Serbs Agonize Over Love of 2 Countries', The Los Angeles Times, April 4,1999. 
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Chapter 5 
'I'd like to name the baby Amerikal: 
Foreigners, Race, and US Public Spheres 
The sticker clung to the multicolored stripes of Sejdi Krasniqi's traditional wool vest, blue 
letters on white marking him and the rest of his family as refugees. Aid worker Carmen Smith 
spotted the gummed insignia as Krasniqi waited beside a baggage carousel yesterday at Dulles 
international AirpoM the last stop on the way to a new life in the rolling foothills of Fauquier 
County. 'You're in America, ' Smith said, eeling off the sticker. 
- Graerne Zielinski and Dan Eggen 
The patriotic vanity of the official US public sphere was perhaps nowhere more evident during 
NATO's war than in the symbolic politics of Albanian-American immigrants and Kosovo- 
Albanian refugees. When Lebibe Karaliju gave birth to a 7-pound-7-ounce boy at Burlington 
County Memorial Hospital within 24 hours after arriving from a refugee camp in Macedonia 
she was quite clear what the baby should be named? As the first 'American' bom as a result of 
the Kosovo Albanian exodus - all children born in the US gain automatic citizen rights - baby 
Amerika's eyes opened onto a 'New World' in more ways than one. 
This happy event seemed to confirm some of the most treasured norms of 
contemporary US life. It is virtual folklore, and certainly a staple of 'American exceptionalist' 
literature since Tocqueville, that immigrants are uniquely the agents of the nation's origins and 
.31 survive as a continual source of renewal The heteronormativi and family values of the 
United States (and the aspirant immigrants) were duly re-affirmed as other Kosovo sweethearts 
said, 'I do' at the US military barracks at Fort Dixý 
As Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner suggest, this positioning of the immigrant as a 
pure and sentimental figure in the official US public sphere is not new; it has been central to 
I Graeme Zielinski and Dan Eggen, 'Fumishing Freedom: Fauquier Community Comes Together To Help 
Kosovo Refugees Feel at Home', The Washington Post, June 8,1999. 
2 Diana jean Scherno, 'Exodus From Kosovo Produces First United States Citizen', The New York Times, May 7, 
1999. 
3 Alexis de Tocclueville, Democracy inAmerica (translated by George Lawrence and edited by J. P Mayer) (New 
York: Harper, [183 5] 1969), pp. 32-40. 
4 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner define 'heteronormativity' as 'the institutions, structures of understanding, 
and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent - that is, organized as a sexuality - 
but also privileged'. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, 'Sex in Public' in Michael Warner, Publics and 
Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002), p. 309, fa. 3. 
5 Editorial, 'Kosovo Sweethearts Say "I Do" at Dix', The Los Angeles Times, May 24,1999; David Finkel, 
young Kosovo Woman Remains Tom Between Love and Family Fidelity' The Washington Post, July 21,1999. 
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the historical effort to 'shore up the core national culture and allay white [male] fears of 
minoritization'. 6 In their words, 
the family form has functioned as a mediator and metaphor of national existence in the 
United States since the eighteenth century... Immigration crises have also previously 
produced feminine icons that function as prostheses for the state - most famously the 
Statue of Liberty, which symbolized seamless immigrant assimilation to the 
metaculture of the United States. 7 
The United States, it seems, perhaps more than most other nations, needs the recurring public 
testimony of the universality of its values. 
The purpose of this chapter is to uncover a number of the norms constitutive of the 
mainstream US public sphere - especially those associated with race, gender and economy - 
that were seemingly upheld and invigorated during the Kosovo war via representations of these 
, foreigners' in the official public sphere. Immigrants, day-by-day, buttress 'America's project' 
(its vision and social construction). What does this project, and the seemingly contradictory 
impulses of both xenophobia and xenophilia, in relation to Albanian-American immigrants and 
Kosovo-Albanian refugees reveal about the management and production of US national 
identity in the mass mediated public sphere? What does it reveal about race, gender, and class 
and the ability to self-represent in public? Is there racism to 'humanitarian' intervention? 
The first section, 'Intervention Historiography and Race', tries to answer this 
preliminary question in an effort to ground the more specific discussion of the role of 
, foreigners' in the official US public realm. Often when NATO's actions over Kosovo were 
critiqued they were characterised as 'an overly passionate embrace of Wilsonianism'9 - 
idealism and an effort to do 'good' that sometimes goes wrong. 10 But as Howard Zinn 
describes, 'the Western world, bedecked with universal suffrage, parliamentary representation, 
technological progress, mass education, Bill of Rights, social welfare, has managed to maintain 
its reputation for beneficence - despite its record of imperialism, war, racism, and 
exploitation. 
"' There has been little or no systematic interrogation by theorists of humanitarian 
6 Berlant and Warner, 'Sex in Public', p. 189. 
7 Beriant and Warner, 'Sex in Public', p. 189. 
8 Homi K Bhabha, The Location ofCullure (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 3. 
9 Alberto F- Coll, 'Kosovo and the Moral Burden ofPower', in Andrew J. B8cevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds. ) 
War Over Kosovo: Politics andStrategy in a GlobalAge (New York: Columbia University Press, 200 1), p. 147. 
10 David Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing: . 4merican Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields (New York: The 
Free Press, 1999). 
11 Howard Zinn, 'Aggressive Liberalism', in On War (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), p. 149. 
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intervention into the intersection between race, empire, and US interventions, as well as the 
role of such violent coercion in the making of contemporary 'Americans'. 
As part of the project of 'making Americans', material and discursive constructions of 
foreigners during wartime need to be conceived as a complex apparatus for constituting and 
securing a fictitious unitary public sphere in the United States as well as central to the process 
of identity construction of displaced persons. The section, 'Kosovar Refugees Come to 
America', following the fi-amework of the thesis as a whole, uncovers the ways in which 
rnigrant identities were put to use (and partially constituted) in processes central to 
constructing the 'official' US public sphere during the war. Hannah Arendt's account of 
'worldlessness' is transposed to the prominent narrative that depicted the ultimate aim of 
NATO's war to be the return 'home' of the refugees. 
Empirical evidence is brought to bear on the theoretical claims of the chapter by 
examining a variety of public discourses, both in terms of substance and mass media form, 
which appeared as fantasy solutions to the problems of immigration, race, and complex 
cultural hybridity in the late 1990s United States. From the racist historiography of 
'humanitarian' intervention to depictions of hard working Albanian-American immigrant men 
to images of fretful refugee mothers and narratives of 'home', the section 'Immigration and US 
Democracy' suggests that the desire for a nostalgic normalcy in the United States has produced 
a mainstream public sphere that links 'whatever positive value immigration has', as Berlant 
has suggested, to the (racial, gender and class) fantasy norms of the 'American way of life' . 
12 
in doing so, we can also uncover some of the ways 'domestic' racial and gendered identities 
are made problematic by efforts to secure 'the' official public sphere and predominantly liberal 
ways of being public. 
The consequence of the personalisation of the public realm on US responses to the 
Kosovo-Albanian refugee crisis is explored within an Arendtian framework in the fourth 
section, 'Gender and Refugees: Sentimentality and the Personalised Public Sphere'. Arendt's 
discussion of 'compassion' begins to uncover the antimony of ethical humanitarianism 
conducted in a depoliticised public realm. Not only has the official US public sphere, as 
Chapter Three suggested, diminished the political forums where citizens may act for and 
12 Lauren Betlant, The Queen ofAmerica Goes to Washington Cify. 'Essays on Ser and Citizenship (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 1 77,179. 
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politically sustain a concern for human rights (as distinct from emergency humanitarianism 13), 
the mentality of a privatised public has sentimentalised and gendered public responses to 
wartime catastrophe. 
For example, although the longstanding intellectual and practical tradition of 'rape as 
the legitimate spoils of battle' has been undermined by Western intervention, Balkan female 
subjectivity was positioned in terms of victim-hood with Western leaders using the rape of 
Kosovo-Albanian women as ajustification for more violence. 14 Compassion and sentimentality 
are not under indictment per se, rather the assumption that such 'humanitarian' emotions can 
be sustained as effective long-term political principles in the US 'present tense'. 15 If being 
6public' less and less meaningfully refers to a community based on citizenship but rather 
accounts of citizen-victims and personal-injury lawsuits the personalisation of the mainstream 
public sphere reveals the public-private dichotomy in crisis. 
Notions of the 'public' as potentially homogenous and unified are little more than a 
&phantom', existing only as an image. 16 It is, however, as Homi Bhaba suggests, symbolic of a 
modem desire for 'unitary collective experiences, 
17 in which to ground US foreign policy. 
Even though 'the public' is a mere image this does not mean that the material effects of efforts 
to constitute' a public are simply imaginary. Samira Kawash has forcefully argued, for 
example, 'If the image of the public - however partial or illusory - is constituted by an 
imaginary act of exclusion, the exclusion itself is material, has material effects, and produces 
particular forms of materiality. ' 
18 
Throughout the thesis there has been a necessary and persistent intermixing and 
dependence between the 'public' defined within a national territorial state and the 
transnational. Yet, even within the emerging literature that deploys the framework of 'post- 
national' public spheres, 
19 migrants are principally conceived as a fundamental ideological and 
physical danger from somewhere else, not as a predicament arising necessarily from within 
public spheres and internal to national identity. This chapter suggests, in contrast, that to 
11 Jim Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: NATO's Humanitarianism versus Human Rights', in Ken Booth 
(ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 177. 
14 Carlotta Gall, 'Refugees Crossing Border Tell of Rape and Killing', The New York Times, April 20,1999; 
David Rhode, 'An Albanian Tells How Serbs Chose Her, "the Most Beautiful" for Rape', The New York Times, 
May 1,1999. 
15 Berlant, The Queen ofAmerica, pl. 
16 Bruce Robbins (ed. ) The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
17 Bhabha, The Location ofCulture, p. 142. 
16 Samira Kawash, 'The Homeless Body', Public Culture, Vol. 10, no2 (1998), p. 322. 
11 jargen Habermas, The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 200 1). 
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properly understand the operation of possible logics of racial and gendered exclusion in public 
spheres we need to understand it is an ongoing practice of violence. The 'problem' of 
immigration and refugees is unavoidably also always a question of public space, especially 
how it is constituted and controlled. 'Foreigners', then, provide an important focus around 
which to examine how publics shaped the politics of the Kosovo war and how representing 
these 'foreigners' helped constitute the official liberal public sphere. 
Intervention Historiography and Race 
The intersection between intervention, empire and racial politics (both domestic and 
international) seems to be better understood in relation to the past than the present. According 
to Rogers M. Smith, 'perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of the [US] government's 
embrace of racial rationales for imperial rule and immigration and naturaaation restrictions 
was the manner in which they strengthened political coalitions and ideological defenses 
supporting segregation [in the South]'ýO If in the past imperial rule helped legitimate racism at 
'home' how might we position the recent race and immigration politics of 'humanitarian' war 
in terms of more contemporary and ongoing forms of globalization? Can we link the domestic 
and international politics of the Kosovo war to the decolonization and economic and cultural 
integration that Stephen Castles has suggested are 'central to understanding the changing 
nature of mcism'? 
21 
Mainstream International Relations scholarship has recently turned to the study of 
(-norrns'? 2 As Robert Vitalis has suggested, however, it is noticeable that the norm of racism 
has effectively been ignored. This is a mode of academic analysis Toni Morrison has termed 
'the norm against noticing'. 23 Racism as an international institution (tradition), however, has 
historically been very much part of the emergence of humanitarian norms sanctioning 
obligations as a kind of colonial mission. 'The colonial form of intervention', in the words of 
Anthony Lang, 'relied on the construction ofnational characters that sustained interventions by 
20 Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997), PA48- 
21 Stephen Castles, 'The Racisms of Globalization', in Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to 
Transnational Citizen (London: Sage, 2000), p. 164. 
21 peter J. Katzenstein (ed. ) The Culture ofNational Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996). 
23 Quoted in Robert Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American 
International Relations', Millennium, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2000), p. 333. 
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envisioning some groups as requiring aid and governance,. 24 Narratives of assistance, shelter, 
and enlightenment were deployed while reinforcing ascriptive hierarchies based on the colour 
of skin. Racism is a norm like any other norm though perhaps more insidious in the so-called 
4post'-racist West. 25 
The norm against noticing is perhaps unsurprising however, given the usual mode of 
historical analysis in the humanitarian intervention literature. Racial subordination is not 
viewed as important to the theory and practice of these wars. Epitomised by Martha 
Finnemore, the literature presents a teleological account of the West's increasing identification, 
in her words, 'with victims to determine who is an appropriate and compelling candidate for 
intervention'ý6 As a consequence of decolonisation, the end of the slave trade, and the 
universalisation of the category 'human' ('not just Christians, not just whites'2), deserving 
targets are ever more identified to be 'like us. Western acceptance of a cosmopolitan humanity 
has progressed to such an extent, by this reading, that Muslims, Kurds, and Somalis can all be 
the object of intervention. This account is only plausible, according to Finnemore, because 
'Humanitarian action generally, and humanitarian intervention specifically, do not obviously 
serve the powerful'. 
28 
This is a typically selective reading of colonial and anti-colonial history, which also 
misunderstands how intervention can and does 'serve the powerful'. As Vitalis points out, 
Finnemore 'never inquires into nineteenth century accounts of genetics, biology, evolution, 
, 29 
race and anthropology to understand the specific idea of humanity and its scope. As Cornell 
West has argued, 'The notion that black people are [in the fullest sense] human beings is a 
relatively new discovery in the modem West'. 
30 Moreover, Finnemore presupposes a 
dichotomy between human and not human that the theory and practice of racism's caste system 
(within a now established common humanity) fundamentally contradicts. Her liberal account is 
based on the assumption that once a group is viewed 'human', as Vitalis interprets, 'equality 
24 Anthony Lang, Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 20 0 1), p. 203. 
25 For a critique of race narratives see Paul Gilroy, Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color 
Line (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 200 1). 
26 Martha Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed. ) The 
Culture offational Security. ý Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 170. 
27 Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention', p. 1 55. 
28 Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention', p. 1 85. 
29 VitaliS, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture', p. 330. 
31 Cornell West, The Cornell West Reader (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999), p. 70. 
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must surely follow'. 31 But this ignores how racialised stereotypes about barbarians can be 
contemporaneous with seemingly benevolent conceptions of cultural difference. 
'Culture', in other words, has stepped in where racial biology has been discredited. 
Due to African-American and anti-colonial freedom struggles public racism had fallen into 
disrepute. Yet where in liberal theory all cultures are equal, social segregation and difference 
nonetheless remain naturalised in practice because the obvious appearance of racial hierarchy 
is deemed merely contingent, entirely conditional on historical circumstances, rather than some 
inherent feature of being non-white. All cultures or 'civilizations' are presumed to be equal 
though socially separate (or segregated). 32 Racism, however, only seems to have waned. As 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued, 'biological differences have been replaced by 
sociological and cultural signifiers as the key representation of racial hatred and fear'. 33 
in humanitarian intervention this has played out in justifications for the differential 
treatment of black Rwandans and Europeans. According to Henry Nau, 
Rwanda might have warranted American intervention because genocide was a bigger 
reality there than it was in Kosovo or Somalia. But... the moral stakes were less, at 
least in the sense that America's democratic identity converges only weakly with tribal 
and warlord-dominated politics in eastern and central Africa, whereas it converges 
strongly with western and European nations potentially threatened in the Balkans. 34 
Rwanda and Somalia have a different cultural 'identity' from 'the West', which partly 
accounts for their different treatment to states in the 'European' Balkans! 
The notion that benign 'humanitarian' motives have overwhelming explanatory power 
because such interventions do not serve the powerful could only be 'obvious, as Finnemore 
wants to argue, in a discipline like International Relations that has never taken the intersection 
between race, power, and empire seriously. 35 The focus on decolonisation and the end of 
slavery deflects analysis away from how the more complex conditions of post-Cold War US 
hegemony, global (and local) caste systems and law (discussed in Chapter Two) are central to 
the establishment of intervention and non-intervention cultural 'norms' and the operation of 
hegemonic power. 
31 Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture', p. 340. 
32 For representative account see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizzations and the Remaking of World 
order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
33 Michael Hardt and Antonio NcgrL Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 200 1), p. 191. 
34 Henry Rý Nau, At Home A broad. Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), p. 193. 
35 For an exception see Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International 
Relations', Millennium, Vol. 3 1, no. 1, (2002), pp. 109-127. 
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Moreover, the kind of exclusionary politics witnessed in the treatment of Rwandans 
operates at (and is connected to) the domestic social and political level. New arguments to 
restrict immigration likewise avoid explicitly racist claims but, as Leonard Dinnerstein and 
David Reimers suggest, have instead turned to denvironmental concerns, economics, faults of 
the present system, and assimilation issues'. 36 As post-Cold War threats were deemed more 
diffuse the nature and target of immigration legislation altered. 
The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Blegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (HRIRA) were fi-amed in terms of 
post Cold War national security threats where secret evidence could be used to deport. The 
1993 World Trade Center attack, Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 (committed by a white male 
US citizen), as well as more geneml anti-immigrant discourses provided the political rationale. 
The MURA included authorisation of new border fences, increased the size of the INS, made it 
easier to deport illegals, and tightened the procedures for asylum seekers. In the same year, 
Congress passed a new welfare law limiting the fedeml budget for immigrants. 37 
More general trends included efforts to make English the official language of the 
United States and attacks on programmes for bilingual education. In 1994, Proposition 187 was 
approved in California by a margin of 59 percent to 41 aimed at denying government services 
(including education) to illegal aliens. Since the 1996 general election, however, immigrants 
38 have been the fitstest growing voting bloc and the Democratic Party has principally benefited. 
It was perhaps no surprise, therefore, that President Clinton's 1995 'Citizenship USA' Act led 
to the streamlining of naturalisation. By 1998 the Supreme Court had declared 'Prop 187' 
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the naturalisation of non-white peoples as 'illegal' immigrants, 
as criminals, as in need of humanitarian assistance is productive of ideological obstacles to 
understanding the connections between immigration, race, and globalization/intervention. 
Consider the intersection between the political economy of US prison expansion, race, and 
intervention in the wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
36 Leonard Dinnerstein and David A Reimers, Ethnic Americans: A History of1mmigration (4ed. ) (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 202. See Huntington, The Clash of0vilizations, pp. 198-206. 
37 Dinnerstein and Reimers, EthnicAmericans, p. 224. 
33 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of1mmigration Control in A merica (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), p. 285. 
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The imprisonment of illegal immigrants in the United States is dramatically on the rise 
and precedes the response to the 9/11 attacks. 
39 This escalating strategy is a global effort, with 
local and transnational dimensions, to govem and regulate the flow of people and capital rather 
than take seriously global redistribution. 'As flows of global capital and labor increasingly 
became a challenge to the stability of American cities', in the words of Jonathan Simon, 
'imprisonment has emerged once again as an important technology for governing, just as it did 
during the rise of the industrial city in the nineteenth century. '40 
Most obviously, this style of globalization, as distinct from the much-vaunted economic 
and cultural forms, has manifested itself in the militarisation of immigration, turning 'aliens' 
into a national security threat to secure a particular vision of safe 'America. ' The 'public' for 
whom the prisons are ostensibly there to protect do not need to critically engage with the social 
problems of globalization and late capitalism! 
' Unfortunately, there is little new in thiS! 2 
What is new is growing cross-institutional and international coordination efforts to protect the 
global North from the human costs of violence and neo-liberal economics on a global scale! 
3 
important links can be drawn, however, to the wars in the former Yugoslavia by 
extending the analysis of a relatively neglected dimension of the globalization of punishment: 
its links with the emergence of the wider 'prison-industrial complex' in the United States and 
the racist structures through which its political economy is underpinned. Not only have 
struggling African, East European and Latin American economies been undermined by 
structural adjustment programmes. The restructuring of the US economy from primarily 
manufacturing-based to service and information-based industries with attendant mechanisation 
in both the rural and urban contexts has coincided with the dismantling of New Deal social 
welfare programmes and prisons have taken up the slack. 
Not only do social problems disappear from public view when 'coloured bodies 44 are 
incarcerated, domestic structural adjustment has also resulted in the contraction of subaltern 
'9 Jonathan Simon, 'Refugees in a Carceral Age: Ille Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the United States', 
Public Culture, Vol. 10, no. 3 (1998), pp. 577-607. 
40 S imon, 'Refugees in a Carceral Age', p. 603. Also see Thomas L. Dumm, Democracy and Punishment: 
Disciplinary Origins of the United States (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 198 7). 
41 Angela Y. Davis in Angela Y. Davis and Avery F. Gordon, 'Globalism and the Prison Industrial Complex: An 
Interview with Angela Davis', Race and Class, Vol. 40, no. 2-3 (1998/9), pp. 145-57. 
42 Ernesto Verdeja, 'Law, Terrorism, and the Plenary Power Doctrine: Limiting Alien Rights', Constellations, 
Vol. 9, no. 1 (2002), pp. 89-97. 
4' Susan Sachs, 'Illegal Immigrants: Long Resistan4 Police Start Embracing Immigration Duties', The New York 
Times, March 15,2002. 
44 Davis, 'Globalism and the Prison Industrial Complex', p. 147. 
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public spheres organised around black struggles for political, economic and social rights. In the 
words of Paul Gilroy, 
The specific traditions of public interaction that were originally products of the agency 
of slaves are being surpassed. They are declining... now that postslave cultures are 
being recomposed around new priorities and opportunities associated with digital 
media, de-industrialization, and the growth of consumerism. 45 
The political economy of penal expansion - the removal of social problems from the 
bourgeoisie's public view - is overwhelmingly founded on racial assumptions about crime and 
conviction rates. 46 
The privatisation of the US penal system, an extremely profitable big business, shows 
how a series of global structural adjustments unite domestic and international militarisation in 
complex ways. As Ruth Gilmore describes, 'military Keynesianism is giving way to, or 
complemented byq. carceral Keynesianism'! 
7 This unprecedented expansion of prisons is far 
more pointedly a creation of the political-economic geography of globalization in which the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia, of course, have been intimately a part. IMF-led efforts to 
&reform' the international financial architecture since the 1970s, including the imposition of 
severe austerity measures to liberalise Yugoslavia, contributed directly to the breakdown of 
domestic order in the federal state resulting in the refugee and humanitarian crises in which the 
United States then intervened. 48 
Kosovar Refugees and US/NATO as Humanitarian Protector 
If a human being loses his political status, he should, according to the implications of the 
inbom and inalienable rights of man, come under exactly the situation for which the 
declarations of such general rights provided. Actually the opposite is the case. 
-Hannah Arende9 
The severe austerity measures imposed by the BE are not often placed front and centre in 
accounts of the wars that destroyed the old Yugoslavia. 
50 In contrast, the 'ethnic-conflict' 
scenario formed the basis of much of the received wisdom about the nature of the wars and the 
45 Gilroy, '"After the Love has Gone": Biopolitics and the Decay of the Black Public Sphere', in Against Race, 
178. 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, 'Globalisation and US Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to post-Keynesian 
Militarism', Race and Class, Vol. 40, no. 2-3 (1998/9), pp. 171-88. 
47 Gilmore, 'Globalisation and US Prison Growth', p. 174. 
48 Susan Woodward, 'The Politics of Economic Reform and Global Integration', Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and 
Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 47-8 1. 
4911annah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, [1951] 1958), p. 300. 
50 Woodward is the major exception. See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. 
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subsequent implications for Western intervention PoliCY. 5 1 This narrative maintained that the 
attempted transition from one-party rule to liberal democracy, as experienced in other Eastern 
European states, resulted in the destruction of Yugoslavia in civil war due to rival ethnic 
identities. 52 
Unremitting national antagonism combined with the inherent problem of organising 
multi-national states under Communist rule was the most important factor, according to this 
view, in bringing about and shaping the course of the post-Cold War Yugoslav revolution. 53 
Nationalism had always been influential and shaped civil society in ways that could not 
overcome historical antagonisms, eventually proving the greatest barrier to the peaceful 
transition to democracy. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displace persons - 
Serbs, Croats, Bosnian-Muslims, Kosovars and Roma - all emerged, so the argument goes, as 
the almost inevitable response to this crisis. 54 
After NATO's bombing campaign began, roughly 863,000 people sought refuge 
outside Kosovo, mainly into Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, while an additional 590,000 
were internally displacedý5 Ninety percent of those who fled were Kosovo-Albanian. Only the 
migration fleeing the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1991 Kurdish passage from Iraq 
matched the speed of the Kosovo outflow. 56 
NATO relief workers were involved in establishing refugee camps, transporting 
supplies and providing logistics. Politicising what was ostensibly a humanitarian operation, 
LTNHCR., the UN agency responsible for reftigees, reluctantly cooperated with NATO, a party 
to the conflict, in the provision of relieL (The Red Cross refused for fear of undermining its 
neutrality. 
57) Within five months roughly $2 billion had been donated as well as the $40 
million World Bank credit extended to Macedonia to ensure it did not close its border. 58 The 
51 For an overview see Lene Hansen, 'Western Villains or Balkan Barbarism? Representations and 
Responsibility in the Debate over Bosnia, PhD dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1997. 
52 j, F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (London: Adamantine, 199 1). 
53 This is not to deny that nationalism is not a problem for all systems (Northern Ireland, Quebec) but that 
communist ideology is largely incompatible (at the least in tension with) nationalism. George Sch5phlin, Politics 
in Eastern Europe, 1945-92 (London: Blackwell, 1993), p. 66. 
-'4 For a well-worn but good critique of the dominant positions in Western policy-making circles and public 
opinion see Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'Discourses of War: Security and the case of 
yugoslavia', in Krause, Keith and Mchael C. Williams (eds. ) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases 
(London: UCL Press, 199 7) pp. 149-18 S. 
The Kosovo Report: Independent International Commission on Kosovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), P-90. 
-% Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis'. p. 171. 
57 Elisabeth Becker, With NATO in Charge, Relief Looks Less Neutral', The New York Times, April 10,1999. 
58 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refiigee Crisis', p. 172,173. 
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result of keeping in check the regional flow of refugees, however, as Jim Whitman described, 
I is likely to have undermined the international protection regime for refiigees'. 59 
As defmed by the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol, a refugee is a person who, 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that countryýo 
The basic right of the refugee includes a legal (not charitable) obligation on the state of first 
asylum to allow entry and for that state to provide some minimal practical support. As a 
supplement to the basic right of entry is the principle of 'non-refoulment', prevention against 
forced return to the country from where the refugee has fled. 61 
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) do not enjoy the same legal status. Although in 
1998 non-binding Guiding Principles were established to protect IDPs, 62 and despite the 
apparent generosity displayed toward those who made it across the border in time, the situation 
of those displaced inside Kosovo, from whatever community, considerably worsened with the 
bombing. 63 
The response to the crisis, in other words, was part of the much larger, and less benign, 
effort on the part of 'Fortress Europe' to deal with asylum and migration numbers more 
generally. Even as refugees from Kosovo continued to arrive, and representative of trends 
across the whole of the Western world, a popular vote in Switzerland approved government 
plans to drastically tighten asylum laws. 
64 In March 1997, Italy had declared a state of 
emergency when Albanians fleeing the breakdown of civil order arrived in boats. Emergency 
powers soon came into effect to forcibly repatriate Albanians 'deemed to be a danger to public 
security'. 
65 
59 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis', p. 164. 
60 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis, p. 1 64. 
61 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis, p. 1 66. 
62 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refiigee Crisis', p. 1 68. 
63 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis', p. 1 75. 
64 Elisabeth Olson, 'Swiss Approve Asylum Limits And Reject Maternity Benefit', The New York Times, June 
14,1999. 
65 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis', p. 1 67. 
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Symbolism became all for NATO in the need to paper over the contradictions between 
(apparent) humanitarianism on behalf of refugees and obvious militarism. 66 For the 
&unprecedented response' was not so much concerned with the human or citizen rights of the 
people of Kosovo (witnessed by NATO standing by as Kosovo-Serbs and Roma were 
ethnically cleansed after the bombing) than with the political imperative of maintaining public 
support for war. 
Theirs was the face of human suffering seemingly justifying NATO's post-Cold War 
existence and providing the test of its reputation. This was vividly witnessed by the excluded 
voices of the Kosovo refugees most often being represented by others, in this case NATO who 
positioned itself as being able to speakfor them. Alongside photographs of the dislocated and 
desperate these individuals were otherwise disembodied and homogenised in the form of 
statistics compiled by the vast network of the international humanitarian regime. 
67 
The strangeness and state of limbo of these exiles when stripped of mutually equal 
rights, of course, was immense. 
68 As Arendt witnessed, refugees have lost 'the entire social 
texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place 
in the world . "69 The new 'worldlessness' of thousands of 
Kosovo-Albanians was exemplified 
by the efforts of Serb militants, as John Kifner describes, 'to strip Kosovars; of all identity 
papers, rendering them, in effect, stateless nonpersons and making it difficult for them ever to 
return home'. 70 Operating on a number of distinct levels, this narrative of 'home' utterly 
pervaded the language surrounding the Kosovo-Albanian refugees. It is worth dwelling on this 
for a moment for it illustrates how norms of public and private derived fi-orn the political 
development of the West shaped the treatment of reffigees during and after NATO's war. 
From the perspective of the dominant state (bourgeois) ideology of the separation 
between public and private, to be a refugee means to be without the private domain into which 
the public subject is supposed to withdraw. Though customarily depicted a theorist of the 
public, Arendt knew well the value of the private. A private world away from the polis was 
necessary for creating personalities able to participate in the public sphere at all, for the 
66 Jef Huysmans, 'Shape-Shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis'. Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 28, no. 3 (2002), pp. 599-618. 
67 jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement. Re gees and the Politics ofHumanitar an m (M ne ol 
University ofMinnesota Press, 2000). 
Ou i is in ap is 
" T. Christian Miller, 'Albanian Refugee Family Struggles inLimbo', TheLosAngeles Times, June 21,1999. 
69 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 293. 
70 John Kifner, 'The Ravaging of Kosovo: How Serb Forces Purged One Nfillion Albanians Serbs', The New 
York Times, May 29,1999. 
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creation of a thoughtful, engaged citizenry. 71 Though imbued with a problematic gender 
subtext, for Arendt, the 'household', or classical oikos, provided a location away from the 
&glare of publicity', where uniqueness and individuality could be nurtured. This accords with 
Arendt's sense, further discussed in Chapter Six, in which the artefacts that make the world our 
home are necessary to provide a place in which we can then publicly appear. 72 
This ideological framing is also productive of a material truth vexing to the familiar 
division between public and private worlds central to liberal civil society: the refugee, without 
a 'home' in the world, is literally exposed to the constant public glare and is paradoxically 
almost entirely depoliticised. 'Since the protection of refugees takes place in a "humanitarian 
space" and not a living polity', as Whitman has argued, 'emergency humanitarianism cannot 
address the enactment of human rights'. 73 
The largely uniform conception of 'home' deployed by the 'international community', 
to which reffigees may be sent back, also contributes to 'the construction of a newly 
74 
homogenous national Community, ' as David Campbell has described . Indeed, the recent 
move away from supporting people fleeing their countries of origin towards protecting their 
right to remain in their national 'home, the language of 'preventive protection', must also be 
considered as part of a neoliberal agenda of deteriorating support for resettlement. 75 We Can 
therefore comprehend the establishment of vast refugee camps surrounding the Kosovo 
territories as, to borrow Jennifer Hyndman's words from a different case, 'less a humanitarian 
practice than a donor-sponsored effort to contain forced migration and to avoid international 
legal obligations to would-be refugees'. 76 
The gesture politics behind allowing some Kosovo-Albanian refugees eligibility for 
permanent legal residence in the United States also ran up against the other political necessity 
of avoiding the signal that some would not be able to return 'home'. 
77 If the fundamental aim 
of the campaign was to 'return the refugees 
78 
_ an oddity given that the vast majority were 
7' Hannah Arendt The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 54. 
72 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 52. 
73 Whitman, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis, p. 167. 
74 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identify, andJustice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University 
ofMinnesota, Press, 199 8), p. 229. 
75 Hyndman, Managing Displacement, pmvii. 
76 Hyndman, Managing Displacement, p. 2. 
77 Blaine Harden, 'Kosovars Relocated to U. S. Would Be Eligible to Remain', The New York Times, April 23, 
1999. 
73 Judith Miller, 'NATO's War Aims; The Test: Getting the Refugees Home', The New York Times, April 25, 
1999. 
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displaced after and largely as a consequence of the bombing -then permanent settlement in the 
United States would seem to vex. 
As immigration experts forecast that many would never return, large numbers of 
Albanian-Americans living in New York, Chicago and San Diego, US cities with large 
Albanian communities, began filing the names of family members still stranded hoping they 
could come. 79 Eventually 4,000 would pass through and be screened by immigration, health, 
and police authorities prior to resettlement across some forty US states. 
80 Hysnije and Ilir 
Hoxha and their three children found themselves wedged between two apparently different 
worlds as a result. From the trauma of Kosovo they found themselves the guests of Christian 
pacifists in a 'quiet coýnpound' near Comer, Georgia being pushed gently into 'American life' 
by studying English, the language of their new 'home'. 81 
Kosovar Refugees Come to 'America' 
Relatively neglected in media accounts of the pre-history of Albanian immigration to 
the United States was the legislation of the 1920s that instituted a quota system based on 
national origin. Explicitly based on the pseudo-science of eugenics, regulations drew 
hierarchies among desirable European immigrants at the expense of those from the south and 
east. 82 
Southeastern Europeans have traditionally been seen as less desirable newcomers to the 
United States. In the words of Woodrow Wilson, the forefather of liberal internationalism, they 
had neither the skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence'. 83 As the supposed 
assessment of both good and bad foreigners is the degree to which they reinstate rather than 
transform the nation, 'nationalist xenophilia', as Bonnie Honig suggests, 'tends to feed and 
(re)produce nationalist xenophobia as its partner. 84 
With all the fanfare celebrating the United States' generosity in housing and re-settling 
some of the Kosovo-Albanian refugees, few seemingly noticed the initial proposal on 6 April 
79 Melissa Healy, 'U. S. Families Eager fDr Refugees', The Los Angdes Times, April 24,1999. 
80 Diana Jean Schemo, 'As Airlift Ends, Refugees Weigh Lure of U. S. Against Pull of Home', The New York 
Times, June 5,1999. 
31 Diana Jean Scherno, 'In Woods of Georgia, Echoes ofBalkan Teffor', The New York Times, June 16,1999. 
92 Desmond King, Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins ofDiverse Democracy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p3. 
11 Quoted in King, Making Americans, p. 18. 
"Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 76. 
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1999 to send the migrants to the now notorious Cuban installation at GuantAnamoBay. 85 While 
Fidel Castro protested what the US govemment saw as its right from the outcome of the 
Spanish-American War, others were prophetically concerned that the offshore tent city would 
be 'more a prison than a safe haven'. 86 
By 9 April, the day the first refugees had been scheduled to arrive, and after much 
protest from UNHCR, the Guantinamo plan had been discarded in favour of housing most of 
them at barracks in Macedonia and the rest at Fort Dix army base in the 'Garden State' of New 
Jersey. The Guantinamo location, of course, would have been partly symbolic. Residence 
there could only be transitory, demonstrating to Milosevic that his alleged plans for Kosovo 
could only fail. The Kosovo-Albanians would have to return home. But Alexander Aleinikoff 
and Kathleen Newland also suggested, however, that 'The prospect ofputting 20,000 refugees 
behind barbed wires in Guantinamo should be chilling... Those sheltered there would not be 
, 87 able to apply for asylum because they would not be in the United States . 
The contrast between the 'Welcome V banners, flowers and stuffed toys at New York's 
Kennedy Airport and the horrors of Balkan communal war presented what might become one 
of the future US history textbook images of the late 1990s. 88 Kosovo-Albanians would be the 
last mass-immigrants of the 20'h Century to make a home in the 'New World'. The 
transnational histories of these migrants must, therefore, be narrated to conform to the fantasy 
norm of US history. With the operation named 'Open Arms', Fort Dix military base 
accordingly became a transitive public space and, from news accounts, a seeming gateway site 
of fantasy and awe. 89 
First Lady (and aspiring New York Senator) Hillary Rodham Clinton duly greeted four 
hundred and fifty-three 'ethnically cleansed' Kosovars as they arrived at the base, formerly a 
training camp for military rescrvistsýo This geopolitical space was transformed, according to 
The New York Times, 'into kind of sprawling Ellis Island, gearing up to be a gateway to 
'5 Joanne Van Seim, 'Reception in Other States: Information Relating to Other Key States Involved in the 
Reception ofKosovars', in Joanne Van Sekn (ed. ) Kosovo's Re 
2000), P. 222. 
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90 George F. Will, 'An Equal-Opportunity War', The Washington Post, May 16,1999. 
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America'. 91 Later, of course, the refugees would experience the backoom. immigration offices, 
wire fencing at the reception (or detention) centres and waiting areas for INS checks, the 
banalities of waiting for food and clothing. 
Vice President Al Gore nonetheless made more literal the association between Ellis 
Island and Fort Dix in a speech on the occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary, promising to 
relocate 6,000 of the refugees to the US proper (4,000 is the accurate figure). 92 Several families 
did not stay in the 'in-between' space of Fort Dix for long. 93 After two weeks, some were 
awarded the status of automatic permanent residence after they had stayed in the US for a 
6mere three years'! 4 What made 'unexpected news', according to one report, was the extent to 
which several of the refugees eligible to remain actually wanted to go 'home'! s 
As outlined in Chapter Four, fundraising and volunteer efforts from US citizens 
abounded. 96 The New Jersey Arts Council paid $ 10,000 to artists to work with the 1,500 child 
refugees at Fort Dix. 97 Translators volunteered with the American Red Cross. 98 The Refugee 
Internet Assistance Initiative donated $500,000 in computer services and equipment to assist 
the refugees to access news and information in their native languageý9 
Others were not so lucky, especially those immigrants without documentation. The INS 
readily deported immigrant Serbs aspiring to remain in the US as a way of avoiding Yugoslav 
army conscription. 100 Twenty-five of the Kosovo-Albanian refugees at Fort Dix were caught in 
violation of US immigration law after entering under a false name. 101 Four others were jailed 
in Pennsylvania for deceiving US immigration officials in Macedonia. They were later released 
and returned to Fort Dix still eligible for permanent residency, though the usual refrain that 
such bad apples threatened to undermine the leniency so enjoyed by the rest is common in 
91 Diana Jean Schemo, 'Fort Dix, A Change of Mission'. The New York Times, May 5,1999. 
92 Katherine Q. Seeyle, 'Gore Says U. S. Will Open Door to 20,000 Kosovars', The New York Times, April 22, 
1999; Diana Jean Schemo, 'More Kosovo Refugees Reach U. S. ', The New York Times, May 8,1999. 
93 Diana Jean Schemo, 'Refiigees Say Goodbye To an Army Post', The New York Times, July 18,1999. 
94 Diana Jean Schemo, 'Resettlement of Refugees Begins', The New York Times, May 21,1999; Somini 
Sengupta, 'In Brooklyn, a Warm Refuge for Kosovo Kin', The New York Times, May 10,1999. 
95 Anne Swardson, 'Home Is What It's All About', The Washington Post, May 4,1999. 
96 Stephanie Stassel, 'Rising Up to Relieve Refugees', The LosAngeles Times, April 10,1999. 
97 Karen DeMasters, 'In Split Vote, Arts Council Approves Kosovar Program', The New York Times, May 30, 
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98 Elsa Brenner, 'Yonkers Translator', The New York 7-Imes, May 16,1999; 
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matters of immigration. 102 As a point of comparison consider the treatment of so-called 
I immigration cheat' Amadou Diallo. 
In the month before NATO's war, on 4 February 1999, Diallo, a West African 
immigrant, was hit nineteen times by officers of the New York Police Department after they 
had 'accidentally' fired forty-one shots. After the four white officers were acquitted, the 
Department of Justice stated, '[We] could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
officers wilfully deprived Mr. Diallo of his constitutional right to be free from the use of 
unreasonable force'. 
103 As the officers approached him on the steps of his home Diallo, who 
was unarmed, had put his hand in his pocket to withdraw a wallet. Describing Diallo's 
(unrelated) claim for political asylum as 'bogus', one commentator could even note that 
(presumably by dying) he had done 'no favor for foreigners genuinely in need of haven fi-om 
oppression'. 
104 
Two days before NATO began bombing Yugoslavia hundreds of New Yorkers 
protested racist police brutality, leading to the arrest of one hundred and forty-one. 105 The 
comparison between NATO's claims and the reality of life for many in the United States was 
not entirely lost. In the words of Sarah Flounders, 
If one wants to defend the rights of national minority people from police brutality and 
abuse, you don't have to go thousands of miles away. The shooting of Amadou Diallo 
in NYC is just the tip of the iceberg. African American, Latino, Native, Arab, and 
Asian people are routinely the victims of racism, discrimination, and police terror 
inside the United States. 106 
The shooting of Diallo came soon after the case of Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, who 
was tortured and sodomised with a plunger handle by New York police inside a precinct office. 
The trial of the guilty officer was ongoing during NATO's campaign. 107 
102 Diana Jean Schemo, 'I. N. S. Releases Jailed Refugees and Will Let Them in U. S. ', The New York Times, May 
18,1999. 
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Immigration and US Democracy 
The stunningly dramatic Jewish Museum here was built with five empty spaces. They are 
called Voids, and when the museum eventually opens, they will remain empty and unheated -a 
place to chill the body and, with a mere moment's thought, the soul. If you want to know why 
NATO fights in the former Yugoslavia, come here and stare into the Voids. 
- Richard Cohen 
108 
Clearly liberal societies have not opened their arms to all immigrants all of the time. Michael 
Walzer argues immigration should be limited to the extent that a political community has the 
right to safeguard the integrity of its way of life. 
109 The common liberal narrative is that 
immigration scares occur principally during eras of political uncertainty and economic 
decline-110 In that case, the nation-state is always living in uncertain times. Crises over 
immigration are not the product of Administration change or straightforwardly a response to 
shifting economic facts; they have always historically been mixed up with allegations that 
something 'essentially American' is in jeopardy. 
But even as 'foreign ideas' and cultures have been deemed a threat to US values others 
have been hailed. 'The co-presence in American political culture of xenophilia and 
xenophobia', suggests Honig, 'comes right out of America's fundamental liberal commitments, 
which map a normatively and materially privileged national citizenship onto an idealized 
immigrant trajectory to membership'. "' This uncertainty as to the position of the foreigner, in 
other words, is productive of disciplinary strategies that help to secure the definition of the US 
nation and the official public sphere. By switching around the more customary question of 
, How should we solve the problem of foreignness? ' Honig suggests 'the foreigner' and ideas 
of -, foreignness' have been formative in multiple political foundings (both theoretical and 
practical) as idealised immigrants and citizens. 
Given the alienating civil privatism caused by capitalism and liberal individualism, 
described in Chapter One, only newcomers, according to Walzer, are able to foster the civic 
108 Richard Cohen, 'A Look Into 1lie Void: Kosovo as Holocaust analogy', 77ie Washington Post, April 16, 
1999. 
" Michael Walzer, Spheres ofJustice: A Defense ofPluralism and Equality (New York, Basic Books, 1983), 
rx. 31-63. 
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(, ideological cycle') between liberalism and racism as an explanatory variable in the account of immigration 
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and familial attachments required to reinvigorate social democracy. ' 12 Since liberal regimes are 
meant to derive legitimacy from citizen consent, in an age of widespread alienation from state 
institutions and a piercing 'legitimation crisis, " 13 xenophilic ideas about the immigrant origins 
of the United States serve to ratify the 'choice worthiness' of the regime. They now come to 
stand for (rather than undermine) the integrity of America's way of life. 
The widely circulated media image of immigrant naturalisation ceremonies, 114 fo r 
example, vicariously re-present general public assent in ways beyond reach for disinterested 
native-born citizens, half of whom do not vote. Literally, as the refugees arrive, otherwise 
cynical citizens get to see the body politic through their still-captivated eyes; these new 
members consent to the regime just by virtue of desiring to be there in a way native-born 
citizens cannot. As Berlant describes, immigrants offer 'symbolic evidence for the ongoing 
power of American democratic ideals. That is, immigration discourse is a central technology 
for the reproduction of patriotic nationalism... because the immigrant is defined as someone 
who desires Amerka'. 
115 
The multi-cultural diversity of liberal America was accordingly celebrated during the 
Kosovo war with the valorisation of the three returned US hostage-soldiers, two being of 
Latin-American descent. Prior to their safe return, newspapers were full of images of friends 
and family with symbolic yellow ('support the troops') ribbons on their clothing, gardens, and 
streets! 16 Members of First InfiLntry Division, Staff Sergeants Ramirez and Stone and 
Specialist Gonzales were hailed as heroes as they arrived home, later awarded six medals for 
their scrap with the Serbs, the Purple Heart included! H The parade of US Christian, Jewish 
and Muslim clergy visiting the hostage-soldiers prior to their negotiated release reinforced the 
presumed superiority of US tolerance of diversity and the communal hatred NATO was 
ostensibly bombing Kosovo to forestall. 
118 
The domestic politics of the war over Kosovo, of course, became bound up with 
Mexican-American (as well as Serb- and Albanian-American) immigrant struggles for 
legitimacy and reveals something important about the experience of being public for vast 
112 Michael Walzer, What It Means to be an American (New York: Marsilio, 1992). 
"I jargen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (translated by Thomas McCarthy) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). 
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117 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 200 1), p. 14. 
I's Susan Sachs, 'A Plan By Jesse Jackson to Free Soldiers is Stalled', The New York Times, April 23,1999. 
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numbers of US citizens, if not all of them. Mexican-American opinion leaders readily took the 
opportunity to highlight their community's contribution to US national defense. ' 19 The crowds 
screamed, flags were waved, and for days the soldiers received medals and were the subjects of 
various 'Welcome Home' paradeS. 
120 (The national symbolism of military parades is age old, 
of course. On Memorial Day, which fell during the campaign Clinton called on citizens to 
honour the US war dead and understand NATO's goals. 121) 
The emergence of potentially powerful 'hyphenated' social and ethnic groups, Jewish- 
Americans, African-Americans, Mexican-Americans, which can be creative of publics in their 
own right, has been one of the most important and distinctly 'American' trends in the 
development of recent 'identity' politics, especially since the 1960s. Of course, in a nation of 
immigrants organised action on behalf of particular ethnic communities has a much longer 
heritage effecting civil rights, housing, quotas and internal migration. 122 The diversity and 
potential power of these ethnic and cultural groups has been condemned and celebrated fi-om 
multiple perspectives. 123 
In Arendt's endeavor to theorise the emergence of republican, civic forms of political 
association she viewed the uncritical acceptance of the normative status of social movements 
as dangerous. 
124 Where social movements play a considerable role in lobbying, in articulating 
interests, the kind of 'joining in' indicative of interest-group politics was only a surrogate for 
political participation, she argued, an extension of the corrupt party system, simply becoming 
additional mass-organised pressure cliques. 
But this has not always been so. Subaltern public spheres that have been formed out of 
African-American freedom struggles constituted an 'interpretive community... ' as Gilroy 
suggests, 'on which the black vernacular was built in times past'. 
125 For the purposes of our 
analysis we can see, as Warner suggests, that in the 'ideals of ethnic identity... an assertive and 
affirmative concept of identity seems to achieve a correspondence between public existence 
119 Frank del Olma, 'Saluting our Latino, Soldiers', The LosAngeles Times, April 2,1999. 
120 Editorial, 'The Heroes' Homecoming', The Washington Post, May 29,1999. 
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and private self. 126 To be public for numerous self-identified Mexican-Americans during the 
Kosovo war, in other words, was precisely not to overcome the private identity of ethnicity but 
to affirm a common interest in solidarity. 
Similarly, thousands of the approximately 400,000 Albanian-Americans took to the 
streets, marching in support of NATO. 
127 The National Albanian American Council, 128a non- 
profit advocacy organization, and the rival Albanian American Civic League (AACL), founded 
in 1989 by former Congressman Joseph DioGuardi, 129 arranged rallies across the United 
States. Hundred demonstrated for ground troops outside numerous federal buildingS. 130 With 
chants of 'U-S-A, Free Kosovo', members of the AACL marched to the White House calling 
for the establishment of an independent Kosovo once the bombing had ceased. 131 Muslim 
groups, uniting to form the 'Kosova Task Force USA, also backed the air-strikes evidently 
concerned about Kosovo's Muslim Albanian majority. 
132 The concern of California's Muslims 
for the troubles of their brethren was also marked on the occasion of the end of the yearly 
pilgrimage to Mecca. NATO's actions 'cast a solemn yet grateful note over the ceremony', 
according to one report. 
133 
Semi-famous, or least influential, Serb- and Albanian-Americans were profiled. Several 
almost-famous Serb-Americans voiced concern, including MetroStars coach Bora Milutinovic 
and Sacramento King center, Vlade Divac, who sports fans were told also had family in 
Kosovo. 134 Isuf Hajrizi suddenly appeared in the limelight as editor of Ilyria, New York's 
Albanian- and English-language semi-weekly. 135 Aleksandar Radojevic, the 7-foot-3-inch 
Montenegran, at the time trying out with a National Basketball Association team, was ruled out 
126 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 26. 
127 Jodi Wilgoren, 'Albanian-Americans Rally To Voice Support for Raids', New York Times, March 30,1999. 
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during the bombing campaign of playing for Ohio State due to the (unrelated) matter that he 
had been paid to play briefly with a Yugoslav club. 136 
Several American-Jewish groups joined many of the Muslim and Albanian-Americans 
in support of both the refugees and, by seeming logical extension, NATO. The American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, an umbrella organisation of Jewish-American relief 
agencies, worked with both Kosovars and Kosovar Jews. 
137 Children of Holocaust survivors 
were moved to 'do something' from watching on TV the images of fleeing refugees. 
138 
According to Fred Hyatt, 
If the Holocaust were taking place today, would the story bore us after a few weeks? 
Would news executives be saying, 'We led with Auschwitz last night. Let's go with 
something else tonight? '... There is a holocaust taking place today. An entire 
population, nearly 2 million strong, is being systematically forced from its country. 139 
These claims are exaggerated but are politically powerful in the United States. Where 
Germany was (once again) reminded of its past, NATO's (and Germany's) first use of military 
force was simultaneously justified in terms of solemnly repaying old debts. Kosovo Albanians, 
after all, had been on 'our side' in W)&T. 
140 
Indeed, according to some, fear of letting 'genocide' in Europe happen again partly 
justified NATO's deliberate misrepresentation of events (discussed in Chapter Four). I& as 
Anthony Weymouth suggested, 'The Holocaust was not merely the logical extension of the 
insanity of fascism, [but also] represented the failure of Western values to prevent it', 'this 
time' might be different. 141 In his words, 
Haunted by the mistakes of the past and fearful of the outcome of this new calamity as 
it unfolded, politicians and the media may well have engaged in a feeding frenzy of 
rumour, conjecture and ambiguous information, and exaggerated the nature of Serbian 
brutality. But it is conceivable at least that this overreaction occurred more out of 
ignorance (i. e. the absence of verifiable information) than out a primary desire to 
mislead the public. 142 
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Might not also guilt and earlier embarrassments in Bosnia and Rwanda account for this 
seemingly new readiness to act in the face Of seVili? 
143 A personal story from NATO Supreme 
Commander, General Wesley Clark, helped make the WWR analogy more potent. Clark 
learned as an adult that he was the grandson of a Russian Jew who escaped the pogroms and 
fled to the US over one century ago. 144 
A variation of 'the iconic good immigrant' narrative, productive of US national identity 
and values since Tocqueville, was also witnessed in full display with news coverage regularly 
portraying hard-working Albanian-American immigrant men compelled to send money (and 
sometimes weapons) back home to the KLA. Some who had never been to the Balkans 
planned to join the Kosovo rebels in person. Described as a 'legal no-man's land' as no US 
citizen can aid and abet military action against a state (Yugoslavia) with which US is (even 
only technically) at peace, Albanian-Americans who went into ground combat could 
theoretically have been prosecuted under the Neutrality Act of 1794 . 
145 This did not prevent 
the newest KLA volunteers of all ages going shopping for gear to wear when refreshing 'the 
tree of liberty', as one report described. 
146 
The enthusiasm for US goods observed in these idealised immigrants is seen as 
representative of the typically good liberal lifestyle. In Anne Norton's words, 'Consumption 
among immigrants appears in this context as a constitutional act, an exercise of the right to 
self-determination'. 
147 Through the practice of consumption liberal publics have regularly been 
encouraged to express themselves 'politically', especially in the United States. Capitalism is 
thereby 'assimilated to democracy' through the enactment of liberal ideals. 148 As Norton 
describes, 'choice is freedom and free choice evidence of consent, that people exercise 
authority in the selection of representatives and representations of themselves, and that the 
representations of themselves does not replace but instead extends the self . 
149 Reinforcing the 
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notion that Kosovo would eventually be assimilated into the global liberal-democratic order, 
these Albanian-American immigrant men are represented as supporting their brethren's right to 
fight for the political and economic freedom they so enjoyed in the New World. 
As has become familiar with the old stereotype about hard-working Asian-immigrants, 
what is esteemed in traditional liberal fashion, as Honig suggests, 'are the resources available 
[from new immigrants] to be sacrificed for financial success... not... their potential to serve as 
sites of associational political power'. 
150 Moreover, by reinforcing the myth of US citizenship 
as defined by 'class mobility' one effect of this good immigrant narrative is to 'discipline the 
domestic poor'. 151 
In general, immigration to the US has fortified racial inequality against African- 
Americans, especially those with poor education and low income. 152 As a basic economic 
point, the hiring of cheap immigrant labour has generally reduced the employment prospects of 
poor African-Americans. However, the concomitant ideological construction of the United 
States as the place where, with hard work, you can get ahead is perhaps equally destructive of 
overcoming the legacy of slavery. This is especially disturbing in light of the recent 
adjustments in US government rhetoric about (usually black) recipients of public housing. 
Drawing on the language of 'ethnic cleansing', 
153 Berlant has described this as 'a particularly 
brutal mode of what we might call hygienic governmentality... ' 
154 
Both the classical and liberal traditions, as we have seen, try to naturalise the 'outside' 
of the domestic reahn as the proper place of politics. 
155 So although public space in liberal 
societies is increasingly becoming privatised, the formal and practical distinction has served to 
systematically disadvantage those seeking to politicise issues and agendas traditionally 
associated with the 'home', including issues of public housing. 
Jamie Owen Daniel, for example, has shown that black public housing residents in the 
United States are far less likely to be allowed to 'self-represent within the official public 
sphere'. 156 This was not inevitable. As CK Doreski has shown, 'writers for the black 
110 Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, p. 80. 
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[independent] press assumed that the "true principles" of government were located in the 
public sphere - and that community news, with its unrestrained airing of dissensus, was 
instrumental in the construction of authentic race narratives'. 157 
The difficulty contemporary black public housing residents have found in self- 
representing is perhaps not surprising, however, given that Kant first defined the bourgeois 
public sphere as naturally comprised of property-owners. Being 'their own masters', 
proprietors were assumed to be able to self-abstract, to rise above narrow, factional agendas in 
the way property-less wage earners were not. 158 
The commonly observed media narrative of condensing the identity of female black 
public housing residents 'precisely to [their] body and its gendered reproductive behaviour', 
159 
as Daniel describes, reinforces racial and gendered stereotypes. For example, instead of 
locating the identity of one resident first and foremost in ten'ns of her citizenship and attendant 
right to make claims regarding housing to an attentive public sphere, usually without delay she 
is categorised, in Daniel's words, 'as the "45-year-old mother of thirteen. ", 
160 
These common practices by media and politicians are not aberrations of liberal- 
republican practice in the United States, but are intrinsic to the historical construction of its 
official state-public sphere. This effort to present a unitary public sphere and form of discourse 
(self-abstraction) as the most valued, however, disadvantages other publics, forms of speech, 
and subject matter. Feminists, gays and other subaltern counterpublics have long argued that 
understandings of 'the public' have worked toward ends that are less than egalitaxian (or 
democratic). 161 
In other words, the 'rhetorical strategy of personal self-abstraction, as Warner 
describes, 'is both the utopian moment of the public sphere and a major source of domination, 
for the ability to abstract oneself in public discussion has always been an unequally available 
resource. Self-abstraction from male bodies confirms masculinity. Self-abstraction from female 
157 C. K. Doreski, Writing America Black Race Rhetoric in the Public Sphere (Cambridge-. Cambridge 
University Press, 199 8), p. xiii. 
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160 Daniel, 'Rituals of Disqualification', p. 73. 
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bodies denies femininity'. 162 Such narratives, discussed below, have gendcred representations 
of public responses to the Kosovo refugee crisis. 
The attempts described in Chapter One to save liberalism from 'ascriptive America' 163 
mistakenly separate discourses and practices that have proved rather too well matched. 164 As 
practiced throughout US history, the very abstractness and disembodied character of the 
celebrated liberal public subject has crucially left open the issue of which persons and groups 
of persons are eligible to political and civil rights. In Carol Horton's words, 'the apparently 
neutral category of "the individual" is suffused with highly divergent cultural meanings in 
various forms of liberalism, even to the extent of constructing certain types of subjects (e. g. 
, 165 women, blacks) in explicitly inegalitarian terms . 
Gender and Refugees: Sentimentality and the Personalised Public Sphere 
The political as a place of acts oriented to publicness becomes replaced by a world of private 
thoughts, leanings, and gestures. Suffering, in this personal-public context, becomes answered 
by survival, which is then recoded as freedom. 
- Lauren Berlant 
166 
Gendered representations of 'female' identities, typically as homemakers, were common in US 
news accounts of the role played by Albanian-American women during the refugee crisis. 
Those perhaps unwilling or able to go fight with the men were, of course, otherwise moved to 
contribute. 
167 Muzafere Beka, a travel agency entrepreneur, duly represented the universalism 
of US capitalist values. A Kosovar-Albanian US resident for thirteen years, she booked flights 
for fellow expatriates until her business was forced to close after trips to crisis-ridden Kosovo 
had dramatically declined. Now, however, ten of her family members made refugees in 
Kosovo would move in with her in the Bronx. 168 
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Other US-based Kosovar-Albanians registered with international relief agencies to 
accommodate both refugee relatives and strangers. Individual media profiles of such 
volunteers were overwhelmingly of women. 169 The sketch of Eva Shakri was typical. 
'Remembering the kindness her family received decades ago when they left the Balkans for the 
United States, Eva Shakri has returned the favor by opening her home to refugees from 
Kosovo - 30 of them'. 
170 
Given pervasive sexualised assumptions in Yugoslavia about Muslims in Kosovo (that 
the men were rapists and the women 'mere baby-factories' 171), gender based violence by Serb 
militias, including attacks while women were in flight, held hostage, detained, or simply at 
home, had undoubtedly been fuelled over a long period of time. Julie Mertus has described, for 
example, how Serbian media 'pump[ed] out portraits of Albanian women as baby makers, 
calling their offspring "biological bombs", labelling Albanian family life as primitive and 
172 
backward' . 
Outsiders tried to assess whether Kosovo-Albanian women were generally more or less 
likely to suffer rape than the rest of Yugoslavia's women, and also tried to substantiate claims 
about the scale of rape by Serb militias as a weapon of ethnic cleansing. 173 The experts on 
Kosovo-Albanian society, unsurprisingly, contested most of Belgrade's claims. 'Crime rates, 
including rates of rape', according to the Kosovo Report, 'were considerably lower in Kosovo 
than in the rest of Yugoslavia. 174The accuracy of such evidence might be skewed, however, 
by the apparent difficulty (both before and after 1999) Kosovo-Albanian women have had with 
reporting rape (a not uncommon phenomenon), belying such politicised comparisons. 
On the other hand, continual reports filled US news and TV coverage of the 
premeditated rape of ethnic Albanian women by Serb soldiers and policemen, now classified a 
war crime by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. "' That numerous women 
refused to volunteer their stories was widely attributed to the social stigma that rape brings on 
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to both the woman and her family in a society in which female virginity and fidelity are a 
central mode of social control. 
176 In the language of public and private, it is not surprising that 
women generally used to being on display as objects of male desire should come to feel the 
visibility of publicly admitting sexual violation as, in Warner's words, 'a kind of intimate 
vulnerab ility 9.177 
Notably, a Human Rights Watch report felt compelled to comment on the 
6opportunistic use of rape allegations' as part of NATO's propaganda campaign. NATO 
spokespersons 'inflated rhetoric about rape' and deployed premature and unsubstantiated 
178 
claims largely 'to justify the continuation of the bombing campaign'. More than that, the 
report continues, the consequences of NATO's media operation may have been to seriously 
undercut 'more careful reporting on abuses. NATO's use of insufficiently substantiated 
allegations provided Serbian officials with an opportunity to denounce all rape reports as mere 
propaganda' . 
179 Nonetheless, as witnessed most recently with narratives of race and gender 
used to marshal support for the 'War on Terror', including through the manipulation of images 
of Afghan women, 
180 NATO and the United States were readily able to position themselves as 
liberators of women in general. 
The birth rate in Serbia drastically declined, it was reported, and abortion rate sharply 
increased as large numbers of women decided to remain childless under Milosevic's rule. 
Reasons imputed included women's anxiety about civil war and, according to one report, an 
tunwillingness to raise children in a nation whose standard of living has declined every year 
for the past decade. "81 IMF-imposed austerity measures, again, were not mentioned. As a 
contrast to childless Serb women, however, it was reportedly the very 'lives of children' that 
kept some Kosovo-Albanian women going, inspired to escape death and return 'home' to 
them-182 
A less widely noted consequence of Western intervention has been the massive 
increase in East European sex-slave traffic into and out of Kosovo, including to London, 
176 Elisabeth Bummiller, 'Deny Rape or Be Hated: Kosovo Victims' Choice', The New York Times; june22, 
1999; Carol L Williams, 'In Kosovo, Rape Seen as Awful as Death', The LosAngeles Times, May 27,1999. 
177 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 24. 
178 Human Rights Watch, 'Kosovo: Rape as a Weapon ofEthnic; Cleansing', Vol. 12, no3. March 2000. 
179 Human Rights Watch, 'Kosovo'. 
180 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 'Exiles, Tom Between Countries, Want to Help Rebuild Afghanistan', The New york 
Times, February 10,2002. 
181 Blaine Harden, 'Stresses of Milosevic's Rule Blamed for Decline in Births', The New York Times, July 5, 
1999. 
182 Paul Watson, 'Lives of Children KeptMother Going', The LosAngeles Times, June 27,1999. 
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bolstered by the almost non-existent criminal justice system, insecure borders, and custom of 
international troops and aid workers. 193 US Army Staff Sergeant Frank Ronghi, part of the UN 
peacekeeping force, was sentenced to life in prison for the rape and murder of Merita Shabiu, 
an I I-year-old girl, in the town of Vitina. 
184 
The many moving individual portraits during the war obviously appeal to a mass 
audience, providing a human face with whom 'we' were supposed to identify. 82 year-old 
Naxhie Salihu, we were told, daily endured taunts from Yugoslav soldiers during NATO's 
bombardment. 'Hey, Granny. Are you still here? Are you waiting for us to kill you? ... We will 
bum you alive and eat you if you don't leave . 
185 Another Kosovo-Albanian women described 
for reporters the murder of her son. 
186 Kosovar nuns and a priest of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church suffered 'psychological violence' from KLA guerrillas as glass and religious icons 
187 
were smashed . In the 
housedress she had wom for a month, RukiJe Bytyci wept as she 
described to reporters how she 'just want[ed] the boys to come back. I just want my boy to 
come back'. 
188 Another woman was a veritable 'emblem of suffering, in the words of one 
189 
report. 
These characterisations of Kosovo-Albanian women should by now not be surprising, 
especially when contrasted to the dominant depiction of the men as warriors-190 (When it was 
revealed that Lieutenant-General Michael Short was commanding his only son, an A-10 jet 
pilot, it seemed the masculinity and family values of the United States were being afrumed. 
191) 
Masculinity in the West has traditionally been the experience of occupying public space; the 
political awakening of the Alban ian-American men, for example, was overwhelmingly 
"' Peter Finn, 'Sex Slavery Flourishes In Kosovo: E. European Women Forced into Brothels,, The Washington 
Post, April 24,2000. 
134 Steven Erlanger, 'The Ugliest American', The New York Times, April 2,2000; 'US Soldier Jailed for Kosovo 
Killing', BBC News on-line. See http: //news. bbc. co. uk/lAii/Nvorld/ainericas/862063. stm [doxNmloaded 5 October 
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york Times, June 15,1999; Editorial, 'Gypsy Woman Slain in Kosovo Town', The Los Angeles Times, 
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The LosAngeles Times, May 29,1999. 
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represented as active. Femininity, by contrast, is traditionally represented in the language of 
private feeling. We can also see this through the personal stories given of the refugees as they 
arrived in the United States, especially of Kosovo-Albanian 'Mothers'. 
192 
According to Arendt, however, since Jean-Jacque Rousseau's edification of private 
human empathy for suffering in The Social Contract, which transformed the passion into an 
emotion resembling pity, generalised public compassion turned political in a perverted form- 
193 
As witnessed during the French Revolution, the boundlessness of pity took the abstract, mass 
collectivity and fed upon it, fitstening onto misery as a camouflage for power-driven aims and 
eventually an excuse for cruelty. No matter the original sensitivity of the uncorrupted 
Robespierre, according to Arendt, the revolutionists compassion became 'pity when... 
brought... out into the open where [it] could no longer [be] direct[ed] toward specific suffering 
and focus... on particular persons'. 
194 
Where Chapter One suggested the worldly objects made by humans in the process of 
making a public realm could be destroyed with their subjection to endless consumption, with 
the homogenisation. of refugees into whole ethnic groups or genders, we also see the worldly 
space between people destroyed. With the political space between refugees abolished through 
compassion for a multitude, the human fact of individuality and plurality is lost. Berlant makes 
a similar point. 'Because the ideology of true feeling cannot admit the nortuniversality of pain', 
she argues, 'its cases become all jumbled together and the ethical imperative toward social 
transformation is replaced by a civic-minded but passive ideal of empathy'. 195 
But what is wrong with feelings of general compassion for suffering when 'something 
must be done'? It is not compassion for suffering per se that is problematic. In questioning its 
virtue upon entering the political realm Arendt's intention was not to denigrate compassion in 
the personal. 'Because compassion abolishes the distance, the worldly space between men 
where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located', Arendt argued, 'it 
remains, politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence'. 
196 
192 Alissa J. Rubin, 'One Mother's Plight Moves First Lady, The Los Ange Tim MaYI5,1999; T 
, Kosovar Mother, Son Find Refuge', The Los Angeles Times, May 21,991es 
es ini Tran 
9; Alissa J. Rubin, 'Even in Refugee 
Camps, Women's Work Never Done', The Los Angeles Times, June 6,1999. 
193 Hannah Arendt On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, [196311970), pp. 83-4. 
194 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 84. My italics. 
195 Berlant quoted in Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 298 fn. 69. 
196 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 8 1. My italics. 
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The suggestion is that compassion, like love and pure goodness, is in essence 
unpolitical. Arendt was adamant that the public realm could only properly deal with, and was 
indeed constituted by, appearances. 197 In other words, only deeds not motives could be judged; 
even authentic human feelings could rarely withstand the 'glare of publicity,. 
198 'Because of its 
inherent worldlessness, love', she wrote, 'can only become false and perverted when it is used 
for political purposes such as change or salvation of the world'. 
199 
Paradoxically, mobilised compassion for suffering, as we have seen, habitually incites 
direct, sometimes violent action at the expense of speech. This is best illustrated in Arendt's 
discussion of Herman Melvilles's novella Billy Budd, where Billy is a thinly veiled depiction 
of Jesus. The parable depicts even the most genuine, authentic goodness leaving political 
questions unsolved. Billy, the young sailor, stammers impotently in his innocence able only to 
answer the lying sailor Claggart, represented as 'evil', with a violent (and lethal) blow. 
200 
The pervasive sentimentalism of political journalism throughout the Kosovo war 
deployed personalised and emotional stories to reveal a structural effect. This personal-public 
context appeared throughout the intervention and partly structured the public response to what 
occurred (or what was thought to have occurred) in Kosovo. The crisis and NATO's response' 
was partly framed, to borrow from Berlant, by a 'world of private thoughts, leanings, and 
gestures 201 indicative of the personalised US public sphere. 
This personalised public context has serious consequences for the viability of any 
politically engaged humanitarian ethic. Consider the suggestion by Anthony Lang, for 
example, that, 'By respecting the narrations of women, elders, religious leaders and others in 
communities whose histories are rarely acknowledged we can begin to see ways of acting that 
might sustain and support alternative forms of humanitarian aid'ý02 
The international 'Public presence' of a state during the course of a military 
intervention, according to Lang, obliges the state to confront its self-image. 203 This notion of 
political agency manifest in the act of intervention, based on Lang's reading of Arendt, has 
implications for both historical self-understanding and humanitarian pmctice. instead of 
191 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 199-212 
I'll Arendt, On Revolution, P. 93. 
199 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 52. 
11 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 79. 
201 Berlant quoted in Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 298 fh. 69. 
202 Lang, Agency and Ethics, p. 205. 
203 Lang, Agency and Ethics, p. 1 96. 
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proudly declaring that various Balkan interventions are warranted due to the US position as the 
104 
only capable superpower, Lang suggests, 
such action might spring from a recognition that the United States went through (and is 
still going through according to some) a period of deep and divisive ethnic or racial 
conflict. Based on this similar history, leaders could present their action not as a 
triumph of national power and purpose, but as an empathetic response to a history too 
205 
similar to be ignored . 
This is a form of agency in global politics, according to Lang, based on instances of historical 
narration that might make possible a sense of empathy and compassion, a public revelation of 
the state in the global realm more appropriate to humanitarianism. 206 
The discussion of the dangers of compassion in a depoliticised public sphere speaks 
against the straightforward embrace of domestic liberal apologetics. For Lang's account is 
based on a teleology that positions the US as having (almost) sufficiently overcome its ethnic 
divisions to be able to provide/impose a model for others to emulate. It sets up a benign image, 
a white man's burden. But it is imperialism nonetheless. More contriteness on the part of 
political leaders, which we saw with Clinton anyway, is an insufficient basis for the re- 
imagination of the 'historical foundations of foreign policy'. 207 
The real political danger is that 'we lose the original impulse behind sentimental 
politics', as Berlant describes, 'which is to see the individual effects of mass social violence as 
different ftom the causes, which are impersonal and depersonalising' ý08 For as Arendt and 
others have argued, the very (gendered) language of suffering and the inexpressibility of 
physical pain hinder endeavours to react politically. 
209 Indeed, the constant photos of the 
masses of immigrants arriving to the US and the personalised media portraits of refugee 
mothers and sons articulate how utterly generic the mainstream public sphere represented the 
hopes unfurling from these migrant bodies, h, ow the aspirations of thousands - presumed to 
coincide with the aspirations of the United States - could be literally 'sketched in simple black 
and white'? 
10 
204 Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing, p. l. 
205 Lang, Agency and Ethics, p27. 
206 Lang, Agency and Ethics, p 28. 
207 Lang, Agency and Ethics, p 20 1. 
209 Berlant quoted in Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, p. 299 fh. 69. 
209 Also see Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and the Unmaking ofthe World (Oxford: Oxford 
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Conclusion 
In highlighting the US politics of immigration and refugees during the Kosovo war the 
chapter has endeavoured to represent the 'official' space of the US public (including the 
material advantages and rights of the 'normal' population) as not natural but necessarily and 
violently made. Crystal Bartolovich has shown, for example, that the image of a unitary and 
secure public sphere necessitates 'a... continuing disavowal of the constitution of the actual 
66space" of that "public"'! " As the thesis has argued throughout, public spheres are often 
violently produced and violence has played a major role in the historical process through 
which US citizenship has been defmed. 
Historically our understanding of immigration and refugee policies should not be 
restricted to the obvious political agenda of linking the 'problem' to various eras of racism, 
economic decline, or federal legislative and judicial and administrative policy activism. Insofar 
as this process reinforces assumptions about the US as the 'Promised Land', the refugees who 
cross it bolster the border of the US nation-state, no matter how much the subsequent 
'diversity' is condemned, ignored, or celebrated. Although originally expounded as a 
bourgeois concept, public sphere critique cannot exclude analysis of the transnational, gender 
and race dynamics at play in the practices of publics. 
When conservative columnist George F. Will termed Kosovo an 'equal-opportunity 
war' he might have quite literally meant it. 
212 While arguing for an expanded definition of 
Federal 'hate crimes' during the bombing campaign, President Clinton compared the dangers 
of 'Primitive' hatreds in the Balkans to some of the values of the Old American SoUth? 
13 Jean 
Bethke Elshtain critiqued this 'attempt to put a distinctly American stamp on the Balkans 
114 tragedy' . Clinton 
'spun out a "vision"', in Elshtain's words, 'for anew postwar Kosovo that 
sounds like a multiculturalist pipedream'. 
215 
Rather than view humanitarian action as a catharsis for past wrongs a more penetrating 
critique of existing liberal societies is warranted. Indeed, several critical theorists suggest that 
it is precisely through understanding the historical experiences of displaced, diasporic, and 
211 Crystal Bartolovich, 'Inventing London', in Mike Hill and Warren Montag (eds. ) Masses, Classes, and the 
Public Sphere (London: Verso, 2000), p. 1 9. 
212 George F. Will, 'An Equal-Opportunity Wae, The Washington Post, May 16,1999. 
213 Katherine Q. Seeyle, 'Citing "Primitive" Hatreds, Clinton Asks Congress to Expand Hatr-Crime Law', The 
New York Times, April 7,1999. 
214 Jean Bethke Elshtain, 'Kosovo and the Just War Tradition', in William Joseph Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: 
Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 2000), p. 366. 
215 Elshtain, 'Kosovo and the Just War Tradition', p. 366. 
218 
marginal peoples that some of our most exemplary lessons for thought and action can be 
gained? 16 In the words of Giorgio Aganben, 'because the refugee destroys the old trinity of 
state-nation-territory... [this] apparently marginal figure deserves to be, on the contrary, 
considered as the central figure of our political history' 
! 17 
By the end of World War I, 'stateless persons', for Arendt, had become the 'most 
symptomatic group in contemporary PolitiCS., 
218 Still, in late-modem Public life 'peripheral 
peoples' - exiles, migrants, and refugees - remain emblematic! 
19 The history of massive 
transfers ofpopulations and forced or voluntary migrations is endemic within, and symbolic of, 
recent human experience 
? 20 Three months after NATO's bombing campaign ceased 
approximately 750,000 Kosovo-Albanians had been returned to the province. KFOR troops did 
inot, however, prevent an equally tragic evacuation of 200,000 non-Albanian Kosovars, Roma 
and Serbs. An assumed desire for revenge was brutally enacted on the Roma peoples accused 
of collaborating with Serbs. 
221 
The historical contradiction between human and citizen rights is at the core of why 
humanitarian policies habitually serve to transform individuals into 'naked' human beings 
stripped of citizen rights and political agency. 
222 'Equality', as Arendt suggested, 'in contrast 
to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us, but is the result of human 
organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we 
become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves 
mutually equal rights i, 
ý23 
What of the future? How can 'mutually equal rights' be globally guaranteed? For Ken 
Booth, 'the progressive construction through international law of a global public realm in the 
interests of common humanity is the greatest prize'. 224 But where should we look for the 
theoretical and practical resources to realise such a reward? Calls for war in 1999 were 
popularly couched in terms of an activist, global civil society and public sphere with attendant 
216 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 172. 
117 Quoted in Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 228. 
218 Arendt, origins of Totalitarianism, p. 277. 
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Modernity', in Seyla Benhab ib (ed. ) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries ofthe Political 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 3 14-33 0. 
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221 David Rhode, 'Kosovar Attack on Gypsies Reveals Desire for Revenge', The New York Times, June 7,1999. 
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224 Ken Booth, 'Ends and Means Against Terror', WorldEditorial and International Law, Vol. 1, no. 1, 
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human rights culture inscribed in international law. 225 As recognised by James Kurth, 'The 
new American ideology of human rights and the open society - liberal globalism - in turn has 
provided the justification, and sometimes a compulsion, for a new kind of US military 
interventionism'. 226 
Concomitantly, attempts to extend public sphere forums beyond the national territorial 
state, derived especially from Habermas's deliberative tradition of dcmocratic thought, have 
been harnessed to justify intervention, law, and the establishment of a global public realm in 
numerous and problematic ways. According to Habermas, 
legitimate law emerges from, and reproduces itself only in, the form of a 
constitutionally regulated circulation of power, which should be nourished by the 
communications of an unsubverted public sphere that in turn is rooted in the 
associational network of a liberal civil society and gains support from the core private 
spheres of the lifeworld. Public sphere and civil society, the centerpiece of the new 
image, form the necessary context for the generation and reproduction of 
communicative power and international law ? 27 
The possibilities and consequences of this project is the subject of Chapter Six. All political 
spaces, like all publics, are produced. This is no less so for any global public. The thesis has 
attempted to make more explicit the link between public spheres and forms of war. Rather than 
conceive new discourses of a deliberative global public as necessarily progressive we must 
address, with Arendt, how they may intimately be associated with the further production of 
violence. 
225 JOrgen Habermas, 'Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality% in William 
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Chapter 6 
Global Publics, 
Violence, and Hannah Arendt 
on the other hand, humanity, which for the eighteenth century, in Kantian terminology, was no 
more than a regulative idea, has today become an inescapable fact. This new situation, in 
which 'humanity' has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would 
mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to 
humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself. It is by no means clear that this is 
possible... For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political 
possibilities, that one fme day a highly organized and mechanized humanity will conclude 
quite democratically - namely by majority decision - that for humanity as a whole it would be 
better to liquidate certain parts thereof, 
- Hannah Arendt' 
By the end of 1990s, and before 9/11, 'humanitarian intervention' was widely projected in 
liberal academic and policy-making circles to be the new Western way of war for the 
globalized 21" Century. According to the communiqud issued by NATO during its April 1999 
summit to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary, the 21" Century had already begun as the bombs 
were still dropping on Belgradeý 'If we are as resolute in building peace as we were persistent 
in conflict', urged Policy Planning Staff Director at the US State Department, 'the crisis in 
Kosovo may come to be viewed as a turning point in European history'. 3 Kosovo will 
represent 'the wave of the future'. 
4 
If NATO's actions were somehow avant-garde, arguments for the war were also 
underpinned by deliberate appeals to the conscience of a seemingly flowering activist global 
public sphere. VAclav Havel was exultant. In his words, 
NATO has not acted out of license, aggressiveness, or disrespect for international law. 
On the contrary, it has acted out of respect for the law - for the law that ranks higher 
than the protection of the sovereignty of states. It has acted out of respect for the rights 
of humanity as they are articulated by our conscience as well as by other instruments of 
international law. 5 
1 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, (1951] 1958), pp. 298-9. 
2 --NATO ofthe 21 st Century Starts Today", Says Communiqud', 771e Washington Post, April 25,1999. 
3 Morton H. Halperin, 'Winning the Peace: America's Goals in Kosovo', in William Joseph Buckley (ed. ) 
Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 2000), p. 225. 
4 Graham Fuller, 'More Kosovos', The Washington Post, May 4,1999. 
5 Vjclav Havel, 'Address to the Senate and the House of Commons ofthe Parliament of Canada!, in William 
Joseph Buckley (ed. ) Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2000), p. 245. My italics. 
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Serb-nationalist atrocities against Kosovo-Albanians, on this reading, had amounted to acts 
that evoked in 'our conscience' one of Michael Walzer's criteria for a 'just' war. 
6 
Humanitarian intervention 'is justified', according to Walzer, 'when it is a response 
(with reasonable expectation of success) to acts "that shock the conscience of mankind"... The 
reference is to the moral convictions of everyday men and women, acquired in the course of 
their everyday activities. 7 With 'mankind' duty shocked, JUrgen Habermas could now remark 
(once again) that, 'The transformation of the "law of nations" into a law of world citizens is 
thus on the agenda'. 8 A global public sphere of 'everyday' men and women was being actively 
produced, in would seem, by the violentjolt of 'genocide' in Europe. 
Thus far the thesis has offered an empirical and theoretical account of how NATO's 
war and US public debates about it were shaped by processes central to the historical 
development of US public spheres. It has addressed some of the ways in which publics in the 
national context of the United States shape and condition the use of force. This final chapter 
examines what has increasingly become a central and related mode of inquiry in international 
theory and vital to public justifications for the Kosovo war: the nexus between discourses of an 
emerging global public sphere and the legitimisation of violence. If the "humanitarian' legacy 
of Kosovo still resonates in the on-going 'war on terror', as the Conclusion to the thesis will 
suggest, we must attend to the important way in which the public conscience of the 
6civilizational West' was mobilised, indeed actively produced, during this war. 
The first section of the chapter, 'Deliberative Global Publics', shows how the 
normative category of the 'public sphere' as understood by Habermas is beginning to appear in 
the discourse of international theory operating at the 'structural' level, existing between and 
above states. 
9 If the conflict between national identity and the ideal universalism of an 
6 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A MoralArgument with Historical Illustrations (2ed. ) (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992). 
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degalitarian legal community' is integral to both the concept and historical emergence of the 
nation-state, deliberative democrats are now celebrating the newfangled forms of 
communication and human rights discourses that destabilise particularistic identities. 10 The 
dissonance between the notion of state sovereignty and existing power arrangements under 
globalization would seem to demand a revision of our notions of governance and conceptions 
of the public sphere. 
Violence, however, is inherent to the modem territorial state and any apparent 
transcendence of state structures must attend to how violence (and expansion) is therefore 
newly marshalled. Mary Kaldor has argued that, 'any scheme for "transnational democracy" 
has to take account of fundamental changes in patterns of organized violence that are 
associated with the erosion of the autonomy of the nation-state'! 
I The second section of the 
chapter, 'Deliberative Violence', suggests that the insight of Kaldor (and others) that the 
changing role of violence must accompany accounts of the globalization of Western social and 
political forms, including that of the public itself, does not go far enough in analysing the 
relationship between publics and war. 
For example, within much of the 'transnational democracy' and 'global public sphere' 
literature, especially those drawing on Habermas, there is a necessary and incipient division of 
the world. There is one 'peaceful' or 'humane' realm where normative/deliberative discourses 
and justifications constrain (usually liberal) state behaviour. This is defined against another 
realm in which strategic interaction and 'barbaric' war still predominates. This separation, it is 
suggested, is implicated in the production of violence in numerous and problematic ways as 
well as concealing the historical and systematic relations of domination and subordination that 
exist between these only seemingly separate spheres. 
There is something about violence, the violence of founding a public as well as 
imperial military interventions that should point theorists to the practical political problems in 
taking Habermas's public sphere theory as foundational. While Habermas's Structural 
Transformation certainly contains important sociological insights, the thesis, and this chapter 
in particular, is not a prelude to a theory of communicative humanitarian action 
12 or attempt to 
11 jargen Habermas, The Inclusion ofthe Other (edited by Cairan Cronin and Pablo De Greift) (Cambridge, MA: 
NUT Press, 2000). 
11 Mary Kaldor, 'Reconceptualizing Organized Violence', Re-imagining Political Community. Studies L-1 
Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 199 8), p. 9 1. 
12 see ijirgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (ft-anslated by Thomas McCarthy) (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1984). 
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redeem a Habermasian unfinished project of humanitarianism. Not only is there an implicit 
violence in the deliberative rationality assumed by discourse ethics that privileges certain 
modes of being public and certain speakers there is an explicit legitimation of military force, as 
the Kosovo case reveals, in the means-end effort to 'make' a global public realm. This claim is 
supported not only empirically through NATO's Kosovo war but also historically and 
theoretically through the work of Hannah Arendt. 
Arendt identified a 'politics-as-making' tradition - which naturalises the violence in 
politics - as one of the major fault lines running through Western political theory in almost its 
entirety. This tradition equates political action with shaping the human condition toward a 
preconceived end in the way a carpenter might violently shape a piece of wood. This 
relationship is evident in Habermas's deliberative fi-amework and can be traced to current 
discourses of a communicative global public sphere used to justify war over Kosovo. The third 
section of the chapter "'Politics-as-Making": Publics and Violence', suggests that Arendt's 
work, unlike Habermas's, explicitly recognises - if only through exclusion - the way in which 
violence and politics conceived as simply 'making' discounts the performative, non- 
instrumental side of the public realm and the politics necessary for human rights to have 
meaning. 
The stakes of this dispute between Habermas and Arendt are great. The differences 
between them however, have received a great deal of attention in political theory and do not 
require much further elaboration here. 
13 Arendt exercised a profound influence on Habermas's 
understanding of emancipation through human interaction and he has read his own categories, 
not always accurately, onto Arendt's. 
14 Not only did Arendt directly influence Habermas, 
contemporary deliberative thinkers have seized on her 'narrative model of action' and account 
of political judgment to read 'with Arendt against Arendt'. An integral part of Seyla 
Benhabib's project of reviving a feminist Critical Theory has been a Habermasian reading of 
Arendt. 15 Accordingly, the final section of the chapter, 'Arendtian Resolution? ', suggests there 
may be some resources for global deliberative theory in Arendt's unfinished work on 
13 See Margaret Canovan, 'A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas and Arendt. Political 
Theory, vol. I I, no. l, (1983), pp. 105-16; SeylaBenhabib, The Reluctant Modernism ofHannah Arendt 
(London: Sage, 1996). 
14 See Habermas's discussion ofArendt and communicative power in Between Facts and Norms, pp. 146-150 and 
, Hannah Arendt: on the Concept ofPower', Philosophical-Political Profiles (translated by Frederick G. 
Lawrence) (London: Heinemann, [1976] 1983), pp. 171-187. 
15 Seyla Benhabib, 'Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jorgen Habermas, ' in 
Craig Calhoun (ed. ) 11abermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992) pp. 95. 
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'judging'. However, because Arendt's work also revives an agonistic conception of public 
space, less dependent on assumptions of rationality and more open to the performative 
dimensions of public life, straightforward deliberative readings of Arendt are problematic. 
As the thesis has already suggested, the founding of basic institutions in Arendt's 
reading of the polis and the American republic are attractive to agonists because, in the words 
of Dana Villa, theirmeaning and authoritativeness ... are determined by the clash of conflicting 
interpretations. So conceived, the public sphere is, above all, an institutionally articulated site 
of perpetual debate and contestation'. 
16 In Bonnie Honig's interpretation, the arena 'of 
Arendt's performative action is the radically contingent public realm where anything might 
happen, where the consequences of action are boundless, unpredictable, unintended, and often 
unknown to the actors themselves'. 
17 This is quite removed from the world of deliberative 
rationality; an important step away from a Habermasian conception of language towards 
investigating the force contained in the performative and expressive act of articulation. 
The difference between Arendt and Habcrmas, however, goes beyond the 
deliberative/agonistic dichotomy common to so much of the political theory literature. First, 
the dichotomy between deliberation and performativity is over-stated when we no longer 
conflate the ethos or principle animating an act with the performance of the act itself Arendt 
understands political action as neither supported by rational truth or the poststructuralist 
revelling in repudiation because of an inescapable Will to Truth. Her stress on action, what 
appears in the world, meant she understood that when 'men begin to act, their action displays 
the principle that animates it'. 
18 The dichotomy between an agonistic politics and a deliberative 
ethos are revealed as not so divergent in the case of the American revolutionists, for example, 
as many of them were enthused by the 'interconnected principle of mutual promise and 
common deliberation. 
19 Deliberation and performativity were co-existent, if only for a fleeting 
moment amongst a small group of men, at the US founding. 
20 
Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought ofHannah Arendt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 1 16. 
11 Bonnie Honig, 'Arendt's Account ofAction and Authority', in Political Theory and the Displacement of 
politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 93. Also see Bonnie Honig, 'The Politics of Agonism: 
A Critical Response to "Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action" 
by Dana R. Villa', Political Theory, Vol. 2 1, no. 3 (1993), pp. 528-33. 
'a Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, [1963] 1970), p. 124. My italics. 
19 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 215. 
20 As suggested in Chapter One, this reading does not discount the class politics ofthe American Revolution and 
that the mutual promise' and 'common deliberation' was highly selective. The classic text is Charles A. Beard, 
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Second, the deliberative/agorustic debate obscures what may be a far more significant 
conceptual and practical problem of how we consider the relationship between publics, states, 
and war. Recall the discussion of Habermas's historical-sociology of the bourgeois public 
sphere in 181 Century Europe. It was argued in Chapter One that the relationship between 
imperialism and the political awakening of the bourgeoisie was under-emphasised by 
Habermas. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, in contrast, Arendt argued that the bourgeoisie's 
political emancipation was directly linked to imperialism. 'The bourgeoisie', she wrote, 
, turned to politics... for it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is 
constant economic growth, it had to impose this law... and proclaim expansion to be an 
ultimate political goal of foreign policy'ý' These concepts, violence and expansion, that 
Habermas and his followers largely ignore when considering the structural transformation of 
global public spheres are precisely those useful for understanding the potential and actual 
violence of a global public when marshalled by powerful states. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that Arendt's contribution is more appropriate to a critical international history and 
theory of US and global publics and their relationship to organised violence. 
Deliberative Global Publics 
Because Habermas's public sphere concept has become the received reading in 
international theory to date we must show how the categories established by him have been 
applied in emerging international and global public sphere literatures. Several assumptions 
become operative in international theory when Habermas's account of the public sphere is 
privileged. While his more recent work is cognisant of the way nationalism would need to be 
overcome for a global public based on 'constitutional patriotism' to emerge he does not 
consider that understanding 'post' sovereign relations in the global North requires locating it in 
more contemporary histories of US and European expansion and engagement. 
In line with Critical Theory's rejection of the post-modem critique of reason, Habermas 
accepts cultural and linguistic embedded-ness while endeavouring to rethink the immanent 
potentialities in reason and truth by which dominant practices could be critiquedý2 Habermas's 
An Economic Interpretation ofthe Constitution of the UnitedStates (New York: Macmillan Company, [1913] 
1961). 
21 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 126. 
22 For Habermas's most sustained critique of 'post-structuralism' see The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity. 
Twelve Lectures (translated by Frederick G. Lawrence) (Cambridge, MA: Wr Press, 1987). 
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own recent revisions of the public sphere concept to account for globalization and 'post- 
nationalism' must also be noted. 
23 Responding to the numerous criticisms of The Structural 
Transformation, Habermas has since revised his influential notion of a single authoritative 
bourgeois realm conceiving a globalized 'postnational' world of numerous debating publics 
less encumbered by the constraints of material inequality and nationalism. 24 
Although bourgeois and singular in origin, then, the 'public sphere' discussed more 
recently has begun to recognise the existence of a plurality of spheres. In the words of James 
Bohman, 
The cosmopolitan public sphere is not merely a structure but an ongoing process: the 
process by which emerging collective actors address the audience of world citizens and, 
in doing so, change the institutions that organize the publics into majorities. 
Cosmopolitan social critics and international collective actors may participate in the 
emergence of new publics, keeping democracy vital and its decision-making 
organizations flexible. 
According to Mike Hill and Warren Montag, 'there is also a sphere of all spheres. The public 
sphere thus conceived is the totality formed by the communicative interaction of all groups, 
even nominally dominant and subaltern'. 
26 
What is driving the proliferation of these seemingly new kinds of global and 
transnational publics? The growth of supraterritorial spaces, as well as the consolidation of 
capitalism as the dominant structure of production, is 'simply the continuation of a process', 
Habermas writes, 'of which the function of integration performed by the nation-state provided 
the first major example'. 27 In line with Max Weber's sociology, the nation-state seemed on one 
occasion, according to Habermas, to represent 'a cogent response to the historical challenge of 
finding a functional equivalent for the early modem form of social integration that was... 
disintegrating. Today we are confronting an analogous challenge'. 28 
23 Jurgen Habermas, The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 200 1). 
24 Jurgen Habermas, 'Concluding Remarks', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ) Habermas and the Public Sphere 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 462-479. 
23 James Bohman, 'The Public Spheres of the World Citizen', in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann 
(eds. ) Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 196. 
26 Mike Hill and Warren Montag, 'What Was, What Is, the Public Sphere? Post-Cold War Reflections', Mike 
Hill and Warren Montag (eds. ) Masses, Classes, and the Public Sphere (London: Verso, 2000), p. 3. 
27 Jurgen Habermas, 'The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship', 
public Culture, Vol. 10, no. 2 (199 8), p. 3 99. 
28 Habermas, 'The European Nation-State', p. 3 9 S. 
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The traditional territorial state, according to the popular view expressed by Jan Aart 
Scholte, is losing 'predominance as a site of governance'. 29 However, processes leading to the 
development of the nation-state hold important insights to understanding the emergence of 
global political forms. Although globalization has inaugurated an 'unprecedented increase in 
abstraction we can take our orientation on the precarious path toward postnational societies', 
Habermas suggests, 'from the very historical model we are on the point of superceding'? o 
With the emergence of supraterritorial constituencies, extensive multilateralism, the retreat of 
the welfare state, and transformations in the organisation of 'legitimate' violence we now seem 
to be witnessing a radical reordering of the global political and economic architecture. 31 
If covert and unaccountable decision-making is already present - and with governments 
increasingly captivated by the power of global capital - initiative for democratic change is 
unlikely to come in the form of public policy centred on the state. 
32 If we fail to establish new 
forms of integration and accountability the stakes would seem to be great. In Habermas's 
words, 
If not only the nation-state has run its course but along with it all forms of political 
integration, then individual citizens are abandoned to a world of anonymously 
interconnected networks in which they must choose between systematically generated 
options in accordance with their preferences. In this postpolitical world, the 
multinational corporation becomes the model for all conduct? 3 
With increasingly visible instances of 'transnational harm', especially neo-liberal economic 
globalization affecting the provision of human health and welfare, absolute reliance on existing 
national institutions can only injure the civic ideal. 
34 Global representative and democratically 
accountable institutions will have to be fashioned? 
5 
Recent accounts of the proliferation of networks of organisations and individuals active 
outside the bounds of the state, especially in the liberal human rights community, have done 
much to bear out conceptions of an imminent global public. Guidry, Kennedy and Zald, 
following Habermas, suggest that an emerging, 'transnational public sphere offers a place 
29 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 133. 
10 Habermas, 'The European Nation-State', p. 399. 
31 Martin Shaw, Theory ofthe Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
32 Cf Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question (2ed. ) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
33 Habemas, 'The European Nation-State', p. 414. 
34 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation ofPolitical Community: Ethical Foundations of the post- Westphalian 
Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 1 82. 
35 Daniele ArchibugL David Held, and Martin KOhler (eds. ) Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in 
Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
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where... organization and tactics... can be transmitted across the globe... More generally, the 
spread of human rights ideologies and movements exemplifies the power and consequences of 
this public sphere's global reach' 
?6 Where the bourgeois public sphere sought to hold state 
power accountable to liberal freedoms, the foundation of more recent conceptions of global 
publics clearly mobilise the transnational discourse and practice of human rights. 
Central to these visions is that a transnational public sphere centred on the human rights 
debate has matured to allow individuals and groups in countries without a' liberal' tradition to 
raise claims both domestically and internationally in terms of 'rights, 
?7 In their study of 
transnational activist networks, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink offer a similar liberal 
logic. 'The new networks', they argue, 'have depended on the creation of a new kind of global 
public (or civil society), which grew as a cultural legacy of the 1960s'? 
s 
James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, following Habermas, go ftirther, 
conceiving globalization as productive, in their words, of 'a constellation of forces that make 
peace feasible... [ifl human rights achieve a legal status in the rights of world citizens'? 
9 This 
assumed nexus between human rights, liberal peace, and publics is powerful. Hill and Montag 
are even more ambitious suggesting that, 
Globalization, whatever its challenges, is therefore the bearer of a genuine universalism 
that insofar as it is communicative in its essence transcends the merely material 
differences between nations... It no longer makes sense to speak of an international 
balance of forces when one of the two contending parties [the USSR] has ceased to 
exist and the global realm of communicative action, governed by the 'cognitive content 
of morality', is said to have finally escaped the imperatives of material lifeýo 
Much of this literature on the potentialities for global publics remains embryonic, and is 
certainly more problematic in the wake of the unilateralism of the United States post- 
36 John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald, 'Globalization and Social Movements', in Guidry, 
Kennedy, and Zald, (eds. ) Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public 
Sphere (Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press, 2000), p. 7. 
31 Patrick Ball, 'State Terror, Constitutional Traditions, and National Human Rights Movements: A Cross- 
National Qualitative Comparison', in John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds. ) 
Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 54-75. Also see David Beetham, 'Human Rights as a Model for 
Cosmopolitan Democracy', in Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler (eds. ) Re-imagining Political 
Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 58-71. 
38 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. - Advocacy Networks in International 
politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 199 8), p. 14. 
39 James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 'Introduction', in Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (eds. ) Perpetual 
peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 10. 
40 HUI and Montag, 'What Was, What Is, the Pub fic SphereT, p. 4. My italics. 
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September 11. Yet recent efforts to provide a more comprehensive international public sphere 
theory along deliberative lines have emerged. 
Mark Lynch has developed an international public sphere theory organised in terms of 
communicative action and the constitution of state identity and interests through public 
deliberation. Following Habermas's distinction between 'instrumental' and 'communicative' 
rationality, Lynch conceives the structure of global politics as comprised of both traditional 
forms of 'strategic interaction' (instrumental action resembling the market) and a public sphere 
of 'communicative action' (resembling the forum) based on deliberation, dialogue and 
persuasion! ' The international public sphere is where state action is 'justified, interpreted, and 
contested' !2 We only need look at the 'empirical observation of state justifications '943 
according to Lynch, to demonstrate the presence of an international public sphere. 
Other theorists have looked to deliberative theory to fashion a democratic system of 
global governance. Because a communication-based model of interaction is presumed to 
operate with 'fluid boundaries', John Dryzek argues that deliberative accounts of global public 
space are 'more appropriate for we can now look for democracy in the character of political 
interaction that generates public opinion%" Democracy at the global is conceived as a process 
of communicative deliberation rather than simply voting or representation. 
45 'Governance 
without government', national and international order based on resolving common problems 
without 'binding decision structures', can develop from 'spontaneous co-operation in 
decentralized systems'! 6 The 'grand logic' animating this model, like Lynch's, originates in 
discursive sources of power and authority. Thus conceived social change in the global realm 
follows a path, according to Dryzek, that largely replicates political struggle in the democracies 
of the industrialised West. 
Alongside the invocation of Habermas, the work of English School theorist Hedley 
Bull suggests the overlap between these accounts of international public spheres and 
41 Lynch, State Interests andPubfic Spheres, p3. This distinction is made by Habermas innumerous places but 
see Jargen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society. Student Protest, Science and Politics (London: Heinemann, 
[196911971). 
4' Lynch, State Interests and Pub lic Spheres, p36. 
43 Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres, p39. 
44 john S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 129. 
45 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy, p. 1 29. 
46 Drynk, Deliberative Democracy, p . 120. 
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deliberative global governance and the notion of a 'society of states 9.47 'Bull's emphasis on 
shared norms, expectations, and institutions', according to Lynch, 'involves communicative 
action and the public sphere dimension of structure , 
!8 The international public sphere, like the 
society of states, is a feature of social structure with both material and normative dimensions. 
We can therefore treat the international (as opposed to the global) public sphere and the society 
of states as functionally equivalent. 
Nicholas J. Wheeler has built upon similar arguments to justify the 'norm' of 
humanitarian intervention within the 'society of states'. States can be held accountable for their 
actions by revealing the potential (not assumed) gap between 'humanitarian' discourse and 
political action. During debates at the United Nations concerning the legitimacy of NATO's 
Kosovo intervention, for example, Wheeler suggests that an important reason for Argentina's 
public support in the Security Council was 'its growing commitment to democratic values at 
, 49 home [which] was being reflected in a commitment to defend human rights internationally . 
These deliberative theorists do not necessarily seek to discover behaviour that is devoid 
of power and interest but to reveal the conditions where 'public justification oriented to shared 
norms, goals or identity, 
50 pushed behaviour toward a different course of action. Lynch gives 
the example of Arab state behaviour during the 1950s and 1960s where, in his words, 'Arab 
states exercised power in large part by advancing claims in the Arabist public sphere which 
challenged the target to justify its deviance from this interpretation of Arabist norms or else 
COMPIY,. 51 Dialogue, deliberation, and persuasion in public spheres are as much a structural 
feature of international politics by these accounts as domination, imposition, and the use of 
force. 
Citing Habermas, Wheeler similarly argues for the distinction 'between power that is 
based on relations of domination and force, and power that is legitimate because it is 
predicated on shared norms', 
52 though without considering that the 'norms' themselves may 
actually be domination and force. If states cannot come up with sufficient or 'plausible' 
legitimating reasons for their actions, it is argued, they will necessarily be constrained. In other 
"'HedleyBuH, The Anarchical Society A Study of order in world politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977). 
48 Lynch, State Interests andPublic Spheres, p34. 
49 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p180. 
50 Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres, pAO. 
51 Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres, pA4. 
52 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 2. 
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words, according to Wheeler, 'legitimacy is constitutive of international action ... [because] 
justification is a critical enabling condition of action and not simply a rationalization of 
decisions'. 53 Keck and Sikkink have termed this process 'accountability politics'. An 
exemplary tactic for transnational human rights advocates they suggest is holding powerful 
actors to their formerly declared principles. 
54 Liberal discourse is apparently especially prone 
to the shaming or accountability politics crucial to deliberative accounts. 55 
Whether reflecting the emergence of cosmopolitan discourses of human rights and 
military interventions, the potential for deliberative global 'governance without government', 
or the constitution of state identities and interests in an international public sphere, Habermas's 
account of the public sphere is central and growing in influence. Although there are differences 
in emphasis we can begin to rank a number of IR theorists together as exemplary in their 
assumptions concerning the usefulness of Habermas's framework of analysis. 
By drawing on Habermas as the theorist of the public sphere, however, numerous 
assumptions are drawn into the way in which we understand politics, global governance, and 
rights. The emphasis on liberal rights, an exclusion of violence, as well as the imposition of 
hegemonic western notions of what deliberative communication can and will provide have 
been suggested thus far. Perhaps more importantly, however, where Habermas's earlier 
bourgeois idealisation led to the creation of public realms in the European cities that served to 
enhance the power of one class and one gender and one civilisation over another new global 
public discourses, the next section will argue, similarly serve to rationalise violence. 
Deliberative Violence 
The conflict between order and justice, between state sovereignty and human rights, 
seems to be the tension - the normative cutting-edge - that animates much of the global public 
sphere literature. As Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann describe, 'If there is any room for coercion 
in international law, it is in the enforcement of human rights precisely against states that use 
their sovereignty to abuse human rights for particular political, religious, or nationalist goals'. 56 
As Chapter Two suggested, there already seems to be more room for violence in 
international law than these authors would allow. However, it is worth interrogating the space 
51 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 4,10. 
54 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 16. 
55 Keck and Sikkink, Activists BewndBorders, p206. 
56 Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 'Introduction', p. 1 8. 
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opened for violence by recent invocations of human rights ideologies in the context of global 
publics and hegemonic liberal states. It is worthwhile because the globalization literature - in 
which much of the talk about global publics is situated - has tended to be overly economist in 
emphasis, ignoring the centrality of military force in the globalizing process. This can be seen 
in the global public sphere literature in the opposition between reason and force. 
Hill and Montag are (almost) right to suggest that 'Absolutely centml to the notion of 
the public sphere in all its versions is the opposition between reason and force'. 57 They are 
almost right because Arendt, for example, would replace treason' with 'speech'. Hill and 
Montag also add to the opposition between 'reason and force' an antagonism between 'speech 
and action'. However, from both Arendt's and Habermas's perspective this second opposition 
is certainly wrongheaded, speech itself being a kind of 'communicative' (Habermas) or 
sperformative' (Arendt) action. 
Nonetheless, despite this apparent confusion - and mirroring the traditional opposition 
between reason and force in deliberative theory - the global public sphere literature is 
dependent upon a structural and ideological separation of the world. There is one realm 
characterised by Habermasian communicative discourse - an extension of either Lockean or 
Kantian logics of cooperation" - necessarily defined against its opposite, the traditional 
Hobbesian realm of strategic interaction and potential war. 59 
Lynch is explicit about the division of the world based upon structural variation. 'Some 
international structures, he suggests, 'more resemble the market, with its strategic bargaining 
behaviour, while others more resemble the forum, with communicative action and 
persuasion'. 
60 In much of the global public sphere literature 'public' space is presented as 
discursive in a rational-communicative form usually epitomised by the 'peaceful' or 'humane' 
liberal regimes. Also implicit in deliberative notions of the public sphere is that it can only 
remain a place of rational communication as long as the use or threat of force between liberals 
57 Hill and Montag, 'What Was, What Is, the Public Sphere? ', p. 6. 
58 For an explication of Lockean international order see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory ofInternational 
politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
59 For a similar argument about the democratic peace literature see Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'The 
International Relations of Democracy, Liberalism, and War', in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds. ) 
Democracy, Liberalism, and War. Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2oo 1), pp. 1-23. 
60 Lynch, State Interests and Pub fic Spheres, p35. 
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61 is excluded. In other words, the civilisational identity of 'the West' is predicated on the 
presumption that war between states within the liberal sphere is virtually unthinkable. 
In his analysis of a 'cosmopolitan' public sphere, however, Martin K6hler suggests that 
because liberal-democratic governments are seemingly more susceptible (democratically 
accountable) to costs and risks at the global level they are also more likely through co- 
operation to embark 'on a long term process of democratization of the external environment 9! 2 
Indeed, without such an opposition between spheres there would be no place 'outside" the 
realm of the liberal peace in which to intervene and transform. It is in this context that 
'humanitarian intervention' has become a major legitimation for the use of force by Western 
regimes. 
Mary Kaldor's recent work on changing patterns of 'legitimate9 violence not only 
illustrates the new rationale for 'humanitarian' war. Her account epitomises the implicit 
opposition in the deliberative global public literature between the civilised, liberal West and a 
world of (at best) continuing non-cooperation or 'barbarism' (at worst). 63 Consider a major 
assumption of the 'humane warfare' literature that was renewed after wars such as Kosovoý' 
'The West's attempts to humanize war', suggests Coker, 'to rob it of those features such as 
cruelty, hatred and courage runs against the grain of much of what is happening in the non- 
Western world. For one of the disturbing trends in contemporary conflict is that inhumanity 
and incivility seems to be on the rise'. 
65 
KaIdor is more explicit, however, on the association between the extension of global 
public space and new demands for the legitimisation of violence. Moreover, she is unequivocal 
about the extent of social engineering necessary for the 'transnationalization' of legitimate 
violence. In her words, 'any attempt to control violence on a transnational basis can only be 
conceived as part of a far-reaching cultural transformation in which the duties and rights of 
"'Hill and Montag, 'What Was, What Is, the Public Sphere? ', p. 6. 
11 Martin Kdhler, 'From the National to the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere', in Daniele ArchibugL David Held, 
and Martin Kohler (eds. ) Re-imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: 
polity, 1998), p. 243. 
61 Mary Kaldor, 'Reconccptualizing Organized Violence', pp. 91 -110. 
`4 See Colin McInnes, 'Spectator Sport WarfiLre', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, no3 (1999), pp. 142- 
65 and Michael Ignatiefý Virtual Wars: Kosovo andBeyond (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000). 
63 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 200 1), p. 5. Coker provides no evidence that there 
has been a'rise' in inhumanity during recentwars. This is a critique also made of MaryKaldor in Ken Booth, 
'New Wars for OldT, Civil Wars, VoIA, no. 2 (200 1), pp. 163-70. 
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citizenship are redefined in cosmopolitan terms'. 66 Not all are willing or able to undergo such a 
'cultural transfonnation' and these, according to Kaldor, are the groups who will engage in the 
most barbarous, despite technologically sophisticated, war. 
'While groups who defme themselves in terms of identity [sic] may well be backward 
looking in their ideology and rhetoric, she argues, 'nevertheless the way they engage in 
violence, the instruments they use, their goals and their forms of mobilization can only be 
explained in contemporary terms' 
ý7 Coker offers a similar logic. In contrast to the 'humane' 
West, 'Elsewhere in the world war is becoming more inhumane, not less... War is becoming 
more dirty... Whatever we wish to call it... it has a logic [that] runs counter to what the West 
is trying to do - to make war less cruel'ý8 The most crucial feature in any effort to theorise 
cosmopolitan democracy, Kaldor argues, is 'whether the capacity for regulating violence can 
be reinstated in some new way on a transnational basis and whether barbarism can be checked 
by an alert and active cosmopolitan citizenry'ý9 
Deliberative notions of an imminent global public, like its twin liberal peace theory, 
depend on a seemingly progressive teleology of historical development that presents the West 
as already civilised and democratic. The functional virtues and telos of the modem state, based 
on Weberian processes of integration, rationalisation and 'abstraction' are merely undergoing 
further expansion and abstraction via globalization. Coupled with these functional virtues, of 
course, are liberal citizenship rights to be potentially expanded (including through 
'humanitarian' war) in the 'post-Westphalian' era if the territorial link between the 'national- 
state' and 'public' is to be duly severed. 
'The praxeological task', argues Andrew Linklater, for example, 'is to use the moral 
resources which have been deposited in the idea of citizenship to imagine forms of political 
community which harmonise the claims of universality and difference'. 
70 Such a vision may in 
principle include preventing states abusing human rights through armed intervention. As Molly 
Cochran has shown, Linklater does not rule out the possibility that interventionary violence 
can be justified in terms of the dialogic ethic. This would follow, in Cochran's reading, 'once 
66 Kaldor, 'Reconceptualizing Organized Violence, p. 1 08. For a critique of the social engineering implied in 
several cosmoporitan approaches see Stephen Hopgood, 'Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society. The 
Inexorable Hegemony of the Liberal Self, Millennium, Vol. 29, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1-25. 
67 "dor, 'Reconceptualizing Organized Violence', p. 1 03. 
11 Coker, Humane Warfare. pp. 22-3. 
"" Kaldor, 'Reconceptualizing Organized Violence', p. 1 09. 
70 Linklater, The Transformation ofPolitical Community, p. 182. 
235 
we have established that those who may do the intervening have ethical credentials established 
through their participation in a politics of discourse'. 71 Humanitarian intervention would be 
honourable if those intervening agreed through fair procedures that the violent means justified 
the ends. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, similar assumptions about the function of UN debate 
over Kosovo formed the basis of English School/deliberative attempts to endorse the war. 
'NATO's action', Wheeler wrote, 'was for the most part greeted with either approval or 
acquiescence by the society of states'. 72 The assumed procedural rationality of UN debate, 
despite the lack of Security Council approval, is presumed to have bestowed legitimacy on the 
use of military force. Is this an acceptable understanding of the politics of legitimacy, however, 
given the structure of global authority? 
From a perspective drawing on Arendt deliberative theorists have only seemingly 
justified (to themselves) but not legitimated the Kosovo war. Power, in Arendt's view, is a 
collective act based on speech; it is what comes into being between people in the public sphere. 
Violence is the antithesis of power. In her essay 'On Violence', she draws the distinction 
between power, legitimacy and violence. In her words, 
Power springs up whenever people get together to act in concert, but it derives its 
legitimacy fi-om the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may 
follow. Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while 
justification relates to an end that lies in the future. Violence can be justifiable, but it 
will never be legitimate. 73 
Throughout Saving Strangers, Wheeler conflates these distinct notions of 'justification' and 
'legitimacy', attempting to legitimate interventionary violence by the humanitarian outcomes 
of the case. In response to the destruction caused by NATO, for example, he writes, 'whilst the 
bombing accelerated Serb ethnic cleansing and led to thousands of Kosovars being killed, this 
has to be set against the fact that NATO's use of force made possible KFOR and a measure of 
political autonomy'. 
74 
71 Molly Cochran, Normative Theo? y in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 253. 
72 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 242. 
73 Hannah Arendt, 'On Violence' in Crisis ofthe Republic (New York: Harcourt l3race Jovanovich, 19721 p. 
151. 
74 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 283-4. 
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This is ajuslification based on a selective and premature reading of Kosovo's future 
highly sympathetic to NATO and KFOR! 5 For a political action to be legitimate, however, it is 
the 'initial getting together' of states that we must adjudicate, especially given the incredibly 
narrow definition of international 'society' employed in the English School account. As well as 
the abstentions and threatened vetoes by the usual suspects at the UN (Russia and China), the 
notion that the wider'international community' meaningfully called for a war against Belgrade 
is inaccurate unless we are to exclude representatives of most of the world's people. " It is 
perhaps not surprising that the English School employ such a narrow definition of the 'society 
of states' as the theory itself is based on an international system that has historically 
legitimated imperial hierarchy. 'n 
In any case, properly speaking, violence itsetf can never be legitimate; it can only be 
justified on a means-end basis. 'Humanitarian' war over Kosovo and elsewhere can only fall 
short in this important regard. For Arendt, violence could only be instrumental, in-line with her 
rejection of all means-ends categories applied to politics: 'the means are always the decisive 
factor'. 78 Indeed, those concerned with human rights do not need to offer moral sanction or 
'legitimacy' to liberal state violence to justify even a violent response to atrocities. 79 
In contrast to Habermas, Linklater and Wheeler, witness Cochran's refusal to legitimise 
military intervention within her 'pragmatic' theoretical fi-amework. 
80 In Cochran's words, 
(pragmatic critique cannot sanction violence and its own form of absoluteness: once a life has 
been taken, it cannot be given back... There are no assurances regarding outcomes that the 
75 For a less sympathetic reading see Jasmina Husanovi6, "Post-Conflicf' Kosovo: An Anatomy Lesson in the 
Ethics/Politics of Human Rights', in Ken Booth (ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimensions 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 263-80. 
76 During the Summit ofthe G-77 in Havana, for example, there was a declaration stating, 'We reject the so- 
called -right" ofhumanitarian 
intervention'. Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East 
Timor and the Standards ofthe West (London: Verso, 20 00), p. 4. This 
is not to deny that individual member 
states ofthe G-77 may 
have had their own, less than benign, reasons for rejecting the principle ofhumanitarian 
intervention. Rather it is to point out that the English School argument about the international community being 
in favour ofthe intervention over Kosovo is inadequate even on its own terms. Just as those who evoke the idea 
ofa unitary public sphere are those most 
likely to try to speak in its name, powerful states and intellectuals who 
refer to the 'international community' are also 
those most likely to try to act in its name. 
77 justin Rosenberg, Empire ofCivil Society. A Critique ofthe Realist Theory ofInternational Relations 
(London: Verso, 1994). 
7' Hannah Arendt, 'Hermann Broch, 18 86-195 1% Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1968), P. 148. 
79 Drawing on Kant, rather than Arendt, Booth makes a similar point about some wars being 'necessary' or 
sexcusable' rather than 'just'. See Ken Booth 'Ten Flaws ofJust Wars, in Ken Booth (ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy. 
The Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 314-24. 
10 Cochran explicitly engages with but distances herself from Arendt in favor ofDewey but without fully 
exploring Arendtian resources. 
See Molly Cochran, 'ConceptuaMng International Public Spheres', Paper 
presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Chicago, 200 1. 
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ends will in fact justify the means or that violence will secure better ways of coping or a 
workable solution. '81 Interestingly, violence itseýf is not ruled out. However, mirroring Arendt, 
'Pragmatic critique can recognize this as the required instrumental, rather than ethical, 
decision'. 82 With the international ethical credentials of liberal regimes already assumed in 
most of the deliberative public sphere literature, however, the politics behind 'communicative 
discourse' is largely concealed. 
Deliberative accounts, in other words, redraw global political boundaries but not in 
positive ways. The traditional world of inter-state alliances is replaced, as Stephen Rosow 
describes, with a new world 'of internal connections among liberal democratic states set off 
83 
against a hostile array of non-liberal, undemocratic powers (states and others) outside'. 
Although deliberative democrats are certainly critical of the level of democracy in the liberal 
West and do not consciously seek to replicate in the global arena the ills of contemporary 
liberal societies, one of the material effects of their teleology is the (often violent) 
extemalisation of the project of liberal democracy under the sanitised label 'intervention'. 
First, at the same time that war is not defmed as war but as 'intervention' by legal fiat 
succour is given to global public sphere theorists and violent liberal regimes. 'War', in the 
words of Tarak Barkawi, 'is a matter of the clash of armed forces in definite historical and 
social contexts; it is not conducted with legal distinctions or the juridical division of 
territory' !4 Second, deliberative theorists tend to equate liberal regimes and what they may 
desire with the whole of humanity. Following Carl Schmitt, Barkawi, rightly suggests, 
there is no actual political entity which corresponds to 'humanity', rather only those 
which seek to speak in the name of it... This identity construction does not reflect 
either the historical or contemporary nature of relations between the West and those 
countries in which humanitarian crises occur ... [T]he langua e of 'humanitarianism' f5 
works to legitimate global hierarchies of power and inequality. 
The crucial distinction animating deliberative global public sphere theorists is thus not only (or 
even) between state sovereignty and human rights as so often presented in the literature but 
more problematically a world of two spheres. 
$I Cochran, Normative Theory, p. 252. 
82 Cochran, Normative Theory, p. 252. 
Stephen J. Rosow, 'Globalisation and Democratic Theory', Millennium, Vol. 29, no. 1 (2000), p. 35. 
" Tarak BarkawL 'War Inside the Free World: The Democratic Peace and the Cold War in the Third World', in 
Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds. ) Democracy, Liberalism, and War- Rethinking the Democratic Peace 
Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 126. 
85 Tarak BarkawL 'Air Power and the Liberal Politics of War', in Ken Booth (ed. ) The Kosovo Tragedy: The 
Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 3 10. 
238 
The assumption of an unforced force of the better argument in Habermas's account 
rearticulates the intrinsic and violent hierarchy between global spheres assumed in the 
deliberative literature on public spheres and changing patterns of violence. The repercussions 
and consequences of accepting Habermas as foundational for understanding the public sphere, 
even when considering the possibility of multiple publics operating at different levels, are 
therefore potentially huge. What Arendt may offer in contrast is a model of theorising not the 
ideal public realm transposed to 'the global', as Habermas and his followers have attempted, 
but an account of the way in which virtually all attempts to fashion a polity in the modem 
6politics-as-making' tradition may involve and justify various forms of violence. 
'Politics-as-Making': Publics and Violence 
Violence is the evil twin of Arendtian politics. As John McGowan has effectively 
shown, 'Arendt's definition of the political... often seems constructed primarily through 
negations. Arendt consistently links with violence what she wishes to exclude from politics'. 86 
This exclusion is most evident in The Human Condition. 'Only sheer violence is mute', she 
writes, 'and for this reason alone can never be great... To be political, to live in the polis, 
meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and 
violence'. 87 
Whilst recalling the conventional view that 'whatever brotherhood all human beings 
may be capable of has grown out of fratricide', 
88 Arendt's purpose in contrasting the French 
and American precedents in On Revolution was to shatter the grip of French Revolutionary 
categories, to suggest that revolution, the foundation of a republic, may not be bloody. 
Moreover, in an effort to show that even goodness habitually incites direct, sometimes violent 
action at the expense of speech, her discussion of Herman Melville's novella Billy Budd 
depicts the young sailor stammering impotently in his innocence able only to answer evil with 
a violent (and lethal) blow. 
89 In her most explicit essay on the subject, 'On Violence', she 
11 John McGowan, 'Must Politics Be Violent? Arendt's Utopian Vision', in Craig Calhoun and john McGowan 
(eds. ) Hannah Arendt and the Meaning ofPolitics (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1998) p270. 
This seems to be quite in keeping with the classical realist understanding ofthe difference between the domestic 
and the international realm, where peace and order reigned inside the state and Potential war and anarchy was the 
norm in the system of states. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace 
(New York: Alfred A. KnopZ 1948), p. 2 1. 
87 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195 8), pJ6. 
'8 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 20. 
11 Arendt On Revolution, p. 79. 
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depicts the activity as the almost inevitable response of political minorities unable to create a 
realm for action in the modem bureaucratised polity: 'the greater the bureaucratization of 
public life the greater the attraction of violence'? o 
Why this radical exclusion of and thereby intimate connection between violence and 
the political? For Arendt, to be political, to speak and to act, was to be most free; freedom is 
the raison dWre of the politica0l As part of this understanding Arendt famously maintained 
the phenomenological distinctions between labour, work and action. No account of Arendt's 
conception of violence and public spheres can begin without an explication ofthese conceptual 
distinctions, especially work and action, traced from their etymological origins in ancient 
Greece to their transformations in the modem age. 92 
Political meaning, for Arendt, could only arise through human inter-action in the public 
sphere, the 'realm of appearances', not 'things' to be shaped. In contrast to the activities of 
labour and work, there is some intangibility at the core of this conception of 'action', in 
Arendt's words, 'since there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; the process of 
acting and speaking can leave behind no such results and end products. For all its intangibility, 
however, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common'ý 3 
in other words, 'power', she wrote, 'is the only human attribute which applies solely to the 
worldly in-between space by which men are mutually related'. 
94 
Inter-subjective reality (loosely conceived) is thus crucially linked to the worldly, 
human-made setting that mutually relates us. The promise of politics, for Arendt, was that 
humans 'form a world between them'. 95 We insert ourselves 'into the human world', she 
suggests, 'through action and speech. 996 Knowledge in this realm is always mediated by the 
interactions of a plurality of diverse individuals. A public stage of shared institutions and 
spaces, however, is crucial to our sustaining a sense of worldly reality fostered by the 
testimony ('story-telling') of others. The public is partly constituted as a human artefact and 
90 Arendt, 'On Violence, p. 178. 
"Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 79-135. 
92 The categories, however, as Margaret Canovan suggests, 'are shaped as much by the needs of [Arendt's 
theoretical] web as by her considerable sensitivity to previously unrecorded experience'. Canovan, Hannah 
A rendt. A Reinterpretation ofHer Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 102. 
93 Arendt The Human Condition, p. 1 83. See Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism, p. 112. 
94 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 175. 
95 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 1 74. My italics. 
96 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 184. 
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&signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us... who inhabit the man-made 
world together'. 97 
Clearly for Arendt political action was a specifically worldly and world-making 
activity, requiring the existence of others. The activity of 'work' is accordingly conceived in 
terms of the activity of creating the world, the 'human artifice' of objects, the architecture 
surrounding humanity. 
98 This is a durable realm, a space of artificial, man-made objects - laws, 
as we saw in Chapter Two, institutions and cultural settings - that made the earth our home. 
This environment provides stability and as such an element of enduring reality to overcome the 
never-ending flux of the life-process of labourý9 
Importantly, the realm of work is not only the creation of a lasting world. It is also a 
realm of violence, of humans acting upon and radically altering objects - where human force 
manipulates and fabricates earth-given nature for the end of creating a home. It is the realm of 
means and ends from which it derives legitimacy. Albeit necessary, these are the activities of 
force and control. 
Most crucially for our discussion, it is the temptation to conflate the realm of work, of 
means and ends, with politics, according to Arendt, that has been one of the most destructive 
aspects of the Western philosophical tradition right down to recent re-articulations by 
deliberative theorists. 100 For it was in response to Plato and Aristotle's exacerbation with 
democratic political action - its unpredictability and sheer contingency - which led Arendt to 
argue that the entire tradition has perceived political actors as, in her words, 
'craftsmen': the result of their action is a tangible product, and its process has a clearly 
recognized end. It is as though they had said that if men only renounce their capacity 
for action, with its futility, boundlessness, and uncertainty of outcome, there could be a 
remedy for the fi-ailty of human affairs. 101 
One effect, as Arendt suggests, is that it 'makes it almost impossible to discuss [political] 
matters without using the categories of means and ends and thinking in terms of 
instrumentality'. 102 
97 Arendt The Human Condition, p. 52. 
98 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 136-174. 
99 Arendt's distinction between work and labour is not central to the discussion here but see Robert W. Major, 'A 
Reading ofHannah Arendt's "Unusual" Distinction Between Labor and Work', in M. A. Hill (cd. ) Hannah 
Arendt. The Recovery ofthe Public World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 131-155. 
100 Arendt, The Human Condition p. 229. 
101 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 195. 
102 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 229. 
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The moral and political results of the modem conflation of making (always partly 
violent) with politics have been disastrous: action is equated with violence. Indeed, although 
Arendt suggests that violence has always played a role in 'political schemes' and in traditions 
of thought that conceive politics principally as 'making' rather than acting, in her words, 
up to the modem age, this element of violence remained strictly instrumental... Only 
the modem age's conviction that man can only know what he makes... brought forth 
the much older implications of violence inherent in all interpretations of the realm of 
human affairs as a sphere of making. This has been particularly striking in the series of 
revolutions... all of which - with the exception of the American Revolution - show the 
same combination of the old Roman enthusiasm for the foundation of a new body 
politic with the glorification ofviolence as the only means for 'making' it. 103 
The revolutionary effort to found a polis in the absence of traditional morality, the search for a 
gnew absolute', explains this resort to violence. 
Machiavelli, like the Romans, viewed the revolutionary founding of a polis as the 
central political act. But in contrast to the Romans, Arendt argues, Machiavelli 'felt that for 
this supreme "end" all "means", and chiefly the means of violence, were justified'. 104 Thus 
Machiavelli's contention that politics and violence were two sides of the same coin actually 
expressed, she suggests, not his 'so-called realistic insight into human nature' but nothing more 
than 'his futile hope that he could find some quality in certain men to match the qualities we 
105 
associate with the divine'. 
In other words, when the act of founding is identified with 'making', Arendt suggests, 
its 'justification of violence [is] guided by and receive[s] its inherent plausibility from the 
underlying argument: You cannot make a table without killing trees, ... you cannot make a 
republic without killing people'. 
106 But this 'politics-as-making' tradition - politics equated 
with the making' involved in work - underpins not only the effort of revolutionaries to found a 
republican public sphere. The search in deliberative public sphere theory for the divine 
procedure with which to legitimate politics similarly tries (but fails) to elide violence. You 
cannot make a deliberative global public it would seem without killing people. 
"I Arendt, The Human Condition, p22 8. My italics. 
104 Arendt, 'What is Authority? ', in Between Past and Future: Eight EXercises in Political Thought (New York: 
Viling Press, 1968), p. 139. Also see Arendtý 'Understanding and Politics', in Essays in Understanding: 1930- 
19.54 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994), p. 32 1. 
101 Arendt, On Revolution, p39. 
116 Arendt, 'What is AuthorityT, in Between Past and Future, p. 139. Also see Arendt, 'Understanding and 
Politics', p. 3 2 1. 
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Recall that Habermas equates the establishment of 'postnationall constitutionalism, the 
seeds of a global public sphere, with the effort to overcome the apparent need for the patriotic 
appeals historically needed to supplement democratic citizenship. The grounds of national 
unity needed to go beyond merely pragmatic approval of the existing order; the cult of 
nationalism was far more effective for binding society and modem states mobilised citizens for 
war precisely in these more primordial (patriotic) terms. 
But if political communities are to overcome nationalist exclusion 'post-Westphalia' 
the search for a 'constitutional' rather than a national 'patriotism' is under way. In other words, 
where more primitive appeals once served as a legitimating mechanism for binding individuals 
to the modem nation-state, nowadays, as Habermas suggests, 'republicanism must learn to 
stand on its own feet'. 
107 
Clearly 'humanitarian' wars presumed to rest on the transcendence of exclusionary 
political community (if only for a fleeting moment) would require more civic, political 
justifications for the use of force. As Mun Appadurai has suggested, however, 
The idea that modem nation-states borrow the mystique of some form of primordial 
folk identity to complement the force of democratic legitimation... is not entirely 
wrong. But it obscures what may be a more disturbing mechanism by which the 
modem nation-state secures... full attachment, apart from any claims to legitimacy. 
Full attachment, rather than coming from an authentic prior sense of shared 
community... mightactually beproducedby variousforms oftiolence instigated, even 
perhaps required, by the modem nation-state. 108 
if, as Habermas suggests, the development of the nation-state holds the key to understanding 
the emergence of global governance this may not be restricted to the efficacy of democracy 
and citizenship rights along the lines articulated by Linklater. Any global public may also 
require 'various forms of violent mobilization', as Appadurai suggests, 'in order to "Produce 
the people"... [or] to display the techniques of modem governmentality'. 
109 
NATO acted in Kosovo, Habermas suggests, 'as if a completely institutionalized 
cosmopolitan condition already existed, the achievement of which is supposed to be 
Habermas, 'The European Nation-State', p. 40 8. 
Arjun Appadurai, 'Full Attachment, Public Culture, Vol. 10, no2.0998), p. 446. My italics. 
109 AppaduraL 'Full Attachment', p. 447. For the case in the United States see Richard Slotkin, Regeneration 
through Violence: the Mythology ofthe American Frontier, 1600-1860 (New York: HarperPerennial, [1973] 
1996). 
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promoted'. ' 10 But if ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was something that shocked'the conscience of 
mankind' how was this alleged conscience manifest? Or rather how was this global public 
conscience with attendant human rights culture inscribed in international law actively 
produced? 
A more unsettling possibility than the more common account of the power of the global 
'media"" (the 'CNN-effect' and so on) is that to come into existence deliberative global 
publics, like the national identities of nation-states before them, may actually depend upon 
violence. Global governance, the existence oftransnational decision structures and institutional 
order, does not necessarily imply the production of an 'imagined community' as associated 
with the rise of the nation-state. An optimistic view may conceive global governance as 
expressed through a liberal conscience of the human rights discourse, but it is not necessarily 
or solely this. Through the violent production during Kosovo of this 'shocked' liberal 
conscience we may (speculatively) suggest that an imperialist conscience is manifest, one that 
is also partly codetermined by the very founding, in the politics-as-making tradition, of an 
imminent global public. 
Although this chapter has moved away from the specific focus on public spheres in the 
US context there are more general ways in which NATO's war over Kosovo can be framed by 
the nexus between publics and violence. The Kosovo war was signifIcant because for many it 
represented the first authentically 'humanitarian' war partly legitimated by the conscience of a 
potentially global public. Not only is this an inaccurate (and dangerous) picture because 
political leaders, especially in the US State Department, were in many ways the driving force 
behind the military effort (not a shocked 'public' opinion formed by the globalized media) but 
more importantly the war itself, if only for a fleeting moment was seen as Partly producing 'the 
people' on behalf of whom the war was ostensibly fought. 
If the thesis in general has tried to make more explicit the link between US public 
spheres and the legitimisation of violence, in light of the findings of this chapter we might 
agree with Gayatri Spivak. In her words, 
The 'globe' is counterintuitive. You walk from one end of the earth to the other and it 
remains flat. It is a scientific abstraction inaccessible to experience. No one lives in the 
I" Habermas, 'Bestiality and Humanity, p. 315. Habermas is perhaps slightly ambivalent in his endorsement of 
NATO. 'The broader perspective urges greater caution. NATO's self-authorization cannot be permitted to 
become a matter of routine'. Habermas, 'Bestiality and Humanity', p. 316. 
"I Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas G. Weiss, 77ie News Media, 0WI War, and Humanitafian Action 
(Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1996). 
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global village... Culture at work or at play, on the other hand, is not a problem of 
knowledge, but a regulator of relations. My question, therefore: In what interest, to 
regulate what sort of relationships, is the globe evoked? ' 12 
That most democratic image of 'the public' can serve ends that are extremely undemocratic. 
Moreover, as Craig Calhoun has shown, 'All attempts to render a single public discourse 
authoritative privilege certain topics, certain forms of speech, and certain speakers. This does 
not mean that the flowering of innumerable potential publics is in and of itself a solution to this 
basic problem of democracy'. 113 Public sphere theory in general is not a panacea for world 
politics. Rather than straightforwardly conceive new discourses of a deliberative global public 
as necessarily progressive an Arendtian reading otherwise allows us to address the potentially 
violent politics in the making of public realms. 
Arendtian resolution? 
By linking Habermas's implicit 'politics-as-making' account to his explicit association 
with the global public sphere literature and 'humanitarian, war the chapter has thus far 
suggested some of the various and problematic ways deliberative rationality legitimates 
violence in the effort to 'make' a global public realm. There may, however, be some overlap 
between efforts to theorise global publics and Arendt's emphasis on inter-subjectivity and her 
unfinished work on 'judging'. This is briefly discussed below. Despite this potential 
coincidence the chapter concludes not with an Arendtian resolution of the appropriate 
justification for violence, but an account of how her work attempts to understand the 
conditions ofpolitics in the context of plurality, unpredictability, and sometimes futility. It is in 
this dimension where Arendt's strongest contribution to publics, humanitarianism and war is to 
be made. As Jeffrey Isaac has suggested, though rarely explicitly addressing human rights, 
Arendt is 'a theorist of the politics made necessary by a world that despoils human rights'. 114 
Arendt's reading of Kant's account of reflective judgment on the surface seems to offer 
succour to a deliberative model of inter-subjective meaning constituted in public spheres, both 
112 Gayatri Chakravorry Spivak, 'Cultural Talks on the Hot Peace: Revisiting the "Global Village', in Pheng 
Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds. ) Cosmopolitics. - Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: 
University ofMinnesota Press, 1998), p. 3 29. 
"' Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and the Public Sphere', in Jeff Weintraub and Kristin Kumar (eds. ) Public and 
private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a GrandDichotomy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1997), P. 81- 
114 jeffrey C. Isaac, 'A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics offluman 
Rights', American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, no. 1 (1996), p. 67 
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local and, in principle, global. ' 15 Arendt died before completing 'Judging', the final part of The 
Life of the Mind trilogy; hence theorists have reconstructed and interpreted her dispersed and 
occasional writings on this theme. 116 
The essays 'The Crisis in Culture', 'Truth and Politics', and 'Freedom and Politics' 
depict judging as a political, 'practical' activity, part of the vita activa. 117 Later, however, in 
'Thinking and Moral Considerations', Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, and The Life of 
the Mind, the seeds of a more ambitious project begin to take shape which emphasise judging 
as a 'contemplative' activity, as Ronald Beiner suggests, where 'one weighs possible 
judgments of an imagined Other, not the actual judgments of real interlocutors'. 118 
According to Arendt, to be politically relevant any judgment or claim to truth must in 
principle possess Kant's 'general communicability'. This necessary communicability implies 
the existence of a community, in Arendt's words, 'who can be addressed and who are listening 
and can be listened to'. 
119 Judging is intrinsically social in that it must make reference to a 
common world of appearances -a public sphere - shared by other judging subjects. In her 
words, 
The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking 
process that is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure 
reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, 
even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with 
others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement ... 
120 
For deliberative theorists 'judging' would seem to be essential to political debate and opinion 
formation, always relational and deliberative, never ffixed: the ideal-type activity in the public 
realm. 
The 'enlarged mentality' necessary for judgment, though not requiring 'enlarged 
empathy' where we arrogantly presume to know what others actually think and feel, is made 
I's When Arendt died ofa heart attack in 1975 found in her typewriter was a blank page with the single heading 
of 'Judging'. See Hannah Arendt, The Liffie ofthe Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978). 
116 See Ronald Beiner, 'Interpretative Essa3r Hannah Arendt on Judging', in Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's 
political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 89-156. Also see Albrecht Wellmar, 'Hannah 
Arendt on Judgment The Unwritten Doctrine of Reason', in Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature ofModernity 
(translated by David Midgley) (Cambridge: NET Press, 1998), pp. 291-311. 
I` See Hannah Arendt, 'Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance' and 'Truth and Politics' in 
Between Past and Future and 'Freedom and Politics' in Albert Hunold (ed. ) Freedom and Serfdom: An 
AnthologY of Western Thought (Dordrecht Reidel Publishing, 196 1), pp. 191-217. 
118 Beiner, 'Interpretive Essay, p. 92. 
119 Hannah Arendt Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (edited and with an interpretive essay by Ronald 
Beiner) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 40. 
120 Arendt, Crisis ofthe Republic, p. 220. 
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possible by the faculty of imagination. In her lectures on Kant's political philosophy Arendt 
suggested, 
By the force of the imagination it makes the others present and thus moves into a space 
that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of 
Kant's world citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one's 
imagination to go visiting. (Compare the right to visit in Perpetual Peace )121 
'Without this kind of imagination... ' Arendt wrote, 'we would never be able to take our 
bearings in the world... It is the only inner compass we have'. 122 Religious authority was 
unable to offer the sense of enduring social reality that all in the public realm, in principle, 
might be able to share. This account has resonance with the 'moral imagination' important to 
Cochran's 'pragmatic' approach to emerging global publiCS. 123 
George Kateb has identified a major problem with Arendt's conception of political 
judgment, however, resonating deeply in the context of violence and any deliberative global 
public realm. He writes, 
Judging may extend only to the company of actors. The others may remain unimagined, 
unrepresented, in the inner dialogue of the individual and in the process of public 
speech in which judging makes its appearance in the world. All that the faculty of 
judging can guarantee is that those one recognizes as one's equals will be taken into 
account. The demand that all be recognized as one's equals, that one not equate 
humanity with one's group, does not necessarily follow from the activity ofjudging. 124 
Liberal states, presented as the usual standard-bearers of any global rationality, are eminently 
prone to equating their group with the whole of humanity. 
125 Moreover, the 'company of 
actors' that might make up the core of Kant's republic of devils"26 such that it is, is very small 
and self-referential indeed. 
127 If we question the trustworthiness ofdeliberative ethics to impart 
this criteria internally the entire deliberative project applied to the international and human 
121 Arendt, Lectures, p. 43. 
122 Arendt, 'Understanding and Politics', p. 3 23. 
'23 According to Cochran, 'it is via imagination that we think about what it would mean to apply new or different 
moral ideas to new ways of life'. Cochran, Normative Theory, p. 25 S. 
124 George Kateb, Hannah. 4rendt Politics, Conscience, Evil (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), p. 3 S. 
125 This is not to suggest that proponents ofother universalistic ideologies (such as communists) do not equate 
what is good for them with what is good for everybody. Liberal regimes just seem to have the upper hand now. 
126 'As hard as it may sound, the problem of setting up a state', Kant suggested, 'can be solved even by a nation 
of devils (so long as they possess understanding)'. Immanuel Kant 'Perpetual Peace, in Kant. Political Writings 
(edited by Hans Reiss, translated by HJ3. Nisbet) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1970] 199 1), p. 1 12. 
127 As Cochran suggests, 'discourse ethics aims to be "self-refercntiar, to find its own moral criteria via "an 
inbuilt communicative rationality that is part and parcel of the everyday use of language, ". Cochran, Normative 
Theory, p. 25 8. Cochran is quoting JOrgen Haacke, 'Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, 
Self-Reflection, Rational Argumentation', Millennium, Vol. 25, no. 1 (1996), p. 265. 
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rights realms is undermined. Such a critique can be made both on theoretical and historical 
grounds while also illustrating where Arendt is far removed from the tenor of deliberative 
democratic theory. 
Although Arendt's speculations on political judgment may accord with aspects of 
deliberative democracy it is false on theoretical grounds to assimilate her to the view that the 
extension of public deliberation necessarily guarantees a healthy public realm. Habermas's 
efforts, as Villa suggests, are 'at once Arendtian and at odds with the spirit of her work V. 
128 
Arendt did not believe in 'anything remotely resembling universal concurrence in objective 
truth' or that political disputes could be resolved 'by purely rational means. v 129 The public 
sphere in Arendt's conception is otherwise conceived as one of instability, of boundless action, 
incessant debate and re-founding. 
once we distinguished between 'the act of consent, accomplished by each individual 
person in isolation' and the 'act of mutual promise' enacted 'in the presence of one another' 
130 
collision between authentic'Moral experiences were unavoidable in the public realm. This anti- 
foundationalism, Arendt's doubt concerning the existence of universal principles to impose on 
the public realm is manifest in her humanist position - without absolute standards found 
beyond humanity, we are not helpless, as Margaret Canovan recounts, inasmuch as 'standards 
and judgmýnts are human themselves'. 
131 
Moreover, the 'procedural formality' and 'incontrovertibleness' of Habermasian 
discourse ethics 'is a liability', as Cochran similarly argues, 'because rules cannot ensure either 
approximations of authentic critique or convergence around ethical criteria'. 132 Borrowing 
from Nancy Fraser, such criteria 'may be seen as an external imposition... particularly if.. it 
cannot be guaranteed that its procedures are not tainted by semantic structures of power that 
obstruct the ability of certain groups to participate'. 
133 In the 'domestic' arena, as the thesis has 
suggested, cases of public sphere exclusion have included women, immigrants, African- 
Americans, and the poor. In the global realm we might point to those voices and locales 
"I Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror, p. 143 
129 See Canovan, 'A Case of Distorted Communication', p. 1 09. My italics. Also see Dana R. Villa, 
-postmodernism and the Public Sphere, American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, no. 3 (1992), pp. 712-21. 
130 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 170. 
131 Canovan, Hannah Arend4 p. 174. See Arendt, 'Understanding and Politics', p. 3 2 1. 
132 Cochran, Normative Theory, p-259. 
133 Cochran, Normative Theory, p. 289,260. 
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systematically absent from the US govemment definition of the 'intemational community', 
that is, most of the non-Westem world. 
Indeed, as Fraser's work suggests, it is not through the incessant sep-examination of 
liberal publics but the 'external' energy brought to bear by multiple subaltern 'counter-publics' 
that positive change might be realised. 134 In the context of globalization we should 'view the 
interactions of those "counter-publics"', as Crystal Bartolovich suggests, 'transnationally, and 
not simply with respect to the "internal" politics of particular states'. 135 Social life, past and 
present, must be understood as developing through relationships, networks and institutions not 
organized solely around the privileged site of liberal states, even if 'post-national'. 136 
In historical terms, then, Habermas's account reinforces the misleading assumption, 
following Bartolovich, that the 'territorial "state-public" (even if "post-national") is the form 
that "the public" has taken - and should take - in the first instance. ' 
137 As a point of contrast, 
Arendt's examples of multiple, non-violent, publics are very different from the doriginary' 
public sphere of bourgeois enlightenment Habermas sought to honour. 
Arendt's interest in evoking the memory of the occasional formation of small-scale 
republics is illustrative. Issued repeatedly in embryo form throughout the course ofrevolutions, 
from France to the US to Budapest, the grassroots action in council systems seemed to Arendt 
a genuine alternative to centralised party systems. 138 Crushed in each case before properly 
established, these spontaneously formed popular bodies represented a public space for 
discussion and action. 139 The transnational publics of the anti-war and civil rights 
communities, discussed in Chapter Four, also echo in this context. 
Though anti-foundational, unlike Nietzsche, then, Arendt held out more hope for the 
promise of democracy. 
140 Even without a logical or (Habermasian) rational 'banister' on which 
134 Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique ofActually Existing 
Democracy', in Bruce Robbins (ed. ) The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993), pp. 1-32. 
135 Crystal Bartolovich, 'Inventing London', in Mike Hill and Warren Montag (eds. ) Masses, Classes, and the 
Public Sphere (London: Verso, 2000), p. I S. 
136 Adun AppaduraL Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions ofGlobalLzation (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996). 
137 Bartolovich, 'Inventing London', p. 16. 
139 Arendt, 'Epilogue: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution', Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 480-5 10. 
139 For a discussion ofArendt's valorisation of these council movements see Canovan, Hannah Arendt, pp. 232- 
238. 
140 For Arendt's reading ofNietzsche see 'Tradition and the Modem Age', in Between Past and Future, pp. 17- 
40. For a discussion of the similarities between Arendt and Nietzsche see Dana Villa, 'Democratizing the Agon: 
Nietzsche, Arendtý and the Agonistic Tendency in Recent Political Thoughf , Politics, Philosophy, Terror, 
pp. 107-127. 
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to lean we are not lost she suggests. 'Even though we have lost yardsticks by which to 
measure, and rules under which to subsume the particular', wrote Arendt, 'a being whose 
essence is beginning may have enough of origin within himself to understand without 
preconceived categories and to judge without the customary rules which is morality'. 
141 
Moreover, it was partly her conviction that political action occurred 'in concert' among 
plural equals which animated her claim that the meaning of political action could not derive 
from the personal motives of the actors themselves. Never balking from the irreducible 
relativity of human opinion Arendt in effect politicised Nietzsche's diagnosis of morality 
demonstrating how in modemity the search for extra-political groundings for public spheres, 
including those based on deliberative rationality, was self-defeating and almost invariably 
violent. 142 
If Habermas has been undermined in both theoretical and historical grounds is there an 
Arendtian resolution? It is clear that the political' occurs belatedly for Arendt. Indeed, 
McGowan has gone as far as suggesting that politics, in the image of founding a polis, is 
established precisely as a 'ring-wall' to guard against the frequency of violence in the human 
condition. 
143 'Neither violence nor power', she wrote, 'is a natural phenomenon, that is, a 
manifestation of the life process; they belong to the political realm of human affairs whose 
essentially human quality is guaranteed by man's faculty of action, the ability to begin 
something new'. 
144 
Is Arendt suggesting that almost any attempt to begin something 'new' contains within 
it a potential for violence? Certainly the act of founding a system of laws was for the Greeks 
pre-political, not the end result of 'action' but the product of 'making'. In her words, 
the Greeks... did not count legislating among the political activities. In their opinion, 
the lawmaker was like the builder of the city wall, someone who had to do and finish 
his work before political activity could begin... Before man began to act, a definite 
space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take 
place, the space being the public realm of thepolis and its structure the law. 145 
141 Arendt, 'Understanding and Politics, p. 321. 
142 Arendt, 'What is Authority, in Between Past andFuture, pp. 91-142. Also see Villa, Politics, Philosophy, 
Terror, p. 114,116. 
143 McGowan, 'Must Politics Be ViolentT, p272. 
144 Arendt, 'On V iolence', p. 179. 
145 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 194-5. 
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Though there is ambiguity - this is the Greek view, not Arendt's - and she more often praised 
146 
the Roman conception of political founding (see Chapter One), we are still left with the 
question: what is the substance of 'action'? 
Arendtian 'politics' is often criticised as virtually devoid of content. Her concern, as we 
have seen, was to preserve the integrity of both the public and private against nationalism, 
bureaucracy, and the modem 'rise of the social'. This strict separation is perhaps rightly seen 
as privileging an aestheticised political form over content. 
147 Without adjudicating here on this 
vexing (and gendered) division in the Arendtian scheme 
149 we can otherwise imagine her 
account of the public sphere as designed precisely to circumvent violence. Much of Arendt's 
work can be conceived as an effort to fashion a public sphere not through violence, even if 
, 49 justified by deliberation, but 'under the condition of human plurality " that is, one which 
embraces unpredictability, futility, and contingency. 
150 On this reading, the desire to 
democratise the international arena could never be used to legitimate war. 
Arendt did not however, offer a programmatic framework for how the current state of 
affairs could to be reorganised. Responding to the Cold War McCarthy investigations into 'un- 
American activity' she wrote, 
America, this republic, the democracy in which we live, is a living thing that cannot be 
contemplated and categorized, like the image of a thing which I can make; it cannot be 
fabricated... If you try to 'make America more American' or a model of democracy 
according to a preconceived idea, you can only destroy it. Your methods, finally, are the 
justified methods of the police, and only of the police. 151 
It was a pnncipled dimension of her work that such endeavors were destructive of the very 
political freedom such blueprints sought, at least in theory, to render, politics is such that no 
theory can adequately be 'applied' without destroying the very essence of political life. 
In contrast to any Critical Theory inspired sense of instrumentally applying thought to 
action, there is no ideal unity between thinking and doing in Arendt's work. To think and to act 
are not the same: 'all our categories of thought and standards forjudgment seem toexplode in 
146 Jacques Taminiaux, 'Athens and Rome% in Dana Villa (ed. ) The Cambridge Companion to HannahArendt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 165-77. 
t4l Bonnie Honig (ed. ) Feminist Interpretations ofHannah Arendt (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
press, 1995); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 7he Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 199 8). 
148 This has been a major focus ofcritique against Arendt. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private 
Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (second edition) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
149 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 39. 
150 Arendt, 'Hermann Broch, 18 8 6-195 1', in Men in Dark Times, pp. 147-8. 
151 Arendt, 'The Ex-Communists', in Essays in Understanding, p. 400. 
251 
152 
our hands the instant we try to apply them'. Where thinking, often referred to by Arendt as 
that solitary 'internal dialogue between me and myself, 
153 importantly thrives on an 
anticipated communication with others, there was no unity between thought and action. Indeed, 
even if it were so this would not be fortuitous given that, 'You can't say A without saying B 
and C and so on, down to the end of the murderous alphabet'. 
154 
Arendt preferred thinking in examples. The kinds of historiographical illustrations 
Arendt offered were very much indebted to Walter Benjamin's methodology of fragmentary 
history, of reading history against the grain. For Benjamin, 'To articulate the past historically 
does not mean to recognize it "the way it really was"... It means to seize hold of a memory as it 
flashes up at a moment of danger' . 
155 'What guides this thinking', Arendt wrote, 
is the conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of 
decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in the depths of the 
sea ... some things 
'suffer a sea-change' and survive in new crystallized forms and 
shapes that remain immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl 
diver. 156 
Pearl-diving into history, telling the story of moments of political freedom - the spontaneous 
workers councils after the French Revolution, the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam War 
demonstrations - are disruptive fragments Arendt saw as breaking the hold of history as 
chronology and continuity. 
157 158 
Arendt, the 'reluctant' or 'anti-modemist" was no clear-cut enemy of modernity 
or a disengaged pessimist. Persuaded that republican institutions and public-spirited citizens 
granted the most capable defence against political evil possible, Arendt came forth from her 
rendezvous with Nazism undaunted as a radical republican in the French Revolution and 
broadly Enlightenment mode. Unlike Nietzsche, who viewed the modem democratic 
individual as but a herd animal subject to slave morality, 159 and Weber, who saw humanity 
152 Arendt, I Mankind and Teffor', in Essays in Understanding, p. 3 02. 
'5' Arendt, Crisis of the Republic, p220. 
04 Arend4 Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 472. 
151 Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy oflEstDry', in Illuminations (edited and with an introduction by 
Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Kohn) (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 25 7. 
111, Hannah Arendt 'Introduction: Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940' in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (edited and with 
an introduction by Hannah Arendt, translated 
by Harry Kohn) (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 5 1. 
157 Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism. 
Is' Kateb, Hannah Arendt, p. 1 $3. 
139 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Vie Genealogy ofMorals (translated by Francis Golffing) 
(London: Anchor Books, [18871,195 6), pp. 178-8. 
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stranded in an 'iron-cage' of rationality, 160 Arendt held out more hope for the promise of 
democratic politics where public spheres still existed. It was in this vein that she hoped to 
supply us with political categories that have been concealed, but not totally destroyed, by the 
modem age. 
Conclusion 
Publics are world making. But there is no public that covers the entire world. The 
humanitarian condition of global political action does not yet exist. The current military, 
political and ideological arrangement is only able to fathom a 'politics-as-making' condition 
that is invariably violent. The Kosovo war was important, therefore, for supporters and critics 
alike, because it became representative of the virtues and horrors of what a potentially global 
public might be capable of achieving. Explicitly stepping back from how US-centred public 
spheres shaped and were shaped by this war we can see there are more general, wide ranging, 
and problematic ways in which 'humanitarian' war can be fi-amed between publics and 
violence. 
'So great is the allure... ' suggest Hill and Montag, 'of a public sphere free from 
determinations of material life that the relatively few extant critiques of the public sphere have 
161 had little effect on the broad reception of the notion in the current American-Anglo context' . 
In fact, the many extant critiques of Habermas's public sphere concept seem to have had even 
less an impact on the recent reception of his work in international theory. By way of critiquing 
this literature, the chapter has engaged Hannah Arendt's political theory most explicitly by 
suggesting some of the many ways her work contributes to international history and theory. 
Arendt sought to confront the enduring problems of humans as political animals and 
provides a compelling elucidation of the public sphere. Unlike recent endeavors to transpose 
Habermas's public sphere category from within states to relations between them or offer an 
abstract model of global public spheres at either the sub- or supra-state level this final chapter 
has suggested that we more fully engage with the production and politics behind the invocation 
of global publics, and, following Arendt, the violence this might entail. 
161 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism (new introduction by Anthony Giddens, 
translated by Talcott Parsons) (New York: Charles Sribner's Sons, 1976), p. 18 1. 
161 Hill and Montag, 'What Was, What Is. the Public SphereT, p. 6. 
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Kosovo has made it easier to invoke the conscience of the peaceful 'civilisational West' 
in the mobilisation effort for continual imperial war. 162 The historical and systematic relations 
of domination that exist between the separate spheres constructed in the deliberative literature, 
one communicative (liberal) and one strategic (barbaric), are further concealed and justified by 
Habermasian discourse ethics. In the means-end effort to 'make' a global public realm certain 
modes of being public and certain speakers are privileged and violent confrontation is ethically 
justified. By not seeing Arendt for Habermas, assumptions concerning politics and liberal 
rights and the imposition of hegemonic western ways of being public come to the fore at the 
expense of understanding the violence of founding a public and the implicit imperialism of 
'humanitarian' military intervention. 
We need to think about the practices and theories of global publics as articulated in 
much of the global governance literature as implicated in expansionary violence. When we 
understand politics and governance as produced within a particular Habermasian framework 
that is not surprisingly liberal in its focus on rights and govemance the violence in the 
production of a global public sphere is obscured and rationalised away. But Arendt is 
significantly more cognisant of the difficult relationship between organised violence and public 
spheres. Key features of Arendt's theory - her conception of the paradoxes of attempting to 
found a polis, her account of the relationship between politics and violence and the modem 
(, politics-as-making' tradition - help us examine how the very founding of public realms, 
including at the global level, can itself be productive of the violence the creation of a public 
sphere ostensibly sought to banish. 
162 For a justification of a revived imperialism along these lines see Robert Cooper, 'The New Liberal 
Imperialism', The Observer, April 7,2002. 
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